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ABSTRACT
This dissertation takes up Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of ‘good Europeanism’
and his related idea of Europe to show how the former disposition may be cultivated to
achieve the latter—a reinvigorated culture on the continent. It does so by applying his
vitalist politics and power ontology (will to power hypothesis and theory of decadence) to
critique European integration in the broader context of globalization. The analysis
enables me to theorize how “healthy” individuals might exploit opportunities in the
present to become 'good Europeans', with the aim of realizing Nietzsche’s quasicosmopolitan idea of Europe. It is my primary contention that Nietzsche’s diagnosis of
Europe’s ailment remains relevant, as does his strategy, via a radically Dionysian
affirmation of life, for overcoming the international order it has spawned.
In doing so I utilize Nietzsche’s related perspectivalist epistemological stance and
hermeneutical framework to build on Nietzsche's genealogy of morality. This shows the
West’s present “slave moral” regime to be a further intensified development of
secularized Christian–Platonic values. It arose through the fusing of liberal-optimism
(belief in equality, emancipation, enfranchisement, etc.) with modernity’s doctrines of
universalism, humanism, secularism, progressivism and rationalism. It also coextends
with the positivistic orientation of scientism to transmit a secular faith in truth, and unparadoxically an injurious relativism and cynical worldview. It is through Nietzsche’s
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vitalist perspectivalism that I understand the psychological-historical origins and current
operation of the axiomatic narratives promulgated via the meta-discourse of ultra-liberalmodernity.
The same critical framework is applied to a doxagraphical survey of theories of
European integration. These theories are understood as differing perspectives conceived
within and informed by the same values matrix, and critiqued in chronological order of
their appearance to reflect the evolution of the field. Problems of evaluation,
indeterminacy and bias, and the form of reasoning privileged by the positivistic
orientation conferred by scientism are examined in terms of how they inform the conduct
of social science and conceptualizations and uses of fact. Acts of theorizing are
understood as indicative of a will-to-truth which can positively augment life or negatively
hamper it. I consider how the mainstream of the field has tended to reiterate the
ideological presuppositions of ultra-liberal-modernity. Notable exceptions include recent
constructivist approaches and discourse analysis critiques. These critical perspectives are
productively broadening and potentially subverting the dominant conventions of the field.
This raises the possibility that good Europeans may influence the future development of
the EU as counter-theorizers of it.
The EU is understood as a crucial locus of the globalization complex, a primarily
reactive power constellation comprised of myriad institutions, processes and forces. A
ressentiment-driven project, the globalization complex functions as an ideological
juggernaut to universalize ultra-liberal-modern values. It affectively implements a
negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power which culminates in a hyper-decadent
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condition typified by resignation to its prerogatives. Its values are politically instantiated
throughout the world via democratization and hegemonic capital process.
I examine the spectacularized existential meanings and simulated ontological
purpose provided by the globalization complex. These engage and automatize the masses
by means of commercially generated, media promoted desires and an ethos of
consumerism. These sustain a philistinic culture of conformity by means of which its
ideological proponents, ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment, justify and naturalize
their authority. Their influence extends a spirit of revenge against life’s radical
contingency and temporality. It privileges homogenizing and ossifying modes of being to
inhibit authentic becoming.
However, the globalization complex cannot contain all the affective capacities its
shrinking and simultaneous acceleration of the world generates. The increased
interconnectivity between people that it facilitates and the reactive values matrix it
imposes give rise to a changed mentality or consciousness. Life in within the
globalization complex provides a few with a philosophical education that endows them
with a broadened perspective on the differences between human types. They gain a
profound appreciation of the need for the divergent worldviews that distinguish disparate
cultures—forms of life imperiled by conventional globalization. This nurtures a
reflective, historical consciousness and an acceptance of difference (entwined with their
love of fate) that augments their emerging sense of globality and occasionally manifests
itself in ways that escape capture. Among a few, globality fosters the skeptical-ironic
disposition toward truth claims and craftiness characteristic of ‘good Europeans’. Such
iconoclastic individuals may creatively challenge the legitimacy of ultra-liberal-modern
iv

values, their distinctive striving symptomatic of a positive will to creative destruction as
generative power and authentic becoming-other.
To foster the development of the skeptical-ironic disposition, or Weltironie, of
good Europeanism I suggest a six-fold skeptical praxis. This is based on the classical
Pyrrhonean skeptical notions of akatalepsia (recognition of the impossibility of certain
knowledge), epoche (the suspension of belief due to the contingency of truth), ataraxia
(the ancient skeptic and stoic doctrine of disciplined withdrawal toward becoming what
one is), apangelia (an avowal not involving a commitment to truth or falsity), adoxastos
(the disciplined effort to avoid forming convictions and feigning agreement with
prevailing value standards when necessary, which corresponds with the strategic use of
masks), and finally, from the ancient cynics, the concept of parrhesia (fearless speech in
mocking ascetic values). These practices support the necessary perspectivalist stance
toward all truth claims to radically affirm the chaos of becoming. The adherents of such
an anti-essentialist discipline revel in the fundamental contingency of life.
According to Nietzsche’s vision, I consider how ‘good Europeans’ might achieve
their aims in light of the prevailing values of our globalizing world. Acting as comedians
of ascetic ideals they engage in kynical acts that may utilize the new technologies and
enhanced communications provided by science and industry (key components of the
globalization complex), to lampoon the anti-human decadence and nihilism of our age.
Their inherently political mockery of the prevailing social discourses arouses the passion
of other healthy types. They are spurred to similarly creative experiments and lifeaffirming acts of defiance, and the ethos of ‘good Europeanism’ gradually spreads,
thereby. Through their striving such ‘good Europeans’ (who, in our globalizing age, may
v

appear in any geographical locale) become capable of recognizing and exploiting
unanticipated, abstract potentials of globality.
Afflicted with the decadence of our age, they are not the Übermenschen Nietzsche
anticipated, but prevenient to them. More likely to be perceived as buffoons than as great
leaders, they are neither conventional revolutionaries nor “improvers of humankind”;
they endeavor to discredit the ultra-liberal-modern order instantiated through the
globalization complex. By prompting it to reactively assert its prerogatives and intensify
itself, they make its contradictoriness, antagonistic impetus and hostility to difference
more apparent. However gradually, this will erode its legitimacy, as good Europeans
exploit its vulnerabilities.
According to Nietzsche’s vision, I consider the ways in which ‘good Europeans’
would likely employ the democratic, egalitarian and populist sensibilities of the
globalized masses, and how the EU could be hijacked to augment their aim. This could
include the crafty use of human rights, artificial intelligence and bio-engineering to
hasten our enervated epoch to its expiration. Efforts to challenge the reigning asceticconsumerist ideals are conditioning the possibility for the appearance of Übermenschlich
individuals to (nomothetically) legislate an agonistic socio-political milieu predicated on
a natural rank order of types. It is the hope of ‘good Europeans’ that such Übermenschen
will one day inaugurate a transhuman future and create a higher culture for the
flourishing of greatness that secondarily edifies the multitude with the meaning and
purpose great works provide.
I conclude that if humankind succeeds in transfiguring itself through the goingdown of our ultra-liberal-modern epoch (the most pervasive and decadent socio-political
vi

order in recorded history) these Übermenschen, the progeny of contemporary ‘good
Europeans’, will focus on the rehabilitation of the environment and preservation of the
earth.
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BOOK ONE
Nietzsche’s Diagnosis of Liberal-Modernity and its Ineliminable Decadence
Introduction
Nietzsche's vitalist politics and corresponding power ontology provides a critical
lens through which the values driving both contemporary European integration and
globalization may be examined afresh. In this work I apply Nietzsche’s diagnostic
method for appraising the role and utility of values for life to an assessment of Europe’s
ongoing unification in the broader context of globalization. I theorize how Nietzsche’s
good Europeans can exploit abstract potentials of globality to become who it is they are
and transfigure the decadence of our epoch. 1 This suggests how their creative
experiments and attempts at self-overcoming could revalue the nihilistic values
enervating humankind to realize a Nietzschean idea of Europe – and remake the world
accordingly.
I contend that the originally Western, ideologized ultra-liberal-modern values that
prevail in our global age are propagated through axiomatic socio-political narratives that
combine liberal-optimism with the modern doctrines of universalism, humanism,
secularism, progressivism and rationalism. 2 This meta-discourse co-extends with and
supplements the positivistic orientation conferred by scientism, the customs, practices
and duties of which comprises a secular-faith. The anti-natural value-standards, or “slave
morality of decadence”, subtending this hegemonic power-knowledge regime are
1

implemented universally through a multiplicity of reactive institutions, forces and
processes comprising the conventional globalization complex. 3 A ressentiment-driven
project, the globalization complex comprises an authoritarian power constellation that is
unprecedented in human history. 4
Out of the analysis that follows I advance a strategy for attaining a transhuman
condition through the exploitation of these contemporary developments. The aim is to
illuminate how contemporary European institutions, particularly the European Union
(EU) and the norms and practices it sustains, coextend with and promulgate the
aforementioned norms of the globalization complex. I show how, despite being a locus of
that complex, the same values and the modes of existence the EU maintains are giving
rise to abstract potentials of globality that hold the promise, when realized, of
transmuting them the reactive forces of globalization and its increasingly hegemonic
socio-political and economic management of humankind.
I then explore how, via a set of “Nietzschean” tactics, European society and its
supranational institutions might be so elementally transfigured by superlative individuals
through a revaluation of the values subtending the reactive forces and leveling processes
of globalization. It is my contention that the sort of ‘good Europeans’ to whom Nietzsche
appealed and hoped to spur into action are being enabled, through the abstract, positive
potentials of globality, to realize (an approximation of) his idea of Europe. This involves
revaluing the decadent values of the present—our hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern
age—to initiate the development of a higher culture (Bildung) through which new
political identities may be created that confer salubrious meanings to individuals and
provide the societies they comprise with a sense of purpose in communal existence.
2

In becoming ‘good Europeans’ and working to achieve that distinctive idea
through disciplinary regimes of self-creation, such individuals reinvent humankind’s
future, enhance its vitality and enlarge the opportunities available to and varieties of
becoming conceivable for the species. Concerned with the question of ultimate political
significance, “what ought humankind to become?” their self-creation—as nomothetic
legislation—hastens the development or arrival of over-human types, the Übermensch
Nietzsche famously designated “as embodying the perfection, rather that the
transcendence, of humankind.” 5 Conway states that “the Übermensch is any human being
who actually advances the frontier of human perfectibility.” This is intertwined with “the
central task of politics,” which “is to produce (as a matter of design) those individuals
who stand, ‘in relation to humankind as a whole,’ as exemplary human beings.”6
Nietzsche conceived these superlative individuals as those capable of simultaneously
assisting humankind in its going-down and acting as mid-wives at the birth of “a
successor age to modernity”; a future, post-human condition. 7
Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology are indispensable to his general
theory of decadence. Daniel Conway provides a concise definition of Nietzsche’s
conception of decadence, as:
a degenerative physiological condition, which characteristically manifests itself
as: a growing disparity between the cognitive and volitional resources at one’s
disposal; a yawing chasm that divorces intention from accomplishment; the
widening gulf that separates what one wants from what one needs; and, most
succinctly, an irreversible weakness of will. 8
Nietzsche employed this notion of decadence within a broader critical framework for
evaluating political institutions, cultural vitality and the health of a people / society.
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Conway further notes, “the enduring value of Nietzsche’s confrontation with
modernity”, which symbiotically developed with his theory of decadence, “is strictly
heuristic”, but as such it provides a persuasive, alternative set of interpretive tools for
assessing the efficaciousness of dominant socio-economic, political and cultural
institutions within the governing post-Enlightenment liberal framework that produced
and continues to validate them. 9
Central to Nietzsche’s philosophical project is the quite radical argument that
cause–effect relations are illusory and that consequently traditional Western
philosophical assumptions about them have badly misled us. 10 According to Nietzsche
will to power—a dynamic array of anorganic forces—constitutes all that is, and becomes.
Related to the Greek philosophical concept of dynamis (active and passive capacity,
hence power and potentiality11), will to power describes the elemental nature of the world
in terms as anti-foundationalist as any founding notion that has yet been conceived. 12 The
veritable Higgs-Boson of Nietzsche’s (and perhaps much of contemporary) philosophy, it
must be acknowledged that there is in fact no less empirical evidence to support or
independently verify Nietzsche’s notion of will to power and by extension his general
theory of decadence than there is for substantiating the philosophical tenets of liberalmodernity. 13 This is in part due to the fact that the prevailing notion of cause and effect
relations is erroneous, “an arbitrary division and dismemberment” of “a continuum out of
which we isolate a couple of pieces… in [any one] moment of [which] there is an infinite
number of processes that elude us.” 14 After citing this passage, Williams further explains:
Cause and effect are orders imposed on becoming by the human mind; they do not
exist in the world. …Will to power, then, does not lurk behind affects, causing
affects. Will to power consists of the affects themselves. It is the event by which
4

becoming and affects are recognizable. …Yet our language leaves us little
alternative for expressing Nietzsche’s position other than [to reference] ‘affects of
will to power’. 15
Nietzsche asserts that both the conventional notion (that is, metaphysical fiction) of
mechanistic causation and will to power are perspectives with important consequence for
life. His symptomatological method of understanding—or “diagnosing”—those
consequences prompted him to develop ‘will to power’ into an innovative (quasicosmological) theory of the affects, and by extension the political, co-extending with a
highly unconventional ontology.
Nietzsche is primarily concerned with health and strength as symptomatized by
ascending life, and how it may be generated from and/or augmented by culturally situated
values facilitated by corresponding forms of socio-political organization. However,
whilst his theory recognizes and engages this subjectivity, liberalism attempts to ground
itself in reason and universalize a corresponding interpretation of human experience and
the ideals that its construal of reality brings into being. 16 Nietzsche gives us a compelling,
genealogical explanation of how the slave moral (contemporary liberal-modern)
paradigm arose and similar account of its self-justificatory discursive mechanisms and
perpetuation up through the aforementioned, presently hegemonic institutions. Donnelly
observes that:
For the liberal, the individual is not merely separable from the community and
social roles, but specially valued precisely as a distinctive, discrete individual—
which is why each person must be treated with equal concern and respect. 17
Nietzsche rejected the liberal-modern notion of the individual. He also doubted the
theoretical viability of extricating her from her community and warned against the
practical effect of doing so. 18
5

Although neither Nietzsche’s general theory of decadence nor the long dominant,
post-Enlightenment liberal-modern paradigm it elucidates can convince him of their
“objective” superiority independent of the reality they comprehend, Nietzsche’s antiliberal theory arguably provides us with a more comprehensive and, by extension, valid
perspective on the motives of human activity. This includes the values, norms and
practices that arise to enable, perpetuate and justify it. It does not suggest an answer to
the question of whether or not Nietzsche’s alternative would be more desirable than the
status quo to most individuals. Toward the end of this work I address this question and
advance a hypothesis that attempts to account for the core ideals of Nietzsche’s political
vision.
A central contention in this work is that through the perspectivist epistemological
stance inbuilt to his general theory of decadence, Nietzsche provides a more expansive
hermeneutical framework for evaluating ethico-political principles than does the liberalmodern paradigm it challenges. As a plausible alternative to liberal-modernism it
warrants being taken seriously on its own terms; the insights it provides when applied as
a critical lens for appraising and comprehending the world also warrant serious
consideration by extension. At the very least it can be confidently asserted that the
critique of liberal-modernity Nietzsche’s theory essays prompted many of the most
influential philosophical developments in Anglo-American and continental European
thought during the 20th century, and to judge from the plethora of Nietzsche-indebted
work presently being done across the social sciences and humanities, it clearly continues
to inspire, goad and persuade.
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Nietzsche anticipated that many would cite his theory’s lack of empirical grounds
as a pretext for dismissing out-of-hand its veracity (even while they continued to
unselfconsciously embrace its equally unproven by metaphysically gratifying antipodes),
so he appealed to Europe’s historical experience via his genealogical methodology to
stand as a foundation for and quasi-empirical corroboration of his analysis. 19 His own
skeptical critique of the Western philosophical tradition – its customary (if currently
syncretic mixture of elemental Platonist, Cartesian, Kantian, etc.) notions of causality,
epistemology, ontology, teleology and metaphysics – combined with both his
subversively incisive redeployment of its own rationalist methodologies and his
psychological account of human action to bolster his theory’s experiential claims. 20
Nietzsche’s theory of decadence co-extends with his vitalist politics and power
ontology in important ways that will be made clear below. It is enlisted throughout this
work as a heuristic device for analyzing and evaluating European integration, the EU, the
conventional globalization complex and the liberal philosophical presuppositions
subtending each of these interrelated subjects. As a thought experiment, it provides
valuable perspectives on and insight into the ultra-liberal-modern values subtending these
contemporary European developments and suggests how they may be utilized, via a
considered ‘good Europeanism’, as a basis for formulating a practical strategy by which
to hasten, if not achieve, the re-naturalization of political life in a post-liberal Europe.
In addition to being of general interest to Nietzsche scholars there is a substantive
reason for putting Nietzsche’s vitalism to such use. His will to power and theory of
decadence are immanent to his perspectivalist hermeneutics and epistemology, as well as
his genealogical illumination of how the anorganic forces comprising all existents find
7

socio-psychological expression via involuntary drives and impulses. Together they also
elucidate the role that instinct (the product of generations of breeding) plays in organizing
those drives and impulses—both at the level of the so-called “individual” (the micropolitical sphere) and at the level of society (the macro-political sphere)—to foster the
cultural life of peoples and civilizations. Its analytical payoff lies precisely in the unique
insight it provides into the dependent and conditional process of value creation and truth
legitimation. 21
Readers needn’t believe in the actuality of Nietzsche’s vitalist premises or
necessarily subscribe to the hypotheses they turn out in order to take seriously their
distinctive insights into the generation of reality. According to his theory of truth, or the
affects, their apodicity and veridicality is not diminished thereby. Indeed, a reader would
misunderstand his work—and the aim of this book—entirely if they took it as advancing
any thesis with dogmatic certainty. Rather they ought to permit Nietzsche’s many dares
to stimulate an appreciation of contingency and to cultivate within themselves the
intellectual stance of Weltironie. The incomparable challenges his vitalist politics and
power ontology pose to the Western philosophical tradition provide us with a set of
perspectives / understandings that cannot be arrived at from another angle.
Central to my project is an attempt to explicate how the EU might be exploited by
untimely ‘good Europeans’. I argue that through unanticipated abstract potentials of
globality such thymotic ‘free spirits’ (Freigeist) may become who it is they are and
overcome the reactive forces generated by the hegemonic, ultra-liberal-modern ideals
dissipating life in our hyper-decadent age. Bergmann notes that “Nietzsche saw the free
spirit’s ultimate ‘mission in removing all the barriers that stand in the way of the fusion
8

of mankind: religion; states; monarchical instincts; illusions of wealth and poverty;
prejudices of health and race—etc.’” 22 Toward such an end—which is prevenient to the
conditions necessary for the development of authentic culture—I theorize how the antinatural, homogenizing objectives of the globalization complex may be hijacked and
redeployed to hasten the eventual realization of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe. 23
These

coherent

explanatory

propositions—informed

by

contemporary

developments—should elucidate how their pursuit of natural aims consisting with a
master morality of breeding and the philosophical education it advances is likely to
transfigure Western civilization by establishing a new basis for culture (Bildung) from its
ruins. According to Nietzsche, the institutionalization of a naturalized pathos of distance
between types (an authentic embrace of difference) to augment and the fullest flourishing
of those capable (the healthiest and highest exemplars of humankind) will multiply the
varieties and supplement the development of elevated forms of life.
In contending with criticisms of Nietzsche’s program, Conway concedes that
“[b]linded perhaps by his [Nietzsche’s] romantic attachments to bygone epochs, he
underestimates the political alternatives available to agents in late modernity”. 24 By way
of putting some of those alternatives to use—and Nietzschean ends—I suggest a number
of strategies for exploiting the existing, and really ineliminable resources available for
countering the deleterious effects of our age’s ultra-liberal-modern values. In addition I
propose ways in which Nietzsche’s good Europeanism can enable diverse modes of
existence for Europeans and, by extension, all humankind.
The project of unifying Europe was, unsurprisingly, conceived in terms of the
prevailing statist logic that serves as the basis for international politics and society. The
9

ongoing unification process of formally sovereign European nations obviously has its
origins in perceptible Euro-centric philosophical presuppositions and corresponding
cultural biases. However, it may become a transcultural and syncretic one, as good
Europeans, individually or acting cooperatively in sub-subaltern groups, creatively
revalue the ascetic Anglo-European values and anti-culture of the conventional
globalization complex through ever-transmogrifying potentials of globality. 25 This
prospect and capability may serve to enhance the becoming of free spirited individuals
everywhere. Through abstract potentials of globality that arise within the conceptual
spandrels of conventional globalization—the myriad fields of interaction and junctures
between the institutions, processes and forces comprising the complex—and are
exploited at the margins of those neglected spaces and/or non-spaces, exceptionally
strong social mavericks may overcome themselves and revalue the nihilistic values of our
hyper-decadent era. 26
Central to this endeavor is a doxagraphical–historical critique of the power
constellation comprised by the discipline of European integration theory understood as a
will to truth symptomatic of an underlying will to power. I examine each of the major
schools of thought within it from its early emergence to the present according to the
critical framework Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology and his corresponding
perspectivalist epistemological stance provides. I do so with a view toward the way each
represents the anti-natural ultra-liberal-modern values (ethical/moral prejudices)
informing its theoretical assumptions and symptomatizes the will to power of its major
theorizers and co-extends with a broader, partisan political agenda, for determining the
integration of Europe. Of particular concern is how these theoretical approaches
10

themselves constitute power constellations that (ant-)agonistically and involuntarily strive
to realize and make dominant a perspective (will to truth and will to power) on Europe’s
integration and the extent to which that perspective serves a declining or ascending form
of life.
Who should care about such a project and why? Firstly, anyone interested in the
history of the idea of Europe, as it conditioned the possibility and prepared the ground for
the contemporary project of European unification, which has profound affective power
and manifold, measurable effects on the lives of Europeans, will value the significant role
that Nietzsche played in fortifying it. A towering figure in the history of European
philosophy and thought on Europe, Nietzsche articulated the existential challenges facing
the continent during his lifetime and beyond it (the challenges he described were even
then setting the stage for the crises, setbacks and developments of the 20th century) and
defining an ideal for it as a life-affirming cultural realm with unique potential to enhance
the positive growth of all humankind. The development and expansion of the EU, as an
effort to perfect and universalize the “quantitative total state” 27 has, by extension,
affected everyone in the world to varying degrees; Nietzsche’s thought helps us envisage
ways by which the project may be perfected and thereby overcome.
Secondly, the extent to which key aspects of the ethos of ‘good Europeanism’ (as
Nietzsche described it) are relevant and realizable universally should also interest all
those conscious of the pervasive social malaise in our post-industrialized, overexcited and
technologized age of “Empire” 28 who desire its positive transmutation. The possibility of
cultivating new modes of being conducive to the emergence of authentic free spirits
capable of extraordinary creation and philosophers of the future able to enforce a new
11

disciplinary regime based on naturalized (and re-grounded) values concerns all those
interested in augmenting the positive growth of humankind.
As a theoretical framework for disclosing the promise in existent opportunities for
such developments, among other things, international politics and European integration
theorists are likely to be surprised by the utility a Nietzschean critique can provide their
conceptual apparati. A number of twice-removed heirs of Nietzsche’s intellectual legacy
have already impacted both of these fields through anti-foundationalist post-structural
and “post-modern” assessments of major debates within the mainstream discourse. 29
Thirdly, Nietzsche gives us a conceptual framework for understanding the
signature tensions and contradictions of our age, to which I attach the moniker ‘ultraliberal-modernity’ to connote the intensification of the same decadent, all-too-human
trends Nietzsche identified in the late 19th century. This said, the challenge of becoming
‘good Europeans’ should be of interest to Nietzsche scholars as well as anyone who takes
his thought seriously, as Nietzsche earnestly meant for his readers to do so. Furthermore,
the task of doing so requires utilizing all the tools in Nietzsche’s theoretical box,
compelling me to examine some of the recurring themes in his oeuvre and engage many
of the ongoing debates in the literature.
Integral to Nietzsche’s naturalist power ontology, 30 his vitalist politics provides a
(perspectivally

contingent)

conceptual

framework

to

effectively

evaluate

the

globalization complex and abstract potentials of an emerging globality. It is my
contention that an awareness of globality promotes a unique intellectual disposition
toward truth and human potential. It does so by prompting the sort of consciencevivisection Nietzsche thought necessary for the cultivation of an awareness of “how the
12

illusion of being” gives rise to reactive “value judgments [and] all world defamation”.
This stance—a self-undertaken effort to attain the understanding provided by multiple
perspectives about one’s enlightenment, that is the quest for knowledge itself—indicates
a conative disposition or (in Heideggerian terms) anticipatory resoluteness which
originates in the understanding that “Becoming does not aim at a final state, does not
flow into ‘being’”, and is indispensable to the development of good Europeanism. 31 The
broadened perspective on life (enlightenment) conferred by this distinctive propensity is
at once opposite to and emergent from the philistinic culture of conformity enforced by
the conventional globalization complex. By enabling vigorous individuals to become
good Europeans, it stands to incrementally facilitating the realization of Nietzsche's idea
of Europe.
Expressions of the reactive forces, process and institutions of globalization as well
as the positive prospects of globality can be identified in every area of contemporary
human endeavor. Reflective of the interconnectedness of all the spheres of human
activity, this fact makes Nietzsche’s assessment of the realms of conventional politics
(which he abhorred—and his ‘good Europeans’ would subvert) and the sickening
“culture” (a thoroughly decadent symptom of his declining epoch) seem difficult to
square with our shared experience of everyday life. This is because we ourselves are
thoroughly decadent and increasingly exhausted, despite the prevailing liberal-optimistic
representation of the world. Nietzsche’s hope was for the generation of an authentically
life-affirming, transformative culture (Bildung) for the eventual overcoming of
humankind.
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Though Nietzsche privileged culture over politics he recognized the significance
of the political for organizing a social framework conducive to the growth of higher
culture. To dismiss the import of the political in favor of concerns for culture in
Nietzsche’s thought (as some scholars have done) is at odds with his identification of the
complexity of European man and the crisis of nihilism in our hyper-decadent age. 32 In his
notebooks he wrote of the irrecuperable crisis of modernity that had plunged humankind
into an abyss of seeming meaninglessness:
What has happened, at bottom? The feeling of valuelessness was reached with the
realization that the overall character of existence may not be interpreted by means
of the concept of “aim,” the concept of “unity,” or the concept of “truth.”
Existence has no goal or end; any comprehensive unity in the plurality of events is
lacking: the character of existence is not “true,” is false. One simply lacks any
reason for convincing oneself that there is a true world. Briefly: the categories
“aim,” “unity,” “being” which we used to project some value into the world—we
pull out again; so the world looks valueless. 33
This feeling of valuelessness (pathos) is taken, falsely in Nietzsche’s view, as
hopelessness by those too sick to affirm life. The realization that all former meanings and
purposes of life were illusory (be they beliefs in various notions of an other-worldly,
super-sensible beyond or in the transcendentally universal truths of reason and empirical
science) induces paralysis in most people. Humankind’s terrible new awareness—one to
end the age of Christian-Platonic values—when taken as hopelessness, leads to nihilism,
a condition of resignation that inhibits the creation of new values. This indifference, in
turn, compounds the problem of decadence.
The prevalence of nihilism as a characteristic feature of contemporary Western
anti-culture and the globalization complex that universalizes it constitutes a fundamental
assumption of this work. As a primary symptom of decadence, the apodicity of nihilism
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as a lived condition informs my critical diagnosis of the current social malaise originating
from the West’s anti-culture. It is my primary contention that globalization (and the EU
understood as an institutional loci and agent of the values constituting it) is disseminating
ultra-liberal-modern values throughout the world and with them the existential ennui and
sense of purposelessness that fosters passive resignation among the weak. This
acquiescence is a foremost symptom of the intensified or hyper-decadence that has come
to epitomize our age.
The problem of decadence and its intensification via the duration and spread of
nihilism is comprehensive, for decadence as Nietzsche recognized, infects every aspect of
life in a degenerating epoch, such as ours. 34 By extension, Nietzsche’s diagnosis of it as a
problem and his prescribed cure are also inextricably imbricated in the decadence of our
age. The degeneration typifying this apathetic condition is, according to Nietzsche’s
general theory of decadence, produced by the waning instinctual organization of the
drives and impulses at both the level of the political microsphere (that of the individual)
and the political macrosphere (the inter-personal and communal). It is from these
mutually constituting dimensions of human life that the socio-political and cultural
aspects of our existence arise. 35
Contrary to Nietzsche, or going further than he would have likely allowed, I shall
argue below that these two realms of social activity, the political and the cultural, are
inextricably enmeshed in one another. Nietzsche’s (somewhat romantic and nostalgic)
affirmation of and emphasis upon culture and frequently contemptuous dismissal of the
political (particularly in its conventional forms and appearances) represents a sort of
lacuna in his self-understanding as a meta-political thinker. His analysis, which on many
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levels is otherwise extremely compelling, distorted his view to conceiving pragmatic
strategies for overcoming the crisis of late-modernity which he identified.
His diagnosis inhibits the conceptualization of “solutions” in the conventional
sense; a way out that might be generated within the spectrum of life-affirming human
activity, even in a period in which resurgent (albeit secularized) slave-moral values had
castrated a once feracious culture. It is also somewhat at odds with some other important
aspects of his thought, namely his recognition and celebration of the involuntary eros 36
and expressive arête characteristic of a vital culture (Bildung) and natural politics and
that each impels in the other. The political and cultural are always already crossgerminating dimensions of humankind’s social existence, a feature of these interrelated
phenomena about which Nietzsche occasionally signals an explicit awareness.
Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeanism’ is one of the shorthand terms he uses, unironically, throughout his middle and late periods, to designate the disposition he wished
to inspire among his readers. It refers to the cultivated mentality embodied in uncommon,
free spirited experimenters capable of recognizing the value that each of the continents’
self-designated peoples could, through the perfection of their respective cultures, bring to
the project of perfecting European man and, by extension, humankind. Undeniably Eurocentric, the notion iterates Nietzsche’s own habituated prejudices—a particular
chauvinism privileging European civilization that was characteristic of his time.
This idea of good Europeanism recommends an ethos markedly less imperialistic
than Kant’s cosmopolitanism, however. Such a project consisted with Nietzsche’s
overarching vitalist objective of naturalizing everyday life by having the healthiest
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individuals fulfill their role as physicians of culture and revaluing all values in that
capacity. As Conway observes, Nietzsche:
…locates the sole justification of human existence in the continued perfectibility
of the species as a whole, as evidenced by the pioneering accomplishments of its
highest exemplars. 37
This ongoing effort to perfect the species would encompass, over a long period, the
overcoming of nationalism and associated all-too-human prejudices such as ethnic
chauvinism, xenophobia, racism, etc., characteristic of the 19th and 20th centuries.
This desire—the irrepressible creative volition of the type he designates ‘good
Europeans’—necessitates the uniting of the continent via the diffusion of a radically
inclusive, perspectivally expansive identity that takes the highest account of difference,
possibly—but not necessarily—through the mutually agreed abolition of formal political
divisions along national lines, so that “humankind [might ultimately] create the favorable
conditions under which those great redemptive men can come into existence” 38 in a
deliberate and systematic process of political perfectionism organized by the best
“against the indifference of nature”. 39
Nicholas Martin contends that “[w]e are on safer ground when treating
Nietzsche’s notions of ‘Europeanism’ and the ‘Good Europeans’ as foils to the Europe of
the nineteenth century than as blueprints for the Europe of the twentieth.” 40 I concur in
part with this, insofar as Nietzsche’s good Europeanism is a quasi-ideal and the artist–
philosophers who personify its characteristics, are correspondingly rare, but I maintain
that Nietzsche thought of them as realizable types in the necessary, longer process of the
self-overcoming and perfection of European man. While his good Europeanism certainly
does not constitute a “blueprint” for Europe’s becoming, it does suggests an effective
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trajectory for a few, exceptionally healthy specimens embodying humankind’s potential
greatness. By extension it suggests that such cosmopolitan and iconoclastic individuals
could, against the so-called “higher men” who enforce the slave-morality of the herd,
condition the possibility for the eventual appearance of authentic Übermenschen—those
futural individuals capable of revaluing the decadent values diminishing humankind, to
initiate the overcoming of the species man and inauguration of a post-human era.
I theorize how this development may be encouraged in the present through the
conventional, primarily reactive institutions central to the globalization complex (by
which I refer to the assemblages of forces, emerging networks, practical norms and social
processes developing under the rubric of globalization) toward their ultimate destruction
in creative affirmation of authentic becoming. In what may initially strike many
Nietzsche scholars as counter-intuitive I shall argue that Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’
would actively encourage certain ongoing processes of globalization so that the state of
globality and the transhuman condition it is likely to facilitate might be realized as the
successor epoch to modernity.
Another objective in undertaking this study is to provide an unique,
“Nietzschean” analysis that will appeal to advocates and critics of globalization, and both
the so-called “Europhiles” and “Europhobes” with regard to the European Union’s
ongoing integration and expansion, by demonstrating how each of their respective diverse
views capture a critical component of reality. In addition, it ought to appeal as well to
scholars of East and Central European and post-Communist studies and those with
concerned with controversial issues of democratization and human rights in the dawning
post-liberal era. 41
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In book two I extend this Nietzschean critique to an examination of multiple
theoretical perspectives on the process of European integration and the EU’s expansion,
the actual variety of which are shown to describe a relatively narrow ideological
spectrum. While symptomatic of the will-to-truth in the metadiscourse of ultra-liberalmodernity and its proponents’ enfeeblement, all but the most recent schools of thought
miss the mark as to what the EU is actually doing in terms of values. 42
European integration theorists are (like all descriptive theorists) motivated by an
all-too-human will-to-truth, however partisan or biased their objectives or to whatever
extent they are of a programmatic, practical or prescriptive variety, or some combination
thereof. The perspectival limitations and hermeneutical deficiencies that follow from
each theory demonstrate this, in addition to underscoring the impossibility of adequately
capturing the enormous dynamic complexity at work in Europe’s unification process and
their individual author’s will-to-truth (as a will-to-power). As with all inquirers, theorists
of European integration all too often fail to identify theoretical opacities their efforts at
illumination overlook. This inherent constraint – the predicament of all inquiry and
critique – inclines theorists to make generalizations that lack nuance. They may focus too
intently on the specifics of particular institutions, their bureaucratic organization and
animating politics so that they miss general trends. Or in attempting to demonstrate the
veracity of an abstraction (e.g.: anarchy, sovereignty, etc.) they may diminish the
significance of contradictory details.
However they cut into the matter, none of the conventional theories of European
integration individually seems to fully comprehend what taken collectively they have the
potential to reveal, though (Nietzsche indebted) ‘discourse analysis’ and ‘post-modern
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approaches’ have made great strides toward “unpacking” some of the theoretical conceits
taken for granted in the discipline, as opposed to the bland inventory taking that serves
only to repack them in the similarly unexamined baggage once more. A Nietzschean
examination of the field of European integration theory illuminates dimensions of the
discipline previously neglected, for the etiological action theory comprised by his vitalist
politics and power ontology enable a different way of comprehending the functionality of
key concepts in theories of European integration and International studies more broadly.
This study should therefore be of value to those involved in Europe’s contemporary
politics and integration process and assist them in augmenting its becoming.
In book three I turn to globalization itself, taking the EU as a crucial instantiation
of globalizing institutions at the level of the political macro-sphere, and its transformative
processes. I understand the EU to be one of the principle engines of globalizing values.
Drawing from major theories of globalization I explicate how the forces, institutions and
processes of that leveling and homogenizing phenomenon are inadvertently giving rise to
abstract potentials of globality.
Of interest to international politics and political theorists alike will be the way in
which a Nietzschean analytical framework illuminates the function of the underlying
liberal–modern ideology within mainstream theories of globalization and European
integration. It also exposes their considerable role in rationalizing the transformation of
East and Central Europe in the post-Communist era, in addition to the possibly counterintuitive results for human freedom and becoming. The ramifications of its conclusions
for human societies and the scope of possibilities for action for individuals within them
are especially salient to contemporary concerns of political theorists, particularly those
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receptive to critiques of the present that aspire to the post-liberal. Left post-moderns may
find the conclusions as provocatively “conservative” or “reactionary” as statist thinkers
find them unimaginably radical and “leftist”.
If successful, the analysis should contribute to each of the aforementioned fields
and interest areas by demonstrating, in Nietzschean fashion, the simultaneous validity of
seemingly contradictory “truths” contained in various, disparate perspectives on
European integration and globalization, characterized by neo-liberal, post-industrial
capital process and its corresponding democratic state form. It shall also show how the
qualitatively positive aspects of these ultra-liberal-modern trends may be combined to
fundamentally alter our expectations of the former processes as well as the manner in
which we may effectively contend with the oft-alleged ubiquity of reactionary power to
contend with the unprecedented totalitarian potential of contemporary institutions. This
paper thereby seeks to point toward how we may become what we are individually while
radically affirming life so as to enhance the growth and vitality of humankind as it
transitions into a post-liberal, transhuman future.
I begin by applying Nietzsche’s vitalist critique of the political to an analysis of
historical (genealogical) European unification, the EU and its eastward expansion, in the
context of globalization. In so doing I will demonstrate the extent to which Nietzsche’s
idea of Europe is being indeliberately realized through European unification. I explicate
how, in such a theoretical context, globalization may be understood, counter-intuitively
perhaps, as contributing to the vigor of European society and the extent to which
individuals may become ‘good Europeans’ both within and outside of the EU. From the
standpoint of a coextending post-modern anarchist politics 43 I also examine how largely
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reactive globalizing institutions, forces and processes may be augmented to hasten the
emergence of abstract potentials of globality. I then suggest how the latter, positive
potentials, which exist in nascent form, may be exploited by “godless antimetaphysicians” through a Nietzschean technique of the self based on six classic
skeptical doctrines for living. The analysis utilizes disparate (“post-modern”) critiques of
contemporary life in the post-industrialized West and largely rejects pessimistic
conclusions about the future to posit a Nietzschean prescriptive formula toward the
realization of a radically emancipatory politics conducive to the greatest multiplicity of
becomings.
Through this work I seek to dispel the notion that Nietzsche was an “anti-political
philosopher” as Walter Kaufmann famously maintained. 44 Kauffman made this claim as
part of his career-long endeavor to rehabilitate Nietzsche’s reputation in America. The
legacy of Kaufmann’s well-intentioned assertion is waning, but Nietzsche’s status as a
political philosopher remains controversial among some scholars. Nevertheless, I
understand Nietzsche to be a truly meta-political philosopher.
Despite his frequent eruptions against conventional politics, it must be recognized
that Nietzsche steadfastly believed in the necessity of the rule of law and certain essential
functions of community for the perfection of the species man. Unlike conventional
political philosophers, his chief political concerns are with the desire and corresponding
health indicated by the organizational form a community gives rise to, how that form
facilitates the community’s durability, as well as the instincts it facilitates and to what
ends they are directed. All of this is considered in terms of how effectively it generates a
great and elevating culture (Bildung). However, he frequently remarked on customary
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political concerns, such as forms of governance (monarchy, democracy, socialism, etc.,)
the legitimation of authority, sovereignty, nationalism, international conflict, imperialism
and foreign trade, among others. 45 Nevertheless, it consists with Nietzsche’s own
arguments that we comprehend the political as broadly co-extending with both the sociocultural and economic realms of human activity / expression; for he insists that the
imposition of a “natural” (political) order on the many is a prerequisite for a creative
society and the flourishing of a higher culture.
Nietzsche thought culture would be impeded from fulfilling its proper role if not
kept distinct from the state, and that the health of a polity—as opposed to the modern
nation-state—would suffer if the mundane affairs of state and its pragmatic concerns
were privileged over culture:
If you invest all your energy in economics, world commerce, parliamentarianism,
military engagements, power and power politics, – if you take the quantum of
intelligence, seriousness, will and self-overcoming that you embody and expend it
all in this one direction, then there won’t be any left for the other direction.
Culture and the state – let us be honest with ourselves here – these are
adversaries: ‘Kultur-Staat’ is just another modern idea. The one lives off the
other, the one flourishes at the expense of the other. All the great ages of culture
have been ages of political decline: anything great in the cultural sense is
apolitical, even anti-political. 46
The established “Bismarckian” notion in Wilhelmine Germany that a strong governing
state apparatus is necessary for prosperity and a robust culture, is criticized here and
taken as supporting Nietzsche’s broader critique of the decadence of modernity. While he
suggests that great cultural achievements are possibly anti-political, this rhetorical
provocation could not accurately be construed in such a way as to define him as an antipolitical philosopher.
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Secondary Literature
Each of the four books comprising this work includes an internal literature review
salient to its broad themes. In terms of the secondary literature on Nietzsche my analysis
is significantly indebted to Daniel Conway’s lucid explications of Nietzsche’s general
theory of decadence, or vitalist politics and power ontology. Additionally, it draws on
many other critical interpretations of Nietzsche’s politics, including those provided by
Ansell-Pearson on the machinic becoming of man in the age of globality toward a
transhuman future; Appel on Nietzsche’s affirmation of the ineliminable and highly
nuanced role of cruelty in the world and discipline in Nietzsche’s ethico-political thought;
Shaw on ‘Nietzsche’s political skepticism’, Call on the philosophically anarchistic
implications / dimensions of Nietzsche’s politics.
I make considerable use of Deleuze’s take on Nietzsche’s notions of force and
becoming; draw on Detwiler’s understanding of the political implications of the death of
God and the compulsion to revalue all values in its wake to cultivate future Übermensch.
I cull important insights from Elbe’s works on Nietzsche’s idea of Europe; Hatab’s
innovative contemplation of the possible Nietzschean uses of agonistic democracy;
Heilke on Nietzsche’s response to the conundrum of life and the role of education for
contending with the tragic dimensions of the political and Hunt on Nietzsche’s related
notions of justice and immoralism and the role of his experimentalism for achieving a
natural social order.
I utilize David Owen’s reflections on Nietzsche’s critique of liberalism and the
political tradition it spawned; Richardson’s views on the ‘Will-to-power’ as an
ontological theory of becoming; Smith’s work on the combined role of Nietzsche and
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Heidegger in transitioning Western civilization to a truly postmodern era and Thiele’s
thought on Nietzsche’s celebration of heroic individualism and its consequences for
understanding the political. I also cite other classics of the secondary literature by
(alphabetically) Berkowitz, Heidegger, Hollingdale, Kaufmann, Lampert, May, Nehamas,
Strong, Taylor, and Wilcox.
Many other works of contemporary philosophy are cited throughout this work,
including major texts by Heidegger, MacIntyre, Deleuze, Arendt, Rorty, Baudrillard,
Sloterdijk, Debord, Virilio, Derrida and Foucault. It should be noted that my application
of Nietzsche’s thought comprises an amalgam of Heideggerian and Deleuzean
interpretation, which will be readily apparent to Nietzsche scholars.
In book two I draw upon recent works on European history and seminal critiques
of integration theory, including those by Chryssochoou, Rosamund, Wiener and Diez and
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, among others. I also utilize many of the field’s primary texts in
approximately chronological order of their production to make a doxagraphical survey
toward a genealogical critique of the field itself. In book three I make use of a gambit of
globalization literature, including particularly influential works by Shaw, Robertson,
Beck, Albrow and Khan, among many others. Books two through four are heavily
informed by a plethora of contemporary international relations theory including works by
Booth, Campbell, Wendt and Connelly. I also employ the human rights theories of
Donnelly and Benhabib. Book four also draws from the secondary literature on Classical
skepticism and transhumanist studies.
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Methodology
Nietzsche’s vitalist critique of the political, power ontology and perspectivalist
epistemology and hermeneutical stance serves as philosophical framework for this
analysis. It provides a unique interpretive standpoint for effective discursive and textual
critique as well as historical analysis, the primary methodological tools applied in this
study. 47 From this standpoint and by these means I engage in some axiological process
tracing (value formation and development) and empirical research into theories of
European integration and EU institutions to discern the former’s historical development,
and the latter’s institutional design and function.
This critical Nietzschean lens provides a means of evaluating how Europe’s
unifying political institutions serve to edify life on the continent and transform
international order. These theoretical tools also provide insights into how the EU’s
institutions function within the constitutive matrixes of the globalization complex. While
relevant EU treaties and documents provide abundant evidence of the “all too human”
characteristics of institutionally instantiated forms of the bad-conscience and
ressentiment Nietzsche identified in the human condition, they also substantiate the thesis
that Europe is ineluctably moving toward the opposite of this, that is, in positive
directions from a “Nietzschean” perspective. Differing strains of recent globalization
literature corroborate this conclusion in their theorization of globality.
Through a Nietzschean critique of theories of European integration and the EU in
the broader context of globalization, I demonstrate the contemporary relevance of
Nietzsche’s critique of liberal modernity and show how that critique extends the tradition
of skepticism and invigorates its significance to life and the political. By extension I
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show how Nietzsche’s critical understanding of the political, (an assessment over one
hundred years old but only now beginning to be taken seriously), has real significance to
any genuine effort at a comprehensive understanding of the formative institutions and
defining norms of our era. Finally, the synthesis shall demonstrate the salience of
Nietzsche’s objective in our own age, which is the practical necessity of and prospects for
exceptional, pluripotent individuals to become ‘good Europeans’.
A unique method, Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutics and genealogy of
morality provides an unconventional evaluative stance to elucidate important dynamics of
these interrelated phenomena that standard assessments of European unification and
globalization miss. I argue that a vitalist examination of the European idea pronounced by
Nietzsche coextends with an authentically radical, ‘post-modern mode of “becominganarchist”’ to paraphrase—and give a Deleuzean twist to—the way Lewis Call
persuasively puts it. This idea paradoxically entails the co-determination of morality and
politics as expressed by certain elemental globalizing forces in the present.
In book three I postulate globality as the preeminent (type of) conceptual and
normative paradigm of the dawning post-modern age – one antithetical to the hegemonic
liberalism manifest in the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity; a plethora of
institutions, processes and forces under the rubric of globalization. Each of the
aforementioned developments in European unification is therefore seen as indicative of
globalizing processes in themselves that aim to fulfill a reactive cooptation of cultural
diversity and homogenization of ideational and identic difference. However, within each
of globalization’s multivariate phenomena largely unrecognized, abstract and positive
potentials of globality arise which present opportunities for authentically agonistic
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becomings. The abstract potentials of globality destabilize and disrupt the conventional
globalization complex, the ideological prerogatives of which inform and direct the
continuum of activities and events constituting European unification.
Furthermore, this inquiry critically assesses the hegemony of neo-liberal
capitalism and the ideologically corresponding democratic state form that characterizes
the dominant institutions and processes of globalization. Taken in summa these myriad,
overlapping and mutually supporting institutions, processes and forces comprise a
globalization complex, the loci of which lie within and simultaneously exceed the US and
EU (among other places). In complicated ways this globalization complex transforms
human life and (arguably) enhances human capacities to enable the realization of
globality’s abstract potentials. This occurs largely despite the formers’ ubiquitous, hyperstatist conventional politics, its bestowal of uncritical complacency via its ever-subtler
and more refined governmentality. 48
Consistent with the spirit of Nietzschean critique, this analysis comprehends
European unification, EU expansion and the multivalent phenomena of globalization
generally as products of the dominant, originally Western, ideological metadiscourse of
ultra-liberal-modernity. It theorizes their simultaneous, “schizophrenic” development
from it, their utilization and intensification of it as opening possibilities onto, or
providing an impetus for a revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe), toward a
naturalized politics and/for the enhancement of culture (Bildung).
To achieve this my analysis also draws in part upon the Gramscian concept of
mass-consent by interpolated subjects to hegemonic values that are universalized through
ever-modified, rather than “post”, neo-imperialist doctrines. In the present these consist
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of Euro-centric “Western” ideological that, originally Anglo-European, have been
significantly influenced by American practices in the last century. Furthermore, an
Althusserian notion of the affective power of ideology, and its dissemination,
naturalization and enforcement through the myriad (superstructural and structural)
institutions, forces and processes comprising the globalization complex, comprises a
background assumption throughout my work. 49
Nietzsche’s ‘epistemic framework and critical method’ affords a distinctive and
astute perspective on the ways in which reaction and decadence contributed to the
collective nightmare that Europe—and humankind by extension—suffered in the first
half of the twentieth century. 50 The valuable insights provided by Nietzsche’s vitalist
thought extend to the globally transformative reorganization of international society that
followed the catastrophes of the world wars, as well as Europe’s present condition, its
future prospects and those of the human species. They do so by providing us with a
compelling set of intellectual tools and psychological insights with which we may
examine the nature of human desire, the diverse meanings ascribed to it, and the
multitudinous forms of existence to which it gives rise. The issue of being fair to
Nietzsche aside, however, it is the challenges his thought presents those who would
accept it that are most formidable, as Conway asserts:
Since we have never before witnessed the death of an epoch from the inside, we
have no empirical means of confirming or disputing the jeremiad he so forcefully
advances. Those who endorse his critique of modernity must consequently make
it their own, concocting additional theoretical support if possible and
compensating for his decadent influence in any event. 51
Compensating for Nietzsche’s own decadence – which according to his analysis was
expressive of the dissolution characteristic of his age – does not, in my view, present a
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difficult challenge. For, although Nietzsche’s account laments the state of European
man’s declining vitality in modernity and prophesied the period’s consequent doom, it
also entails an exceedingly hopeful notion of what mankind might become through the
transfiguration of its all-too-human decadence. The transfiguration he envisages, in which
good Europeans – as free spirits – gradually realize their (Nietzschean) idea of Europe,
will necessarily require the creative destruction of modernity’s injurious assumptions
about human nature.
The ambition motivating this project forces me to directly contend with the
tensions, prima facie paradoxes and complexities that inhere to considerations of how the
sort of life-affirming, natural order that Nietzsche advocated may be realized (as an
always-realizing). This aim must be understood in the context of his broader concern with
reinvigorating an authentic European culture (Bildung) for the type of great health it
would generate for humankind.
However improbable it is that Nietzsche’s ideal form of political order may be
realized any time in the foreseeable future, it, and the historical / psychological /
axiological analysis that generated it, is worth taking seriously. It is helpful insofar as it
forces us to notice the deficiency of our present socio-cultural situation, the inauthentic
modes of being it authorizes and the operation of the deleterious values that sustain them.
I therefore attempt a careful explication of how a Nietzschean “political” program ought
to be understood so to remain consistent with the ethos of Nietzsche’s naturalistic values,
constantly aware of the extreme dangers facing those capable of (re: strong enough for)
adopting it, who would reasonably dare to apply it only through the strategic cultivation
of a sophisticated disposition and corresponding use of masks.
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Nietzsche thought (re)establishing a healthy ethical basis for socio-political
organization was the greatest task confronting mankind and thus could only be properly
undertaken by the “strongest,” who are so by virtue of possessing the most positive
affective will. This futural dimension of his thought is at once crucial to Nietzsche’s
system and constitutes what might be taken as the prescriptive facet of it. As
aforementioned, the strength to actively will and to endure the suffering that invariably
results confers a nobility of spirit upon them that serves as the natural basis of their right
to act as determiners of the “good.” Nietzsche effectively stipulates the conditions for
overcoming the decadence of modernity in order to realize the maximal prosperity of
mankind’s foremost exemplars.
The analysis is also fundamentally concerned, as was Nietzsche, with
considerations of agency and freedom (or liberty), albeit not from the traditional liberal
sense that approaches these issue with an interest in asserting / demonstrating the
inalienable rights and innate equality of individuals per se, but in terms of how human
activity may be directed to cultivate favorable circumstances for the improvement of the
exceptionally strong, healthy individuals whose maximal development is likeliest to
advance mankind as a species. Ultimately, this does reaffirm certain Liberal assumptions
about the necessity of meritocracy, access to opportunity and protection from undue
subjugation or interference, if for radically different reasons and objectives. But the
crucial difference is the reason (and reasoning) by which one might arrive at such
conclusions.
Among the most profound concern of political philosophers is negotiating the
dilemma between the(ir) desire to realize the greatest liberty possible (defined ever more
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broadly and inclusively to the present, as Hegel recognized) while regulating society to
realize that desire; order social life to such an (culturally and historically relative) end – a
paradoxical task that, in recorded history at least, has required some form of governance
and methods of coercion. The existence of institutionalized governance and the necessity
of its legitimation (about which Nietzsche was a thorough-going skeptic) constitutes a
general acceptance of the need—at whatever level—for cruelty; the necessity of making
and enforcing distinctions as well as managing their effects.
Nietzsche’s recognition of this fact and its ineliminable necessity is often
misrepresented by his opponents as a thoughtless endorsement of gratuitous cruelty
and/or violence. It is not. Rather it sought to expose a well veiled characteristic of
Western liberal democracies, that being their somewhat incoherent dream of abolishing
all suffering—including it would seem, the striving required for their continuation. The
excessive consumption (re: “wealth”) typifying Western life entails tremendous
exploitation and cruelty hidden from view by the machinations of capital process. Yet, as
I attempt to show below, the inherent contradictions of the ultra-liberal-modern
ideological apparatus (promulgated by the globalization complex) give rise to
vulnerabilities that ‘good Europeans’ of the Nietzschean variety can exploit. In doing so
they may hasten the demise of the prevailing hyper-decadent order to initiate a successor
era to modernity and a transhuman future.
Nietzsche, whose views on the necessity of law and the mis/uses of punishment
are complicated, accepts the inherent cruelty of the exclusions law entails,
acknowledging that governance, in both its masterly / breeding and slavish / taming
forms, involves a conceit, namely that some governing authority may “legitimately”
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intervene upon and compel people to comply with its bidding. 52 Government is
invariably usurpation. The entire tradition of Western political philosophy has been
engaged in expounding pre- and pro-scriptions for this arrogation of right. 53 Yet despite
two and a half millennia of often violent debate, the constitution of authority and means
of its legitimation is no more resolved today than in the city-states of classical Greece.
The operation of establishing and justifying authority, both the effect and putative end of
doing so, is a complex issue to which Nietzsche gave a unique response: government is
most illegitimate when it is imposed by the congenitally botched on a society’s highest
exemplars. If not a traditional political theorist, Nietzsche left us with conceptual tools
for considering the political, and the dilemmas inherent to it, anew.

Contending interpretations of Nietzsche and his project
So-called “left” Nietzscheans, such as Foucault and Deleuze, more or less
concluded that, as Nietzsche believed, every prerogative taken from an individual is a
usurpation of some quanta of their innate autonomy and sovereignty; that by extension,
all (conventional) power is usurpation. Through ultra-liberal-modern lenses this line of
reason logically leads to radical anarchist conclusions about the nature of power and the
objective for individuals in society. 54 But that would have been anathema to Nietzsche,
who also believed that most individuals were not strong enough physically, spiritually or
intellectually, to command themselves much less lead others.
Rather, he insists that those who are so capable, rare individuals of unusual vigor,
or übermenschlich (over-manly) types, would instinctively create values for their
communities consistent with its highest potentials; their actions comprising nomothetic
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legislations generative of socio-political frameworks that reorder the macro-sphere of
communal life. In so doing the limited capabilities of weaker individuals could be made
to effectively contribute to the betterment of the whole, re-naturalized social organism,
rather than dissipating it.
According to this notion as the society’s members (even its weaker ones) are
invigorated the increasingly conscious objective of the community is the production of an
ever greater vitality—a society in which extraordinary individuals engage in an authentic
agon and their cultural achievements could thrive. A somewhat romanticized notion of
Classical Athens served as Nietzsche’s model for this ideal, along with Renaissance Italy,
which he cites as a consummate example of flourishing culture.
Recent continental philosophers (such as Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze) do
contend with Nietzsche’s “conservative” implications, as it were, for instance in the
“positive” sense of Foucault’s recognition that we are constituted by disciplinary power /
knowledge regimes and may develop through “techniques of the self”; likewise the
Deleuzean notions of the fold, nomadism and lines of flight account for the positive,
transformative potential in even the most “reactive” conditions. Many contemporary
scholars following in the tradition of such “left Nietzscheans” do not effectively contend
with the “conservative Nietzsche,” eliding important aspects of his thought because they
disturb sacrosanct assumptions about human nature. To effectively contend with them
means having to square Nietzsche’s anti-liberalism with their own ultra-liberal-modern
aspirations.
Accepting the explicit usurpation of prerogatives that constitutes power,
Nietzsche is concerned with the attainment of a more natural political order that will
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enhance the becoming of mankind and, ultimately, all of its members. There is not one
precise type of Übermensch in Nietzsche’s view. Who may legitimately arrogate the
conceits of “authority” to themselves?: those with the greatest vitality, which is broadly
indicative of the strongest health, the best intellectual ability, the highest degree of nerve
or daring, the deepest sensitivity and heritable talents, all of which are determined
through creative acts in a genuinely agonistic socio-political setting. The predominant
values of society must – if they are to maintain its health, the authentic telos of values in
Nietzsche’s view – nurture and privilege such individuals, but the legacy of
Enlightenment liberalism, which provided the philosophical basis and ideological
objective for most of our world’s governing (globalizing) institutions, leveled all
individuals through its mutually reinforcing discourses of rights and equality, stymieing
the exceptions.
Nietzsche identifies such ideologies with ochlocratic forms of rule and the herd
mentality. The mindless conformity to which the phrase “herd mentality” refers arises
from his psychological critique of weakness among those individuals comprising the vast
majority. This mentality compels resignation to the status quo, reinforcing established
codes of behavior through norms, mores and taboos; disciplinary regimes that generate
insecurity and fearfulness within communities. These exclusionary practices comprise a
“thou shalt” that implies the threat of social ostracism or marginalization by othering, to
ensure the compliance of the masses with the will of those deemed arbiters of norms,
whose authority empowers them to constitute themselves and leaders and their values
(prejudices against or toleration of forms of difference) as mainstream.
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Nietzsche’s ‘Genealogy of Morality’ explicates the process by which the majority
in a society, the vast preponderance of whom in ancient societies were often slaves (the
designation Nietzsche provocatively employs) who are initially just the losers in the war
for dominance at the establishment of a society, come to constitute a type that, lacking a
sense of its own agency, values out of ressentiment and a spirit of revenge. 55 The slaves
empower themselves by inverting the values of the masters, labeling them as evil while
re-designating their own meekness as merit and their oppression by the strong as
injustice. 56 When successful over long periods, such as the Christian era, these slave
values foster the forgetting of their ignoble origins and come to serve as rhetorical and
conceptual devises for flattering their advocates as the arbiters of genuinely righteous
virtues.
The violences that characterized the former masters are excoriated and
criminalized. Enactments of such natural behavior are tabooized and punished. 57 A selfdescribed altruistic and selfless disposition is rewarded as the highest ideal; even today,
the secular saint is revered above all others. 58 The ascetic ideal she personifies (and the
collective desire for subterranean revenge she fulfills), covers up its own means of
coerced compliance. Ultimately that ideal itself is the culmination of ressentiment and
mendacity; a celebrated model of “group think” that compels conformity and punishes
difference to ensure mediocrity.

The EU and its transfiguration of the nation-state
A central aim of this project is that of illuminating the ways in which Europe’s
political integration and the EU’s expansion – as a globalizing power constellation – are
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simultaneously enabling and impeding the fulfillment of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe. It
considers the efficacy of his “political,” vitalist objectives and the capacity of
extraordinary individuals to contribute to an evolutionary revaluation of values that may
fundamentally transform human societies by organizing them for the perfection of the
species’ strongest members. Through an anti-dogmatic strategy based on six classical
skeptical tenants I allege that healthy individuals can attain a perspectivalist ethos—the
“freedom from any kind of conviction” and delight in contingency—necessary for
becoming a good European. 59 It is individuals such as these who are most likely to hasten
our achievement of those objectives; goals for humankind that Nietzsche thought could
only be realized following the major wars over ideology and nationalism he predicted for
the 20th century—conflicts that, contra Fukuyama, are not in fact resolved.
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was originally conceived in
large part as a protectionist response to certain economic practices that would become
characteristic features of globalization. Despite this, the organization would serve as a
precursor to the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) with the Treaty
of Rome (1957). This group of communities (customs union and Euratom) antecedent to
the EU, would evolve and expand significantly over the next five decades. In so doing
what arguably were protectionist stratagems for Europe’s industrial and economic
independence developed into a crucial locus of the globalization complex, and perhaps
the most multifaceted power constellation in the world.
In its present capacity the EU enforces the values of ultra-liberal-modernity as it
geographically extends itself across the continent. It provides Europe’s citizenconstituents with simulacrums of existential meaning and ontological purpose by
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simulating both the democratic state form’s representative legitimacy and hierarchical
authority. 60 Through the EU’s pseudo-meritocratic promotion of neo-liberal capital
process and its massification of desire (a nullification of authenticity), it augments the
circulation of spectacularized modes being-in-the-world / forms of life that continually
generate need and corresponding means to satisfy it. In so doing it tantalizes the masses
with illusions of gratification and deflects them from their state of inauthenticity. Its
enticements are offered to distract, occupy and sate their nihilistic will to consume—
momentarily fulfilling in material terms both corporeal necessity and socio-political
imperatives fostered by the aforementioned simulacrums. 61
This suggests how the numerous simulacrums of an emerging, globalized
spectacular society produce and sustain a highly reactive simulation of the healthy-authentically agonistic—social and political order necessary for the eventual overcoming
of the human type. An ultimately undesirable, albeit necessary, modern veil of Isis that
obscures its own ideological basis and ends, it is nevertheless conditioning the possibility
of its own transfiguration by generating myriad opportunities for the incremental
transvaluation of the slave-moral-unto-anti-natural percepts it is predicated upon.
Situated in the broader context of the globalization complex, the EU’s institutions
and practices are seen to ramify numerous features of the former. Ideologically
supervenient to one another, they comprise differing degrees of institutionally
instantiated forces and processes within the same dissipative ultra-liberal-modern value
matrix, an ideological regime usefully understood to be propagating “Empire”. These are
experienced variously—according to the type of individual and her vitality—as qualia.
The is evidenced by the imposition of international order via the nation-state as
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privileged form of polity, followed by its systematic democratization, as well as the
enforced adoption of the precepts of neo-liberal capital processes and conformity with the
hegemonic regulatory mechanisms to which it has given rise. The globalization complex
is typified by technological rationality coupled with a methodical and comprehensive
massification of everyday life; its overarching functions and objectives compel fallenness and inauthenticity in the social relations of individuals and lives of communities it
transforms. It always already entails the superficially significant but ultimately transitory
partisan debates that absorb the attention of the majority and deflect them from the deeper
and invisible currents imperceptibly transforming their existences.
According to this critical analytical framework, contemporary social and political
life in the West and its globalized penumbra are understood as a product of innumerable
expressions of a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power manifested disparately
through reactive force. These anti-natural impulses are legitimated through a hermeneutic
of desire via disciplinary regimes of truth and responsibility that are in turn rationalized
by ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. The preponderating reactive forces of the
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity are symptomatized in Europe’s ongoing
unification, via the EU. It is a project dominated but not exclusively directed by asceticconsumerist priests according to the secularized slave-moral values and reified
rationalism they enforce.
As such Europe’s ongoing integration via the EU, in collaboration with other
major IGOs such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
the Council of Europe (COE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is
fulfilling the largely dissipative ambition of European and international elites, all last39

man types, alike. Yet contrary to this dark actuality Nietzsche suggests, in accordance
with his vitalist conception of the political 62 and corresponding idea of Europe, that an
opposite desire for uniting Europe connects the continent’s representative exemplars
across healthy ages – those periods of great cultural production between decadent,
declining epochs.
Highly contemptuous of the populist trends of his time for the increased danger
they presented to the higher spiritualization of mankind and its exemplars, Nietzsche
dedicated a great deal of thought to the consequences of post-Enlightenment
democratization and the rise of socialism in the 19th century, coming to some prescient
conclusions (published in 1880):
The practical outcome of this spreading democratization will first of all be a
European league of nations within which each individual nation, delimited
according to geographical fitness, will possess the status and rights of a canton: in
this process the historical recollections of the former nations will be of little
account, since the sense of reverence for such things will gradually be totally
uprooted by the domination of the democratic principle, which thirsts for
innovations and is greedy for experiments. 63
This passage suggests the trajectory the democratic impulse would set for the politics of
the European continent, and it must be acknowledged that the EU is innovating political
authority and accountability and arguably experimenting with supranational governance
at once in conjunction with and over its increasingly canton-like member-states.
Although he could not fully anticipate the disorientation and corresponding
increase in individual adaptability wrought by the political and technological revolution
that characterized the twentieth century, he clearly identified the ethos that presupposed
the innovations and experiments that produce it. The premonition was largely correct and
could plausibly be said to characterize one of the primary objectives of European
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unification in the present, namely its furtive efforts to eliminate the former reverence of
the nation among its member-states, whose identities it would subsume into a synthetic
personality based on ultra-liberal-modern principles correlated to post-Enlightenment
notions of representative democracy.
In an oft cited section from the first volume of the same book, entitled ‘A Glance
at the State,’ he endorses just this inevitability, having understood nationalism as an
effort to stem what, as a consequence of these complicated changes in European society,
brought “a weakening and finally an abolition of nations, at least the European,” and “of
a continual crossing a mixed race, that of European man, [which] must come into being
out of them.” In the same passage he concludes, “once one has recognized this fact, one
should not be afraid to proclaim oneself simply a ‘good European’ and actively to work
for the amalgamation of nations”. 64 It is notable that Nietzsche—who disdained populism
and democracy—advocated the amalgamation of European nations over the brand of
shrill, vituperative nationalism that arose in reaction against that possibility. Such was his
contempt of and anxiety over the ethnocentric, chauvinist nationalism that was gaining
momentum across the continent in his day, and which the forces of populist democracy
were exacerbating.
From “Human, All Too Human,” the text marking the beginning of his middle
period, until the end of his productive career, Nietzsche identified “‘good Europeans’”
with a “supranational and nomadic type of man which, physiologically speaking,
possesses as its typical distinction a maximum of the art and power of adaptation.” 65
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They are proto-types of the philosophers of the future:
[T]hose rare and rarely contented men who are too comprehensive to find their
satisfaction in any kind of patriotism and know how to love the south in the north
and the north in the south – the born midlanders, the “good Europeans”. 66
Such superlative individuals are compelled by their overflowing desire (desire understood
as a complex assemblage of forces) to seek the unfamiliar and develop themselves,
combine qualities and perspectives characteristic of Europe’s various regions in order to
appreciate in personal and pan-European terms.
This indicates an unconscious conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness
that corresponds with the physiological condition of exceptional strength or vitality; the
preconditions necessary for fostering and enhancing individual and social development
via acceptance of difference in otherness. Across the continent he perceived, to varying
extents and in different guises:
[T]he process of the assimilation of all Europeans, their growing detachment from
the conditions under which races dependent on climate and class originate, their
increasing independence of any definite milieu, as a unique “process of becoming
European.” 67
In our own era ‘the assimilation of all Europeans’ into a malleable instrument is being
achieved in large part through continual cross-cultural exchange, instantaneous
communication, the mega-media representations of desire, the merchandizing of ideas,
values and products (massification and homogenization) and legal mechanisms born of
treaty agreements that have profoundly transformed economic, political and social norms
and practices. The machinic and technological aspects of this assimilation via integration
efforts will be considered by means of Ansell-Pearson’s consideration of viroid life and
possibilities of a future, transhuman condition.
42

Nietzsche concluded that an unavoidable process of assimilation would lead to the
economic unification of the continent. He declared, “Europe wants to become one,” 68 on
the basis of forces personified in those rare, far-ranging types he dubbed ‘good
Europeans’, those who, as “rich heirs of millennia of European spirit,” were most capable
of recognizing the beautiful and infinite in what was foreign and unfamiliar (i.e.,
everything, as certain knowledge and “Truth” are unattainable since our limited
understanding is always a perspective situated in a particular context). 69 However, their
shared objective for the continent’s socio-political integration differed radically from that
consistently articulated by arbiters of the liberal-modernist project, in terms of both its
premises and its objectives. Antithetical to the popular democratic aim of attaining the
greatest liberty for all—a condition which would make rulers of the rabble and amplify
the decadence weakening society—the ambition of Nietzsche’s good Europeans was (and
remains) to cultivate a well-ordered and compliant instrument of the people upon which
the strongest might freely create edifying works and perfect themselves through agonistic
contests.
This is indeed what has come to pass. However, there is a relatively broad
spectrum of opinion on how far the authority of the EU should extend over Europe today.
Despite their many differences with regard to what Europe should become, most of the
EU’s present supporters (Europhiles) and opponents (Europhobes) agree that its
development as giving rise to a super-state. Although it clearly is a physical enlargement,
and some would argue an ideational expansion of the classic state form, I argue that it is
doing more than this, that while unifying Europe the present EU “super-state” indicates
just one (early) phase in the radical overcoming of the state form itself.
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As regards the nation-state, Nietzsche was always suspicious and frequently
contemptuous, mainly seeing the modern state as deforming human development. The
socio-political dimensions of our hyper-decadent era have been produced by the
consolidation of the democratic nation-state and the rights of the individual over the
course of the last half-century. With regard to the nation-state—the quintessentially
European and thoroughly universalized form of internationally sanctioned polity—and
the international setting within which it exists, this has been naturalized through an array
of legal institutions for the normalization of its sovereign authority and legitimacy.
The universalization of this formalized structure constituted an effort to abolish
anarchy in the macro-political realm (that of the nation-state and international society),
and has been thoroughly diffused into the micro-political realm (the level of the
individual), which evinces similar transformations as those the nation-state has
undergone and continues to undergo. It does so, to use Foucaultian terms, through
corresponding technologies of the self—the largely simulated and disciplinary, ultraliberal-modern principles of free will and agency, the basis for which lies in our notions
of the intrinsic and equal worth of persons, the inviolable rights that inhere to every
individual, and—within the limits defined by common law—their undeniable capacity for
self-determination. The legitimacy of the nation-state is now popularly understood as
residing in its ability to ensure the dignity and rights of the individuals—or citizens—it
serves.
In the Western world the state form has undergone significant modifications over
the past century. Among myriad other things, this includes the intersubjective adaptation
of its powers to demands placed on it by ultra-liberal-modern values, which have arisen
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as a result of forces both within the nation-state and outside of it. Since Nietzsche’s
lifetime the nation-state has become the indisputably dominant organizing force for the
political and social life of humankind—imposed universally by Anglo-European powers
throughout the course of the 20th century.
Nietzsche opposed the preeminence of nation-states. Zarathustra’s identification
of the simulated veracity of this “new idol” remains prescient, as the state form—whose
perfection is widely held to be the democratic variety of it—has been geographically,
notionally and legally extended to encompass every polity around the world. Today the
democratic state form is reified in numerous ways, from multiple legal institutions to
reactive expressions of populist patriotism.70 In a subtler way, the EU re-invokes identic
affiliations based on historical tradition and sentimental nostalgia through its simulations
of political enfranchisement and simulacrums of community. In the absence of
unproblematic identic roles, it has come to act as an identic surrogate, personified, albeit
somewhat ambiguously, by a neo-cosmopolitan “European” identity that takes the
banalization of difference as a basis for belonging and the aim of its form of citizenship.
This contrivance depends on ambiguity in order to sustain what diluted meaning it is able
to generate.
As a new “super-idol” the EU seeks to supply the “all-too-human” psychological
need of its subjects (or “citizen-constituents”) for legitimate authority while gradually
supplanting the waning power of its member states (as Europhobes throughout the
community have long known):
State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it tells lies too; and
this lie crawls out of its mouth: “I, the state, am the people.” That is a lie! It was
creators who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they
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served life. It is annihilators who set traps for the many and call them “state”: they
hang a sword and a hundred appetites over them. 71
The EU’s architects, managers and bureaucratic functionaries are sophisticated
descendents of those who in Nietzsche’s lifetime set the traps called the state, are
(involuntarily) enacting their reactive roles, ones necessary for Europe’s future lifeaffirming development.
I maintain a position likely to strike both apologists for Europe’s ongoing
integration process and Nietzscheans as counter-intuitive: that integration is
indeliberately

producing

conditions

of

possibility

for

the

emergence

of

a

comprehensively transformative, positive will to creative destruction as generative
power, thereby. The EU will very likely enable certain exceptionally strong individuals of
future generations to “look beyond the state” 72, and drape a new faith and love over their
contemporaries, those whose predecessors passively received the EU as a super-state and
willingly accepted their incorporation within it as citizen-subject-constituents in our own
era.
Identifying what Nietzsche desired for Europe is simpler than describing how he
thought it could be—let alone would be—achieved. “Nietzsche wished to foster the
reconstruction of Europe as a cultural entity, led by a new aristocracy, shaped by
indigenous artists and poets, which could assume global leadership in the age of great
politics that he predicted.” 73 Having seemingly created another, enlarged personification
of “the people” in the EU, its “long-eared and short-sighted” designers venerate the cold
monster—as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra dubs the modern state—revering it while remaining
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oblivious of the ways in which their endeavor promises to foster the conditions necessary
for the recrudescence of genuine free spirits with the strength to slay it.
Nietzsche conceives these daring experimenters—artist–philosophers capable of
revaluing our decadent values—as simultaneously witting and unwitting annihilators.
Impelled to obey life-affirming regimes of self-imposed discipline (askesis) for the task
of self-creation (auto-poiesis) through involuntary enactments of their native volition,
they gradually bring new modes of being into existence—a salubrious aesthetic-political
production of life-forms that destroys decrepit, petrified orders (in our own case the
ethno-nationally based bureaucratic state with which Nietzsche was quite familiar). By
doing so their valuations re-habilitate a social preference for the instinctual organization
of drives and impulses characteristic of vigorous individuals. This re-invigorates the
macro-political life of their communities while preserving disciplinary measures for the
“all-too-many”, those being the majority who, congenitally weak and terminally sickened
by decadent values, are incapable of being aroused by the erotic passions of their highest
exemplars.
As the actual and figurative descendants of the late 19th century’s “international
homeless financial recluses” 74 the all-too-many loose themselves in vulgar hedonism and
crass consumerism. However a few, whom I name ascetic-consumerist priests of
ressentiment, rapaciously exploit the order generated by the globalization complex, to
profitably utilize its institutions, forces and processes to stimulate the herd’s
multitudinous appetites and manipulate its perceptions. These are the leaders and
apologists for the ruling order, who maintain the reactive values hegemonic throughout
the globalization complex today, and include politicians and pundits, government
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officials and bureaucrats (civilian and military), business executives, corporate managers,
the mainstream media, “white-collar” workers, labor leaders, educators, etc.
There is a hierarchy too among these administrators of status-quo asceticconsumerist values. As the “managers” of our dissipative social order a few of these
individuals stand completely outside the order they enforce. At the highest levels are
found the genuine ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment referenced above, which
include CEOs, high-ranking politicians, etc. Beneath them a variety of hebetated
automatons function to ensure the continuation of social-order and the labor of the alltoo-many. These veritably zombified consumers occupy a place at once within and at
some distance from the majority, a group which includes investment bankers, lobbyists,
executives, administrators, professors, etc. These highly paid professionals tend to enjoy
a materially comfortable life and get an extra paragraph of two in their obituaries at the
end of it.
Most managers and executive are indistinguishable from the all-too-many, lost in
myopic concerns through which they expend themselves. Their feeble energies and
passions are absorbed in the supervision of everyday labor—the toil that the masses are
engaged to perform as modern wage-slaves. The striving of these low-ranking ideologues
consists of mimetic performances always-already in adherence with the dominant matrix
of anti-natural values. Their enactments’ are motivated by a desire for security and the
promise of prosperity. Comfort is the reward that prompts them to unwittingly ape the
accepted norms of “professionalism”; their compensation that of conventional safety and
“success”.

48

Executives, managers and wage-slaves, white and blue collar workers alike,
labor—however consciously—to ensure that the slave-moral order functions to
ameliorate and/or co-opt any threat to it. They serve a critical function as ideological
soldiers who implement the doctrines of equality and rights that sustain the prevailing
slave-moral order and herd mentality. There are of course, exceedingly rare exceptions
within the hierarchized order of these automatons. However, they are likely to be selfcensoring and dissipated by the necessity of masking their differences to maintain their
position and abide accepted conventions of the reigning culture of conformity, dissent
from which—always understood as a default on their existential debt to, and a betrayal of
the community that provided for them—is harshly punished. There are generally no
exceptions among those populating the higher levels of the conventional power structures
that order contemporary Western society. These well-vetted and credentialed asceticconsumerist priests of ressentiment must on some level comprehend their function and
zealously embody their role as the “enforcers” of anti-natural ideals.
Yet as any sense of obligation to and the perceived veracity of the state dissipates,
the “all-too-many” remain “trapped” by the conventions of a secularized slave morality
that demands devotion to the dying monster’s “confusion of tongues of good and evil: the
sign of the state.” As those for whom “the state was invented,” comprehend no
alternatives to the semiotic conceits upon which the conceptual snares in which they are
caught arose, they are fated to go down with it. Just as their “leaders” fail to recognize the
ways in which they destroy the state as they seek to expand—or “supranationalize”—it,
the masses do not comprehend that their idol, the state, is in fact dying: “just as news of
the death of God takes a long time to reach us, so too does news of the death of the
49

state.” 75 The eminent death–or the conspicuous decrepitude unto dying–of the state, was
palpable to Nietzsche by the late 1870s.
The EU’s arbiters and the political functionaries, technocrats and bureaucratic
who enact their will are, collectively, the inheritors of Europe’s historic great power
states. In the shadow of US hegemony since World War Two, these ascetic-consumerist
priests of ressentiment have been happy to allow the US to hold their sword while
dedicating themselves to the pursuit of economic greatness and the cultivation of the
“restless affairism of doing” wherein every person is required to give an accounting of
themselves in terms of how busy they are against the classic notion of leisure toward the
ersatz virtue of workaholism (the liberal form of secular piety). 76 The corporate-military
leadership of the US, as the singular “super-state” manically pursuing military might
largely for the benefit of its and its international allies’ plutocratic elites, has been happy
to oblige.
Europe’s representative exemplars over the past half century have performed the
limited role of social engineers (as opposed to great nomothetic legislators) and made
substantial contributions to the project of unifying Europe. In less significant ways
countless others, from entrepreneurs to bureaucrats and anonymous workers, have also
incrementally transformed Europe according to its ultra-liberal-modern model. Yet from
the outset of their self-described “grand” project to establish a new political order by
unifying the continent, the instigators of a noble, federalist vision for the unification of
the continent, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Altiero Spinelli, Mario Albertini, who had
themselves risen from among the ranks of “the superfluous” that “steal the works of the
inventors and the treasures of the sages for themselves,” but whose vision arguably
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elevated them above the base allegiances of more common types, and who had to manage
that vision so that it would not be turned into total “sickness and misfortune”. Yet,
however noble certain elements of the federalist vision may have seemed, they consisted
with the signature prejudices of their age, and were already infected with liberal-modern
values which they would invariably serve as a means of perfecting. The founders of what
would become the EU were not nomothetic legislators, but “plucky bricoleurs”, who
gathered the waning energies of an exhausted people to extend the duration of a declining
era by briefly stabilizing it. 77
Not paradoxically, “superfluous individuals”, as Nietzsche provocatively labeled
the masses, would be essential to the achievement of Europe’s economic and political
integration. In his view they included the bureaucrats, technocrats and exemplars in state
philosophers, prime ministers and presidents, etc. As conformists to prevailing
convention these passive nihilists had previously contributed to the murderous excesses
of some of the most degenerate state forms ever known. In the aftermath of World War
Two, such individuals were therefore rather easily persuaded to collaborate in the
recuperative liberal-modern project of realizing a pan-European scheme for the
amalgamation of the continent’s peoples and nations.
The aim of post-War Europe’s institutional designers was the transfiguration of
the continent’s disparate, territorially defined nation-states and their relations (understood
at once in spatio-temporal terms) through the practical application of a conceptually
refined philosophical and legal complex developed upon the traditions of liberalmodernity. The ultra-liberal-modern value norms that resulted were an instantiated,
widely-shared set of now-familiar attitudes and beliefs. A central contention in this work
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is that in ideological form, these beliefs have been sublimated so thoroughly via
moralizations of decadence that they operate on a largely unconscious level, informing
popular conceptions of justice and fairness, panoplies of “inalienable” rights and
corresponding expectations of the constitution of legitimate authority and the
responsibilities of those in / with “power”.
Today this essentially decadent ultra-liberal-modern ideology informs all aspects
of everyday life, including the positivistic mind-set, materialist expectations, quantitative
economic standardization of value and the creation of co-extending and ultimately
unified civil institutions and laws to contend with common security concerns. As
Lampert writes in considering Descartes’ skeptical analysis of the law, “Belief often
occurs without knowledge of belief. Belief is itself a form of obedience entailing
submission to the believed; knowing what one believes liberates from that submission
and from the actions it dictates.” 78 Nietzsche’s skeptical, good Europeans, understand
ultra-liberal-modern values to serve as the ideological basis for the hegemonic moral
framework of our age, and the first such set of value-standards and principles to be
successfully extended globally.
Against the arbiters of the globalization complex, good Europeans seek—through
conscience-vivisection—to examine the psychological and philosophical impetus for
these beliefs and expose their dissipative affects. Therefore they are spiritual and
intellectual opponents of the ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment who, since the
Second World War, have universalized their secularized Christian–Platonic, anti-natural
and anti-cultural beliefs through the extension of capital process, technological rationality
and the systematic massification of desire. Good Europeans—those with a supra52

European, authentically affirmative view of the earth—instinctively seek to overthrow
their enfeebling, ultra-liberal-modern regime and reverse its diminution of humankind.
A thorough revaluation of values, including a deconstruction of the privileging of
the nation-state as the preeminent political form and basic unit of the international
system, will be required if the resulting political entity is to be more than the sort of
“super-state” toward which Europe seems headed. 79 For this revaluation to occur, “the
superfluous,” whom Zarathustra described as “impotent paupers and swift, clambering
monkeys,” need to be preoccupied. 80 As they are ineluctably enticed by the conventional
power ongoing reactive developments offer, this poses no challenge. By engrossing the
attention of the ambitious, the transformation of the nation-state via integration may
fortuitously serve ‘good Europeans’ as a means of acquiring the space and time they
require to instigate such a revaluation.
From the chaos and destruction of two world wars in the first half of the twentieth
century the originators of European unification reconceived, albeit in ultra-liberal-modern
terms, the political order needed to temporarily invigorate humanity according to a
deepened sublimation of conventional slave-morality. Eschewing overtly revolutionary
programs that would automatically be opposed by “idolators of the state” and its
“preachers of death,” (characteristics that they had once unconsciously personified, but
now strove to discredit in careful expressions of disdain for the failed values of the past,
such as bellicose nationalism) they sought to gradually evolve political life by reestablishing it on older traditions while maintaining a semblance of the all-too-familiar
order, so to amalgamate the nations of Europe into one over a long span, rather than
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dispensing with the state itself, which would jar an already distressed continent and
surely prove counter-productive.
In pursuing their ambition, they recognized (after Nietzsche) that a wider sense of
cohesion would have to be cultivated, at least between the respective nations of Western
Europe. A mutual sense of belonging between former enemies would need to create in
order for the new polity they envisaged to function effectively. The process would require
more than formal treaty agreements to foster the changed mentality this idea of Europe
required. With little more to go on but historical enmities and the wounds of war, these
conditions would have to serve as a starting point for a future, integrated European
community.
The ineffectuality of the League of Nations and shared suffering at the hands of
the Nazis in the first half of the 20th century fostered the common desire to rebuild a
destroyed continent. In addition to the desire to regenerate bankrupt economies,
guarantee free trade and stimulate competition a corresponding awareness of the need for
radically deepened cooperation toward achieving that aim was evident. New legal
institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods accords were codifying a
new international order to assure a broad measure of security and thereby provide
conditions for the European project of economic and political integration.
The pre-existing web of practical illusions grounding notions of truth and justice
that arbiters of integration could exploit due to Europe’s experience of grief and
tremendous desire for renewal would provide the catalyst and ready-made justifications,
when needed, for the slow but sure fulfillment of their aspiration. The ambition to
achieve European unification necessitated much productive and fruitful meditation on the
54

dynamics of cooperation and compromise in various spheres of inter-personal belonging
and identity, including local affiliation, regional autonomy and national sovereignty, etc.,
including the need for a fundamental revaluation of the efficaciousness of the nation-state
system for human life. The latter in particular would be especially long in coming, and
arguably has yet to happen. But measurable progress toward the alleviation of immediate
physical misery in post-War Europe would enable arbiters of integration to seriously
entertain such potentially dangerous revaluations and prevail over skeptical naysayers,
nationalists and other advocates of the status quo European state system who opposed it.
With hindsight across the twentieth century we can see opportunities for deepened
integration both seized and lost as those “whose conscience bears the weight of the
overall development of humanity, […made] use of the prevailing political and economic
situation. 81 But the long-term endeavor of those with a shared comprehension of
Nietzsche’s noble idea of Europe has steadily paid dividends, and as their ambition
increased and the momentum accelerated for realizing the continent’s unification via
populist democratic means, that ambition gained broader acceptance. As opposed to
atavistic statesmen promoting ‘great politics’ of the sort that culminated in the twentieth
century’s world wars (and whose presence is still felt in the politics of nations), the
arbiters of European integration—whom Nietzsche would likely have derided as
“‘improvers’ of mankind”—have by a number of matrixes economic, institutional and
cultural, succeeded in profoundly altering life for their fellow Europeans and by
extension for individuals globally.
Through Nietzsche’s vitalist notion of the political, we understand that the postwar instigators of European integration were involuntarily pursuing something that was,
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in part at least, very positive. I refer to their desire to overcome certain suicidal
tendencies from which European culture, and humankind, had barely survived.
Tragically, their proposed solution fell back on the logic that had generated the original
problem, leading them to create institutions that were bound to develop over the
following decades into another, albeit less-homicidal monstrosity. The EU we study
today replicates some of the worst aspects of the old state form which it, at least in part,
strove to overcome. However, it has also come to present potentials upon which a ‘good
European’ might productively build.
It is my primary contention that Nietzsche’s meta-political concerns, his diagnosis
of Europe’s cultural (re: existential) sickness and his proposed “cure”, comprise a
strategy that remains relevant, via a radically Dionysian affirmation of life, for
overcoming the irrecuperably decadent nation-state that typifies the hegemonic form of
social organization imposed by the globalization complex in our hyper-decadent age of
ultra-liberal-modernity. The major institutions of the globalization complex, particularly
the EU, already embody certain (ascetic) ideals that a ‘good European’ might reverse
and/or exploit to hasten the eventual attainment of an authentically natural agon and
revivified culture (Bildung) for the maximal flourishing of salutary individuals.
It is important to state that Nietzsche’s works tell us next to nothing about how,
precisely, the formal political institutions of Europe, which he largely reviled, ought to be
re-organized. We may confidently infer that he envisaged a system of rule organized
through a natural hierarchy of types. This would be a form of governance capable of
sustaining a maximally agonistic state of affairs while preserving a flexibly adaptable,
authentically aristocratic order. Some analysts have drawn close comparisons between
56

Plato’s Republic and the sort of order Nietzsche’s works would suggest he prefers. He
adamantly rejected revolutionary programs in favor of more gradual, fundamentally
recuperative change, when the sort of traditions (and institutions) that ensure the duration
of a life-affirming polity governed by its preeminent specimens can no longer be
sustained.
According to Nietzsche’s diagnosis of European society such was the case in his
lifetime, and would determine Europe’s foreseeable future. This prompted him to
dedicate much thought to contemplating what conditions conduce to the production of the
best (healthiest) individuals and communities and thereby maximize human flourishing,
namely the facilitation of the highest potentials of humankind’s healthiest exemplars.
Appel writes that at the very least:
Nietzsche deserves his place in the canon of political philosophy not because he
provides a detailed institutional account of the optimal type of polity, but rather
because his sweeping denunciation of liberalism, democracy, socialism,
feminism, and other offshoots of modernity leads him to formulate (albeit in a
sketchy and unsystematic manner) an alternative, radically aristocratic model of
politics that bears serious examination. 82
Anglo-American political philosophers nevertheless largely dismissed Nietzsche
until the 1960s due chiefly to the legacy of systematic, instrumental abuse of his works
first at the hands of his sister and then by the Nazis. Misunderstanding of his thought was
compounded among his sleepier readers by his (often purposefully ad hominem)
polemics. The latter, as Conway explains, “are best understood as occasions for
galvanizing an internal resistance to the moralists, priests, dogmatists, and decadents who
inhabit[ed] his own polycentric soul.” 83 There was a utility to his polemics that served an
important role in Nietzsche’s becoming, that is, in the self-overcomings crucial to the
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development of his own micropolitical, corporeal politics and to his evolution as a
philosopher.
Nietzsche’s political advocacy (bodied forth in persistent admonitions and advice
as well as the practical implications for life of his thought) suggests a strategy by which
his favored polity might be attained over-against nihilistic alternatives spawned by
liberal-modernity. As Hutter notes:
Nietzsche’s entire effort at philosophical legislation, besides radically denying the
myth of progress, is oriented very much to a present potentially filled with joy and
ecstatic self-experience. 84
That experience corresponds with (among other things) an ironic or skeptical disposition
toward all truth claims, for in Nietzsche’s view “the need for faith, for anything
unconditional… is a proof of weakness”. 85
Legislators of the future comprehend “all knowledge [as] …only a means for
creation. They gain an awareness of the contingency of their ubiety or emplacement in a
world increasingly (futurally) determined by globality as a foundation for all authentic
identic conceptions. Joyous experimentation and ecstatic self-creation are essential
elements in the skeptical practices of good Europeanism. They reciprocally fortify the
will to affirm all of life which is also a will to avert the diminution to mediocrity
promoted by liberal optimism under the guise of prosperity. The specifically political
dimension of this, although counter-intuitive to conventional political scientists, consists
of a productive agonism that realizes a Dionysian or tragic-aesthetic worldview
(Weltanschauung).
His chief hope, that “philosophers of the future” might contribute to a revitalized,
re-naturalized order predicated on their revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller
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Werthe), directly corresponds with (and is demonstrated by) a central concern that runs
throughout his works: the future of European man, culture and civilization. As Conway
observes,
Nietzsche’s political thinking centers around a simple, yet powerful thesis: human
existence is justified only by the presence of those exemplary individuals who redefine the horizons of human perfectibility. 86
The perfectibility and overcoming of the human species as an objective must be
understood in the specific, unavoidably political sense in which Nietzsche meant it.
The task of legislating a morality of breeding, propaedeutic to that undertaking
requires truly great politicians, charismatic leaders in Weber’s sense, a megalopsychoi as
Aristotle understood the term, who are first of all mythopoeists capable of revaluing all
values and (re-)establishing a convincing basis for communal society, so as to
nomothetically create a viable new order thereafter. I elaborate on this throughout the
material below.
In his middle and late works Nietzsche would come to identify those
aforementioned individuals as ‘good Europeans’ and their efforts at perfection with a
noble idea of Europe. My interest lies in employing Nietzsche’s thought to critique
present developments in the institutional politics of Europe in a practical, meaningful
way, and to demonstrate how the EU may unintentionally foster such a type and idea.
From this I extrapolate means by which his objectives might more methodically be
achieved. I seek to do so by demonstrating the salience of Nietzsche’s thought to the EU
project in the broader context of globalization. I understand the functioning of the
globalization complex, as a form of Empire. 87
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On the contrary, the contemporary globalization complex has clearly identifiably
power centers and is much less “postcolonialist and postimperialist” than they assert it
is. 88 The primary mistake of their analysis is to conflate the ideologically driven aims of
the conventional globalization complex with what it aims at or has in reality achieved. I
would agree that their description of Empire quite aptly portrays the reactive ideals and
objectives of the globalization complex, but they have by no means been reached, even,
arguably, in the centers of the complex itself. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that they
ever will or could be attained. Out of this awareness my life-affirming, Nietzschean
analysis identifies actual possibilities for the realization of truly radical sorts of freedom
and the corresponding emergence of new modes of invigorated life. Freedom should be
counted among Nietzsche’s central concerns, contrary to the impression popularized in
the late-20th century by the Continental philosophers and the ‘new Nietzsche’. As
Mandalios makes clear:
Against radical denunciation of freedom proffered by Derrida and Deleuze—
freedom as essentially a bourgeois humanist illusion… Nietzsche offer[s] an
alternative (post-liberal) conception… Rather than eschewing freedom in
reference to the modern world… Nietzsche can be understood as a serious thinker
of human freedom and its political moment vis-à-vis his complex conception of
will, power and freedom [sic] and their necessary entwinement ultimately with
responsibility. 89
Not surprisingly, Nietzsche’s particular notion of freedom contrasts with the prevailing,
popular conceptions of it, as freedom from obligation or responsibility, in so far as his
concern centers on potentiality and the possibilities of becoming. The question that
occupies his politics therefore is individual ‘freedom for what?’ freedom to do
something, as opposed to the ultra-liberal-modern anxiety with freedom as the abolition
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of restraints and obsessive concern with freedom from what?’ understood merely in terms
of resistance to something.
Nietzsche’s idea of freedom is inextricably enmeshed in the agonal process of
becoming what one is, as well as the ethos of his good Europeanism. This sort of free
spirit is capable of revaluing the anti-natural values that preponderate in the present to
actualize their (Nietzschean) idea of Europe: a socio-political environment promoting
cultural greatness. Its potential realization entails providing skeptical, axiological
critiques of our hyper-decadent age (as I attempt to provide below regarding European
integration and efforts to theorize it), to spur action and thought toward the development
of a morality of breeding. The values conferred by the moral education this would entail
would cultivate the pathos of distance necessary for a natural hierarchy of types and
corresponding socio-political order.
This also requires the actual hybridization of European man (a process that, I shall
argue below, the EU is facilitating) to produce a much-turned, wily type (polytropoi)
willing to don multiple costumes and masks. Strengthened by attempts at self-perfection,
cheeky good Europeans, inflamed by the hypocrisy and violence of prevailing values,
laughingly deride the life-denying conventions enforced by reactive moralities of taming,
out of awareness conferred by their hard-earned sense of world-historical irony. Their
moral pluralism (quasi-cosmopolitan acceptance of the difference fostered by becoming)
conditions the possibility of philosophers of the future who may hasten humankind’s
going-down and the simultaneous ascendency of the Übermenschen at the dawn of a
post-human future. 90
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Nietzsche’s diagnosis of decadence: the political problem of our age
In our hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern age of dissipating instincts the pursuit
of military and economic greatness, rather than indicating a noble impulse largely
expresses the reified ressentiment of the comprehensive war-machine manifested by the
hegemonic democratic state and neo-liberal economy. It represents the diversion of
needed energy from the noble pursuit of a genuinely life-affirming higher culture. 91 Postindustrial militarism and the exaltation of speed, consumption and wealth has come to
serve as surrogates for all that had previously counted as meaningful cultural activity, as
well as comprising the essential ingredients of the poison-mixers, who concoct pretexts to
reinforce the prerogatives of their destructive apparatus to regulate life on the planet. The
ersatz, philistinic culture they fabricate is effectively vacuous, and directly augments
reactive force by commending ressentiment of authentic health, strength and beauty. Its
sophisticated will to nothingness infuses spectacular forms of desire to distract and
entertain the crowd, thereby inducing amnesia and paralysis. 92
According to Nietzsche the national (now ultra-liberal-modern, globalized) state
depends upon, naturalizes and simultaneously exalts a crass materialism that corresponds
with a misleading notion of individualism. Together these place the highest social value
on monetary wealth. This “wealth” becomes synonymous with conventional success and
personal validation, both of which cover-up a nihilistic (death) drive. 93 Lampert remarks
on Zarathustra’s contempt of the forces such proponents of the state, and its philosophical
initiators, made (and continue to make) use of:
Zarathustra implicitly criticizes Locke and other teachers of the modern
commercial state by condemning the emancipation of acquisitiveness, or of the
desire for more than one needs, that such teachers counseled as the basis of a new
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political order. The modern state also appeals to might, and while Zarathustra has
just roused the martial spirits of his listeners, he judges ignoble the appeal to
might in the modern state, because it is in the service of either mere appetites or
justice as equality.” 94
However, super-states such as the US and EU, whose existence is a symptom of the
dissipative force of hyper-decadence of the present age, rather than merely encouraging
acquisitiveness like their late-modern imperialist predecessors, are increasingly amenable
to redirection by artist–philosophers with the verve to surreptitiously subvert their
sustaining values in plain sight.
These courageous individuals promote potential co-optations of shallow
acquisitiveness—the crass consumerism that realizes the spectacular existential meanings
and simulated ontological purposes circulated by the globalization complex—to liberate
active potentials from, or reverse, its reactive control over bare life. This is to say they
strive to destabilize the reigning anti-natural order that compels instinctual organization
of drives and impulses; the now basic (albeit value-constructed) urges the prevailing
(acquisitive) disposition of herd society in the globalized world indicates. The intensely
all-too-human war-machines or super-states of the present age could, in Nietzsche’s
optimistic view, be transfigured to direct human activity at authentically generative aims.
In Nietzsche’s view human societies result from the gradual amalgamation of
small herds into larger ones through diverse processes of peaceful amalgamation and
violent conquest gives rise to larger communities occupying a geographical territory, with
a shared language, worldview (Weltanschauung) and defining sets of customary norms.
From a people, extraordinary exceptions, or genuine individuals emerges only rarely, and
they are likely to endure persecution or ostracism for being unusual; they may be
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dismissed as eccentric or locked away as insane and even suffer death for the differences
that set them apart from their herd, or community. It is only very recently in the historical
development of human societies that a single person could prosper, let alone survive for
very long outside his community.
The post-Enlightenment notion of the individual was an innovation on the concept
of personhood and the situatedness of the self that was in turn exaggerated in the
Romantic era of the early and mid-19th century. Nietzsche recognized that the latemodern notion of individualism prevalent in his own day was a recent and somewhat
overstated idea of what was practically achievable, much less desirable, for the vast
majority. For the masses, whose utility and highest function was that ordained for them as
a socially-constituted self, self-creation and self-governance were impossible to conceive.
On Nietzsche’s notion of ‘the herd’, Danto observed that:
The herd would have been made up of individuals, but they could not have been
aware of themselves as such, and deviations from the norm would simply have
perished, cast out like alien bodies, through inability to express their wants.
Within each herd there would be a profound and virtually irresistible force
making for homogeneity …there could have been differences between herds,
because each would have worked out its language against the conditions that
made for its survival; and as these vary, so do herds. 95
The herd mentality lends itself to and ramifies the naturalization of slave morality
because people cannot legislate for themselves individually and come to resent anyone
with the strength to do so.
In most societies and epochs some form of the herd mentality and variant of slave
morality (as an intensity relative to the cultural terms with which it corresponds) is likely
to prevail. This is because the mediocre are able, by virtue of their sheer numbers as the
overwhelming majority, to impose an inversion of natural values upon the strongest, the
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natural masters. From these (here very abbreviated) premises Nietzsche provided the first
really radical, genealogical critique of the inter-related phenomena of Judaeo-Christian
morality96, Western rationalism, 97 the metaphysical semiotics of truth 98 and discourses of
modernity 99.
According to Nietzsche’s vitalist conception of the political, institutions in
decadent epochs are organized to stifle the vicissitudinary nature of the human organism,
considered at the individual, micro-level of the political or the communal, macro-level of
political life. The law itself, conceived to facilitate a set of anti-natural ideals, serves this
perverse aim. The function of effective political organization in periods of decline
becomes managing decrepit capacitors whose efficient discharge of the amoral force or
agency of life as will-to-power that involuntarily flows through them falters and
gradually break them down. 100
In healthy ages political institutions serve to augment an instinctual arrangement
(for which the law provides naturalizing grounds) that facilitates the increase of will-topower in capacitors (organisms) at all levels, effectively facilitating change in culturally
specific and therefore salubrious contexts.101 As a political institution cobbled together
from the wreckage of a thoroughly exhausted era, the EU (though still a molar aggregate)
may be utilized to transition Europe and mankind to a higher form of polity – made an
instrument of machinic heterogenesis through / for rhizomatic becomings that reconfigure
ontology and segue us from a human to a transhuman condition. 102
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Fulfilling Nietzsche’s all-too-human desire for a comprehensive revaluation of
values toward the overcoming of humankind: my conjecture
As a primarily reactive, stultifying development of the political drives, arbiters of
conventional state authority in our hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern age may
unwittingly contribute to the transmutation of the reactive values they enforce through the
realization of their vulgar desires. For in doing so they thereby create opportunities for
their antipodes to initiate naturalizing, salubrious revaluations of prevailing herd-values
to enhance human naturalness toward the development of genuinely post-modern, postliberal forms of political community. If the healthiest individuals – burgeoning
übermenschlich types of the present day – can more freely exert themselves and
inadvertently enhance each others’ disparate efforts at self-perfection to the greatest
extent possible thereby, they may redeploy and weaken guises of modernity’s envy, greed
and egocentricity. By masking the radical implications of their aims, they can
approximate the decadent arbiters of spectacular desire to overwork the acutely liberal
disciplinarity of the slave moral matrix that constitutes and sustains conventional
authority, and ultimately exhaust it. Advantageous chances to create the authentically
healthy values necessary for a future, transhuman condition might then be seized upon.
Nietzsche’s notion of the Übermensch should not be (mis)understood according to
the crude and reductive popular stereotypes of it that abound. According to AnsellPearson it was in fact partially conceived against what it was Nietzsche falsely
understood to be the social dimensions of Darwinism:
Nietzsche construes the experimental creation of the Übermensch not in
‘Darwinian’ terms as a superior type evolving through natural selection; rather, he
configures it in terms of a notion of emergent cultural complexity and
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deterritorialization, laying particular stress on the hybridic emergence of diversity
and difference within the order of things. 103
Übermenschlich types may come about quite randomly in the midst of broad institutional
change. Übermenschlich characteristics in strong individuals spur the passions of the
more exceptional, who undertake more rigorous regimens of self-discipline to re-create
themselves. Their emergence occurs in a complex socio-cultural and corresponding
political context. In the right circumstances this generates an authentically agonistic
milieu that stimulates a rupture with the forms of life that preceded (and enabled) it. This
social event provokes others, invigorating some individuals. Their experiments impel
innovative expressions of difference, modify language, and incite the development of
new meanings and change the cultural setting in which they act. This alters the political
environment for further transformations of and experiments on life by the strong.
Eschewing overtly “revolutionary” pseudo-solutions to decadence, exemplary
individuals accept the need to maintain, even develop, familiar economic structures that
partially satisfy the herd’s crude appetites without entirely sating them, thus
disseminating and intensifying the values of neo-liberal capital processes, including its
mutually reinforcing notions of debt, guilt and accountability, and supporting concepts of
(simulated) free-will and responsibility / culpability. They seek to exploit the state’s
sublimated might by redirecting the martial spirit it rouses into activities of commerce
and trade, along with the ressentiment that molds the herd into homo economicus. The
ultra-liberal-modern simulation of freedom as an uninhibited ability to consume is
likened to equal access to products, goods and services which presence reductive notions
of both justice as fairness and equality of opportunity among the all-too-many. This
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perfectly co-extends with representative democracy, which is also consumed by the
multitude. 104
With the attentions of the herd (innumerable, willfully docile subjects of
consensus) absorbed by such endeavors, their preoccupation and surplus production
might afford rare exceptions – who will emerge unexpectedly without respect to social
class or pedigree – a chance to open windows of thought from inside their communities.
The drafts of fresh air let into societies largely enfeebled by a toxic miasma of antinatural values will serve to refresh other, similar types. Once relieved of the oppressive,
disciplinary ressentiment of the herd, which remains distracted by the “need” to consume,
they can do so without suffocating in its poisonous air.
The sort of opportunities Nietzsche believed his philosophers of the future would
involuntarily create for revaluing the hyper-decadent values of our ultra-liberal-modern
age are being made possible through unanticipated abstract potentials of globality. These
possibilities are continuously generated from the cycle of responses and/or oppositions to
the prerogatives and hegemony of the conventional globalization complex. Both as
unwitting and quite conscious comedians of the reigning ascetic-consumerist ideals, these
kynical ironists engage in imaginative subversions, deflections and creative
incorporations of the globalization complex. They undermine its ongoing effort to reinterpolate all that defies or escapes it and all those it reduces to citizen-constituents, the
subjects of its dissipative order. 105
It would not be inaccurate to state that Nietzsche’s “oppositional ethics” (or
agonistic method of valuating) may be rendered into a very complex and thoroughly
unconventional—or authentically agonistic—adversarial politics (if only because
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morality, a symptom of desire, always subtends the political), but the term oppositional
must be understood in a particular Nietzschean sense. This will become clear in the
affective practices (praxis) it suggests, which will strike many fervent, ultra-liberalmodern crusaders as counter-intuitive. Based on a skeptical, ephectic drive, it does not
correspond to the usual methods or aims of “revolutionary” programs (i.e.: it does not
advocate the immediate overthrow or destruction of prevailing hierarchies for the
liberation of the masses). This paper therefore constitutes an examination of how
Nietzsche’s oppositional morality could serve as a basis for transforming contemporary
political life via the action of good Europeans.
However, in utilizing his critical framework I do not rigorously interrogate the
presuppositions of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics, within which his theory of will-to-power,
decadence, force, self-overcoming, etc., figure importantly. To do so would replicate
work others have done better than I could and divert me from my aims. Yet I
acknowledge that, as Conway observes, Nietzsche’s critique of his age is an immanent
one and no empirical evidence can convincingly substantiate the grounds he gives us for
his appraisal or persuade us to accept his universalization of the philosophical
explanations or conclusions he develops from it. It failed to resonate more broadly in
Nietzsche’s own lifetime largely because it did not adequately capture the complex
dynamics of the (very real) sweeping changes he saw occurring throughout Europe and
the world. This is mainly because his appraisal (for reasons arguably similar to the
theoretical weaknesses that plagued Marx’s analysis of the transformative forces of his
age) did not adequately appreciate the political significance of perceived enhancements in
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the material conditions of life for millions of human beings throughout Europe in
Nietzsche’s own day.
These ostensible improvements were an apparent result of technological /
scientific innovation, advances partially attributable to the post-Enlightenment ethos of
liberal-modernity. Whatever the actual relation, ultra-liberal-modern ideologues claimed
as “advancement” each transformation of everyday life that scientific progress,
technological innovations and industrialization produced. They were less willing to
attribute the homicidal / suicidal excesses of that same technology—typified by the
Holocaust and Hiroshima—as similarly resulting from the liberal-modern ethos,
however. 106
Less an analytical failure than evidence of his consistent incredulity toward
“progress”, Nietzsche’s unique analysis leads to interesting and not entirely unpersuasive
results. Nor, when applied with specificity, are its conclusion merely ex post facto
confirmations of its premises. It even seems to have provided Nietzsche with some
measure of predictive power, as he presciently anticipated some of the turmoil that
marked the last century of European history. I maintain that the apodicity and veridicality
of Nietzsche’s system (including the will to power hypothesis, corresponding theory of
decadence and eternal return of the same) is no more vulnerable to positivistic critique
than any of the major philosophical systems in Western intellectual history. 107 However,
Nietzsche’s provides a distinctly effective means—via his perspectivalist epistemology
and hermeneutics—for critiquing the metaphysical presuppositions of positivistic
scientism.
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Aesthetic politics, the problem of decadence and Nietzsche’s philosophers of the
future
Nietzsche’s conception of the political is highly aesthetic, which strikes many
conventional political scientists as counter-intuitive, if not absurd. He understands the
political as the organization and maintenance of a communal life. As such it is a specific
form of aesthetic or cultural practice concerning the creation of superlative individuals.
He maintained “beauty is for the few” (pulchrum est paucorum hominem), a phrase he
employs sporadically throughout his works, 108 and it is clear that he may be accurately
understood as an aristocratic radical in the sense that the healthy / decadent continuum of
his vitalist politics describes a spectrum ranging from higher to lower ordering among the
disparate forms of human life. These correspond with the differing capacities and
instinctual organizations of types of people without regard to their ethnic, racial or
cultural origin. The health of the human organism is his chief concern and the basis of his
vitalist politics and power ontology. He contends that healthy and sick types occur within
and among all human groups, but certain cultural forms enhance the health (strength) or
exacerbate the sickness (decadence) of the society from which they arise. The goal of
politics—understood as the intrinsically creative endeavor of organizing human
communities—ought to be the cultivation of those most capable of flourishing (the
strongest, healthiest types). This is dependent on the systematic enhancement of a
salubrious culture (Bildung) toward the elevation of the species.
Nietzsche hierarchy of values and related rank order of types (Rangordnung) was
conceived to reflect the natural qualities and dissimilarities between individuals; therefore
he cannot be construed as an elitist in the ordinary sense. This aspect of his vitalism
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constitutes a key part of his politics, and if one can accept its premises it is arguably the
most inclusive sort of partiality. It is a notion that can be traced back in origin through the
Western philosophical tradition, specifically in the works of Machiavelli, Aristotle and
Plato, each of whom provided similar conceptions of the proper aim of a polity: the
enhancement of the natural talents and best features of their populaces, especially the
health of the community’s strongest members.
From such a perspective, Nietzsche saw the intensifying decadence of European
life in the late 19th century as symptomatic of the diminishing significance of these
essential collective meanings. This was confirmed by the erosion of traditional authority,
the rise of socialism, anarchism and a nihilistic relativism that actively rejected all
meaning. Nietzsche perceived an ominous portent in developments, asserting that they
augured trouble for Europe’s immediate future. He presciently foresaw that the
dissipation of shared beliefs and unifying meanings would, in “the next century, bring the
struggle for the domination of the earth” between the most dangerous factions. This
would produce “the compulsion to great politics” in the best individuals as well, namely
those strong enough to resist the spreading infirmity of the age. It was in this latter,
hopeful possibility that his optimism was sustained.
Nietzsche believed the prevailing condition of decadence was bound to lead to
wars the like of which the world had never known. Consistent with the ultra-liberalmodernist project’s reactive will-to-truth, alternative visions of the future—as
possibilities for becoming—were to be preemptively eliminated. In the most extreme
cases, such as that of the National Socialist takeover of Germany, the logic of abolishing
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all difference cultivated an association of every sort of otherness, however insignificant,
with an existential threat to society itself.
The cliché Difference engendre haine arises from recognition that the dissimilar
frightens and unfamiliar customs or beliefs often provoked conflicts between peoples.
But hatred of difference itself (whatever its origin or identification) functioned to
intensify them throughout the early twentieth century. This negative compulsion to great
politics first arose in different strains of nationalism and socialism vying with (equally
reactive) free-market capitalism for hegemony over the continent. Proponents of differing
forms of the liberal-modernist ideology vied to eliminate their liberal-modernist
“opponents”. Through this ultimate war on difference, waged in the latter half of the
century by non-lethal means, the liberal-modernist project has succeeded in unifying
Europe through the systematic, ongoing standardization and mediocritization of much of
what was/is distinctive and differentiating; the banalization of precisely those qualities
which by their nature formerly provoked regenerative competition on the continent. 109
Yet, as this “disease of will” hastens Europe’s cultural degeneration, a newly
invigorated and unified will to defy enforced massification and homogenization of
difference has developed in spite of and in distinction to it.110 The simultaneous
improvement of the type man through the creative acts of courageous exceptions is being
effectuated by those ‘good Europeans’ of our age. 111 However, the reactive momentum of
globalization (understood as a plane of consistency that inhibits lines of flight), is
symptomatic of a negative will to impose a universal normative order.
The aim of this order is the containment of becoming-other through the
worldwide extension of uniform desire to co-opt and interpolate difference. Globalization
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ramifies the hyper-decadence of European cultural realm’s declining age and,
culminating in a nihilistic form of Empire, suggests the wars of the twentieth century may
have been a minor prelude of the all-too-human paroxysms such nihilism may yet spawn.
That a state-driven process of European integration has occurred largely through the work
of ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment and culminated in the EU and Europe’s
other chief supranational institutions (the OSCE and COE) does not, of course, mean that
Nietzsche’s idea of Europe is in any way attained. It does suggest however, that
opportunities for the over-coming of the state form are being generated—if unwittingly—
by the aforementioned arbiters of integration (a potential that is examined below). In
contrast to the motives for integration espoused by conventional Europeanists,
Nietzsche’s:
…vision of what it means to be a “good European” is intellectually more
persuasive in a secular context because it allows for an experimental questioning
of the will-to-truth; that is supremely affirmative of an understanding of existence
that does not try to vest all of its creative efforts in ascetic ideals; that
demonstrates immense spiritual vitality and courage in understanding this
experiment; and that is also more optimistic than the pessimistic reaction found in
much of the literature on the crisis of the European idea. 112
Such an experimental questioning (via Nietzsche’s own vitalist politics) of the motivating
will-to-truth behind both defunct and current ideas of Europe expressed in their differing
visions of the continent’s future, serves as a basis for devising and implementing the
means of attaining a supremely affirmative idea of Europe rooted in the most lifeaffirming or inclusive will-to-truth conceivable. Of particular interest here is that reactive
statist will-to-truth epitomized by the institutionalized aims of the EU, against which
Nietzsche’s idea of Europe emphasizes the multiplicity of types, wealth of difference and
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correspondingly tremendous diversity of possible becomings Europe and its broader
cultural realm contains, all of which his ‘good Europeans’ seek to radically enhance.
The EU, despite being the product of a primarily molar state-form, provides
mechanisms through the ultra-liberal-modernist norms and ideals it naturalizes that ‘good
Europeans’ of the Nietzschean variety can utilize to achieve their objectives. These
objectives include instantiating an “order” conducive to the continuous enhancement and
utmost thriving of humankind’s highest exemplars through a comprehensive revaluation
of the now ubiquitous ascetic-consumerist values that construct and delimit possibilities
for desiring in contemporary life. Corresponding with the conative disposition or
anticipatory resoluteness that may be fortified by globality in our era of globalization, it
is probable that an increasing number of exceptional individuals—European or other
persons globally—are becoming amenable to and capable of undertaking such a radical
revaluing of the values characteristic of globalization.
However, these are largely latent potentials; positive becomings continually
struggling to overcome the inhibiting forces of our media dominated era of massconsumerism, which squanders much potential through myriad diversions and
entertainments while making a veritable religion of labor/work through the reification of
productivity. 113 Nietzsche deduced that Europe’s deteriorating culture would gestate
potentials for renewed authenticity, condemning Europe’s burgeoning “commercial
culture” which deleteriously inhibits strong instincts “at the expense of manifesting
human presence”. 114 The “fundamental idea of a commercial culture” concerned a
negative type of appraisal, the act of evaluating the worth of a thing, be it material goods,
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a work of art or ideas themselves, according to a coarse supply and demand calculus that
distorts and prejudices all values. 115
This type of assessment, based upon the mass appeal of a thing, panders to the
lowest common denominator and achieves hegemony as the reified mode of appraisal
over all other modes of valuing as a commercial culture develops. It is also dependent –
as Marx famously expounded – upon a new form of wage-labor; a degrading form of
servitude that alienates its subjects from themselves and the product of their toil while it
evacuates all “spirit” from the dehumanized culture it perpetuates. Nietzsche saw this
development as one coextending with the democratic ethos or leveling tendency of his
day. Nietzsche fully expected its effects to be intensified and thoroughly naturalized in
the 20th century; a form of character perversion “imprinted in every will and every
faculty: it is this of which …men of the coming century will be proud if the profits of the
commercial class are right to give it into your possession!” 116
This reactive becoming-same (or “molarity”) has resulted in a highly sublimated
form of (self-)glorified slavery, as young men who might otherwise cultivate their nobler
character or talent or the industry innate to themselves are systematically employed
instead: “purloined from themselves, trained to being worn out daily and taught to regard
this as a matter of duty.” These “poor beasts of burden”, the vast majority, are, in a
commercial culture, methodically habituated to perceiving labor for others as an intrinsic
good in their own self-interest. “[T]hey cannot do without it and would not have it
otherwise.” 117
While the herd occupies itself, working to earn its living and partake of frivolous
entertainments, certain anomalous or untimely individuals are likely to be “freed” by the
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surplus of its toil to dedicate themselves to nobler aesthetic creation. 118 In becoming
‘good Europeans’ they come to recognize and diagnose the affliction of decadence
sustained and perpetuated by the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. Thenceforth
their struggle is one of limiting and ultimately reversing the infirmity it spreads:
democratization and its concomitant leveling tendency via an absurdly egalitarian
populist ethos and its cultivation of an obedient “type prepared for slavery in the most
subtle sense.” 119 Their “cure” requires the therapeutic exploitation of the vast potential of
this circumstance. Turning the disease of liberal values against itself, ‘good Europeans’
subvert the debilitating hegemonic order from within and gradually establish a natural
political arrangement predicated on a rank order of perspectives. The hierarchic order
they strive after would allow the existing “wealth of types” 120 to prosper and even
sanction its expansion so to maximally facilitate becoming. Such a natural order would
abet the enlargement of greatness and enhance the dignity and capabilities of every sort
of person, allowing the fullest expression of Dasein. 121
Toward attaining the fullest realization of this, ‘good Europeans’ intuitively
recognize the paradoxical value of reactivity and the intensified decadence of our age:
technological innovation has diversified the variety of forms creative impulses may
take. 122 Properly directed, the fruits of the negative will are not (and cannot correctly be
understood as) limited to the passive resignation or frenzied consumption of the
contented and blinking last man, 123 for the state of affairs that sustains the herd’s pathetic
condition may counter-intuitively inspire the odd great work of visual art, drama,
literature or music.
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Rather, a multitude of possible contributions, the like of which Nietzsche could
not have anticipated have (in the form of broadly delivered basic education, astonishing
feats of engineering and advanced communication; certain applications of technology to
food production—the so-called “green revolution”; radical innovations in medicine and
health care, etc.) provided a sense of ersatz “spiritualization,” that is, a palliative sense of
meaning that is not altogether valueless. It is sufficient for the herd, whose members are
incapable of the sort of freedom expressed in the strength symptomatic of the
extraordinary conation 124, and anankê 125, characteristic of the will-to-power enacted by
best types, pluripotent exceptions. The majority’s indifference—or at least, ignorance—
of those higher types’ struggle for self-perfection is useful for insulating the latter, who
are hardly imputrescible, from the debasing influence of the bourgeois vulgarians who
define “good taste”, determine “propriety” and dominate “culture” in a declining age
such as our own. The apathy of the mediocre majority vis-à-vis their own genuine
becoming leads to the state of fallenness and their eventual ruinance, (Heidegger’s notion
for of a in which they no longer have time to care about their own lives). Although this
condition inspires the freest spirits with dread, the weak settle into a passive acceptance
of it and find a perverse form of contentment thereby. Their dread spurs them into
oppositional stance toward this condition of hyper-decadence and the arbiters of such
extremely nihilistic values that come to be taken by the all-too-many as commonplace.
Nietzsche saw the historic role of ascetic priests of ressentiment as that of
promoting all-too-human notions of equality and the fatuous ideals of a fictive socialjustice to inhibit and/or corrupt those would-be exceptions. Ascetic priest are the great
despisers of life who foster values of self-denial and proclaim the inferiority of this world
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in part as a means of defusing the potential greatness of rare exceptions who are
otherwise likely to undermine their authority. They sought, as Nietzsche puts it, to “level
mountain and valley”, to weaken the strong in order to protect themselves and gain power
over others, namely their betters.
However, I will argue below that the obliviousness of the many to the daunting
potential of the very exceptional few, and even their opposition to the idea of greatness as
it undermines their belief in the intrinsic equality of all, can actually be cultivated by
insuring the former’s relative comfort through a steady rise in their levels of
consumption. This is conventionally understood by contemporary ascetic-consumerist
priests of ressentiment as their ‘standard of living’ and re-presented to the all-too-many
as an “objective” indicator of “improvement” in the lives more generally. In complex
ways it corresponds with current conceptions of “empowerment”, ideals of prosperity and
jejune and narcissistic notions of happiness.
It also corresponds—in the opposite direction—with (residually Christian)
moralistic efforts to deflect attention away from puerile and vain efforts at selfaffirmation that conflict with the values of humility and the celebrated rejection of the
corporeal. In this direction the striving for meaning and purpose is conducted toward
raising the material prosperity of those who are comparatively poor. The pity of the rich
is deliberately focused on the needs of the “destitute”, particularly those inhabiting exotic
locales. The value systems of these underdeveloped societies are systematically
discredited and subverted so that they may come to perceive and believe themselves to be
disadvantaged. Their “deprivation” is them given various causes so that blame for it can
be ascribed and effort more coherently made to ameliorate their plight and correct their
79

deficiency. On the macro-economic level billions of dollars in aid is lent to the
governments of poor countries, which over decades produced even greater pretexts for
pity among the citizens of rich, developed nations, as a new class of highly indebted poor
countries arose in which misery and suffering seemed more pronounced and urgent than
ever. 126
Nietzsche’s meta-politics is concerned precisely with the production of conditions
of possibility for versatile “freer” spirits, rather than the elimination of suffering. Among
those with the strength to encourage, intensify and exploit the perverse conditions of
contemporary life to their own ends (self-overcoming in the pursuit of excellence) the
aim sought is the fruition of a more profound and willful suffering. The active generation
of a vital culture seeks to elevate and ultimately, develop mankind. 127 In the future it may
do so by extricating the strongest from our miasmic condition of hyper-decadence in
globalization 128, pulling them back from a nihilistic abyss of meaninglessness in which
the rest will willingly and perhaps “happily” remain, according to their own all-toohuman, perverse standard.
Throughout his career-long critique of late-modernity Nietzsche maintained that
“democracy has ever been the form of decline in organizing power,” and he characterized
“modern democracy, along with its hybrids such as the “German Reich” as the form of
decline of the state.” 129 He maintained that the “solitary personality”:
…can maintain and develop itself most easily in a democratic society: namely,
when the coarser means of defense are no longer necessary and habits of order,
honesty, justice and trust are part of the usual conditions. 130
This fascinating note betrays Nietzsche’s awareness of the practical and strategic use that
the highest affirmers of life could make of conventional morality and ochlocratic
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(literally mob-power) forms of political organization—such as democracy—that it
spawned.
In precisely this context I assert that the nomothetic acts of ‘good Europeans’, by
legislating the emerging, deterritorializing global age, will assist the perfection of the EU
in ways likely to transform it beyond recognition. In so doing they will overcome its
present reactive form so that their heirs may eventually dispense with the exhausted and
repressive state form entirely, as well as the inhibition of human potential it comprises.
This is to speak of what is required to bring to parturition the age of globality—a
transhuman future—that now gestates within a few.
David Owen has constructively expanded on the appearance of such individuals.
He understands Nietzsche to be advocating the instantiation of an authentic rank order of
values (Rangordnung) corresponding with the natural hierarchy of perspectives and types
to cultivate exemplars (e.g., ‘good Europeans’) whose great cultural achievements will
hasten the ultimate overcoming of the ascetic ideals that inhibit the improvement (and
overcoming) of the species man. 131 This objective would require the intensification of
every dimension of our all-too-human existence, and does not suggest a leaping over man
but his metamorphosis. Nietzsche hoped to accelerate the elimination of the conceptual–
physiological constraints on becoming introduced by the false Christian-Platonic binaries
that differentiated a true, noumenal world from the apparent (and therefore “inferior”)
phenomenal world. In so doing ‘good Europeans’ like himself would reestablish the
primacy of a tragic view of the self over the disabling moral view of the self.
The tragic idea of the self corresponds with the prevailing Greek notion prior to
the Socratic reification of reason over passion. In this natural “tragic” view, agents are
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inseparable from their actions, which are articulated through fate and express a good
conscience. The moral idea of the self privileges “truth” over eros to postulate the notion
of accountability; by falsely separating an agent from his acts it provides a basis for the
concept of guilt, allowing the assignation of culpability and punishment, practices
symptomatic of bad-conscience. 132 In broader, macro-level political terms pertaining to
Nietzsche’s own notion of liberation, Ansell–Pearson cites ‘Of old and new law-tables”
from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, writing that the passage:
…makes clear that liberation consists in freeing ourselves from the metaphysics
of morality and the morality of metaphysics; compulsion, dogma or statute, and
the metaphysical categories (necessity and purpose, good and evil, etc.). In short,
the innocence of becoming, of time as such, is to be restored, and where time qua
transience is conceived as the moment that both gathers and splits up the past and
future. 133
Such innocence of becoming occurs to varying degrees among the range of types
separated by the pathos of distance. Only once modernity’s illusory notion of
metaphysical freedom is forgotten—after the long period of decadence which we are in
ends—will rare, genuine free spirits be able to stand above humankind and revel in the
innocence of their becoming.
Smith states that, “philosophers of the future”, for lacking the necessary native
volition, will remain “locked in a Spirit of Revenge” never to experience the autonomy of
the good Europeans Nietzsche anticipates. However, they “can, properly trained, be the
Free-Spirit’s ‘well trained hounds’ and ‘servants’,” who will be “implicated as priests in
[the] new religiosity” that affirms Dasein through a conscious engagement with the
abysmal ground of our Being-unto-death, experienced as ecstatic Dionysian insight into
No-thingness that stimulates renewed (Apollonian) orderings and creation. 134 Though the
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philosophers of the future might recognize the contingency of all values and truths, they
are compelled to create values and enforce them dogmatically by the requirement of
impressing forms upon and providing stable meanings to those who cannot survive
without them (the vast majority).
The project for philosophical laborers on the noble model of Kant and Hegel is to
establish some large class of given values… and press it into formulas, whether in
the realm of logic or politics (morality) or art. It is up to these researchers to make
everything that has happened or been valued so far look clear, obvious,
comprehensible, and manageable, to abbreviate everything long, even “time”
itself, and to overwhelm the entire past. 135
The all-too-many, who “need to have form impressed upon them from without”, must
eventually be made to forget the counter-productive chimera of metaphysical freedom
through new values whose grounds seem naturally indisputable. 136 This is necessary in
order to create a base upon which both the cultivation of humankind through
philosophical education and breeding can be sustained, and the leisure required by
“genuine, revenge-free ‘free Spirits’” who are the only ones capable of authentic
philosophic individuality and spiritual liberation can be supported. 137 Such an
“aristocratic ethos” is inclusive insofar as it promotes the attainment of a diverse and
natural rank ordering of types that serves as a moral backdrop for all. It constitutes a
moral code that has nothing to do with the (modern) drive to transform morality into a
science, which it will have overcome. 138
This recognition of varying degrees of (un)freedom corresponding to the quanta
of force one may expend as will-to-power and the grouping of types for social
expediency pertaining thereto has interesting implications vis-à-vis the perceived need for
a re-authenticated ‘idea of Europe,’ to serve as a ground for the project of European
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unification in our ultra-liberal-modern, hyper-decadent age of sublimated nihilism. Elbe
usefully observes that since the death of god imbuing Europe with a meaningful idea of
itself—the task of philosophers of the future—would prove difficult.
In Nietzsche’s account the demand for a more meaningful idea of Europe would
persist not only because of the pragmatic necessities of European policy-makers,
but also because Europeans have traditionally been accustomed to having the
balm of metaphysics and ‘true’ worlds to fall back upon in their quest to find the
deeper meaning of existence. 139
Elbe correctly concludes (in the same section) that this would invariably be experienced
“as a profound loss of spiritual vitality”, and would likely give rise to nostalgia for
defunct notions of Europe and reactive ideals of what constitutes “European-ness”.
Indeed, such reaction presently plagues efforts to define what characteristics
warrant full, formal inclusion—via various sorts of codified legal enfranchisements and
citizenship, etc.—in the emerging EU polity, as well as its arbiters’ attempts to construct
a new European identity and corresponding ethos. The latter’s ever more uniformly
(mimetically) articulated expression of the EU’s will-to-truth across its disparate member
states, as well as a simultaneous profusion of dissenting wills emanating from various
corners of the continent are all symptomatic of the anxiety over identity-as-belonging that
the project itself has generated. A truly Nietzschean idea of Europe would likely seem
incomprehensible to many citizens of the Union across the political spectrum, including
both those who support the project and those advocating their nation’s withdrawal from
it, according to the impulse, whatever its manifestation, to systematically exclude others
from each based upon their national origins, cultural heritage, ethnicity or race. 140
The ideals of inclusion and efforts at protecting diversity upon which the EU’s
social, political and cultural statutes are predicated are putatively antithetical to such
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chauvinisms, which arise in opposition to the attributes of individuals that stand to enrich
European-ness and life on the continent. 141 The aspiration of forging a unity out of the
continent’s diverse panoply of peoples and types reflects the EU’s origin in an accountgiving endeavor motivated in part by a spirit of revenge against time and Europe’s
collective past, particularly the horrors of World War Two. It also indicates an aversion
to certain kinds of radical difference and a corresponding effort to homogenize the most
(conflicting) opposite values and variations within its domain.
EU human rights statutes and civil laws guaranteeing regional autonomy, cultural
protections, universal enfranchisement and legal equality comprise the primary and
arguably most positive expression of its attempts to preserve authentic diversity whilst
forging a new and expanded unity, albeit not for the conventional slave-moral ethos upon
which they are predicated. Such efforts usually breed reaction, as they constrain maximal
freedom and becoming in various and complex ways in order to protect and nurture the
weak. They also replicate identic essentialisms privileged by the EU’s newly instituted
order while discrediting and condemning those deemed unfavorable to it. 142 This
disciplinary mechanism compounds the grief inflicted upon a growing number by their
shared awareness “that we can no longer believe those dogmas of religion and
metaphysics” that formerly provided us with comforting essentialisms and secure
grounds for living. 143
The spectrum of these reactions (both positive and negative in conventional
liberal terms) epitomize the profound naturalization of the spirit of revenge, as it
corresponds with the deepening crisis of nihilism characteristic of contemporary life both
within the Anglo-European cultural realms and outside of them in the age of
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globalization. The universal dissemination of Europe’s hyper-decadent, ultra-liberalmodern values means that its predicament of nihilism and meaninglessness is being
experienced in some form or other nearly everywhere in the world.
The slave-moral pessimistic disposition toward the human condition, which is
typified by a rejection of Dionysian reverie and its embrace of the tragic, in favor of the
mitigation of all suffering, is being gradually universalized by the globalization complex.
This should not be surprising however, nor is it entirely lamentable as “Nietzsche
predicted that only large empires would be capable of acting politically in the age of
global politics at the culmination of modernity.” 144 The global spread of the European
form of decadence promotes a brand of pessimism which inhibits recognition of the
“supranational, nomadic cosmopolitan type” that is developing out of its decay, which –
as Nietzsche hoped – is realizing the possibility of “a united European people capable of
the task of global mastery,” for which the multiple, mutually reinforcing spectacles of
globalization are prevenient. 145
The “mastery” of which Nietzsche spoke – and fervently advocated – should not
be misconstrued in terms of a frightening imposition of power-over-others in the tradition
of conventional tyranny or antagonistic and coercive power relations. Rather, it referred
to the crucial project of self-mastery toward radical self-affirmation by which the
healthiest become who it is they are, and to their mastery over the world via the
nomothetic acts they spontaneously perform that provoke (the eros of) others, spurring
their emulation in the socio-political realm. 146 These are plainly taking form in our world
via the realization of abstract potentials of globality which are evident in myriad aspects
of contemporary life in nearly all regions of the world.
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This ‘global mastery’ involves the recognition and acceptance of diversity and
purposeful enrichment of disparate types, each fortified by their respectful
acknowledgement of the other. The task facing good Europeans—“atheists and
immoralists”—is to increase that mastery and direct it to life-affirming projects. This
would come to involve the highest exemplars of every European people and enhance the
development of an advanced, supra-European awareness (Bildung). 147 It would serve to
strengthen those capable of flourishing and edify the hoi polloi with meaning and
purpose. I argue below that such developments are being actualized in the present
through the vis creativa inherent to emergent abstract potentials of globality.
Among Nietzsche’s primary objectives was that of inspiring his readers to
“become ‘good Europeans’”. 148 He hoped to arouse astute iconoclasts, spurring them to
dispense with anti-natural moral conventions and intellectual prejudices. Their passionate
works, as kynical ironists would productively lampoon the decadent values of our age.
This would provide a palliative to the nihilism that dissipates the volitional resources of
Europe’s peoples, especially those who would other-wise emerge as its highest
exemplars. Moreover, it would facilitate the realization of an idea of Europe
corresponding with the ambition of Nietzsche’s aristocratically radical political
philosophy and his recognition “that Europe wants to become one”. 149
In advocating the notion of ‘good Europeanism’ Nietzsche sought to recuperate
elements of a mainly defunct set of ideals and persuade future free spirits to dedicate
themselves to creating a new Europe (and world) in which the best and healthiest would
legislate with the aim of improving humankind physically, intellectually and
“spiritually”. This idea of Europe would be the culmination of his project of translating
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man back into nature to overcome the nihilism of the present. 150 He expected it to prompt
Europeans to “transcend narrow nationalism and accomplish a mingling of many old
races and stocks”, a process that would ultimately culminate in a “new European
culture. 151
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BOOK TWO
Toward What End Does Europe Want to Become One? Polity Making and the
Theorization of European Integration
Section One
Nietzsche’s perspectivalist epistemology and corresponding critique of science: the
political as world-creation and interpretation
Introduction
In this book I critique theories of European integration and the purposes they
serve through the perspectivalist lenses of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power
ontology. 152 Such a thought experiment, and the unconventional analysis is provides,
strives to deduce the function of values informing conceptualizations of Europe’s
integration and the organization of the EU itself, as well as the motives for those values.
It illuminates “the preponderating power of the moral prejudices” that underlies the
project of integrating Europe and unconsciously informs rationales for it. 153 This provides
insights into the maintenance of established understanding (perspectives) of Europe and
their incremental transformation within the dominant ultra-liberal-modern ideological
matrix. 154
Through this assessment I seek to furnish a Nietzschean understanding of the
recent construction and evolving role of European identity/ies. ‘Popular culture’ is also
considered as a force advancing ascetic-consumerist ideals in the economic integration
and socio-political amalgamation of the continent. A doxographical survey toward
genealogical critique, this appraisal of mainstream scholarly theorizing of European
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integration from the end of World War Two to the present sets up my exposition of how
the good Europeans Nietzsche anticipated might cheerfully engage in the task of
remaking the continent and the world.
The books following this one specify the aim of good Europeans in doing so, that
chiefly being to revalue the reactive values out of which the EU developed in accordance
with their quasi-cosmopolitan, active values. They thereby seek to inaugurate a new,
revitalized era predicated on a genuinely agonistic socio-political milieu for the
generation of an authentic culture. Against the sickening nihilism of our hyper-decadent
age which good Europeans seek to end, such a life-affirming environment would
augment the flourishing of those with the health necessary to truly prosper. Nietzsche
envisaged that in doing so these Übermenschlich, if preparatory exceptions would elevate
the human species and hasten its eventual overcoming. He considered this objective of
culture the greatest of all conceivable ‘political’ endeavors.
Recalling Laplace’s dictum, “[t]he weight of evidence for an extraordinary claim
must be proportioned to its strangeness”, I must acknowledge that Nietzsche’s arguments
pose weighty challenges to the precepts of ordinary social science and democratic
political theory. This includes explicating how such theories indicate variations on the
prevailing, anti-natural will to truth, assessing their value for certain forms of life or
modes of being-in-the-world, and prospects for their eventual transmutation into lifeaffirming practices through a revaluation of our hyper-decadent values. The assessment is
supported by discursive critique and empirical analysis, as well analysis of the mutuallyconstitutive role ideology plays in the generation and legitimation of such theories and
how the mainstream of the field they comprise has recently been challenged in ways that
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suggest how conventional understandings about European integration may be overcome
to transform Europe in authentically life-affirming ways.
In sections one and two of this book I examine Nietzsche’s anti-dogmatic
perspectivalist hermeneutical and epistemological stance and coextending vitalism in
terms of how such a critical framework may be utilized to glean an understanding of
contemporary theories of European integration. I draw on Nietzsche’s texts and on
seminal assessments of his critique of science, utilizing his critique of the metaphysical
presuppositions of certain, persistent notions within Western philosophy, such as free will
and the autonomy of the putatively agentic individual. I also employ his related critiques
of the univocality of reason and the corresponding (empiricist) prejudices of science to
show how its knowledge creation for ‘Truth’ legitimation inhibits the conditions
necessary for authentic culture, which Nietzsche’s new philosophy, or gay science, would
be tasked with providing. 155
Nietzsche deduced that empirical science cannot, despite popular misconceptions
of it, be self-grounding. His desire (itself implicated in the same Christian–Platonic will
to truth that generated science 156) to establish a more plausible or naturalistic basis for
knowledge prompted a critical endeavor to push scientific reason to its furthest logical
consequences. In so doing he illuminated the metaphysical faith in reason perpetuated by
the cultural framework it had spawned. He thereby recognized, as Ansell Pearson notes,
that “[s]cience suffers from the fact that it lacks independence, that it is always placed in
the service of a value-creating power, never creating values.” However, rather than reject
science for seeming to provide itself with an axiomatic starting point, Nietzsche reconceived it in aesthetic terms, as a form of artistic production, with art understood as an
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instinctive interpretative/creative endeavor impelled by the anorganic force conducted by
and involuntarily discharged (given expression) through life. By doing so he sought “to
give articulation to a gay science” capable of overcoming a “science [that] unconsciously
performs its own kind of revenge on man by arriving at results that serve to belittle
him.” 157
The privileging of scientific reason over all other means of knowledge creation
via the contemporary discourse of scientism originates in a will to truth that coextends
with (and was arguably formative of) the ideologically hegemonic metadiscourse of ultraliberal-modernity. The reactive interests of the modern state, which seeks to realize the
ideals of ultra-liberal-modernity and employs the discourses of scientism to rationalize
this operation, are served as well, thereby. Through its ultimately linguistic (artistic)
depiction of the ‘real’—an institutional instantiation of a will to nothingness that
culminates in hyper-decadence—the metaphoricity of scientific reason, particularly as
manifested in contemporary political science and theories of European integration, has
momentous epistemological implications for the self-understanding of individuals and
communities. Nietzsche’s vitalist conception of art and the perspectivalist hermeneutic to
which it gives rise provides the critical disposition and corresponding methodology of the
doxographical survey and genealogical analysis of the major theories of European
integration that follows.
Nietzsche was quite enthusiastic about the potential of science and its uses for the
elevation of humankind. However, while engaged in the major debates of his day –
particularly biologism and evolution (both of which significantly influenced his own
thought) he was very critical of the fetishization it was undergoing. These mid- and late
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19th century developments were formative of many contemporary popular conceptions of
science. They led to the reification entailed in the privileging of scientific methodologies
as a means for ascertaining ‘truth’ to “sustain, legitimate and reinvigorate the values of
the Judaeo-Christian tradition, [and reconstruct] religious orthodoxies in a secular,
scientific form” in the wake of the death of God. 158 Nietzsche recognized the dangers this
presented of a new, metaphysical dogmatism, particularly as science was systematically
deployed to discredit other forms of knowledge creation. 159
Throughout this book I aim to show that however effectively Nietzsche’s
perspectivalist hermeneutical and epistemological stance questioned some of the
principle conceits of Western philosophy (and by extension, science) he ultimately does
not—and did not intend to—wholly reject analytical science. 160 Nietzsche meant only to
situate science as one method of accessing the world; one particularly effective
theoretical approach within the encompassing framework of his meta-theoretical
perspectivalism, “which shifts the basis of the problem of science from science to art and
then beyond the question of art to the question of life”. 161 Therefore his actual position on
this complex subject—as well as many others—is at odds with the popular caricature of
his thought as comprising an unnuanced form of relativism.
Holding Nietzsche’s critique to be successful on its own terms, I argue that it
offers significant insights into the limitations of science, particularly as applied to the
study of the social realm with specific relevance to the examination of political processes
undertaken by theories of European integration. In so doing it conversely illuminates the
proper place and acknowledges the benefits of mainstream positivistic, analytic,
objectivist scientific practice. Similarly, Nietzsche would have approved of today’s
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normative social science as a legitimate form of knowledge generation, but objected to its
underlying values, or ideological motivations. He would have understood it—and its
“reality-falsifying simplifications”—as a ressentiment-driven project symptomatic of our
hyper-decadent, cynical age. 162
The third section of this book consists of the aforementioned doxographical
survey of the major schools of integration theory within a broadly genealogical evaluative
framework. It comprises the bulk of this book, and aims to point toward an understanding
of how the discipline—as a knowledge–power regime in the Foucaultian sense—has
developed. The evolution of the field (considered in terms of a disciplinary power–
knowledge regime) is understood first in terms of the development and maturation of an
epistemic community, and second as comprising a veritable research tradition. Third, and
lastly, I survey some of the ways this mainstream has recently been challenged in
productive ways by post-Nietzschean critical methodologies that have illuminated some
of the field’s strengths and weaknesses. The section also aims to demonstrate how the
power–knowledge regime it comprises corresponds with the hegemonic values (metadiscourse) of ultra-liberal-modernity and its coercive project of universalizing a
secularized form of slave-morality, the decadence of which Nietzsche saw as the
European sickness.
In the books that follow this one, contemporary Europe is shown to be a catalyst
for augmenting both life-affirming and life-denying developments, the balance of which
will be critical to the future of humankind. In book three, Europe, under the aegis of the
EU, is situated in and shown to comprise a major organ—or power constellation—of the
broader globalization complex. The decadently nihilistic ethos of globalization is
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contrasted with the positive abstract potentials of globality to which it gives rise and
which good Europeans might exploit both to become who they are and to effect a
revaluation of values. Finally, in book four, I explain how the EU can be hijacked,
exploited and redirected by good Europeans, as I contend it can be throughout the work.
As comedians of the ascetic ideals upon which the EU was founded, good Europeans
may condition the possibility for the emergence of Übermenschlich types capable of
revaluing the dissipative values of ultra-liberal-modernity to realize a Nietzschean idea of
Europe.

Part One: A Brief Review of Nietzsche’s Vitalist Critique and its Utility to an
Analysis of European Unification
Nietzsche’s vitalist critique of modernity and associated call for a revaluation of
all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe) – a rejection of and challenge to the entire
Christian–Platonic “slave moral” tradition – was intended to resonate among healthy
individuals and incite them to “become ‘good Europeans’”. In proffering this critique he
was principally concerned with explicating how human life may degenerate or be
invigorated by values through the forms of socio-political organization they produce. The
socio-political organization of a healthy society functions as a basis for the development
of a higher culture and is secondary, and subordinate to it. The political is essential for
ensuring the natural rank order of types necessary for an authentically agonistic milieu in
which the strongest exemplars, or geniuses, may flourish.
Nietzsche sought to explain how healthy, “masterly” values facilitate the
flourishing of those capable of it by giving rise to an authentically agonistic higher
culture, while anti-natural moralities of taming (specifically the Christian–Platonic
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tradition) were motivated by slave ressentiment and realized by appeal to common
desires so as to impede humankind’s greatest potential. 163 He opposed slave moralities of
taming because they originate in ressentiment and seek to enforce an unnatural equality
between types by leveling disparate forms of life to eliminate difference. It is important
to recall that Nietzsche:
[O]ffers no plan for restoring decadent souls to a more robust standard of vitality.
He is interested neither in prescribing a recuperative system of instincts nor in
rallying the anemic and infirm to unlikely feats of heroism and nobility. Decadent
souls can do nothing by enact their constitutive chaos, expressing themselves
creatively in their own self-destruction. 164
Values themselves are symptoms of the health—or instinctual organization—of
individuals, at the political microsphere, and the health of a culture, via its socio-political
organization, at the political macrosphere. 165
In the work that follows I am specifically interested in how healthy individuals
might involuntarily challenge the hyper-decadent values of the prevailing ultra-liberalmodern, “free-market” democratic state form and its globalization complex, through
kynical engagement—prankish acts that mock and spoof reigning ascetic ideals. 166
Though doomed to fail, in part because they are invariably affected by the decadence of
their abject epoch, they hasten its exhaustion and eventual transfiguration by prospective
Übermenschlich types, whose success in instigating a transhuman future their
naturalizing acts foreshadow and incrementally facilitate. I focus specifically on the EU
as a crucial locus and driving force of the globalization complex.
The empirical evidence Nietzsche musters to substantiate his unsettling
contentions seemed to him readily apparent to anyone with the strength to see it.167
Despite the observed facts he draws upon from late 19th century Europe to support his
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case (e.g.: democratization and enfranchisement, the rise of a middle class bourgeoisie,
growing nationalism and anti-Semitism, etc.,), his characterizations do not in themselves
prove the existence of the decadence he identifies. This raises the issue of what
substantiating empirical support Nietzsche musters in making his arguments about
differing value systems and their correspondence to human types, social forms and levels
of culture. What factual corroboration could be cited to sustain such a critique and verify
its conclusions? It must be acknowledged that there is little in the world by way of
material support to validate his conclusions. As Conway remarks,
His diagnosis of modernity may strike us as scintillating, provocative, even
persuasive at times, but we have no epistemic warrant to following him in
pronouncing it true. 168
Nietzsche’s psychological analysis of human behavior and communal life (politics)
informed his axiological assessment of his and Europe’s historical situation. He sought to
fortify his thesis through a genealogy of morality, in which he would trace the historical
origins and development of opposing moral trends. It was developed most famously in
On the Genealogy of Morality, a work whose themes elaborate previously developed
philosophical investigations and analyses.
Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutical and epistemological stance—which can
be understood as a skeptical, though not relativistic, heuristic device— together with his
power ontology, by means of which he radically challenged the Western tradition of
ontology, provides his critical technique of evaluation and the conclusions arrived at
thereby with a distinctive analytical facility. As with every philosopher preceding him,
and perhaps every philosopher since, his grounds for asserting the “truth” of his theory
may be challenged. However, Nietzsche’s understanding of “truth” (and all related
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concepts such as ‘certainty’, ‘fact’, ‘reality’, etc.) distinguishes his thought from the
tradition that preceded it, and much of Western thought since has in some way or other
constituted a response to it.
In a famous passage from the aforementioned work, he states his case for
perspectivalism thusly:
From now on, my philosophical colleagues, let us be more wary of the dangerous
old conceptual fairy-tale which has set up a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless
subject of knowledge’, let us be wary of the tentacles of such contradictory
concepts as ‘pure reason’, ‘absolute spirituality’, ‘knowledge as such’: -- here we
are asked to think an eye which cannot be thought at all, an eye turned in no
direction at all, an eye where the active and interpretive powers are to be
suppressed, absent, but through which seeing still becomes a seeing-something, so
it is an absurdity and non-concept of eye that is demanded. There is only
perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; the more affects we allow to
speak about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same
thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our objectivity. 169
Conway helpfully remarks on this passage, noting that Nietzsche’s perspectivalism
rejects the “traditional interpretation of Objectivity as disinterested contemplation.” He
further states that the passage demonstrates how, through perspectivalism, Nietzsche:
[A]ttempts to account for those affective ingredients and determinants of
knowledge that traditionally have been ignored or discounted by orthodox
epistemologists. His reconstituted notion of objectivity (consistently noted by his
use of quotation marks) suggests that knowledge is a function of the embodied
expression of our affective investment in the world. His perspectivism thus
presupposes an account of knowing subjects as radically situated in the world and
in their bodies. …Second…his perspectivism is strategically designed to
recuperate the metaphorics of vision that have dominated (and perverted)
representational epistemology. …[T]he pursuit of Nietzschean objectivity requires
us to deconstruct…binary oppositions and integrate the supposedly antagonistic
terms within each. 170
The authority of Nietzsche’s perspectivalist and co-extending vitalist theses (will to
power), even in the absence of a “dynamometer” or some other method of quantitatively
demonstrating it, is supported by philosophical critique, directly observed evidence, long
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reflection on the psychological motivations of human behavior from myriad firsthand
experience, and historical/genealogical evidence. 171
Nietzsche himself realized that the factual bases of his theory, like all such ‘truth’
claims, was contingently perspectival and remained open to dispute. 172 Nevertheless, he
thought it provided superior insights into the presuppositions of conventional notions of
truth and what has counted for knowledge and so remains an excellent framework for
critical analyses as well as discerning the operation of metaphysical fictions. 173 By
contrast to conventional philosophies of analytical science, Babich asserts that “[a]
properly

Nietzschean…perspectivalism…offers

knowledge

an

infinite

domain,

but…offers knowledge seekers no such infinite and no sure method and no truth.” 174 For
obvious reasons this will frustrate dogmatists of truth. However, Nietzsche’s insights
have been echoed by contemporary philosophers of science, such as Paul Feyerabend,
whose aim was theorizing how knowledge is best attained against the privileging of
reason and conventional methodology. 175
Babich contrasts Nietzschean perspectivalism with the casual relativism with
which it is often, and incorrectly, conflated by those unwilling to admit its implications or
possibly unable to comprehend them. Such a conception of relativism is actually
equivalent in its absolutism to analytical science, which is likely why it resonates with
conventional thinkers.
She observes that:
[T]he sophisticated fallibilism exemplified by today’s scientists and endorsed by
the public conception of “objectivity,” features the same turn to absolutism that
characterizes relativism. Hence, through ever-more-accurate approximations,
science and its philosophy claim absolute knowledge or truth via an indirection, a
feint concealing the aim that fosters the project at hand. If the method of science
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does not “yet” yield truth, the point of this disingenuous “yet” affirms that science
is on its way to no other goal. 176
Babich’s recognition of the link between how scientists conceive of what it is they
do and what they ought (rightly) to aim to achieve, and public (mis-)conceptions of same,
points to the deeper operation of ultra-liberal-modernity’s metanarratives via its primary
discourses of rationalism, universalism, secularism, progressivism and humanism. The
post-Enlightenment faith in truth (and positivistic or “scientistic” confidence in the ability
of science to discover, represent and convey it via knowledge, predicated as it is on the
aforementioned discourses), comprises a central tenet in the ideological scheme of the
globalization complex and the EU as one of its dominant and integrative organs.
Nietzsche’s indictment of the decadence of late-19th century European life was
fraught with self-implicating. However, this did not pass unnoticed, nor go unremarked
upon, by him. As Conway notes, Nietzsche’s identification of the great nascent potential
and distinctive brand of turmoil characteristic of his age is itself a symptom of his own
besetting decadence, a “fact” he recognized. 177 Nevertheless his struggle to overcome it
provides a positive example for transforming political life. The values he endorses are
ultimate affirmations of life and supply desirable objectives for humankind’s exemplars.
Although likely disturbing to ultra-liberal-modern sensibilities, his perfectionist aims
body forth a radical, authentically optimistic vision of human becoming against the
prevalence of passive nihilism. Nietzsche envisaged a fundamental transformation of
society and its political institutions through the utilization of our revitalized powers and
energies.
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Disputes over his theory’s “objective” validity occur in the context of scientism’s
authority to define the terms of debate, so it is unlikely to get a fair hearing among those
convinced that their methods, etc., are superior to any alternative. Its practical
applicability will continue to be doubted too, as long as science is dominated by a
“plebeian empiricism” and linear, analytical method, and so long as the majority clings to
metaphysical fictions of objective “Truth” that seek to disclose reality as such; an
absolutist notion corresponding with the anti-natural, tyrannizing ethos of the secularized
slave morality of taming that righteously demands the “Truth”. Nietzsche was concerned
with illuminating the irreversible decadence characteristic of European life in his era, the
age of late-modernity, and the nihilistic forces which he predicted would intensify until
they culminated in a worldwide calamity in the coming centuries. 178 He believed his
particular nuanced variety of vitalism was capable of illuminating these phenomena and
providing as objective a basis as could be conceived for a fundamental revaluation of
values. According to his vitalism—and corresponding politics—the virtues of an era
indicate its ascending or declining life and the condition of its health:
In its measure of strength every age also possesses a measure for what virtues are
permitted and forbidden to it. Either it has the virtues of ascending life: then it
will resist from the profoundest depths the virtues of declining life. Or the age
itself represents declining life: then it also requires the virtues of decline, then it
hates everything that justifies itself solely out of abundance, out of the
overflowing riches of strength. 179
By these criteria he determines the health of modernity, a brief overview of his critique of
which is necessary to establish primary points of his conception of the political and its
applicability to EU expansion in the context of globalization.
Again, the core of this philosophical framework can be found in his genealogical
critique of morality, which developed in part from a psychological theory of the
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unconscious instincts and drives, their correspondence to human strengths and
weaknesses, and role in generating the ressentiment and bad-conscience which largely
characterize the socio-political organization of contemporary Western civilization.
Genealogy reveals the “essence” of the values constituting a system of morality, and their
evolutionary cycle: in what contexts and from what conditions they are created, how
efficaciously they serve the ends of culture, why they get overthrown and what they
indicate about the relative health of the society that spawned them. If we accept his total
rejection of the possibility of “universal values” and “transcendent truths,” ancient idols
whose hollowness he demonstrates by striking with the hammer of life-affirming
skeptical criticism, the salience of his genealogical methodology to any serious inquiry
into values becomes clear. A comprehension of how and for what reasons certain values
evolved, including the interests they serve, is less crucial to adducing their objective
“truth” per se, than for determine their significance for life.
Nietzsche’s desired revaluation of values (which would reinstate healthy virtues
of the sort usurped in the West by decadent Judaeo-Christian morality and Platonic
metaphysics) and explication of the slave-moral inversion of good and bad, from which
European anti-naturalism arose, corresponds with the genealogy of morality that
produced the famous distinction of master and slave moralities that later evolved into a
healthy / decadent dichotomy. Nietzsche advocated reversing the Christian order to
restore the natural hierarchy between individuals and the hierarchy of moralities it had
eliminated. He grasped the opposition this objective would encounter due to the
entrenched decadence of slave morality in modern Western society and recognized the
violences achieving it would require.
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In ‘On the thousand and one goals’, Zarathustra asserts the link between
esteeming the world, an indispensable human action that imbues existence with meaning,
and the simultaneous creation of values. Furthermore he elaborates on the violence
invariably entailed by changes of values:
Only man placed values in things to preserve himself – he alone created meaning
for things, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself ‘man,’ which means: the
esteemer. To esteem is to create: hear this you creators! …Through esteeming
alone is there value. Change of values – that is a change of creators. Whoever
must be a creator always annihilates. 180
Zarathustra would overturn the prevailing moral order to emancipate individuals from
their subjugation to the morality of the weak, confer upon the ego its rightful good
conscience and put it to productive use:
The delight in the herd is more ancient than the delight in the ego; and as long as
the good conscience is identified with the herd, only the bad-conscience says: I. 181
Such facultative individuals would “go under” to create virtues in which “the fire of love
and the fire of wrath” would glow, thereby setting a goal for humanity to provide it
purpose. From Nietzsche’s meta-ethical theory of morality his critique of modernity
emerges. According to Nietzsche the last spiritually edifying, culturally generative epoch
in Europe was the Renaissance, exemplified by the proliferation of arts he takes as
symptomatic of the invigorated human spirit characteristic of the period. Nietzsche
contrasts this with the reactive, anti-natural forces that produced the Reformation and
conditioned European culture for the Enlightenment. 182
Nietzsche identified modernity as an epoch characterized by increasing decadence
and decline; hence everyone born into the era was, to varying degrees, certain to exhibit
symptoms of these unhealthy defining characteristics. No one could completely escape
modernity’s degenerative effects, and Nietzsche recognized his own contamination by
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them. 183 Nietzsche famously explicated slave morality’s role in naturalizing ressentiment
as the “spirit of revenge”, and the bad-conscience operationalized through guilt, its
cultivation of herd instincts, subjugation of humanity and means of taming or forcibly
excluding the strongest individuals in society from governing institutions. 184
On the development of herd instincts in men and the simultaneous growth and
role within communities of an essential morality for the maintenance of order and
continued prosperity, Nietzsche observed:
By morality the individual is taught to become a function of the herd, and to
ascribe to himself value only as a function. As the conditions for the maintenance
of one community have been very different from those of another community,
there have been very different moralities; and in respect to the future essential
transformations of herds and communities, states and societies, one can prophesy
that there will still be very divergent moralities. Morality is the herd-instinct in the
individual. 185
This herd instinct is not necessarily slavish in its character. It does tend to lend itself to
the emergence of such a morality when the mediocre majority adopts anti-natural ascetic
ideals and corresponding world–defaming values and seeks to universalize them.
When the majority succeeds in imposing its dissipative values on its betters –
healthy creators – slave morality comes to prevail. Every morality describes a set of
(disciplinary) values particular to a people (and integral with its culture) and delimits
social relations among its members accordingly:
Wherever we meet with a morality we find a valuation and order of rank of the
human impulses and activities. These valuations and orders of rank are always the
expression of the needs of a community or herd: that which is in the first place to
its advantage – and in the second place and third place – is also the authoritative
standard for the worth of every individual. 186
Among the factors determining the health of any system of morality is who, the strong or
the weak, its valuations and orders of rank serve by design to enhance.
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Autochthonous moralities, the ethos and nomos native to a social organism, (as
opposed to those imposed from outside) symptomatize a mode of life felicitous to the
greatest becoming of each within a natural rank order of types (Rangordnung). These
moralities develop out of the instinctual arrangement of impulses and drives at the macrolevel of the community. By instantiating a rank order of values a morality gives
expression to the shared native volition that, so affirmed, unites individuals in
community. It also ensures that future members of the community feel an inborn duty to
preserve the morality that serves to justify it, the basis of their identity and belonging.
From this vitalist perspective the adherence of a community’s members to its/their
traditional or prevailing moral strictures serves to indicate the health of the society, apart
from socio-cultural practices sustained by the values it enforces. At the micropolitical or
individual level, an autochthonous morality determines the worth of a person according
to how effectively she can conform to its behavioral strictures and carry out its
regulations (here Nietzsche anticipates what Foucault would label disciplinary regimes).
“[D]epending on the agents in question, all ascetic techniques are potentially both
coercive and empowering.” 187 In a naturally ordered polis an agent’s performative
enactment of his community’s morality code determines his success within it and, to a
certain extent, the likelihood of his attaining his own moral perfection. Collectively, a
culturally cohesive populace strives for political perfection through performative
enforcements of its dominant morality. The sociogenic perpetuation of a community’s
instinctual organization naturalizes certain social drives and impulses that come to be
privileged and understood as typifying it, or constituting its self-identity. These are

105

frequently expressed via exclusionary ascetic ideals that valorize the community’s
political preferences. 188
These conclusions were enunciated throughout Nietzsche’s condemnation of postEnlightenment, liberal modern values that emphasized equality and rights. He took the
disposition underlying such values for the secular rationalization of a creeping slave
morality (anti-natural ascetic herd values) designed to ingratiate the ressentiment of the
many, and beyond this to recognize the futility of the “redemptive measures designed to
cure the ills of modernity” he had previously prescribed. Conway states that in his postZarathustran writings Nietzsche,
“…acknowledges that the institutions of modern Europe are simply too corrupt to
serve in the macropolitical capacity he had mistakenly reserved for them [in his
earlier works] …that, independent of the macropolitical resources at his disposal,
he is in no position to orchestrate the redemption of modernity.” 189
Europe’s contemporary institution are no less corrupt, but may nevertheless be subverted
by the macropolitical capacities conferred by abstract potentials of globality.
Nietzsche did not distinguish between varieties of liberalism, which strikes some
contemporary political scientists as problematically unnuanced. However, it should be
understood that he generalized about liberalism not to elide the existence of differences
between various factions of liberals in his own era (the range and diversity of which has
only increased in the century following his death), but to speak of those broad traits he
identified as characteristic of all varieties of liberalism and its unifying ethos. Nietzsche
believed modernity’s dissipative affects would compel the most decadent and socialistic
consequences of the liberal ideology and diminish the life of future Europeans thereby.
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Nietzsche anticipated the further degeneration of socio-political life in the West,
which he believed would have to completely exhaust itself before a new regenerative
order might be founded. As Albrow summarizes, “He recognized the crisis of the modern
and foretold what has become the postmodern.” 190 Nietzsche’s prognosis for Europe,
based on his diagnosis of the destructive course the nihilism of his age had set mankind
upon, bode an ominous portent for the continent, and by extension the world, in the
centuries to come. Yet it also hinted at the ongoing struggle that could evolve more of the
robust ‘good Europeans’ he envisaged, even if in the meantime, their efforts at selfovercoming remained confined to the micropolitical, or individual level. As Conway
notes:
In a strong age overflowing with vital energy, externalized in the institutions and
festivals of a healthy people, lawgivers would have neither the need nor the
inclination to restrict their legislations to the political microsphere. But in a
decadent age unable to sustain the vitality of a people’s signature institutions,
lawgivers have no choice but to legislate from within the political microsphere. 191
In the case of the EU, which might aptly be characterized in Weberian terms as a
remodeled “iron cage of bureaucracy”, it is certainly not the case that the sort of
nomothetic lawgivers Nietzsche envisages legislate. In our hyper-decadent age the EU—
a kakistocratic ochlocracy—is governed by sickly idealists out of a spirit of revenge to
preserve ascetic-consumerist values.
Struggling to legislate to the greatest extent possible the inner, instinctual ordering
of their impulses and drives through regimens of self-overcoming (willfully selfprescribed askesis), their experiments, kynical challenges and prankish acts may serve to
augment the overcoming of the decadence of their age even as they only strive to perfect
themselves. “In some extraordinary cases ascetic disciplines will have a fortifying,
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fructifying effect on agents, inadvertently endowing them with unanticipated freedoms
and affording them greater political latitude.” 192 These strong exceptions abide by the
instinctual ordering of the drives and impulses comprising their native volitions (and
expand the pathos of distance within themselves and between themselves and others) to
preserve and enliven what is noble in themselves and their community as well as their
progeny (literal or otherwise). 193

Part Two: The intensification and universalization of European decadence during
the 20th century
According to Nietzsche, the intensifying decadence of European life in the late
19th century was symptomatic of the diminishing significance of the essential shared
meanings (traditions) necessary to sustain vital communities. This was confirmed by the
erosion of established authority, the rise of socialism, anarchism and a nihilistic
relativism that actively rejected all customary meaning. Nietzsche perceived an ominous
portent in developments, asserting that they augured trouble for Europe’s immediate
future. He presciently foresaw that the dissipation of shared beliefs and unifying
meanings would, in “the next century, bring the struggle for the domination of the earth”
between the most dangerous factions. This would produce “the compulsion to great
politics” in the best individuals as well, namely those strong enough to resist the
spreading infirmity of the age. It was in this latter, hopeful possibility that his optimism
was sustained. 194
In the late-modern era a reactive will to preserve outmoded teachings on the
meaning and purpose of existence qua tradition arose in different strains of nationalism
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and socialism, which vied with (equally reactive) “free-market” capitalism for hegemony
over the European continent and the world. Proponents of differing forms of ultra-liberalmodernist ideology vied to eliminate their liberal-modernist “opponents”, and continue to
do so. Through a war on particularizing notions of difference and their reification via
identity waged in the latter half of the twentieth century by commercial means, the
liberal-modernist project has succeeded in unifying Europe. The materialist ethos of
consumer culture now permits corporations to co-opt and re-present or spectacularize
identities of every sort for mass-consumption; the danger of reified identity has been
eliminated through its systematic banalization.
It has done so through a process of ongoing standardization and mediocritization
of much of what was/is distinctive and differentiating between groups, and by
transforming perceptions and desires in ways that eliminate some of the need for reliance
upon traditional cultural identifiers and weaken the appeal of their corresponding
prejudices. Yet liberal-modernity has banalized precisely those qualities (communal
meanings and worldviews) which by their nature formerly provoked regenerative
competition on the European continent. 195 The price of integration and peace attained by
adherence to liberal-modern precepts has been the diminution of certain forms of life; the
attainment of Europe’s new security comes at the cost of difference.
Yet, as this “disease of will” hastens Europe’s cultural degeneration, a newly
invigorated and unified will to defy enforced massification and homogenization of
difference has developed in spite of and in distinction to it.196 The simultaneous
improvement of the type man through the creative acts of courageous exceptions is being
effectuated by those ‘good Europeans’ of our age. 197 However, the reactive momentum of
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globalization (understood as a plane of consistency that inhibits lines of flight), is
symptomatic of a negative will to impose a universal normative order.
The aim of this order is first the containment and then the management of
becoming-other

through

the

worldwide

extension

of

ultra-liberal-modernity’s

metadiscourse of economic optimism and the univocality of reason, the leveling action of
which functions to co-opt and interpolate difference, leaving only semblances of former
(autochthonous) meanings in their wake. Globalization disseminates new technologies
(improved scientific and medical discoveries, ever quickening methods communication
and efficient ways of conducting business) and transforms expectations, but it ramifies
the hyper-decadence of the West European cultural realm’s decline and pathogenically
universalizes its values as it does so, culminating in a nihilistic form of ‘Empire’.
The reasons for the apparent “success” of the ideological discourses of ultraliberal-modernity are complex. Quantifiable improvements in the material conditions of
life in most parts of the world cannot be discounted, for they provide powerfully
persuasive evidence in favor of practices which developed out of the disposition and
ideas of modernity. Yet the dominance of the discourses and the value-constellation or
world-view they sustain contributes to their validation. Taken in summa, the metadiscourse succeeds by propagating anti-natural ideals that confer an enlightened false
consciousness that deludes its uncritical adherents so thoroughly that they are rendered
incapable of identifying their best interests. 198
In actuality both its positive and negative effects undercut the efficacy of
autochthonous cultural practices and compel the renegotiation of identic categories, the
purpose and proper function of community and, by extension, the basis of belonging and
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security. This risks fomenting moral panic as old ontologically reified differences
reemerge in intensified and vicious new forms, in response to perceived challenges to
moral normativity. 199 The repetition of such reaction and the conflicts they cause, and the
ongoing generation of the conditions prevenient to them suggests that the horrible wars of
the twentieth century may have been a minor prelude to the depressingly all-too-human
paroxysms the nihilism of ultra-liberal-modernity may yet spawn. 200
The post-War statist logic and international order enabling the process of
European integration has occurred largely through the work of contemporary asceticconsumerist priests of ressentiment, frequently evangelizing devotees of the metaphysical
faith in progress determined to convert humankind (forcibly if necessary) into free agents
of ultra-liberal-modern values—the secular age’s salvific canon and algodicy. 201 It has
culminated in the EU as well as Europe’s other chief supranational institutions (the
OSCE and COE), and a whole host of international institutions including the UN, WTO,
World Bank, etc., the dominance of which means, of course, that Nietzsche’s idea of
Europe is in no way attained. The radical extremes of that logic counter-intuitively does
suggest however, that opportunities for the over-coming of the state form are being
generated—if unwittingly—by the aforementioned arbiters of integration (a potential that
is examined below). 202
In contrast to the motives for integration espoused by conventional Europeanists,
and with regard to the crisis of meaning that has arisen lately in the EU itself, Elbe asserts
that Nietzsche’s:
…vision of what it means to be a “good European” is intellectually more
persuasive in a secular context because it allows for an experimental questioning
of the will-to-truth; that is supremely affirmative of an understanding of existence
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that does not try to vest all of its creative efforts in ascetic ideals; that
demonstrates immense spiritual vitality and courage in understanding this
experiment; and that is also more optimistic than the pessimistic reaction found in
much of the literature on the crisis of the European idea. 203
Such an experimental questioning (via Nietzsche’s own vitalist politics) of the motivating
will-to-truth behind both defunct and current ideas of Europe—as expressed in their
differing visions of the continent’s future—serves as a basis for conceiving and
implementing a supremely affirmative idea of Europe. Of particular interest here is that
will-to-truth exemplified in the prerogatives and modus operandi of the EU, against
which Nietzsche’s idea of Europe emphasizes the multiplicity of types, wealth of
difference and correspondingly tremendous diversity of possible becomings Europe and
its broader cultural realm contains, all of which his ‘good Europeans’ seek to radically
enhance.
The EU, despite being the product of a primarily molar state-form, provides
mechanisms through the ultra-liberal-modernist norms and ideals it naturalizes that ‘good
Europeans’ of the Nietzschean variety can utilize to achieve their objectives. These
objectives include instantiating an “order” conducive to the continuous enhancement and
utmost thriving of humankind’s highest exemplars through a comprehensive revaluation
of the now ubiquitous ascetic-consumerist values that construct and delimit possibilities
for desiring in contemporary life. Corresponding with the conative disposition or
anticipatory resoluteness made possible by globality (a stance enabled by but not
identical to the prevailing ethos of globalization), it is probable that an increasing number
of exceptional individuals—European or otherwise—are becoming amenable to and
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capable of undertaking such a radical revaluing of the values characteristic of ultraliberal-modern globalization.
However, these are largely latent potentials; positive becomings continually
struggling to overcome the inhibiting forces of our media dominated era of massconsumerism, which squanders much potential through myriad diversions and
entertainments while making a veritable religion of labor/work through the fetishization
of productivity. 204 Like Marx, whose work he did not know, Nietzsche foresaw this
emerging as a dominant feature of Europe’s deteriorating culture. In the latter half of the
19th century, Nietzsche condemned Europe’s burgeoning commercial and Bourgeois
culture for its deleterious consequences vis-à-vis authentic becoming. He observes that
the “fundamental idea of a commercial culture” concerned a negative type of appraisal,
the act of evaluating the worth of a thing, be it material goods, a work of art or ideas
themselves, according to a coarse supply and demand calculus that distorts all values and
reduces all esteeming to pecuniary considerations. 205
This type of assessment, based upon the mass appeal of an object, panders to the
lowest common denominator and achieves hegemony as a commercial society usurps the
proper role of culture. It is also dependent – as Marx famously expounded – upon a new
form of wage-labor; a degrading form of servitude that alienates its subjects from
themselves and the product of their toil (robbing them of passion for those activities in
which they engage), as it evacuates all “spirit” from the dehumanized culture it
perpetuates. Unlike Marx however, Nietzsche saw this development in terms of “ascetic
psychology”, one that explained both the Bourgeoisification of industrializing Europe
and its democratic ethos, as well as the “revolutionary” reaction against its abusive
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excesses, which (re)asserted the slave moral anti-naturalism exemplified by the leveling
tendency of his day. 206 Nietzsche fully expected its effects to be intensified and
thoroughly naturalized in the 20th century; a form of character perversion “imprinted in
every will and every faculty: it is this of which …men of the coming century will be
proud if the profits of the commercial class are right to give it into your possession!” 207
This reactive or molar becoming-same has resulted in a highly sublimated form of
(self-)glorified slavery, as young men who might otherwise cultivate their nobler
character and innate talents are instead employed in a matrix of machinic economic
relations: “purloined from themselves, trained to being worn out daily and taught to
regard this as a matter of duty.” These “poor beasts of burden”—the vast majority—are,
in a commercial culture, methodically habituated to perceiving labor for others as an
intrinsic good in their own self-interest. “[T]hey cannot do without it and would not have
it otherwise.” 208
It was Nietzsche’s view that as these work-slaves exhausted themselves with
earning a living and diverting themselves from their predicament through frivolous
entertainments, the surplus of their toil is likely to free certain anomalous or untimely
individuals to dedicate themselves to nobler aesthetic creation. 209 In our hyper-decadent
age it is also probable that workers will transfigure their work into a means for selfrealization, and just as probable that those freed from the burden of working will
succumb to the temptations of passive nihilism propagated by our popular culture.
However, in becoming ‘good Europeans’ a few lucky strikes may come to
recognize and diagnose the affliction of ultra-liberal-modernity and the infirmity it
spreads: democratization and its concomitant leveling tendency has cultivated an
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obedient “type prepared for slavery in the most subtle sense.” 210 Their “cure” requires the
therapeutic exploitation of the vast potential of this circumstance. Turning the disease of
liberal values against itself, ‘good Europeans’ subvert the debilitating hegemonic order
from within and gradually establish a natural political arrangement predicated on a rank
order of perspectives. The hierarchic order they strive after would allow the existing
“wealth of types” to prosper and even sanction its expansion so to maximally facilitate
becoming. 211 Such a natural order would abet the enlargement of greatness and enhance
the dignity and capabilities of every sort of person, allowing the fullest expression of
Dasein. 212
Toward attaining the fullest realization of this, ‘good Europeans’ intuitively
recognize the paradoxical value of reactivity and the intensified decadence of our age:
technological innovation has diversified the variety of forms creative impulses may
take. 213 Properly directed, the fruits of the negative will are not (and cannot correctly be
understood as) limited to the passive resignation or frenzied consumption of the allcontented and blinking last man, 214 for the state of affairs that sustains the herd’s
obtunded condition may counter-intuitively inspire the odd great work of visual art,
drama, literature or music.
Rather, a multitude of possible contributions, the like of which Nietzsche could
not have anticipated have (in the form of broadly delivered basic education, astonishing
feats of engineering and advanced communication; certain applications of technology to
food production—the so-called “green revolution”; radical innovations in medicine and
health care, etc.) provided a sense of ersatz “spiritualization,” that is, a palliative sense of
meaning that is not altogether valueless. It is sufficient for the herd, whose members are
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incapable of the sort of freedom expressed in the strength symptomatic of the
extraordinary conation 215, or anankê 216, characteristic of the will to power enacted by
best types.
The majority’s indifference—or at least, ignorance—of those higher types’
struggle for self-perfection is useful for insulating the latter, who are hardly
imputrescible, from the debasing influence of the bourgeois vulgarians who define “good
taste”, determine “propriety” and dominate “culture” in a declining age such as our own.
The apathy of the mediocre majority vis-à-vis their own genuine becoming leads to the
state of fallenness and their eventual ruinance, (Heidegger’s notion for of a in which they
no longer have time to care about their own lives). Although this condition inspires the
freest spirits with dread, the weak settle into a passive acceptance of it and find a perverse
form of contentment thereby. Their dread spurs them into oppositional stance toward this
condition of hyper-decadence and the arbiters of such extremely nihilistic values that
come to be taken by the all-too-many as commonplace.
Nietzsche saw the historic role of ascetic priests of ressentiment (initiated by the
Jewish revolt in and denaturalizing inversion of values) as that of promoting anti-natural
notions of equality and ideals of a fictive social-justice to inhibit and/or corrupt would-be
exceptions. Ascetic priest are the great despisers of life who foster values of self-denial
and proclaim the inferiority of this world in part as a means of dissipating human spirit
and the potential magnitude of extraordinary, pluripotent individuals who would likely
undermine their authority if permitted to excel. Through ideological legerdemain they
sought, as Nietzsche puts it, to “level mountain and valley”. By weakening the strong
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they could protect themselves and perpetuate their power over others, particularly their
betters.
The newspaper culture and corresponding emergence of public education
epitomized their methods of indoctrination and systematic weakening in his era; in our
own the beliefs subtending that nascent economic optimism have morphed into an antiintellectual volksgeist characterized by uncritical faith in consumer driven populism
inextricably bound up in an entrepreneurial form of market democracy. Supposedly
fostering creativity opportunities and “synergizing” potentialities (according to the
messianic proponents in the “New Economy’s” self-described “creative class”), it is
actually nihilistic and intrinsically philistinic (opposed to the aesthetic in all its “elitist”
forms) “culture of abjection”. 217 The enfranchised herds of the Western world slavishly
embrace and defend their democratically legitimated subjugation, rightly convinced that
fulfillment of their coarse aspirations—to consume in safety—lies in the preservation and
extension of social structures that condition their desires in Pavlovian fashion, according
to the quasi-religious doctrine of unregulated free-market capitalism. 218
I argue below that this long-conditioned hostility of the many to the awesome
potential of great exceptions could be exploited for life-affirming ends. By continuing to
ensure the herd’s relative comfort—and facilitating its terminally nihilistic tendencies
thereby—authentic creators might re-naturalize dissipative values and instantiating an
authentic socio-cultural agon. Such means of mass-manipulation are already well
understood by contemporary ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment who encourage
the crowd’s opposition to the idea of individual greatness which undermines their belief
in the intrinsic equality of all. They employ conventional matrices of prosperity that focus
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on ‘standard of living’ to estimate the ability of individuals and societies to consume.
These include per capita income, rates of home ownership, inflation, etc., all of which are
re-presented to the all-too-many as “objective” indicators of the conditions of life and—it
is hoped—evidence of its “improvement”, more generally.
This corresponds with the economic optimism of ultra-liberal-modern discourses
and their mutually reinforcing narratives of “empowerment”, which transmit jejune ideals
of prosperity and solipsistic notions of happiness. It also affirms Sloterdijk’s thesis about
the prevalence of a cynical, albeit enlightened false consciousness in the deindustrializing advanced economies of the West and other loci of globalization. By
extension it also corresponds – in the opposite direction – with (residually Christian)
moralistic efforts to deflect attention away from this-worldly efforts at self-affirmation
that conflict with the values of humility and the rejection of the corporeal. The desire for
meaning and purpose is conducted in this direction by way of a secular extension of the
notion that the growth of material prosperity or amelioration of poverty, relatively
considered, indicates God’s grace. This reaffirms the logic of the ultra-liberal-modern
ideology among the religiously devout and secular materialists, alike. Where the moral
authority of churches or secular, Christian–Platonic institutions (the division between
which is increasingly blurred in Western societies) no longer succeeds in focusing the
pity of the rich on philanthropically attending the needs of the “destitute”, secular reason
persuades by way of the aforementioned economic optimism—with a recent emphasis on
assisting those inhabiting exotic locales. 219
In accordance with the univocality of reason assumed by the arbiters of
globalization, the value systems of these underdeveloped societies are systematically
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discredited and subverted so that their members may come to perceive themselves as
disadvantaged. Their “deprivation” is attributed to various structural causes
corresponding with the mantra of promoting and perfecting “free-market” democracy (the
solution), so that blame for their poverty can be ascribed and effort more coherently made
to ameliorate their plight and correct the systemic deficiency. On the macro-economic
level billions of dollars in aid is granted to the governments of poor countries, which over
decades produced even greater pretexts for pity among the citizens of rich, developed
nations, as a new class of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) arose in which
misery and suffering seemed more pronounced and urgent than ever. 220
Nietzsche’s meta-politics is concerned precisely with producing conditions of
possibility for versatile, “freer” spirits, rather than the elimination of suffering, per se.
Those with the strength to encourage, intensify and exploit the perverse conditions of
contemporary life to their own ends (a project of self-overcoming in the pursuit of
excellence) attain a more profound understanding and acceptance of suffering, one
informed by an awareness of the benefits of existential pain and the introspection and
higher-knowledge it prompts. The active generation of a vital culture seeks to elevate and
enhance humankind. 221 In the miasmic state of hyper-decadence our age of globalization
fosters, the strongest must be aroused to extricate themselves to the extent they can, for in
doing so they will likely invigorate the culture and hasten the future overcoming of the
species man 222. Among the witnesses to their going-down in passionate self-expenditure
through creative acts or kynical squandering, other would-be free spirits are lured back
from the abysmal meaninglessness and cynical resignation to which the majority readily
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succumb. They are inspired to reject the dismal temptations of the world-weary and their
longing for contentment. 223
In critiquing liberal-modernity’s preferred political form, Nietzsche maintained
that “democracy has ever been the form of decline in organizing power,” and
characterized “modern democracy, along with its hybrids such as the “German Reich” as
the form of decline of the state.” 224 Yet he also recognized that the “solitary personality”:
…can maintain and develop itself most easily in a democratic society: namely,
when the coarser means of defense are no longer necessary and habits of order,
honesty, justice and trust are part of the usual conditions. 225
This fascinating note betrays Nietzsche’s awareness of the practical and strategic use that
the highest affirmers of life could make of conventional morality and ochlocratic forms
of political organization—such as democracy—that it spawned.
In precisely this context I assert that the nomothetic acts of ‘good Europeans’, by
legislating the emerging, deterritorializing global age, will assist the perfection of the EU
in ways likely to transform it beyond recognition. In so doing they will overcome its
present reactive form so that their heirs may eventually dispense with the exhausted and
repressive state form entirely, as well as the inhibition of human potential it comprises.
This is to speak of what is required for the conception of a new epoch in humankind’s
evolution—to imagine the parturition of a new age, that of globality—and how it may be
made to gestate within a few.
David Owen has constructively expanded on the appearance of such individuals.
He understands Nietzsche to be advocating the instantiation of an authentic rank order of
values (Rangordnung) corresponding with the natural hierarchy of perspectives and types
to cultivate exemplars (e.g.: ‘good Europeans’) whose striving and self-overcoming will
120

hasten the ultimate transfiguration of the type man. This objective would require (and so
his aforementioned advocacy entailed) the intensification of every dimension of all-toohuman existence, and does not suggest a leaping over man but his metamorphosis.
Nietzsche hoped to contribute to this in so far as he could accelerate the elimination of
conceptual–physiological constraints on becoming introduced by the false ChristianPlatonic binaries that differentiated a “true”, noumenal world from the “apparent”, (and
therefore “inferior”) phenomenal world. In so doing ‘good Europeans’ like himself would
reestablish the primacy of a tragic view of the natural self over the disabling moral view
of the self as metaphysical subject.
The tragic idea of the self corresponds with the prevailing Greek notion prior to
the Socratic reification of reason (logos) and its privileging over passion (eros). In this
natural, “tragic” view, agents are inseparable from their actions, which are articulated
through fate, the acceptance of which expresses a good conscience. The moral idea of the
self coextends with the negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power that privileges
objective “truth” in order to postulate corresponding notions of guilt and accountability.
By falsely separating an agent from his act it provides a basis for assignations of blame:
the identification of responsible parties, designations of fault and the imposition of
punishments; practices symptomatic of a prevailing bad-conscience at the macro-political
level. 226 With regard to the means by which Nietzsche conceived possibilities of
emancipation from life-calumniating values, Ansell–Pearson cites ‘Of old and new lawtables” from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, writing that the passage:
…makes clear that liberation consists in freeing ourselves from the metaphysics
of morality and the morality of metaphysics; compulsion, dogma or statute, and
the metaphysical categories (necessity and purpose, good and evil, etc.). In short,
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the innocence of becoming, of time as such, is to be restored, and where time qua
transience is conceived as the moment that both gathers and splits up the past and
future. 227
In culturally specific ways such an innocence of becoming occurs at the macro-political
level when the naturally existing range of human types is reflected in a corresponding
pathos of distance. Only when released from modernity’s illusory notions of
metaphysical freedom through active forgetting will the born commanders be able to
revel in the innocence of their becoming without undo restraint.
Smith asserts that, “philosophers of the future”, for their lack of the necessary
native volition, are likely to remain “locked in a Spirit of Revenge”, never to experience
the freedom of the free spirits Nietzsche anticipates. However, they “can, properly
trained, be the Free-Spirit’s ‘well trained hounds’ and ‘servants’,” who will be
“implicated as priests in [the] new religiosity” that affirms Dasein through a conscious
engagement with the abysmal ground of our Being-unto-death, experienced as ecstatic
Dionysian insight into No-thingness that stimulates renewed (Apollonian) orderings and
creation. 228 Though the philosophers of the future might recognize the contingency of all
values and truths, they are compelled to create values and enforce them dogmatically by
the requirement of impressing forms upon and providing stable meanings to those who
cannot survive without them (the vast majority).
The project for philosophical laborers on the noble model of Kant and Hegel is to
establish some large class of given values… and press it into formulas, whether in
the realm of logic or politics (morality) or art. It is up to these researchers to make
everything that has happened or been valued so far look clear, obvious,
comprehensible, and manageable, to abbreviate everything long, even “time”
itself, and to overwhelm the entire past. 229
By contrast, Nietzschean philosophers would legislate from the stance of Weltironie.
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The all-too-many must eventually be made to forget the counter-productive
chimera of metaphysical freedom through new values whose grounds seem naturally
indisputable. This is necessary in order to cultivate mankind through education and
breeding for the support the leisure required by “genuine, revenge-free ‘free Spirits’”
who alone are capable of authentic philosophic individuality and by extension, such
liberation. 230 Such an “aristocratic ethos” is inclusive insofar as it promotes the
attainment of a diverse and natural rank ordering of types that serves as a moral backdrop
for all. It constitutes a moral code that has nothing to do with the (modern) drive to
transform morality into a science, which it will have overcome. 231
This recognition of varying degrees of (un)freedom corresponding to the quanta
of force one may expend as will to power and the grouping of types for social expediency
pertaining thereto has interesting implications vis-à-vis the perceived need for a reauthenticated ‘idea of Europe,’ to serve as a ground for the project of European
unification in our ultra-liberal-modern, hyper-decadent age of sublimated nihilism. Elbe
usefully observes that since the death of god imbuing Europe with a meaningful idea of
itself—the task of philosophers of the future—would prove difficult.
In Nietzsche’s account the demand for a more meaningful idea of Europe would
persist not only because of the pragmatic necessities of European policy-makers,
but also because Europeans have traditionally been accustomed to having the
balm of metaphysics and ‘true’ worlds to fall back upon in their quest to find the
deeper meaning of existence. 232
Elbe concludes that this would invariably be experienced “as a profound loss of spiritual
vitality”, and would likely give rise to nostalgia for defunct notions of Europe and
reactive ideals of what constitutes “European-ness”. 233
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Indeed, such reaction presently plagues efforts to define what characteristics
warrant full, formal inclusion—via various sorts of codified rights, enfranchisement and
citizenship, etc.—in the emerging EU polity, as well as its arbiters’ attempts to construct
a new European identity and corresponding ethos. The latter’s ever more uniformly
(mimetically) articulated expression of the EU’s will-to-truth across its disparate member
states, as well as a simultaneous profusion of dissenting wills emanating from various
corners of the continent, are all symptomatic of the anxiety over identity-as-belonging
that the project itself has generated. A truly Nietzschean idea of Europe would likely
seem incomprehensible to many citizens of the Union. Across the political spectrum, both
those who support the project and those advocating their nation’s withdrawal from it,
according to the impulse, whatever its manifestation, to systematically (re)define
collective identity based upon ideals pertaining to factors such as national origin, cultural
heritage, ethnicity or race. 234
The ideals of inclusion and the tolerance of diversity are not necessarily at odds
with efforts to protect identity, however. The EU’s social, political and cultural statutes
are putatively antithetical to xenophobic and racist chauvinisms, which arise in
opposition to attributes deemed enriching to European-ness and life on the continent. 235
While progressive from a liberal stance, the aspiration of forging a unity out of the
continent’s diverse panoply of peoples and types also reflects the EU’s origin in an
account-giving endeavor that was motivated in part by a spirit of revenge against the
burdensome and un-dischargeable debt imposed by Europe’s shared past, particularly the
horrors of World War Two. On a deeper level it also indicates an aversion to certain
kinds of radical difference, notably religious, conservative and nationalistic viewpoints. It
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corresponds with the liberal effort to homogenize the most opposite (conflicting) values
within its domain.
EU human rights statutes and civil laws guaranteeing regional autonomy, cultural
protections, universal enfranchisement and legal equality comprise the primary and
arguably most positive expression of its attempts to preserve authentic diversity whilst
forging a new and expanded unity. However, they do not transcend the conventional
slave-moral ethos upon which they are predicated but increase the mindless contentment
of the last man through psychological weakness. While it is possible to comprehend
human rights and economic liberalization in terms of culture-creation, such efforts
usually breed reaction, as they constrain maximal freedom and becoming in various and
complex ways in order to protect and nurture the weak. In their conventional institutional
instantiations they have also tended to fortify identic essentialisms privileged by the EU’s
newly instituted order while discrediting and condemning those deemed unfavorable to
it. 236
This disciplinary mechanism compounds the grief inflicted upon a growing
number who share an awareness “that we can no longer believe those dogmas of religion
and metaphysics” that formerly provided us with comforting essentialisms and secure
grounds for living. 237 The spectrum of these reactions (both positive and negative in
conventional liberal terms) epitomize the profound sublimation of the Spirit of Revenge
corresponding with the deepening crisis of nihilism characteristic of contemporary life
both within the Anglo-European cultural realms and outside of them in the age of
globalization. The universal dissemination of Europe’s hyper-decadent, ultra-liberalmodern values means that its predicament of nihilism and meaninglessness—the culture
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of abjection and conformity typified by a ‘cynical, enlightened false-consciousness’—is
being experienced in some form or other nearly everywhere in the world. 238
The slave-moral pessimistic disposition on the human condition, which is typified
by a rejection of both Dionysian reverie and the embrace of the tragic in favor of the
mitigation of all suffering, is being gradually universalized by the power constellations
comprising the globalization complex (which Hardt and Negri have—in an idealistic and
sanctimonious reaction—dubbed “Empire”). This should not be surprising however, nor
is it entirely lamentable, as “Nietzsche predicted that only large empires would be
capable of acting politically in the age of global politics at the culmination of
modernity.” 239 The global spread of the European form of decadence promotes a brand of
pessimism which inhibits recognition of the “supranational, nomadic cosmopolitan type”
that is developing out of its decay, which Nietzsche hoped, might realize the possibility
of “a united European people capable of the task of global mastery”. However
paradoxical or counter-intuitive, the multiple, mutually reinforcing tenets subtending the
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and corresponding spectacles of globalization
are prolegomenous to the appearance of the creative experimenters required for this
task. 240
The “mastery” which Nietzsche fervently advocated referred to the crucial project
of self-mastery and the process of radical self-affirmation by which the healthiest become
who it is they are, and to their mastery over the world via the nomothetic acts they
spontaneously perform that provoke (the eros of) others, spurring their emulation in the
socio-political realm. 241 These are plainly taking form in our world via the realization of
abstract potentials of globality which are evident in myriad aspects of contemporary life
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in nearly all regions of the world. This ‘global mastery’ involves the recognition and
acceptance of diversity and purposeful enrichment of disparate types, each fortified by
their respectful acknowledgement of the other. The struggle facing ‘good Europeans’ in
the present is to increase that mastery and direct it to life-affirming projects that involve
the highest exemplars of every European people so as to cultivate an efflorescent, supraEuropean culture and fortify its best members. I argue below that the real potential for
such developments is being actualized through the vis creativa inherent to emergent,
abstract potentials of globality.
Among Nietzsche’s primary objectives was that of inspiring his perceptive
readers to “become ‘good Europeans’”. 242 His appeal was directed at strong (i.e.: healthy)
individuals, whom he hoped might dispense with anti-natural moral conventions and
intellectual prejudices to attain this goal. It aimed to provide a palliative to the nihilism
that dissipated the volitional resources of the continent’s peoples, especially its
representative exemplars, and to facilitate the realization of an idea of Europe that
corresponded with the ambition of Nietzsche’s aristocratically radical political
philosophy and his recognition “that Europe wants to become one”. 243
In advocating ‘good Europeanism’ Nietzsche sought to recuperate elements of a
mainly defunct set of ideals and persuade future free spirits to dedicate themselves to
creating a new Europe (and world) in which the best and healthiest would legislate with
the aim of improving mankind physically, intellectually and “spiritually”. This project of
translating man back into nature so as to overcome the nihilism of the present (BGE: 230)
would culminate in the transformed–consciousness symptomatic of the sociogenic
realization of his idea of Europe. An associated concern was the socio-cultural becoming
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of Europeans who would, he hoped “transcend narrow nationalism and accomplish a
mingling of many old races and stocks” to forge a “new European culture [in which] the
Jews were to be amalgamated into Europe and the Russians were to [serve as] Europe’s
great “Other”. 244 This ambition had important temporal and teleological dimensions that
illustrate the practical importance of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics, power ontology, and
perspectivalist epistemology that will be examined in depth below.

Part Three: The EU and its transfiguration of the nation-state
A central concern of this project is that of examining the ways in which Europe’s
political integration and the EU’s expansion – as globalizing institutions and processes –
are simultaneously enabling and impeding the fulfillment of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe,
his “political,” vitalist objectives and the capacity of unusually powerful individuals to
contribute to an stirring revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe) that may
fundamentally transform human societies by organizing them for the perfection of the
species’ strongest members. In the final book of this work I shall also outline a nondogmatic strategy based on six classical skeptical tenants, through which such persons
may hasten our achievement of those objectives; goals for mankind that Nietzsche
thought could only be realized following the major wars of nationalism and ideology he
correctly predicted for the 20th century.
The EU, as an institutional instantiation of post-Enlightenment, ultra-liberalmodern values coextending with the globalization complex (even if conceived in large
part as a response against the economic dimensions of globalization), provides the
continent’s herds (its disparate, if increasingly homogenized citizen-constituents) with
128

simulated existential meaning and ontological purpose,

by simulating political

legitimacy in the guise of the democratic state form’s egalitarianism and representative
authority. 245 In the post-industrial, advanced capitalist societies of the West, the radical
extension of the franchise, steadily rising levels of consumption and social security have
obtunded the senses of the masses, while serving as anodynes to relieve the nausea that
would otherwise result from the absurdity of contemporary life, despite and also because
of the bad faith it propagates. 246
The EU does so while simultaneously fostering the spectacles of prosperity,
which are continually generated by neo-liberal capital process’s circulation of
commodified desire to tantalize the masses with illusions of ultimate gratification;
enticements offering to sate their nihilistic will to consume. 247 This makes clear how an
over-arching simulacrum of an emerging, thoroughly spectacularized global society can
produce and sustain a highly reactive simulation of the agonistic social and political
order, which in a radically authentic form is necessary for the eventual overcoming of the
human type. An ultimately undesirable, albeit presently indispensable “post-modern” veil
of Isis that obscures its own ideological basis and ends, it is conditioning the possibility
of its own transfiguration by generating myriad opportunities for the incremental
transvaluation of the slave-moral anti-natural ideals upon which it is predicated.
Situated in the broader context of the globalization complex, the EU’s institutions
and practices are seen to ramify numerous features of the former. Ideologically
supervenient to one another, they comprise differing degrees of instantiated institutions,
forces and processes within the same ultra-liberal-modern value matrix, an ideological
regime usefully understood to be propagating Empire. The is evidenced by the imposition
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of international order via the imposed universalization of the nation-state as privileged
form of polity, That order, to whatever degree effective in its numerous national and subnational instantiations, tends to be followed by some measure of liberalization, or
systematic democratization, as well as the enforced adoption of the precepts of neoliberal capital process. This compels a corresponding level of conformity with the
hegemonic political and socio-economic regulatory mechanisms of the democratic free
market ‘New Economy’ consensus, the prerogatives of which the international order
serves to universalize. 248
The EU, as an extensive organizational aggregate of smaller, diverse power
constellations, functions within the even larger globalization complex. It is typified by
technological rationality and aims at the methodical, comprehensive massification of
everyday life; its overarching imperatives compel fallen-ness and inauthenticity in the
social relations of individuals and lives of communities it transforms. It always already
entails the superficially significant but ultimately transitory partisan debates that absorb
the attention of the majority and deflect them from deeper, invisible currents
imperceptibly transforming their existences.
Contemporary social and political life in the West, and to a lesser extent its
globalizing penumbra, are understood according to Nietzsche’s vitalist politics as a
product of a homogenizing negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power manifested via
disparate expressions of reactive force. The anti-natural impulses subtending
contemporary ultra-liberal-modern nation-state’s ideologized values are legitimated
through a hermeneutic of desire via disciplinary regimes of truth and responsibility that
are in turn rationalized by ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. The
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preponderating reactive forces of ultra-liberal-modernity are symptomatized in Europe’s
present unification, via the EU. It is a project dominated but not exclusively directed by
ascetic-consumerist priests according to the secularized slave-moral values and reified
rationalism they put into practice. As such Europe’s ongoing integration via the EU (in
collaboration with the continent’s other major IGOs, including the OSCE, CoE, WEU
and NATO) is fulfilling the largely dissipative ambition of European and international
elites who personify the last-man type Nietzsche abhorred. Yet contrary to this dark
actuality Nietzsche suggests, in accordance with his vitalist conception of the political 249
and corresponding idea of Europe, that an opposite desire for uniting Europe connects the
continent’s representative exemplars across healthy ages – those periods of great cultural
production between decadent, declining epochs.
Highly contemptuous of the populist trends of his time for the increased danger
they presented to the higher spiritualization of mankind and its exemplars, Nietzsche
dedicated a great deal of thought to the consequences of post-Enlightenment
democratization and the rise of socialism in the 19th century, coming to some prescient
conclusions (published in 1880):
The practical outcome of this spreading democratization will first of all be a
European league of nations within which each individual nation, delimited
according to geographical fitness, will possess the status and rights of a canton: in
this process the historical recollections of the former nations will be of little
account, since the sense of reverence for such things will gradually be totally
uprooted by the domination of the democratic principle, which thirsts for
innovations and is greedy for experiments. 250
Although he could not fully anticipate the disorientation and corresponding
increase in individual adaptability wrought by the political and technological revolutions
that occurred in the twentieth century, he clearly identified the ethos that presupposed the
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innovations and experiments that produce it. The premonition was largely correct and
could plausibly be said to characterize one of the primary objectives of European
unification in the present, namely its furtive efforts to eliminate the former reverence of
the nation among its member-states, whose identities it would subsume into a synthetic
personality based on ultra-liberal-modern principles correlated to post-Enlightenment
notions of representative democracy.
In an oft cited section from the first volume of the same book entitled ‘A Glance
at the State,’ he endorses just this inevitability, having understood nationalism as an
effort to stem what, as a consequence of these complicated changes in European society,
brought “a weakening and finally an abolition of nations, at least the European,” and “of
a continual crossing a mixed race, that of European man, [which] must come into being
out of them.” In the same passage he concludes, “once one has recognized this fact, one
should not be afraid to proclaim oneself simply a ‘good European’ and actively to work
for the amalgamation of nations”. 251 It is especially notable that Nietzsche – who
disdained populist democracy intensely – should choose the democratic amalgamation of
European nations over the shrill, vituperative nationalism that arose in reaction to it. Such
was his contempt for and anxiety over the ethnocentric, chauvinist nationalism that was
gaining momentum in his day.
From “Human, All Too Human,” the text marking the beginning of his middle
period, until the end of his productive career, Nietzsche identified “‘good Europeans’”
with a “supranational and nomadic type of man which, physiologically speaking
possesses as its typical distinction a maximum of the art and power of adaptation.” 252
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They are proto-types of the philosophers of the future:
…[T]hose rare and rarely contented men who are too comprehensive to find their
satisfaction in any kind of patriotism and know how to love the south in the north
and the north in the south – the born midlanders, the “‘good Europeans’.” 253
Such superlative individuals are compelled by their overflowing desire (desire understood
as a complex assemblage of forces) to seek the unfamiliar and develop themselves,
combine qualities and perspectives characteristic of Europe’s various regions in order to
appreciate in personal and pan-European terms.
This indicates a conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness corresponding
with a physiological condition of exceptional strength or vitality; the preconditions
necessary for fostering and enhancing individual and social development via acceptance
of difference in otherness. Across the continent he perceived, to varying extents and in
different guises:
…the process of the assimilation of all Europeans, their growing detachment from
the conditions under which races dependent on climate and class originate, their
increasing independence of any definite milieu, as a unique “process of becoming
European.” 254
In our own era ‘the assimilation of all Europeans’ into a malleable instrument is being
achieved in large part through continual cross-cultural exchange, instantaneous
communication, the mega-media representations of desire, the merchandizing of ideas,
values and products (massification and homogenization) and legal mechanisms born of
treaty agreements that have profoundly transformed economic, political and social norms
and practices. The machinic and technological aspects of this assimilation via integration
efforts will be considered by means of Ansell-Pearson’s consideration of viroid life and
possibilities of a future, transhuman condition.
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Such complexifying assimilation, Nietzsche concluded, would of necessity lead to
the economic unification of the continent. Nietzsche declared, “Europe wants to become
one,” 255 on the basis of forces personified in those rare, far-ranging types he dubbed
‘good Europeans’, those who, as “rich heirs of millennia of European spirit,” were most
capable of recognizing the beautiful and infinite in what was foreign and unfamiliar (i.e.,
by which he means everything, as certain knowledge and “Truth” are unattainable since
our limited understanding is always a perspective situated in a particular context). 256
However, their shared objective for the continent’s socio-political integration differed
radically from that consistently articulated by arbiters of the liberal-modernist project, in
terms of both its premise and its objectives. Their aim is to cultivate a well-ordered and
compliant instrument of the people upon which the strongest may freely create edifying
works and perfect themselves through agonistic contests.
Despite their many differences with regard to what Europe should become, most
of the EU’s supporters (Europhiles) and opponents (Europhobes) agree that its
development as giving rise to a super-state. 257 Although it clearly is a physical
enlargement, and some would argue an ideational expansion of the classic state form, I
argue that it is doing more than this, that while unifying Europe the present EU “superstate” indicates just one (early) phase in the radical overcoming of the state form itself.
As regards the nation-state, Nietzsche was always suspicious and frequently
contemptuous, mainly seeing the modern state as deforming human development.
The socio-political dimensions of our hyper-decadent era, typified by a ‘cynical,
enlightened false-consciousness’, have been produced by the consolidation of the
democratic nation-state and the rights of the individual over the course of the last half134

century. 258 As it has been perpetuated by the nation-state—the quintessentially European
and thoroughly universalized form of polity enjoying preeminent international
authority—and the international setting, or structured system, within which it operates—
this disposition has been naturalized through an array of legal institutions and the
normative recognition of it (and their) authority, legitimacy and sovereign power. The
universalization of this formalized structure constituted an effort to abolish anarchy in the
macro-political realm (that of the nation-state and international society), and order the
world into a system of relatively homogenous units. It has been thoroughly diffused into
the micro-political realm (the level of the individual), which evinces similar
transformations as those the nation-state has undergone and continues to undergo. It does
so, to use Foucaultian terms, through corresponding technologies of the self—the largely
simulated and disciplinary ultra-liberal-modern discourses of agency the basis for which
lies in our notions of the intrinsic and equal worth of persons, the inviolable rights that
inhere to every individual, and—within the limits defined by common law—their
undeniable capacity for self-determination. The legitimacy of the nation-state is now
popularly understood as residing in its ability to ensure the dignity and rights of the
individuals—or citizens—it serves.
Despite significant modifications of its powers over the past century and its
adaptation to more recent demands placed on it by ultra-liberal-modern discourses, the
state indisputably remains the dominant organizing force for the political and social life
of humankind. Zarathustra’s identification of the simulated veracity of this “new idol”
remains prescient, as the state form—whose perfection is widely held to be the
democratic variety of it—has been geographically, notionally and legally extended to
135

encompass every polity around the world. Today the democratic state form is reified in
numerous ways, from multiple, mutually ramifying legal institutions to reactive
expressions of patriotism (such as the daily recitation of the pledge of allegiance in
American school rooms) and occasional paroxysms of nationalism (as occurred
throughout the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s). In a subtler way, the EU re-invokes
identic affiliations based on historical tradition and sentimental nostalgia through its
simulations of political enfranchisement and belonging. These increasingly validate the
over-arching simulacrum of community it represents.
In the absence of unproblematic identic roles, it has come to act as an identic
surrogate, personified, albeit somewhat ambiguously, by a neo-cosmopolitan “European”
identity that takes the banalization of difference as a basis for belonging and the aim of its
form of citizenship. This contrivance depends on ambiguity in order to sustain what
diluted meaning it is able to generate. As a new “super-idol” the EU seeks to supply the
“all-too-human” psychological need of its subjects (or “citizen-constituents”) for
legitimate authority while gradually supplanting the waning power of its member states
(as Europhobes throughout the community have long known):
State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it tells lies too; and
this lie crawls out of its mouth: “I, the state, am the people.” That is a lie! It was
creators who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they
served life. It is annihilators who set traps for the many and call them “state”: they
hang a sword and a hundred appetites over them. 259
The EU’s architects, sophisticated descendents of those who in Nietzsche’s lifetime set
the traps called the state, are (involuntarily) enacting their reactive roles, ones necessary
for Europe’s future life-affirming development.
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These idealistic ideologues are indeliberately producing conditions of possibility
for the emergence of a comprehensively transformative, positive will to creative
destruction as generative power, thereby. They will thus enable certain of future
generations to “look beyond the state”, and hang a new faith and love over their
contemporaries, those whose predecessors passively received the EU as a super-state and
willingly accepted their incorporation within it as citizen-subject-constituents in our own
era. 260
Identifying what Nietzsche desired for Europe is simpler than describing how he
thought it could be—let alone would be—achieved. “Nietzsche wished to foster the
reconstruction of Europe as a cultural entity, led by a new aristocracy, shaped by
indigenous artists and poets, which could assume global leadership in the age of great
politics that he predicted.” 261 Having seemingly created another, enlarged personification
of “the people” in the EU, its “long-eared and short-sighted” designers venerate the cold
monster—as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra dubs the modern state—revering it in an expanded,
supranational form, while remaining oblivious of the ways in which their endeavor
promises to foster the conditions necessary for the recrudescence of thymotic iconoclasts
with the strength to slay it.
Nietzsche conceives these daring experimenters—artist-philosophers capable of
revaluing our decadent values—as simultaneously witting and unwitting annihilators.
Impelled to obey life-affirming regimes of self-imposed discipline (askesis) for the task
of self-creation (auto-poiesis) through involuntary enactments of their native volition,
they gradually bring new modes of being into existence—a salubrious aesthetic-political
production of life-forms that destroys decrepit, petrified orders (in our own case the
137

ethno-nationally based bureaucratic state with which Nietzsche was quite familiar). By
doing so their valuations re-habilitate a social preference for the instinctual organization
of drives and impulses characteristic of dynamic iconoclasts. This re-invigorates the
macro-political life of their communities while preserving disciplinary measures for the
“all-too-many”, those being the majority who, congenitally weak and terminally sickened
by decadent values, are incapable of being aroused by the erotic passions of their highest
exemplars.
As the actual and figurative descendants of the late 19th century’s “international
homeless financial recluses” 262 the all-too-many loose themselves in vulgar hedonism
and crass consumerism. However a few, whom I name ascetic-consumerist priests of
ressentiment, rapaciously exploit the order generated by the globalization complex, to
profitably utilize its institutions, forces and processes to stimulate the herd’s
multitudinous appetites and manipulate its perceptions. These are the leaders and
apologists for the ruling order, who maintain the reactive values hegemonic throughout
the globalization complex today, and include politicians and pundits, government
officials and bureaucrats (civilian and military), business executives, corporate managers,
the mainstream media, “white-collar” workers, labor leaders, educators, etc.
There is a hierarchy too among these administrators of status-quo asceticconsumerist values. As the “managers” of our dissipative social order a few of these
individuals stand completely outside the order they enforce. At the highest lever are
found the genuine ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment referenced above, which
include CEOs, high-ranking politicians, etc. Beneath them a variety of hebetated
automatons function to ensure the continuation of social-order and the labor of the all138

too-many. Effectively zombified, these people occupy a place at once within and at some
distance from the majority, a group which includes investment bankers, lobbyists,
executives, administrators, professors, etc. These highly paid professionals tend to enjoy
a materially comfortable life that culminates in an extra paragraph of two in their
obituaries at the end of it. However, they are in the main indistinguishable from the alltoo-many and most notable for the extent to which they choose to lose—i.e.: expend—
themselves in the myopic pursuit of conventional success.
These are the supervisors of mundane labor, the potentially soul-destroying sort of
toil for healthy types that absorbs the energy and dissipates the passions of the masses
who are engaged to do it as modern wage-slaves. The endeavors of these low-ranking,
false-consciousness afflicted ideologues comprise an endless series of mimetic
performances always-already in adherence with the dominant matrix of anti-natural
values; their largely mindless enactments’ are motivated by the promise of a reward
prompting them to unwittingly ape the accepted norms of “professionalism”; their
compensation that of conventional security and “success”.
All of them, however (un)consciously, work to ensure that the slave-moral order
functions sufficiently well to ameliorate and co-opt any threat to it. They serve a critical
function as ideological soldiers who implement the discourses of equality and rights that
sustain the prevailing slave-moral order and herd mentality. There are of course,
exceptions within each rank-order of automaton. However, these exceptions are
exceedingly rare and must mask their differences to maintain their position; the
punishments are harsh for betrayal. There are generally no exceptions among those at the
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higher level of genuine ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment, for they comprehend
their function and zealously embody their role as enforcers of anti-natural ideals.
Yet as any sense of obligation to and the perceived veracity of the state dissipates,
the “all-too-many” remain “trapped” by the conventions of a secularized slave morality
that demands devotion to the dying monster’s “confusion of tongues of good and evil: the
sign of the state.” As those for whom “the state was invented,” comprehend no
alternatives to the semiotic conceits upon which the conceptual snares in which they are
caught arose, they are fated to go down with it. Just as their “leaders” fail to recognize the
ways in which they destroy the state as they seek to expand—or “supranationalize”—it,
the masses do not comprehend that their idol, the state, is in fact dying: “just as news of
the death of God takes a long time to reach us, so too does news of the death of the
state.” 263 The eminent death–or the conspicuous decrepitude unto dying–of the state, was
palpable to Nietzsche by the late 1870s.
The EU’s arbiters and the political functionaries, technocrats and bureaucratic
managers who enact and or serve its will—as well, on a more abstract level, as the
citizen-constituents of the polity it comprises—are, collectively, the inheritors of
Europe’s historic great power states. In the shadow of US hegemony since World War
Two, these ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment have been happy to allow the US
to hold their sword while dedicating themselves to the pursuit of economic greatness and
the cultivation of the “restless affairism of doing” wherein every person is required to
give an accounting of themselves in terms of how busy they are against the classic notion
of leisure toward the ersatz virtue of workaholism (the liberal form of secular piety). 264
The corporate-military leadership of the US, as the singular “super-state” manically
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pursuing military might largely for the benefit of its and its international allies’
plutocratic elites, has been happy to oblige. Hardt and Negri’s thesis on “Empire” –
however problematical in other aspects – usefully explicates certain of these phenomena.
While failing to qualify as Europe’s representative exemplars in the Nietzschean
sense, a few more conventional visionaries, performing the limited role of social
engineers (as opposed to great nomothetic legislators) have made considerable
contributions to the project of unifying Europe. In less significant ways countless others,
from entrepreneurs, to bureaucrats and anonymous workers, have also transformed
Europe in their wake. Yet from the outset of their self-described “grand” project
(conceived as a “new” political order through the political unification of the continent)
the instigators of a noble, federalist vision for the unification of the continent, Monnet,
Schuman, Spinelli, Albertini, who themselves had risen from among the ranks of “the
superfluous” that “steal the works of the inventors and the treasures of the sages for
themselves,” but whose vision arguably elevated them above the base allegiances of more
common types, and who had to manage that vision so that it would not be turned into
total “sickness and misfortune”.
The objective of Europe’s post-War designers was the transfiguration of the
continent’s disparate, territorially defined nation-states and their relations (understood at
once in spatio-temporal terms) through the practical application of a conceptually refined
philosophical and legal complex developed upon the traditions of liberal-modernity. The
ultra-liberal-modern norms that resulted were an instantiated, widely-shared set of nowfamiliar attitudes and beliefs. These included a positivistic mind-set, materialist
expectations, eventual economic standardization and the creation of co-extending and
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ultimately unified civil institutions and laws to contend with common security concerns.
A thorough revaluation of values, vis-à-vis the nation-state as the preeminent political
form (including its founding, essential characteristics such as sovereign independence
and territorial integrity, in addition to its absolute power to determine and confer formal
communal identity and political belonging through citizenship) would be required if the
resulting entity was to be more than a mere “super-state”. For this, “the superfluous,”
who Zarathustra describes as “impotent paupers and swift, clambering monkeys,” had to
be persuaded to strive after the conventional power it appeared to promise. 265
From the chaos and destruction of two world wars in the first half of the twentieth
century the originators of European unification reconceived, albeit in ultra-liberal terms,
the political order needed to temporarily invigorate humanity according to a deepened
sublimation of conventional slave-morality. Eschewing overtly revolutionary programs
that would automatically be opposed by “idolators of the state” and its “preachers of
death,” (characteristics that they had once unconsciously personified, but now strove to
discredit in careful expressions of disdain for the failed values of the past, such as
bellicose nationalism) they sought to gradually evolve political life by re-establishing it
on older traditions while maintaining a semblance of the all-too-familiar order, so to
amalgamate the nations of Europe into one over a long span, rather than dispensing with
the state itself, which would jar an already distressed continent and surely prove counterproductive.
In pursuing their ambition, they recognized (after Nietzsche) that a wider sense of
cohesion would have to be cultivated, at least between the respective nations of Western
Europe. A mutual sense of belonging between former enemies would need to create in
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order for the new polity they envisaged to function effectively. The process would require
more than formal treaty agreements to foster the changed mentality this idea of Europe
required. With little more to go on but historical enmities and the wounds of war, these
conditions would have to serve as a starting point for a future, integrated European
community. The ineffectuality of the League of Nations and shared suffering at the hands
of the Nazis in the first half of the 20th century provided a basis for reciprocal empathy
and fostered the common desire to rebuild a destroyed continent. In addition to the desire
to regenerate bankrupt economies, guarantee free trade and stimulate competition a
corresponding awareness of the need for radically deepened cooperation toward
achieving that aim was evident. New legal institutions such as the United Nations and the
Bretton Woods accords were codifying a new international order to assure a broad
measure of security and thereby provide conditions for the European project of economic
and political integration.
The web of practical illusions grounding notions of truth and justice that arbiters
of integration could create from out of Europe’s experience of grief and desire for
renewal would provide the catalyst and justification for the slow but sure fulfillment of
their aspiration. The ambition to achieve European unification necessitated much
productive and fruitful meditation on the dynamics of cooperation and compromise in
various spheres of inter-personal belonging and identity, including local affiliation,
regional autonomy and national sovereignty, etc., including the need for a fundamental
revaluation of the efficaciousness of the nation-state system for human life. The latter in
particular would be especially long in coming, and arguably has yet to happen. But
measurable progress toward the alleviation of immediate physical misery in post-War
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Europe would enable arbiters of integration to seriously entertain such potentially
dangerous revaluations and prevail over skeptical naysayers, nationalists and other
advocates of the status quo European state system who opposed it.
With hindsight across the twentieth century we can see opportunities for deepened
integration both seized and lost as those “whose conscience bears the weight of the
overall development of humanity, […made] use of the prevailing political and economic
situation. 266 But the long-term endeavor of those with a shared comprehension of
Nietzsche’s noble idea of Europe—or some related variation on it—has steadily paid
dividends, and as their ambition increased and the momentum accelerated for realizing
the continent’s unification via populist democratic means, that ambition gained broader
acceptance. As opposed to atavistic statesmen promoting ‘great politics’ of the sort that
culminated in the twentieth century’s world wars (and whose presence is still felt in the
politics of nations), the arbiters of European integration—whom Nietzsche would likely
have derided as “‘improvers’ of mankind”—have by a number of matrixes economic,
institutional and cultural, succeeded in profoundly altering life for their fellow Europeans
and by extension for individuals globally.
Despite being dedicated soldiers of the liberal-modern values that foster the
hyper-decadence of our age, the post-war instigators of Europe’s integration initiated a
transformation of the governing order that would be very positive for the overcoming of
certain suicidal tendencies from which European culture, and humankind, had barely
survived. If imperfect and bound to develop over the following decades into a
monstrosity that would replicate some of the worst aspects of the old state form which it,
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at least in part, strove to overcome, the EU would also come to presents potentials upon
which a ‘good European’ of the Nietzschean variety might productively build.
It is my primary contention that Nietzsche’s diagnosis of Europe’s (cultural)
ailment remains relevant and his proposed “cure”, via a radically Dionysian affirmation
of life, comprises a strategy for overcoming the irrecuperably decadent nation-state—the
hegemonic form of social organization—and the international order it imposed
throughout the world. The contemporary globalization complex enforces the anti-natural
will to truth motivating this order. It is a ressentiment-driven project for the enslavement
of humankind by means of ascetic-consumerist ideals naturalized by the meta-discourse
of ultra-liberal-modernity. Among the complex assemblages comprising the globalization
complex, a troika of like European institutions—the EU, OSCE and COE—best
exemplify its ascetic ideals. The technological rationality and liberal optimism at their
core, along with the inevitable hypocrisy that arises in the gap between their righteous
principles and more pragmatic practices, give rise to a cynical ethos that ‘good European’
would subvert, reverse and/or exploit to attain an authentically natural agon. Such a
genuinely salubrious socio-political milieu, being conducive to the creative becoming of
rare, profligate geniuses, would condition the possibility for a revivification of culture for
the maximal flourishing of salutary individuals.
It is important to state that Nietzsche’s works tell us next to nothing about how,
precisely, the formal political institutions of Europe, which he largely reviled in his time,
ought to be re-organized. We may however, confidently assume that he envisaged a
system of rule governed through a natural hierarchy of types that would sustain a
maximally agonistic state of affairs while preserving a flexibly adaptable, authentically
145

aristocratic order. Some analysts have drawn close comparisons between Plato’s
Republic and the sort of order Nietzsche’s works would suggest he prefers. He adamantly
rejected revolutionary programs in favor of more gradual, fundamentally recuperative
change, when the sort of traditions (and institutions) that ensure the duration of a lifeaffirming polity governed by its preeminent specimens can no longer be sustained.
Such was the case – according to Nietzsche’s diagnosis – of European society in
his lifetime. He dedicated much of his energy and thought to contemplating what
conditions conduce to the production of the best (healthiest) individuals and communities
and thereby maximize human potential, namely the facilitation of the highest potentials
of humankind’s healthiest exemplars. At the very least, as Appel writes:
Nietzsche deserves his place in the canon of political philosophy not because he
provides a detailed institutional account of the optimal type of polity, but rather
because his sweeping denunciation of liberalism, democracy, socialism,
feminism, and other offshoots of modernity leads him to formulate (albeit in a
sketchy and unsystematic manner) an alternative, radically aristocratic model of
politics that bears serious examination. 267
Anglo-American political philosophers nevertheless largely dismissed Nietzsche until the
1960s due chiefly to the legacy of systematic, instrumental abuse of his works first at the
hands of his sister and then by the Nazis. Misunderstanding of his thought was
compounded among his sleepier readers by his (often purposefully ad hominem)
polemics. The latter, as Conway explains, “are best understood as occasions for
galvanizing an internal resistance to the moralists, priests, dogmatists, and decadents who
inhabit[ed] his own polycentric soul.” 268 There was a utility to his polemics that served
an important role in Nietzsche’s becoming, that is, in the self-overcomings crucial to the

146

development of his own micropolitical, corporeal politics and to his evolution as a
philosopher.
Nietzsche’s political advocacy (bodied forth in persistent admonitions and advice
as well as the practical implications for life of his thought) suggests a strategy by which
his favored polity might be attained over-against nihilistic alternatives spawned by
liberal-modernity. As Hutter notes:
Nietzsche’s entire effort at philosophical legislation, besides radically denying the
myth of progress, is oriented very much to a present potentially filled with joy and
ecstatic self-experience. 269
As I will show below, that experience corresponds with (among other things) an ironic or
skeptical disposition toward all truth claims, an awareness of one’s ubiety or
emplacement in a world increasingly determined by the futural implications of globality
as a foundation for all authentic identic conceptions (ontology), and the ethos of good
Europeanism that results and reciprocally fortifies the will to affirmation of life. The
specifically political dimension of this, although prima facie counter-intuitive to
conventional political scientists, consists of a productive agonism that realizes a
Dionysian, or tragically aesthetic worldview (Weltanschauung).
His chief hope, that “philosophers of the future” might contribute to a revitalized,
re-naturalized order predicated in part on their attempts at a revaluation of all values
(Umwerthung aller Werthe), directly corresponds with (and is demonstrated by) a central
concern that runs throughout his works: the future of European man, culture and
civilization. As Conway observes, “Nietzsche’s political thinking centers around a
simple, yet powerful thesis: human existence is justified only by the presence of those
exemplary individuals who re-define the horizons of human perfectibility.” 270
147

The perfectibility of genuine individuals toward the overcoming of the human
species as a goal (the involuntary “aim” evinced in disparate ways as a positive will to
creative destruction as generative power via their becoming) must be understood in the
specific, unavoidably (and ultimately political) sense in which Nietzsche meant it. The
task of legislating a morality of breeding prevenient to that undertaking requires truly
great politicians, charismatic leaders in Weber’s sense, a megalopsychoi as Aristotle
understood the term, who are first of all mythopoeists capable of revaluing all values and
(re-)establishing a convincing basis for communal society, so as to nomothetically create
a viable new order thereafter. I elaborate on this throughout the material below.
In his middle and late works Nietzsche would come to identify those
aforementioned individuals as ‘good Europeans’ and their efforts at perfection with a
noble idea of Europe. My interest lies in employing Nietzsche’s thought to critique
present developments in the institutional politics of Europe in a practical, meaningful
way, and to demonstrate how the EU may unintentionally foster such a type and idea.
From this I extrapolate means by which his objectives might more methodically be
achieved. I seek to do so by demonstrating the salience of Nietzsche’s thought to the EU
project in the broader context of globalization. I understand the functioning of the
globalization complex, as a form of Empire. 271
On the contrary, the contemporary globalization complex has clearly identifiably
power centers and is much less “postcolonialist and postimperialist” than they assert it
is. 272 The primary mistake of their analysis is to conflate the ideologically basis of the
conventional globalization complex with its dystopic aims or it has in reality achieved.
While their description of Empire accurately explicates the reactive ideals and objectives
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of the globalization complex, they have by no means been reached—contrary to Hardt
and Negri’s assertions—even, arguably, in the primary organs or loci of the complex
itself. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that they ever will or could be attained. Out of this
awareness my life-affirming, Nietzschean analysis identifies actual possibilities for the
realization of truly radical sorts of freedom and the corresponding emergence of new
modes of invigorated life. Freedom should be counted among Nietzsche’s central
concerns, contrary to the impression popularized in the late-20th century by the
Continental philosophers and the ‘new Nietzsche’. As Mandalios makes clear:
Against radical denunciation of freedom proffered by Derrida and Deleuze—
freedom as essentially a bourgeois humanist illusion… Nietzsche offer[s] an
alternative (post-liberal) conception… Rather than eschewing freedom in
reference to the modern world… Nietzsche can be understood as a serious thinker
of human freedom and its political moment vis-à-vis his complex conception of
will, power and freedom [sic] and their necessary entwinement ultimately with
responsibility. 273
Not surprisingly, Nietzsche’s particular notion of freedom contrasts with the prevailing,
popular conceptions of it, as freedom from obligation or responsibility, in so far as his
concern centers on potentiality and the possibilities of becoming. The question that
occupies his politics therefore is individual ‘freedom for what?’ freedom to do
something, as opposed to the ultra-liberal-modern anxiety with freedom as the abolition
of restraints and obsessive concern with freedom from what?’ understood merely in terms
of resistance to something.
A Nietzschean idea of Europe is inextricably enmeshed in an agonal process of
authentic becoming; a task requiring rare courage possessed only by a few exceptions. In
striving to realize their passions with a mocking wit and inclination to prankishness, good
Europeans—kynical ironists—revalue the anti-natural values that preponderate in our
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present, abject condition. In so doing they provoke others and may thereby gradually
actualize Nietzsche’s ideal pan-European hope for the overcoming of the human and
fidelity to the earth. Its potential realization impels perspectivalist critiques of the
dominant prejudices in our hyper-decadent, cynical age (as I attempt to provide below
regarding European integration and efforts to theorize it), to spur action and thought.
Toward this end I employ doubly ironizing language in the course of my analysis to
underscore how
the distortion, elision and falsification that are for Nietzsche the defining
characteristics of language abstract from the concrete individuality of experience
and construe it in terms of universal qualities and properties, imposing an order
which makes the world (or what we understand as the ‘world’) thinkable and
communicable.” 274
This spotlights how the accepted rhetorical tropes and central concepts of European
integration theory, as well as debate about them, rather than comprising a mere
descriptive idiom separate from the phenomena of its investigation, constitute a dynamic
notional figuration of the EU that actually works upon and shapes its physical
organization and institutional functioning.
Unappreciative of their role (a will to power as a will to truth) in this creative /
performative act, the major theorizers of integration theory perpetuate the metaphysical
fiction that they are examining ‘reality’ as such, and expressing literal meanings about
“discrete, self-identical entities in the world”. 275 The simultaneously deliberate and
unwitting dogmatism of this tendency and its disciplinary role in always already
reinforcing the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity is also examined.
However, the primary aim is to demonstrate how such a critical perspective on
theories of European integration, as generative of the EU within the broader context of
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globalization (all understood as mutually re-enforcing and self-immunizing power
constellations), might provide one means of naturalizing (Nietzschean) moral education
to revalue the anti-natural values of our ultra-liberal-modern epoch. This is necessary for
the generation of a natural pathos of distance, hierarchical rank order of types and
corresponding socio-political order.
For my purposes that latter objective (a Nietzschean moral education) requires
showing how the hybridization of European man (a process that, I shall argue below, the
EU is facilitating) is producing a much-turned type (polytropoi) willing to don multiple
costumes and masks to become who it is they are. Strengthened by attempts at selfperfection, the kynical good Europeans Nietzsche described (and hoped to impassion
through his works) laugh at and mock the life-denying conventions enforced by reactive
moralities of taming, out of awareness conferred by their hard-earned sense of worldhistorical irony. Their moral pluralism (quasi-cosmopolitan tolerance of difference and
becoming) conditions the emergence of radical affirmers who may hasten humankind’s
going-down—the final collapse of our decadent age—and the simultaneous ascendency
of Übermenschlich individuals at the dawn of a post- or transhuman future. 276
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Section Two
Theorizing European Integration: the Will to Truth in the Service of Life?
Part One: Conceptualizing the Ongoing Formation of an Emerging Polity
Twenty-three centuries before the advent of the European Union, Aristotle noted
that “all men by nature are actuated with the desire of knowledge”. 277 Concerns with this
desire to know, the passion (eros) generated by the search for truth and the limitations to
our knowledge are central to Nietzsche’s perspectivalism. This makes it, along with the
vitalist theory of the political and power ontology it informs, quite appropriate as a
critical apparatus for analyzing theories of European integration.
According to Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the instincts, drives and impulses
prevailing at the macro-level of the political sphere of life and determining European man
in his decadent era, Nietzsche diagnosed the decline of European culture and anticipated
further degeneration in the centuries to come. He hoped that the diminution of Europeans
that this would advance could be utilized to raise a higher type of individual capable of
nomothetically revaluing Europe’s—and the West’s—liberal-modern values:
The homogenizing of European man is the great process that cannot be obstructed:
one should even hasten it. The necessity to create a gulf, distance, order of rank, is
given eo ipso [through or by that very fact or quality]—not the necessity to retard
the process. 278
The European Union would likely strike Nietzsche as a step toward achieving this aim,
even if the creation of the sort of pathos of distance he had in mind is furthest from the
EU’s purpose and objectives.
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In this section I aim to problematize conceptualizations of European integration,
understood as disparate ideas of Europe, from the 1940s to the present. I seek thereby to
demonstrate two important points, those being how the ultra-liberal-modern discourses
subtending the present-day EU became hegemonic and how theories of European
integration effectively construct understandings of the project and concurrently imbue it
with meaning. Integral to this is a lengthy, chronologically ordered, doxographical
examination of the major schools of thought theorizing these complex and dynamic sociopolitical processes. European integration is considered as a field within the broader
academic discipline of International Studies, which from a loosely historical perspective
further illuminates how most of its major contributors have, wittingly or not, functioned as
apologists for its hyper-modern ideological assumptions.
In a political distillation of the ethos of our age’s predominant ultra-liberalmodernity ideology in the early 1970, Rawls (“the first philosopher of the last man” as
Allan Bloom aptly described him) asserts that:
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of
society as a whole cannot override… Therefore in a just society the liberties of
equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject
to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. 279
It goes without saying that Nietzsche would have responded to such a contention with
great laughter. Recalling LaPlace’s dictum (“The weight of evidence for an extraordinary
claim must be proportioned to its strangeness”), Rawls’ first assertion seems very bold,
particularly given its utter lack of demonstrability or any sort of corroborating evidence to
validate it from the text or elsewhere (i.e.: nature). On the contrary, the entire course of

153

recorded human history persuades us otherwise. The second statement exemplifies the
dogmatism subtending the established, anti-natural liberal order.
Like all polities in the contemporary West, the EU has developed according to the
liberal-modern ideological premises Rawls limned and refined. It continues to develop at
the intersection of the real and the imaginary, or aspirational, and to overlap both of these
realms (as, one might argue, like all human activity). This is to say the EU is at once a
notional phenomena and a concrete set of existing institutions and functioning practices. It
strives to accord with a set of as yet imperfectly realized—and some would contend,
unattainable—ideals; ideals that play a significant part in determining its design.
Where there is ambiguity over the EU’s actuality (the efficaciousness and/or
influence of its institutions) or its unrealized ideals (that to which it aspires) it exists in the
minds of many of its citizens in/as a hyper-real state. A plethora of factors – media
depictions, government propaganda, statements by its officials, academic studies of it, etc.
– contribute to the conscious reception of it among its citizen-constituents. It is
experienced and perceived as representative of many things, but it is arguably the first
post-modern polity: a seemingly beneficent, albeit ersatz, copy of democracy,
enfranchisement, accountability and liberal equality.
Classical notions of political power are problematic in the European context, since
there is no ‘A’ who has such power over any ‘B’ that s/he can get this ‘B’ to do
something that ‘B’ would not otherwise do. Within the EU system, ‘power’ seems
to work as a circulating medium, analogous to money, within what is called the
political system. 280
Van Ham notes that in addition to ambiguities in its exercise of power, its character as a
government and the gap between its democratic ideals and the provisions it makes to
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realize them, it provides only a representation of belonging that lacks any autochthonous
origin or certain reality.
In the postmodern condition European democracy has become hyperreal. It has
become a functioning, legitimate and moderately effective way of governance now
looking for ‘its’ Volk, ‘its’ demos, which is slowly crumbling under its searching
hands. 281
In so far as it occupies the realm of the hyperreal – as a governing entity that arguably
lacks a broad or certain constituency – the EU constitutes the largest and most compelling
example of a hyperreal polity ever to have existed.
The EU is the mainly reactive albeit dynamic product of abstract considerations as
a making of events and the agonistic generation of schemes to resolve disputes which
disparate conceptualizations and understandings of those events spawned, but with
enormous and increasing bureaucratic and legislative authority. Its reality is augmented in
part by its existence as a virtual entity with enormous affective power, simulating the
values upon which it was and continues to be predicated to realize (i.e.: institutionally
instantiate) its idea; on many levels its actuality is only knowable abstractly, even as it is
lived / performatively enacted.
This ambiguousness has implications for EU studies. From a Nietzschean
perspective, the fields of EU studies and European integration theory strive to do more
than make the EU comprehensible. In the first place their investigations constitute a form
of pale reflecting; they take themselves to be refracting the discernable light of superficial
appearances through critical lenses to reveal innumerable – and otherwise invisible –
aspects of an (all-too-)human creation, which they then call knowledge. The practitioners
of this knowledge are generally scientific satyrs who, as mandukagati, think the way
155

frogs walk, clinging to logocentric discourses such as the reification of cause–effect
relations by which responsibility is imputed to individuals as such, of state sovereignty,
of the equality of all persons before the law, of free will, of inalienable rights (and the
moral indignation they illicit), etc., among other sacrosanct metaphysical fictions. 282
They are partisan advocates of our era’s dominant ultra-liberal-modern
metanarrative, and ideologists, witting or otherwise, who are intent upon persuading their
academic audiences and the Western public within whose universities and colleges they
generally work, of its necessity and of the EU’s co-extending duty to realize it. The
authors of these manifold representations of Europe and its integration carefully
simulate—and arguably achieve some relative measure of—objectivity, from a concern
with “Truth” that culminates in a fixation with methodological issues, quantitative
analysis, data sets, etc., as in much social–scientific inquiry. However, as the very same
philosophical presuppositions generate both the interpretive framework for analysis and
the subject of inquiry, they risk becoming caught in argumentative circularity. 283
As ultimately creative acts and implements, the theories—each a variation on the
same ultra-liberal-modern will to truth (a metanarrative realized via the aforementioned
ideological discourses)—cannot be said to constitute an unbiased study of the EU’s
economic, political or social integration of the continent. Those theorizing and practicing
European integration simultaneously create the entity many of them presume to
dispassionately analyze. Therefore the scientific pretensions of theories of European
integration, qua science, are always-already somewhat dubious (or ought to be),
according to Nietzsche. This is, importantly, not to say—nor to imply—that Nietzsche
would have maintained that they do not usefully explain the EU’s political and economic
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processes, or that they do not consider genuine matters of knowledge. Rather, it is to
argue that they create a particular kind of knowledge which reciprocally serves to verify a
certain understanding of the world that corresponds with the theorists’ desires; it
legitimates the expectations and/or stakes its practitioners have in the results it produces.
Unlike physicists, biologists or geologists, there is a very real sense in which
conventional theorists of European integration create the object of their inquiry as they
analyze it. This occurs through an ongoing intercourse between scholars that to varying
degrees accounts for or is informed by the views, beliefs and judgments of elected
officials, policy makers, media and public opinion-makers, myriad political factions
representing the multitude, and socio-cultural trends. Together this cacophony of voices
generates a feedback loop in which those scholars synthesize events and pronounce
estimations of them in analyses always already informed by disciplinary prejudices that
correspond with broader ideological aims and frequently validate certain partisan policy
objectives. While of little to no interest to the European public(s), their scholarship
influences some leaders and policy makers, affecting their understanding of the project in
which they are engaged. By a trickle-down effect these theories may ultimately exercise
some influence on public perceptions, but ascertaining the extent to which they do would
be nearly impossible.
Theorists of European integration are engaged in a circular reproduction – and
mimetic performance – of the very values, norms and practices from which the EU
developed and takes its legitimacy. This in part helps explain why they so often remain
unconscious of the ought implicit in their own seemingly detached analysis, as they rather
feebly ape “hard science” standards of "objectivity". However, contemporary theorizing
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is radically transforming the field—and the social sciences more broadly—by exposing
the operation of underlying ideological assumptions, interrogating reified, metaphysical
assumptions (e.g: sovereignty, anarchy, etc.) and problematizing the field's tendency
toward argumentative circularity.
To better use the artist analogy, conventional integration theorists may be likened
to individual artists who, painting from palettes of limited hues, have collectively worked
on a mural over many decades, a mural whose contested scenes are frequently painted
over and whose margins remain ambiguous. What the mural depicts is largely due to ongoing and highly contested attempts to perfect what had been done at the center of the
rendering. Only recently has an effort been made to rethink these received notions of
theme and method that has limited it, and to innovate or even dispense with them by
reconceiving the aim of the work and its subject.
In this analogy the post-structuralist, deconstructivist and post-modern thinkers
now coming into the field (and who are all intellectually indebted to Nietzsche) are
comparable to cubists, expressionists and even montage artists, for they employ the
painterly equivalent of riotous colors and alternative perspectives to illuminate richer
detail in a more vivid depiction of the subject under scrutiny. Their innovative theoretical
challenges make up a conceptual pastiche that casts doubt on the long use of
monochromatic shades and tones their less daring predecessors employed to achieve the
conventional images that formerly constituted the whole picture. In so doing they have
also painted far beyond the unduly inhibiting borders of the old portrait to demonstrate
the indeterminate limits of the wall it occupies.
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The main theories of European integration operate within the same analytical –
ideological paradigm (interpretation being valuation), and comprise a complex power
constellation. They take themselves as constituting a progressive research project that
seeks to explain the dynamic processes of Europe’s political, economic and social
integration appraise its role in international society and anticipate its future development
and prospects through examination of the institutions of the European Union. These
theories are animated by ongoing debates over terms and merits of competing
perspectives in lively conceptual and methodological debates that make it intellectually
fertile. They are primarily concerned with relations between EU member-states and the
institutions to which their increased cooperation has given rise. These theoretical analyses
(interrelated and competing perspectives) examine socio-political phenomena and their
transformation – matters that also fall under the purview of international relations
theorists, insofar as they concern relations between sovereign states in a system of
anarchy, etc. As a field EU studies also examines the creation and functioning of treaties
and institutions created to administer these policy and procedural changes, in addition to
the tensions generated by the new sort of quasi-domestic European sphere to which they
have arguably given rise.
Efforts to theorize European integration initially arose in response to the
theoretical questions generated by the formal, intergovernmental cooperation and new
institutional arrangements conceived in the aftermath of World War Two. These
historical,

transformative

measures

included

the

creation

of

three

primary

intergovernmental institutions to direct Western Europe’s redevelopment following the
war. These included the COE, the European Coal and Steel Community and
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EURATOM—predecessors to the contemporary EU—and the OSCE, which had its
origins in the Helsinki Accords and developed out of the Council for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, which those accords produced in 1975. The broad and deep
interconnectedness of Europe’s primary intergovernmental organizations—as related
power constellations—is significant. It serves as evidence for (and establishes the
apodicity of) the ideological equipollence enforced by the meta-discourse of ultra-liberalmodernity.
The CoE is a key European organization from which many of the EU’s noneconomic policy rules have taken their queue. The CoE has enhanced the EU’s credibility
as a global arbiter of human rights and democratic values. It can plausibly be said to
serve as a sort of institutional vestibule for applicant countries to the EU itself, as
countries seeking admittance to the EU modify their domestic laws and foreign policy
postures to comply with CoE requirements. Within the auspices of the CoE the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was created
1950 and entered into force in September 1953; the institutional bodies tasked with
implementing it was the European Commission of Human Rights, created in 1954, and
the European Court of Human Rights, created in 1959. The laws set forth and oversight
provided by the former and the binding rulings of the latter oblige EU member states in
ways that both determine and transform its regulatory authority and practical governance
in both economic and non-economic areas of its purview. The decisions of these CoE
institutions also effect the dissemination of human rights norms internationally,
encouraging their enforcement and discouraging would-be abusers, particularly those
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autocratic governments whose economic reliance on trade with Europe motivates them to
remain in good standing with the EU.
Further institutional overlap occurs through the authority of the OSCE, which is a
much broader organization whose membership includes 56 nations, including the US and
Canada, as well as ‘Partners for Co-operation’ as diverse as Japan and Thailand, Morocco
and Egypt. The organization focuses on numerous aspects of regional security and
stability (ensuring and perfecting the status-quo), promoting democratization and a broad
range of norms from media freedom to anti-trafficking and gender equality. It has also
taken up the need for environmental regulation and a centralized authority in the
ecological impact of human activity and its socio-political and economic consequences,
understood in terms of security. In troubled and developing regions of the world it acts to
safeguard political transparency through elections monitoring and assistance. It strives to
manage and mitigate potential sources of conflict, encourages negotiation toward
domestic and international dispute resolution, seeks to provide aid in humanitarian crises
and engages in post-conflict assistance and reconstruction. Each of these organizations
functions to promote and implement democratic norms and compel adherence to human
rights law, which directly enhances the objectives (both economic and non-economic)
and raison d'être of the EU. The overlapping aims and purposes of the CoE, the OSCE
and the EU (among others, which include a broad range of intergovernmental institutions
such as the EBRD, NATO and the United Nations) is to effectively promote and
universalize the ultra-liberal-modern values that subtend the globalization complex in all
its dimensions.
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From a Nietzschean perspective the major theories of European integration in
function as facets of a hegemonic outlook and methodology that aims to maintain
privileged ontological assumptions and achieve a corresponding human good. It is a
social science that seeks to preserve certain forms of life and privileged modes of being
through a discernable disciplinarity. The on-going consolidation and refinement of
Europe’s institutional processes and its continuing expansion – as well as scholarly
explanations of these phenomena – are invariably imbricated in the privileged ideas and
values inhering to them. By recognizing this ‘good Europeans’ may better understand
how the coercive, hyper-decadent values of our ultra-liberal-modern epoch cultivate
‘cynical, enlightened false-consciousness’, and how the practices arising through its
discourses can be combated. 284
Furthermore, according to Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutical and
epistemological stance, we may grasp how the EU—as described, authorized and
reinforced in the world by those theorizing it in veritable enacts of its ideals—represents
the diminution of man through the commendation of a mediocrity legislated through an
economic–juridical order, the perfection of which aims at enforcing universal
humaneness (!) while exciting the acquisitive desires of the spiritually botched and
enabling their fulfillment. I refer once again to both the ethos (mindset) and praxis
(practical effects or consuetude) sustained by ultra-liberal-modernity, which equates
everyone according to basest physical necessity for economistic utilitarian ends so as to
rationalize reducing us to “subtly ‘adapted’ gears [that] represent minimal forces” as a
part of its machinery. This process is motivated and sustained by the instinctual drives
and impulses of weakness, that take “satisfaction in the dwarfing of [hu]mankind”, and
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are typified by precisely the sort of “economic optimism” Nietzsche combated. 285 As
such European integration is shown to be fulfilling Nietzsche’s predictions about the
systematic weakening of Europeans and by extension humankind, a fact that bolsters both
his psychological theory of the affects (will to power) and his proposed solution. After
analyzing the complex ways in which theories of European integration theory body-forth
a neo-liberal will to truth, I explicate how the EU and co-extending globalization
complex might be exploited, in Nietzschean fashion, by good Europeans. 286
It is important to understand why, from a Nietzschean perspective, theorizing
about European integration has to date barely attained a modicum of the impartiality it
presumes as an objective scientific study and how most of its proponents are blind to
and/or unconcerned with this fact. It is largely due to the preponderating influence of
(now customary slave-moral) values – the individual attitudes and/or group prejudices
that act upon specialists theorizing it. Of great significance to Nietzsche, this matter is
little noted by theorists of European integration. As Babich keenly observes:
Science, in its natural and social research expressions, perpetuates its own loyalty
to its absolute by the same expedient Nietzsche shows always to have been
employed in the service of the ascetic ideal: that is, one renounces the appearance
of one’s ideal. Thus, science renounces metaphysics as it renounces any claim of
its own to an absolute status. But in this, it searches for a knowledge that cannot
be called “knowledge” in the traditional (metaphysical) sense, and it delights in
the exploration of the limits of this knowledge—this is its metaphysical sense—so
transgressing its own boundaries. 287
The

self-deception

of

science’s

putative

un-metaphysical

objectivity

as

an

epistemological issue occupied Nietzsche from early in his career and prompted him to
argue that even through the best science we still “discover” only the limited and
conditional nature of our logic—a revelation of our fractional perspectives on the subject
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of inquiry that suggests the need for a tragic culture over the prevailing Socratic
optimism.
Deeply skeptical of the will-to-truth they symptomatize, Nietzsche was familiar
with the positivistic orientation conferred by discourses of scientism that were nascent in
his era. 288 In accordance with the post-Enlightenment, modernist ethos of scientific
methodology, which privileged empirical evidence or observed facts, data sampling,
hypothesis testing, reproducibility, etc., these discourses gradually reified reason and
fetishized mechanistic causality. As their powerful impetus revealed natural law and
transformed the material conditions of life throughout the Occidental (Western) world by
way of technological advances, their demonstrated potential to increase the power of
humankind over nature was irresistible to those interested in social phenomena, the
organization of human communities and their dynamic relations.
This movement spurred a concerted effort to transform the study of social
processes into putative sciences even as Nietzsche wrote. While scientific methodology
was appropriate for the natural sciences such as chemistry, physics, biology, etc., where it
had developed, its application to the study of social life significantly altered what had
long been the concern of philosophers and a part of the activity of philosophizing. The
discourses of scientism changed the character of these subjects of inquiry, particularly in
their academic manifestations, transforming them into the distinct disciplinary fields of
political science, sociology and economics, etc., whose purview would be determined and
supervised by experts. 289 It is quite likely that Nietzsche would have had little patience
for the emerging social sciences or its narrow specialists. He would surely have thought
their philosophical (and methodological) foundations fatuous and redundant in terms of
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their ideological origins. Furthermore he would have been highly suspicious of the
character of the knowledge (via quantitative research) they generated. 290
Rather, EU studies and the various strains of European integration theorizing
collectively reiterate ideological rationales for achieving the objectives of the EU’s
conventional – reactive – arbiters (the aforementioned contemporary ascetic-consumerist
priests of ressentiment), while giving the slave values justifying those objectives the
appearance of a good-conscience. As individual scholars engaged in theorizing European
integration are thoroughly imbued with the philosophical and ideological prejudices that
inspired and sustain the very integration processes they study, they will unconsciously do
so. If they wish to attain conventional success within the academic discipline of EU
studies that has arisen to legitimate Europe’s integration, they will actively seek to
become even better ideologues than their peers.
European integration theory, also referred to as EU studies, constitutes a sub-field
within international politics studies, which themselves occupy places within the broader
academic discipline of Political Science. The field constitutes the activity of one area of
theorizing, and the ongoing scholarly debates it informs. This refers to a set of works
describing processes of political, economic and social integration in addition to the
specific unfolding of thought traceable over the previous six decades. While I examine
the largely similar, if not identical assumptions and intentions shared by the respective
authors discussed herein, the field does not equate with an independent reality or suggest
a possibly un-Nietzschean construction of a non-existent thing. It refers to an intellectual
development: the various interrelated and interdependent analyses of European
integration. The complicated ways in which academic disciplines (and the knowledges
165

they generate) are institutionally reified and the extent to which they are self-reifying is a
matter not directly taken up in this work.
Utilizing Nietzschean perspectivalism 291 as a hermeneutical apparatus, the main
debates within and between the various schools comprising the field of European
integration

theory—specifically

the

major

contributions

of

functionalism,

transactionalism, neo-functionalism 292, and concordance systems theory, as well as the
important theoretical approaches of liberal intergovernmentalism 293 and supranational
institutionalism 294—are understood in Nietzschean terms as collectively comprising a set
of philosophically redundant, if varied expressions of a shared will-to-truth in the context
of which they appear practically analogous and in the service of similarly reactive
ends. 295
In this section I focus specifically on the theoretical explanations of the EU’s
development or evolution through the theoretical lenses of Nietzsche’s perspectivalist
epistemological and hermeneutical stance, according to the evaluative framework
provided by his vitalist politics and power ontology. Specifically, I examine how the
major theoretical schools of European integration have developed according to the
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and positivistic social-science, then attend some
of the exciting challenges to these conventional—largely statist—ways of understanding
the integration project. By doing so I intend to essay an untimely historical
comprehension of the EU, and to shed light on where Western civilization presently is,
and where it may be directed to go.
This entails (re-)considering the specific ways each school challenged what was
then considered to be the prevailing wisdom within the mainstream discipline. I do so by
166

reflecting on the work of a particular thinker considered representative of each school in
terms of the theoretical problems each identified. I examine how their respective critiques
of certain, then prevalent, points of received wisdom within the field ramified the ultraliberal-modern values Europe’s integration symptomatized, specifically its will-to-truth
(a reactive will to power) and seek to show how their striving to give a better account of
integration processes further naturalized ressentiment even as it seemed to advance, or
perfect, the field. Each thinker/school is genealogically situated in the context of the
thought that preceded it toward understanding why the need to posit a new, ostensibly
enriching perspective on the project of Europe’s integration, arose, how well it fulfilled
this need and generated new questions or needs for scholars to contemplate or resolve.
I examine what the major strands of EU studies took to be their innovative
contribution, how the respective challenges they each presented were received within the
field and how they each contributed to a broader comprehension of the integration
process. As Rosamund asserts,
EU studies should not just be accumulating a cache of information about the EU.
Rather, it should receive a further conceptual injection from conventional political
science, the message being that the EU raises issues of concern to pluralists,
systems theorists, students of public policy-making, analysis of party systems, and
scholars of political cleavage formation. 296
Going beyond this privileging of concern specific to the discipline of political
science however, I attempt to situate each “school” historically, both in a meta-political
context and in terms of how it contended with the hegemonic ideological thrust of the
integration project. The latter point pertains to both the disciplining affects of prevailing
discourses and conventional power relations and to Nietzsche’s critique of their origins
and functions.
167

As a matter of promulgating the ascetic-consumerist values characteristic of our
ultra-liberal-modern era (and European integration in particular), I examine the role
theories of European integration play in intellectually validating the economistic logic of
the ideological apparatus it serves to actualize, via its (re-)privileging of reason and the
ethos of scientism (i.e.: rational choice theory and the positivistic orientation) it confers
on mainstream social studies. Additionally, I analyze how this inextricably coextends
with and further ramifies the hegemonic discourses empowering the globalization
complex. Lastly, all of these considerations are weighed in order to assess how each
school furthered a distinctive vision of Europe’s becoming and/or augmented the growth
of a hegemonic power-knowledge regime and the admittance of post-Nietzschean
(Foucaultian and Derridian “post-modern” perspectives) have recently transformed the
field at its margins. This includes a critical assessment of some of the functions each
school performed in enlarging the field’s diversity of thought as well as the ideological
variance permitted by the latter and how each stands in a particular relation—as
potentiality—to Nietzsche’s notion of ‘good Europeanism’.
In critiquing the assorted schools of thought comprising the field of European
integration theory, I strive to provide a Nietzschean assessment of the discourse of
scientism and the state-centric thinking that co-extends with the ideological discourses
that motivate them and which they simultaneously rationalize. In the case of the former, I
endeavor to explicate the way in which reified principles of science, in conjunction with
the privileging of reason and empiricism to ensure the appearance of rigor, has long
imposed a positivist orientation on mainstream EU studies. Among my primary aims is to

168

deconstruct—or suggest a way of deconstructing—the argumentative circularity that
often informs the theories.
Innovative recent works employing alternative methodological approaches have
begun to broaden the field’s range, but the inroads these have made have sometimes been
impeded by a certain reticence among the discipline’s practitioners. However this is
gradually being overcome by exciting theoretical innovations, including certain strands of
institutionalism, multi-level governance theory, post-modern IR theory, discourse
analysis and meta-theoretical perspectives.
It remains the case that conventional realism, rational choice analysis, game
theory and statistical modeling of trends or phenomena all exemplify a persistent feature
of the discipline: the desire to uncover objective reality, or “Truth”, in a fashion after the
so-called “hard” natural (or physical) sciences. It is one that constrains what the study of
the political, conceived as a science, may do by enforcing conformity with a set of norms
that effectively standardizes all academically “legitimate” inquiry. Discourses of
scholarly legitimacy, their function, transformation and the historical context in which
they arise and change are particularly relevant to the genealogy of European integration
theory and its production of knowledge. 297
With regard to the dominance of state-centric thinking, I argue that it comprises a
reactive will-to-truth that perpetuates an ideological view to reinforce and naturalize the
hegemony of conventional norms of sovereignty, legitimacy and power—the very sort of
power politics Nietzsche rejected as characteristic of the German Reich. Furthermore it
systematically inhibits the development of alternative perspectives on Europe and is
therefore likely to blind students of Europe to the radical, dynamic potential for
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becoming-other which Europe’s formal integration presents and which good-Europeans
might exploit through the abstract potentials of globality. I attempt to show how some
recent developments in European integration theory, such as constructivism, discourse
analysis and post-modern critiques represent a turn within the field and by extension the
discipline of political science that is highly indebted to Nietzsche, a fruitful, alternative
perspective from which Europe’s integration may be differently, and perhaps more
productively understood.
A number of serious challenges confront one in making such a Nietzschean
critique of EU studies effective. First, in what ways is a Nietzschean analysis potentially
useful to those engaged in such theorizing? It should serve to de-familiarize those doing it
of some essentialisms and performative operations in their conceptualization of the
processes under study. At the same time it runs the risk of being overly-reductive and
promptly dismissed as glib and/or superficial as a consequence. Second, although
Nietzsche’s view of the impetus behind European integration theory is not implausibly
suggested by his thorough-going skepticism—one inextricably related to his critique of
Western science—it may be asked how effectively the critical-analytical framework
provided by Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology function as a standard for
evaluating the particular theoretical approaches and aims of European integration
theorists.
This is of particular concern given that such a Nietzschean assessment is primarily
based on his assessment of the psychological–historical development of morality, and the
cultural world created through our valuations. Nietzsche’s theory is an appropriate
hermeneutical framework for such a critical examination, for as it must be acknowledged,
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the EU, in all its myriad aspects, is ultimately reducible to the observable consequences
of human behavior, taken at any number of levels of analysis, from the acts of individuals
to group, institution and community interactions. This is to acknowledge that many
different methodological approaches yield useful insights into social life, and the
privileging of one (such as positivism) is unduly constraining.
Yet, from Nietzsche’s critical perspective, physics envy—the pothos of social
scientists to theorize with the empirical power of those in the physical sciences, with
independently replicable accounts for phenomena through time and verifiable means of
predictive power—is a form of desiring that fosters the illusion we can step outside
ourselves to see the world as it is. In fact all we can produce is self-referential kinds of
knowledge, always already imbricated in the (study of the) world. Nietzsche’s view is
that knowledge is objective only insofar as it relates to its own presuppositions. In the
realm of the social sciences in particular, the sphere of human activity, we can never
arrive at independent facts about the world which are separate from or unpolluted by
human experience. This is the essential dilemma of (social) scientific methodology, that
any question or analytical approach admits certain criteria while invariably excluding
others from consideration. 298 To attain a satisfactory degree of certainty the scientist
contends with known factors (however well understood) that frame the questions that can
be asked, while others are downplayed or neglected out of ignorance.
Inquiry itself, which consists of investigating some unknown to expand human
comprehension, is inherently impeded by our inability to identify certain unknowns
necessary to the explanation sought after (an epistemological paradox). Recognition of
this (arguably sophistical) problem, and the futility it might seem to suggest, prompts
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some to succumb to nihilistic resignation via acceptance of fanciful, wholly imaginary
accounts of reality. We immediately realize that the driving impulse of inquiry, the desire
to know (the volitional impulse motivating all will-to-truth) is very similar, if not
identical with the impelling conative force of life, or Will to power. We are involuntarily
disposed to act. And we always act in a relative condition of ignorance, moving through a
world far more complicated that we can conceive. In summa all scientific investigation
can at best result in failure to account for dynamic processes in order to reach a result of
doubtful sureness. We are “successful” when our results generate hope by presenting
further lines of possible inquiry. Nietzsche recognized this element of Dionysian tragedy
in the human quest for knowledge and truth and, although a thorough-going skeptic, kept
questioning and even daring to posit some answers. Babich states that according to
Nietzsche, “the pursuit of truth is always rooted in error, precisely because error is the
condition of life.” 299 She quotes an unpublished note by Nietzsche’s from his notebooks
of 1881:
I recognize something [as] true only in opposition to an actual living untruth.
Thus truth comes into the world as a concept completely lacking power and first
acquires power by inmixture with living errors. And for this reason, one must
permit errors to flourish and acknowledge their dominion. 300
As a thoroughgoing skeptic, Nietzsche simultaneously saw all knowledge claims as false
and as essential operations for generating and sustaining the meanings necessary for life,
even if they are inevitably self-deceiving. The ineliminable human desire for truth
exemplifies both our highest (noblest) and lowest (basest) impulses.
The Apollonian urge for meaning and order gets debased in a decadent age
through the reactive force which gives it expression in a negative will to nothingness a
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nihilistic power, an inclination characteristic of the prevailing will-to-truth in the ethos of
scientism. In a position analogous to Nietzsche’s own with regard to the incontrovertible
“truth” of any theoretical perspective (the apodictical efficacy of which is usually taken
for granted by its proponents), theorists of European integration study highly complex
activities and dynamic relations retrospectively, applying close textual analysis, critical
interrogation and empirically-based data, among other means, to posit explanatory
hypotheses and theorems. In all fairness then it must be admitted that Nietzsche’s
psychological theory of the affects (i.e.: his vitalist politics and power ontology) and
philosophical critique of morality is equal in its aptness as a method for accessing
theoretical attempts to explain socio-psychological phenomena such as European
integration as well as to the act of theorizing: all the empirical observations, critical
reflections and philosophical extrapolations there from.
What of special significance can an examination of EU studies through
Nietzschean lenses persuade those engaged in such work? It is hoped that the critique will
demonstrate

how

differing

sorts

of

unconscious

desire

(active/positive

or

reactive/negative) symptomatize a involuntary volition consisting of instincts, drives and
impulses that spur the development of (forms of) knowledge. The dispositions entailed in
a certain body of knowledge, inclines toward a corresponding life form—or perspectives
that are simultaneously realizing and realized by a Dasein. These inculcate differing
orientations among those in their presence (shared or public knowing) and generate
correspondingly interrelated worlds. What is known is, from this perspective, always
indicative of the vitality of an organism (taken on multiple levels from the individual to
the community, etc.). Those engaged in EU studies may thereby comprehend the ways in
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which a form of knowledge may serve to preserve unhealthy, declining forms of life or
augment healthy modes of existence, and reevaluate their own views and work
accordingly.
Another issue concerns how it is Nietzsche’s thought (and my presentation of it,
in particular) avoids seeming, or actually being, as dogmatic in its “conviction” of
possessing a superior perspective on the world as those EU scholars tend to be via their
respective understandings of Europe. Lastly, consideration is given to the extent that the
EU (as portrayed by the various schools of European integration theory) and the
conventional globalization complex may be conditioning the possibility for the
realization of Nietzschean objectives, namely the fostering of ‘good Europeanism’
toward the realization of his idea of Europe, and if not how they might be made to do so
via a revaluation of values.
This analysis will show how various schools of European integration theory have
sought to explain, critically analyze and sometimes even to predict the integration
process, and how their precepts originate in philosophical prejudices that condition their
inquiry according to a corresponding native volition. Through the lenses of Nietzsche’s
vital politics and power ontology the field is seen as mainly dissipative and conservative,
an attempt to explain events – or mask reaction – with theoretical explanans of polity,
policy or political analysis that more or less accord with the precepts of the hegemonic
discourses of scientism. That is they foster an appearance of endeavoring to comprehend,
explain and even forecast Europe’s transformation by theorizing in objective and
replicable ways.
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However, what mainstream theorizing on European integration makes apparent is
that its insights and developments often serve to refine and sublimate the ideological
pretexts for integration in terms that announce the project’s continuation via the
preservation of a harmful form of order. 301 The discipline’s primary schools of thought,
from about the mid-1960s through the early 1990s could be characterized as having fed in
cannibalistic fashion on each others and their own respective hypotheses to re-assert
nuanced New perspectives developed through the critical application of insights are then
presented as “new” directions in the field about every decade or so. Until about the mid1990s the dominant philosophical schism in the fields overarching discourse was between
state-centric and supranational institutional perspectives. These roughly comprised a
dyad, one side of which occupied by supporters of those who believed Europe’s
integration process to be better explained through the interactions of individual, sovereign
states and those convinced that it was better understood through the supranational
institution that had arisen between them. Although it should be said that the degree to
which the latter view was discernable less “state-centric” in a broader philosophical sense
than its liberal opposite is debatable.
Since the early-1990s the field has opened up considerably, admitting a number of
innovative critical approaches. The durability of the aforementioned debate, which still
fervently persists, as well as the discipline’s resistance to radical challenges to its
traditional assumptions, is indicative of the role that the academy and scholarly
convention has and continues to play in shaping the study’s development. As European
integration theorists always have multiple treaties, functioning institutions and
dynamically interacting individuals to examine there has seemed to be little interest in
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delving too deeply into and/or examining the philosophical principles presumed by the
project itself. It seems there are—or have been, at any rate—strong incentives not to
interrogate those highly revered values informing its privileged narratives.
Given its generally positive and flattering disposition toward its subject of
inquiry, the discipline not only functions in self-validating ways that perpetuate its own
legitimacy, but upholds a worldview (Weltanschauung) supportive of the status quo. It
need not directly advocate the preservation of the social structures, institutions and modes
of being under its consideration, but ideologically secures them against challenges.
Consequently it often amounts to something more analogous to sympathetic reportage
than to critical theorizing. In truth however, it is a mixture, as all social studies invariably
are. A performative enactment of a widely shared will to truth, those theorizing Europe’s
integration make strong claims to objective comprehension of reality in “truth as
correspondence” terms, even if they do not seek predictive power for their hypotheses. It
is not that they fail to glean truths about the world, but that they create them. This is not
problematic so long as their intellectual punditry is recognized as constituting a ‘notshowing’ (obfuscation) that announces the legitimacy of the tenets propagated by the
meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. 302 The authority its axiomatic narratives confer
serves to justify the EU’s imposed (“ascetic-consumerist priest” dominated and driven)
re-organization of European life and its ascendancy over all other political forms on the
continent.
EU scholars often disagree over how to define central concepts and develop /
employ different frames of reference, a fact which provides the field its spectrum of
(relatively) diverse, contending views. This inhibits the development of a commonly
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agreed upon explanation of EU institutions, their structure and functioning—permitting a
“chaos” that is arguably productive and has the potential to be radically so. 303 However,
the mainstream of the field does naturalize a decadent value system—the ideological
juggernaut of ultra-liberal-modernity—consciously or not. A Nietzschean critique should
therefore be of interest on multiple levels, if only for illuminating certain problems
intrinsic to efforts to theorize European integration.
The analysis suggests that most such theorizing is symptomatic of a misguided
striving that culminates in acts of ‘becoming-same’. This amounts to a falling back into
the average everyday-ness of conventional EU studies scholarship only occasionally and
then accidentally approximates the values of ‘good Europeanism’. Disciplinary strictures
prevents those working in the field from conceiving viable alternatives to its ultra-liberalmodern mainstream; possibilities for Europe’s authentic becoming-other. Nevertheless
recent critical challenges are invigorating the field and provide hope that it can break out
of these strictures.
While those in the field need not agree about definitions of foundational concepts
such as sovereignty, interdependence, etc., this does significantly complicate their ability
to assert / claim shared truths. Theories of European integration arguably benefit from the
plethora of views this disagreement generates, but it often has an antagonistic effects,
rather than sustaining genuinely positive agonisms within the field.304 The mainstream
field’s limited diversity is not attributable to an intellectually honest Nietzschean
perspectivalism, but rather the opposite: strident dogmatisms buttressed by the
positivistic orientation conferred by the discourse of scientism and its privileging of
reason and “empirical data”.
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Diez and Wiener observe that, “theories serve different purposes.” Yet while
differences of understanding, however insignificant, over foundational concepts
underscore the differences in the purposes theories may serve, by design or otherwise,
they do not indicate meaningful ideological conflicts. With regard to the aim of
theoretical perspectives on European integration and the purposes they serve, Diez and
Wiener assert that “what they all share …is that they are not primarily concerned with the
development of particular policies, but with abstract reflection on European
integration.” 305 While this is the case, that reflection has tended not to give much scrutiny
to the ideological presuppositions informing integration and its theorization.
The broader historical context of the EU’s development and concurrent
emergence of regional integration theory is important for understanding each. Systematic
scholarly efforts to explicate processes of regional integration roughly coincided with the
outset of the Cold War in the early 1950s and the emergence of European federalism.
Scholars initially strove to provide explanations for as well as predictive power about the
factors required for or inconducive to the integration of disparate nation-states occupying
a common area of the world. Yet as recognition increased of the uniqueness of the
European project and the conditions enabling it, scholars recognized that the insights
developed from studies into Europe’s integration would be largely inapplicable to other
regions. As it became clear by the early 1960s that similar developments were not in
evidence elsewhere the primary subject of their attention was Western Europe, where
significant progress toward the creation of common institutions was occurring.
As an academic sub-field it was situated within international relations theory and
its branch of international organizations theory (which emerged in the aftermath of World
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War Two). In this academic context a set of interrelated theoretical perspectives and
corresponding debates on Europe’s integration have evolved. In so far as they
collectively comprise a field, it has been broadened by insights from the fields of
comparative politics and international political economy. More recently specifically postNietzschean perspectives have been brought to bear on it in the form of post-modern and
discourse analysis approaches. These have arguably opened the field up in significant and
exciting ways.
Rosamund suggests that in attempting to explain dynamic processes of inter-state
and supranational institution building in (initially the Western half of) Europe over the
past half-century, many scholars have not been “reflective” enough “about …the
theoretical roots of their work”. 306 He attempts to productively defamiliarizes our
habituated experience and received understandings. A difficulty that is unlikely to ever be
adequately resolved for those attempting to scientifically ground their analysis on precise
empirical facts was identified by Haas:
[T]he task of selecting and justifying variables and explaining their hypothesized
interdependence cannot be accomplished without an agreement as to possible
conditions to which the process is expected to lead. In short, we need a dependent
variable. 307
Yet there is a very real sense in which such agreement already exists, if unconsciously.
The critical lens of Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutic provides tools conventional
political science (and EU studies) lack, a device that facilitates the identification of the
underlying axiomatic narratives that inform commonly shared attitudes and automatic
beliefs. These value prejudices condition the choice of factors identified as relevant to a
veridical explanatory account of reality. Ignorance of their operation in conditioning the
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act of theorizing leads to exaggerated accounts of the actual differences between
conventional theoretical stances.
The variables upon which any given analysis is conducted would be disputed even
if they shared a common aim or produced results possessing discernable predictive
power, because the objective veracity of the particular choices they represented –
themselves indicative, again, of a hermeneutic of desire expressed via a will-to-truth –
can not be known with unassailable certainty. I refer to the choices / judgments informing
a designation of dependence among possible variables. For instance, in the debate
between neofunctionalists and federalists, attempts to reconcile the principles of
autonomy (state sovereignty and legal prerogatives) within a system of mutual
governance prompted strong disagreement. This arose because of:
…the challenge [of capturing] the dynamics of two complementary objectives:
strengthening the political viability of separate but not entirely autonomous (as
opposed to idealized notions of the Westphalian nation-state system) domestic
orders through the institutionalization of the principle of joint sovereignty and the
practice of political co-determination. 308
A real-world dilemma (maintaining [or conceding] a degree of national autonomy within
the emerging framework of collective authority) generated this theoretical dispute. The
notional disagreements it produced ultimately spurred the EU and its member states to
negotiate a specified degree of autonomy for its nation-state constituents within the EU’s
inter-governmentally determined, overarching supranational framework.
Balancing the changing expectations of evolving notion of national sovereignty
with the demands of new, supranational institutions of the EU has prompted promises of
democratic accountability (which never satisfy advocates of democratic accountability), as
well as soft, institutional coercion via rule enforcement (which consists with agreed upon
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democratic processes) and “harder” sorts coercion, which come in economic, diplomatic
and other forms, as when Jorg Haider’s victory in Austria resulted in that country’s
suspension from certain institutions of the Union.
Few if any theorists of European integration argue that the philosophical
presuppositions of ultra-liberal-modernity are controversial or invalid. 309 The EU and the
values subtending it are taken for granted as desirable – exemplifying a rational,
progressive, secular, humanist, and democratic endeavor. These sublimated ideological
stances are not merely encouraged by the institutional culture its numerous agencies foster
but are enforced comprehensively through socio-political mechanisms of control such as
education, civic participation and legal duties, as well as through a complex array of biopower relations it implements. Its advocates are enthralled with the EU as a “project” and
eager to participate in the universal extension of its values and norms, which they,
naturally, share.
Even those individuals, groups and parties less enthused about the EU likely
accept its principle values. Whether they do or not they are compelled by its ascendancy
to continuously deal with its prerogatives. They may struggle to modify or oppose EU
initiatives, but only through institutional procedures the EU, with its member-states,
determines. Today the social, cultural and political dimensions of life on the continent are
thoroughly dominated by the EU and the values it disseminates and enforces. Those ultraliberal-modern values are, wittingly or not, always already affirmed by the mainstream
theories of European integration, the interrelated concerns of which (sovereignty and selfdetermination, the jurisdictional reach of institutions, individual rights, etc.) take those
values, as their ground, for granted. This risks the self-reification of the field of EU
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studies. In so far as the field claims authority to debate and explain European integration
and EU politics, it abets the EU’s reification of certain notional-unto-ideological aspects
of itself, as well.
More recently some critics in the social constructivist and discourse analysis
schools of European integration have examined the values, ideals and identic forms linked
through rights based notions of equality, perceptions of legitimacy and political
enfranchisement (the EU’s project of developing a new, highly responsible citizen so
adept at promise-keeping as to be self-policing) to gain deeper insight into the motivations
driving Europe’s integration. But the exercise of theorizing the EU’s changing
institutional dynamics (politics of policy making, policy implementation, and the
emerging community as a polity – reflections on the EU’s ever evolving and qualified
facticity) absorbs the intellectual energies of most integration theorists. As opposed to
critically deconstructing the philosophical presuppositions of ultra-liberal-modernity, the
overarching rationality it serves and form of life the EU as an institutional manifestation
of these particular values symptomatizes—and which I argue their analyses largely
support—they examine the EU according to the meta-discourse it universalizes.
Theorists of European integration analyze its operational functions and
contemplate the challenges they pose to the discourses of sovereignty and the nation-state.
This is undertaken with an eye to its effects both within the community and to the macropolitical entity, which obtains a semblance of sovereign authority in its own right, its
determination of community social and regulatory policies, initiation of reform, mediation
of competing interests among its members, and its proper role and degree of influence in
the international community. Controversy ensues over the proper criteria for determining
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where emphases should “correctly” be placed for understanding the EU’s various systems,
the implications of their operations, over how to verify hypotheses alleged to possess
predictive power, over agreement about dependent variables (the problem of confirming
that an outcome was in fact determined by the factors supposed to be responsible for the
anticipated result) and myriad other disagreements have all fueled argument. However, as
liberal, ideologic nomologists, few (if any) seriously questions, much less casts doubt
upon, the intrinsic merit of the ideological presuppositions validating the EU project. A
perusal of the literature reveals that little of broader practical or philosophical significance
is ultimately to be known by it, and that academic debate over what is known arguably
makes even less difference to the status quo (i.e.: foreign policy formulation, development
practices, the applicability or enforcement of international law, etc). 310
This said there is arguably a broad range of perspectives conveyed by theories of
European integration within the relatively narrow liberal paradigm in which such
scholarship operates. These range from the somewhat atavistic to what in its own terms
might be called surprisingly avant-garde. However, as in every social science discipline
the scholarship contends with some fundamental concepts that are notoriously polysemous
(e.g.: sovereignty, legitimacy, anarchy, etc.) and their various interpretations of meaning
can be taken as partially responsible for some degree of the range of that thought as well
as much of the disagreement between the various schools.
Many of these analysts and averagely myopic social scientists disagree even on the
grounds for defining less philosophically broad terms (e.g.: interests), and the appropriate
parameters of their application, which can be expected in a debate over the traits and
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character of an institutional apparatus or the development of broader, associated trends.
[C]ompeting theoretical approaches tend to disagree on background conditions and
process variables, where power lies in the general system, the need for more or
less integration, the impact of formal or informal structures, the feasibility or
desirability of ascribing a political telos to the process and so on. 311
Yet despite disagreements between rival theoretical approaches to theorizing European
integration, the aforementioned major strains comprising the corpus of the field express
perspectival variations symptomatic of the same reactive will-to-truth.
According to Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology the majority of
scholarly theorizing on the subject has served to reinforce a traditional statist view of the
world and, wittingly or not, constitutes an apologia for a corresponding reactive idea of
Europe. Contrary to Nietzsche’s quasi-cosmopolitan idea of Europe, the statist notion—
the notable variations of which describe the different schools of European integration
theory—functions to further normalize conventional power whilst periodically
repackaging itself in neoteric forms. While the Nietzsche’s critical theoretical frameworks
arose from deliberation on and genealogical critique of the axiological origins (the source
and/or foundation of values) of the contemporary European condition, with normative
ramifications for political organization and institutional practice, the mainstream schools
of European integration theory take the ultra-liberal-modern values subtending their
subject of inquiry for granted. 312 The field has arisen via predominantly praxiological
concerns (the basis for and efficacy of practices) with (predominantly Western) European
modes of intergovernmental cooperation, economic and political integration and the
emerging supranational institutional framework to which such collaboration has given
rise.
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In the Nietzschean view they comprise involuntary expressions of desire; almost
automatic enactments of will to power that realize value judgments (their origin in
esteeming) that underlying the aim or objective they strive to reach or develop (their
telos). Corresponding with this, an emphasis on praxiological (to the veritable neglect of
the axiological dimension) aspects of the integration processes was characteristic of
integration theory from the appearance of neofunctionalism in the early ’60s—federalist
and functionalist approaches being early, qualified exceptions: they did focus more
attention of the axiological dimension. This persisted at least until the late 1980s, when
social constructivism and discourse analysis entered upon the scene and began to
challenge more traditional approaches to (and definition of) theory, that, as Diez and
Wiener state, is “understood as a causal argument of universal, transhistorical validity and
nomothetic quality, which can be tested through the falsification of a series of
hypothesis.”
These latter approaches deconstructed meanings in radical (specifically postNietzschean) ways, interrogated the conditionality and reification of identic categories and
examined the situatedness and dependency of all meaning and truth upon the discourses,
the values (through an axiological exposition), and the practices that naturalize them.
Given the many purposes that the spectrum of integration theories and approaches serve,
Diez and Wiener go on to assert that:
European integration theory is thus the field of systematic reflection on the process
of intensifying political cooperation in Europe and the development of common
political institutions, as well as on its outcome. It also includes the theorization of
changing constructions of identities and interests of social actors in the context of
this process. 313
Through the three major historical phases of integration interest in outcomes has changed
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from one of seeking to provide predictive tools to that of adducing how efficacious EU
institutions are at achieving the outcomes they desire across myriad policy areas and
among diverse constituencies, as well as how integration is forcing a re-determination of
concepts of belonging, identity and legitimacy vis-à-vis evolving notions of community,
region, state, nation and Europe itself.
Insofar as Nietzsche’s oeuvre can be taken as a serious, if systematically
unsystematic series of reflections on the forces keeping Europe from developing common
political institutions, the changing constructions of its disparate identities and the interests
of its myriad social actors in the context of these processes, he was indisputably a protointegration theorist. Through his vitalist politics and power ontology Nietzsche directly
and conscientiously theorized the forces that would likely stimulate the future unification
of Europe.
If each distinct school of European integration theory evokes different nuances of
the same discursive set of political desires, nuances that conflict with the emphases of
other theoretical viewpoints, these varied perspectives (competing desires) can each be
said to enact features of a much larger discursive power-knowledge regime. The variety of
thought the field seems to encompass serves a transparently dissimulative function,
deterring us from its overarching ideological aim, axiological foundation and its
praxiological function. The latter aspect of mainstream theorizing about Europe’s
integration serves to articulate and lend validity to the EU’s employment of the guilt and
ressentiment formative of the bad-conscience of the European public whom it directs.
Whether the EU is better understood (re: interpreted) in terms of its state-centric
intergovernmental aspects or with an emphasis on those features that seem to qualify it as
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a supranational community, does not detract from its broader ultra-liberal-modern presuppositions and meanings. Even the discourse analyses and social constructivist
approaches, while innovative and largely indebted to a Nietzschean view to the
contingency of all epistemological meanings and ontological purpose the EU may be said
to generate, provide just a little deeper insight into the conative disposition or anticipatory
resoluteness of the few who, by cultivating a new natural desire (i.e.: nature) among those
capable of the required self-discipline, may drive European unification, in the more
significant, supra-institutional sense, “forward”.
Partisan-cum-academic positions and the debates that follow between them
dominate the field of European integration theory and absorb the energies of its
practitioners, students and interested novices, so that few, if any of them recognize the
over-arching political agenda they abet. 314 They provide outward signs of the spreading
chaos among the all-too-many (i.e.: the relativity of values, the laisser-aller and lack of
reverence for anything) that must eventuate in a more fundamental revaluation of values
premised upon authentic new grounds led by the aforementioned few: thymotic
philosophers of the future, becoming, according to their native volition, good Europeans.
Though the EU is chiefly concerned with taming Europe’s masses and refining the
institutional apparati for doing so along familiar (reactive) ultra-liberal-modern lines, it is
serving an essential function in realizing Nietzsche’s idea of Europe and therefore its
significance should not be minimized by Nietzscheans who are off-put by the necessary
dirt of conventional politics. It would benefit good Europeans to comprehend the affective
dynamism of the EU as a complex of multifarious power constellations, which includes
the disparate theoretical understandings / rationalizations of it (the various schools of
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European integration theory examined below), if they are to subvert it and put it to use as
an instrument for realizing a genuinely noble idea of Europe.
This is not to suggest that scholars working in the field are not aware of the
difficulty (or impossibility) of comprehensively theorizing Europe’s integration. It is
unlikely that any of those working in the discipline fail to appreciate the complexity of the
subject. Working within the hegemonic ultra-liberal-modern ideological paradigm
Schmitter reflects upon the immense difficulty of theorizing something as multifaceted as
the EU, concluding:
…no single theory will be capable of explaining its [the EU’s] dynamics and
predicting its outcome. The EU is already the most complex polity ever created by
human artifice and it is going to become even more so before it reaches its end
state—whatever that will be. Efforts to select out specific events, policies, or
institutions and subject them to simplified assumptions may produce momentary
‘confirmations’ of a specific theory, but often at the expense of contrary evidence
and countervailing trends. 315
But of course selecting out is exactly what theorists of European integration are forced to
do to produce the sort of analysis – complete with dependent and “independent” variables
to bolster the validity of its ultimately arbitrary choices and corresponding claims – that
resonates with the discipline. Theorizing Europe’s integration might be even more
complicated than it now seems to most scholars working the field if they were capable of
interrogating the values subtending it—not to mention the disciplinary conceits that
normalize them—in a serious and sustained way.
As Europe’s, and the EU’s, leaders, politicians and bureaucrats clamber to achieve
their respective partisan objectives and re-present their various agendas to their respective
publics (the citizen-constituents whose putative imprimatur ostensibly validates or
legitimizes their authority), a somewhat parallel academic disputation adds to the din.316
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Their combined chatter is distilled by media (whose operations consist with its values),
from scholarly articles to respected mainstream journals to the popular tabloid press, to
(in)form a spectrum of public opinion and arbitrate between disparate conventional views.
Fused in complex ways with differing historical understandings, cultural and ethnic
sensibilities and received according to varying socio-economic cleavages, this spectrum of
ideologically conditioned opinions develops into convoluted national and supranational
public discourses. These in turn always already serve the ‘superstructural’ framework
provided by the ultra-liberal-modern paradigm by immunizing it against effective—re:
threatening—critical scrutiny. These discourses continually tempt any would-be dissenter
to fall back into the inauthentic Publicness of the They and rejoin the all-contented herd.
The member-state governments and the EU itself attempt to manage these discourses to
their best advantage, further compounding their inauthenticity and deflecting demands
from their citizen-constituents for genuine accountability by seeming to provide an
account of themselves. None of this is a function of conscious collusion; rather it is a
result of the ideological operation of ultra-liberal-modernity, specifically the distortions of
the political (a becoming-inauthentic) caused by the desire it fosters for ease and the
elimination of all suffering.
Through concerted and ongoing public relations efforts the EU represents itself as
an authentically agonistic and democratic, ever-expanding green pasture to the human
herds (or, in its own jargon, the “constituent publics”) it manages. This is done through
numerous means, a telling example of which includes the “Europa” website itself. 317 The
official website of the EU, Europa subtly promotes the agenda of integration whilst
seemingly amenable to public debate about, as if European integration—its raison
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d’être—is that open to question or negotiable. It generates a simulation of its ideal,
posturing as a free and participatory endeavor to ingratiate the ethos arising from radical
notions of enfranchisement and popular democracy.
In this instance (among others) the EU promotes a simulacrum of itself that hides
arguably less democratic methods of its operation and its elite driven agenda, even as it
reveals crucial paradoxes central to questions about its legitimacy. 318 As if motivated by
some concern over or doubt about its authority or some sense that it needs to appear so
concerned, the Europa website expressly invites European citizens to submit their inputs
as to the future direction and character of the EU. 319 Yet this debate—and the egalitarian
impression it is meant to foster—is delimited by a broad notion of identity carefully
created and systematically instantiated into law by the EU itself—even if most European
citizens are ignorant of it. Most Europeans have difficulty defining what it means to be
European, and what characteristics (political, social or cultural, etc.) are distinctly
associated with ‘Europe’. That, it seems, is what the EU takes itself—in large part at
least—as being for; a conceit which begs a whole host of questions about the coherence of
the values upon which it is predicated.
These complexities notwithstanding, concerted efforts have recently been made to
devise ‘A European Strategy for Culture’, with the stated aims of, “promot[ing] cultural
diversity and intercultural dialogue, [utilizing] culture as a catalyst for creativity in the
framework of the Lisbon Strategy for growth and employment, and [advancing] culture as
a vital aspect of the EU's international relations.” These goals were expressed in the
European Commission's first-ever Communication on culture in May of 2007 and adopted
by European Ministers of Culture in November 2007. 320 In relevant sections below I
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address each of these objectives, focusing on the first aim in terms of the paradox raised
by the official promotion diversity, which effectively neuters it; the second as it pertains to
the systematic effort to advance the prerogatives of free–market fundamentalism and the
‘New Economy’; and the third point in the context of globalization’s role in universalizing
European norms and the sickness of its nihilistic, ultra-liberal-modern ethos.
Political opposition that cannot be accommodated within the EU’s agenda is
systematically co-opted and/or suppressed. 321 Broadly inclusive identic and cultural
definitions of the ‘European’ and belonging are similarly imposed—compelling a multicultural civic ethos on presumed citizens, a form of particularism that excludes alternative
forms of otherness and presumes a far-reaching degree of political authority. While
publicly working to alleviate any (perception of a) democratic deficit, entrenched
representative interests’ ensure that a unified European polity emerges that conduces to
their notion of the good: hyper-decadent ascetic ideals that foster a ‘cynical, enlightened
false-consciousness’, and calumniate life. These enfeebling ideals are extolled by the socalled “higher men,” who presume to act in the interests of their less conventionally
“successful” but similarly congenitally botched fellows—the weakly majority of people—
by leveling mountain and valley. They thereby subdue and frustrate the best and
perpetuate the fantasy of an inherent equality and corresponding dignity between all
persons, making society poorer overall. 322
From this attenuation of self-centered concerns a transformed disposition results,
both among individuals and within communities. The changes it confers are fairly
comprehensive, affecting the expectations individuals have of each other as fellow
citizens and toward their society and its politics. A similar change occurs within the
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attitudes of larger communities toward one another. This may perhaps lead to more
peaceful relations between states, as obviously seems the case in Europe, but this is in
some part due to the emasculation of individuals and corresponding spiritual neutering of
their communities or nation-states. Risse observes that as both a result of this, and an
indication of the EU’s conventional success:
…attachment to ‘Europe’ is [now] strongly correlated with support for the EU and
willingness to cede authority and sovereignty to EU institutions in various policy
domains. 323
This underscores the fact that reactive powers personified in the contemporary asceticconsumerist priests of ressentiment (bureaucrats, technocrats, corporate and business
interests, the marketing and advertising industries, the mega-media, etc.) have prevailed in
defining Europe and European-ness in the context of the meta-discourse of ultra-liberalmodernity.
The imperative to yield aspects of domestic control over certain economic,
political and social policies to the supra-national institutions of the EU correlates with
globalization’s narratives of free trade and accountability for the sake of greater
consumption and prosperity. These narratives resonate by mollifying the comfort and
security seeking masses. Yet interesting and similar internal conflicts have emerged
within every state aspiring to EU membership. For, as eager as they tend to be to benefit
from EU membership, they are often reluctant to accept certain of the conditions imposed
by accession, and often push back against them, demanding concessions from Brussels.
This process was especially evident in the long period of accession negotiations between
the former Soviet satellite states of Central and Eastern Europe and the EU, as they strove
to preserve as much autonomy as possible. With regard to the EU’s Eastern enlargement
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Tsoukalis noted that “membership of the Union is perceived as a highly political choice
linked to the consolidation of democracy, the preservation of peace and security, and full
participation in common European institutions.” He went on to acknowledge that “EU
membership

[is]

unavoidably

linked

to

the

process

of

modernization

and

Europeanization”. That has indeed been the case as the waves of accession in 2004 and
2007 produced uneven effects throughout the new (formerly Communist) memberstates. 324
Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology may be construed as loosely
corresponding with the cosmopolitan–communitarian divide in international politics
studies, insofar as his ‘good Europeanism’ cultivates a qualified cosmopolitanism for the
healthiest that is based upon a pathos of distance that maintains a natural hierarchy and
corresponding rank order of types. Through their erotic regimes of self-creation and
discipline, the best, as genuinely (and relatively) autonomous individuals, are capable of
cosmopolitan valuing and engaging in contests over values in an authentic agon with
similarly healthy types. The vast majority, however, take their heteronymous existential
meaning and ontological purpose from their participation in communitarian practices,
through enactments of received traditions and conformity to customary beliefs. 325 The
latter is demonstrated by the contemporary European consumers, who take satisfaction in
easy assurances of their equality and rights, indifferently acquiesce to being represented in
the realm of organized, official politics and almost uncritically adopt one or more of the
readymade identic typologies which describe the narrow spectrum of “normal”. Their
socialized selfhood is constructed for them and adopted—not without some degree of
coercion—according to processes of indoctrination through which they come to recognize
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themselves and “others”. 326 In the loci of globalization identic categories, affiliations and
modes of life are marketed via the culture industry and veritably “consumed” like
products, in a process of (in)authentic self-branding by their “client–adherents”. 327
The EU deploys strategies of socio-political massification to normalize a social
imaginary consistent with a set of socio-economic and increasingly political ends and
secularized ascetic values combined with a consumption-oriented notion of success. In
light of the EU’s thoroughly ideological aims, Nietzsche would perceive conventional
efforts to theorize it (i.e.: European integration)—efforts that originate in the same ultraliberal-modern milieu that gave rise to the EU—as consisting mostly of pseudophilosophical, essentially partisan debate. Setting aside its obvious role in manifesting a
particular set of discourses, it would strike him as “a confusion of idealist dogmatism and
knowledge”, an elevated extension of the ‘newspaper culture’ he despised whose common
sources are crass populism and the reactive tenets of our age’s ultra-liberal-modernity. 328
The most distinguishing and possibly life-affirming features of the field’s chief
schools of thought lie at the margins of that broader anti-natural philosophical program;
the unwitting dogmatism of many integration theorists’ exposes their respective agenda
(for some this could be simply put in terms of their being either “for” or “against” the
maintenance of the “traditional” nation-state), differences in their views point at
ideological presuppositions left un—or under—examined and at the obvious, albeit
incomplete, nature of the empirical claims they make. 329 All effort at such empirically
grounded social “science” is in (its) “truth” an engagement in the observation of events,
elaboration of subjective impressions of effects (symptoms) and supposition about
affective capacities that cannot be measured in any precise or efficacious way. This is not
194

to say that descriptive theorizing is entirely without value, and Nietzsche himself certainly
would have recognized that fact.
To expand on a point made in the introduction to this chapter, an ineliminable
dilemma in the social sciences, particularly those concerning political phenomena, is the
choice of “independent variables”, upon which a respective inquiry or take on social
reality is based. Nietzsche insists that in order to maintain a good-conscience, we must be
constantly mindful of the fact that the act of choosing always already entails excluding
certain considerations, potentially even as much of relevance as a theoretical endeavor
may endeavor to account for; the conceit that any putative “independence” has been, or
ever can be attained in the determination of variables veils an effort to cultivate the
illusion of methodological and/or pedagogical rigor for the sake of objectivity, to imbue
the perspective it aims to promulgate (i.e.: the conclusion it settles upon) with authority
and sustain the illusion of its unconditional “truth”.
What is concealed is that all such variables are always wholly dependent and
situated in a temporal—that is, ever changing—context. The resultant, always-already
subjective viewpoint conditions perceptions that validate belief in and habituate us to its
veracity, until their arbitrary determinants and possibly figmental origins are forgotten.
Thereafter the truth of the viewpoint is taken for granted until such a time as conditions
may indisputably contradict—and thereby de-habituate—us of the presumptions that long
sustained it as true.
Although theorists of European integration agree on much, for much of the EU’s
facticity (in the Heideggerian sense of that term) is not productively disputed, their aim of
disclosing the truth about the EU’s institutions and their functioning raises a problem
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similar to the paradox of knowability. Namely, when they argue in the course of
theorizing that certain truths about the EU are knowable their initial understanding of the
truth of what is known is destabilized by the process of attempting to demonstrate it. 330
This paradox of knowability is complicated by the presentation of evidence to the contrary
presented by other theorists: one theorist asserts that unification is driven by states and
provides evidence demonstrating this hypothesis while another asserts that it is motivated
by supranational institutions and provides evidence to validate that proposition. To
paraphrase Dewey, the operation of knowing conditions what can be known; as Nietzsche
recognized a half-century earlier, “the true and valid object of knowledge” cannot be
understood independent of our consideration of it, which makes the truth of what is known
problematic. 331
Furthermore, there are undoubtedly facts about the EU that are true but unknown;
however, the way theorists of European integration are conditioned to see blinds quite
probably them to the existence of certain of them. Given the way in which mainstream
European integration theorizing has evolved—according to the conceptual constraints of
International Relations theory paradigms and the narrow statist logic with which it largely
deals, in conformity with the positivistic orientation conferred by the discourses of
scientism—alternative perspectives originating outside the political science discipline are
needed to illuminate presently unappreciated or even unknown “truths”. It is my
contention—explicated at the end of this chapter—that recent theoretical approaches
indebted to Nietzsche’s critique of traditional Western metaphysics and epistemology are
doing so.
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Examples of such aforementioned empirical matters include the historical record,
the organization’s key, defining events, the actual treaties that established and govern it,
the design, role and function of its five primary institutions, as well as the committees,
programs, and multi-layered bureaucratic apparatus that makes it all work. All of this
constitutes the pragmatic ground without which more profound debate could not
coherently occur. That shared pragmatic ground provides a basis upon which assumptions
about what is un-problematically known form, but which also cultivates a disposition
toward inquiry and to what ought to be theorized. From there a wide range of divergent
perspectives arise from which theoretical standpoints develop. What is fundamentally
disputed between them is the correctness of characterizations given the evidence mustered
to justify their differing suppositions. The depiction or characterization of facts given in
the course of interpreting them, and the significance those facts are thereby accorded
comprise, in considerable part, the principal antecedent, motive state or reason for
asserting the reasonableness of a set of claims. Their persuasiveness endows the theory
they comprise with credibility, by extension. These proto-theoretical choices, themselves
psycho-political in their essence, inform the act of rationalizing a theoretical proposition
on the basis of a largely subjective causal account.
We cannot know—unless straightforwardly told, and we may even then have
compelling reasons to doubt—how directly ideological inclinations affect the perception
of facts that gives rise to the characterizations out of which theoretical positions arise.
Individual theorists of European integration, as authors, are themselves riven by multiple
motivational and interest cleavages, much as the subject they study. Nietzsche’s vitalist
politics is concerned with analyzing the psychological motives for the portrayals that
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effectively assess the relative value of myriad facts and determine their proper place in an
explanatory conjecture. As unconscious memoirs on the parts of their respective authors,
the accounts of European integration underlying theoretical explanations of it are of
primary interest here.
The value of ordinary theoretical advances depends of course upon their
“correctness”, but that is in part determined according to how effectively the explanatory
work they do relates to an established theory or “legitimate” discourse by solving some
problem associated with it. In the course of doing this, it persuasively augments and/or
reaffirms the prevailing theoretical perspective. Thus a sort of feedback loop arises that
largely validates the received wisdom of the governing view. Occasionally, however, a set
of radical insights produces an extraordinary theory that overturns a long dominant
knowledge paradigm, as Thomas Kuhn explicated in his influential work ‘The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions’ (1962).
Of greater interest here, however, is the sociogenic dimension to the
aforementioned feedback loop in the maintenance of a scientific paradigm or power–
knowledge regime. The apodicity of a perspective-become-theory and its ability to
causally account for some aspect of our world underlies its ability to compel, determining
its prospective authority. But it is made credible via a mimetic process of repetition (in
education, popular media, etc.) and by application to technological innovations, economic
processes and socially transformative practices—all of which contribute to its dominance.
Our knowledge of the world is more efficacious when the sociogenic dimension of
its origins is understood. Namely, that it does not merely arise from an ever-increasing
understanding of empirically demonstrable facts, but at least equally through our
198

interpretation of facts according to a will to truth. Social-science therefore serves us well
as an essential tool for the life sustaining endeavor of creating necessary illusions of truth,
a point Nietzsche consistently affirmed, but the empirical apodicity of a perspective, that
is the correspondence of its truth claims to the world, is not necessarily related to its utility
for social life or the maximal flourishing of intrepid iconoclasts.
Nietzsche is not advocating an anti-realist stance, however; so long as a
perspective originates in life-affirming strength—a positive will to creative destruction as
generative power—what ultimately matters from Nietzsche’s standpoint is not its putative
truth (or, the reliability of its vagueness) but how it can be sustained long enough, via
tradition, to augment the development of a higher culture. Through the invigorating
effects of an elevated culture humankind’s preeminent exemplars may be enabled to do
so. Part two examines how theories of European integration are or are not achieving that
with regard to the European Union, arguably the most progressive, innovative and
dynamic polity in the world today.

Part Two: European Integration Theory: a Doxographical Survey toward
Genealogical Critique
From Federalism to Functionalism
Theorizing European integration naturally came into its own after World War
Two, with the creation of intergovernmental institutions on the continent (i.e.: the OEEC
[now the OECD] and ECSC), though precedents predated that conflict. The theoretical
stances of federalism and functionalism were both established by the mid-1940s within
the nascent discipline of international studies. With the reorganization of occupied and—
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by 1949—divided Europe, many key developments to future economic and political
integration occurred simultaneously.
Federalist visions of a united Europe have been articulated in various guises going
back through the thought of 19th century progressive figures such as Giuseppe Mazzini,
and to 18th century thinkers, including Immanuel Kant whose cosmopolitan notion (in
Perpetual Peace, 1795) entailed qualified federalist ideals, and antecedents such as the
United States’ Articles of Confederation (1775) and Constitution (1787). Examples of
quasi-federal approaches to political comity in Europe included the union of Swiss
cantons, and to a lesser degree the 19th century unification of Italy and Germany and the
early 20th century establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics. In Western
Europe, federalist ideas gestated in the minds of progressive European reformers for two
centuries. Then, in late 1946, the Union of European Federalists was founded in Basel to
promote the unity of the continent along corresponding lines. 332
Federalism is distinguished by scholars from both federation and confederation as
discrete forms of political organization. While a confederation is a joining together of
formally autonomous states along narrowly specified lines, a federation is a formally
unified political body comprised of formerly sovereign states. Scholars generally agree
on this definitional distinction. The relationship between federalism and federation is
more complex however, for as Burgess observes, “federalism informs federation and vice
versa,” but their internal “diversity notwithstanding, all federations are composite states
that constitute a single people.” 333
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The motivations for and practical utility of the federal model of political
organization are many. As Michael Burgess notes:
Past federations have been founded upon distinct territorial identities and interests
as well as upon minority cultures, sub-state nationalisms, religious differences,
and a range of socio-economic factors that served to underline societal cleavages
having political salience. The unity of federations therefore has traditionally been
based upon the preservation and promotion of certain federal values that together
allow these differences and diversities to breathe and flourish. 334
Although the EU is an outgrowth of cooperation conceived to ensure greater economic
security, it has come to encompass all the factors Burgess mentions. The federal values,
which exemplify ultra-liberal-modern, neo-liberal concerns, is explicated in the Acquis
Communitaire and the new (and recently revised) constitution.
The EU, a neoteric sympolity, is (contemporary neo-liberals would argue) the
fortuitous result of an agonistic process that has realized many of the aims pursued by
earlier advocates of European unification. It is an achievement that rests on the crucial
appreciation that “Europe” is a polysemic notion. This awareness has become a maxim of
its development, and enables it to account for and accommodate diverse perspectives—or
feign doing so. Its raison d’être contains echoes of many previous thinkers’ ideas on the
subject, including the principles of civitas gentium (an international union of peoples) and
foedus pacificum (avoidance of war) in Kant’s Toward Perpetual Peace. It shares
Nietzsche’s concern for what European man is to become, if wholly incapable of
consciously pursuing his goals; even less so his promotion of the abolition of nations. 335
Quand même, I argue below that the EU is enabling good Europeans to seriously
contemplate just such a radical future transformation of the political organization of
communal life. The EU has certainly fulfilled one of his predictions, which originated in
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opposition to the prevailing nationalism of his age and asserted that “the economic
unification of Europe is coming of necessity”. 336
Similarly compelling reasons for unifying the continent as those which Nietzsche
observed started to gain traction among progressive elites and small segments of
European publics following the First World War. The pan-European movement entered
popular consciousness during the early 1920s. Their cause continued to gain momentum
throughout the inter-war period, some even merging with the anti-fascist movement by
the mid-1930s. 337 At that time the federalist ideas for a future unified Europe competed
with alternate visions including Julien Brenda’s rationalist universalism and the
International Paneuropean Union founded by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. While
the EU is not (yet) a formal federation, the principles of federalism were favored among
key arbiters of Europe’s unification (the “father’s of Europe”). They were preferred in
large part for their practical viability in reaching agreements between sovereign states and
arguably played a significant role in the development of the EU’s primary institutions.
Rosamund states that:
[F]ederalism most commonly describes political systems in which there is a
division of authority between central and regional or state government. Federal
systems are usually understood as resting on historic compromises involving the
permanent compact between territorial units… [whereby they place themselves
under] common, centralized institutions… [while] retaining at least a measure of
autonomy. 338
In many parts of the world, and Europe as well, the federal model enables multi-ethnic
and multi-cultural nation-states to exist (Belgium being a case in point); holding distinct
units together in a political unity over centrifugal forces of identic particularism that
would otherwise pull them apart.
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Burgess asserts that “the core of the federal idea… is based upon the notion of a
voluntary union of states and peoples—the result of a bargain, treaty, contract, or
covenant freely entered into—that is binding upon its members and rooted in mutual
respect, recognition, reciprocity, tolerance consent, and equality.” These organizing
principles are clearly operative at many levels of institutional governance among many
nation-states in the world today, including some that are not formal federations, such as
Spain and the UK, Nigeria and Kenya. Moreover, these principles describe just as aptly
key aspects of the EU which lead many to believe that federalism lies at the heart of the
logic integrating Europe. Indeed, among EU member-states today Germany, Austria, and
Belgium are formal federations. Although the EU appears to embody key principles of
federalism, the extent to which it actually does so is a contentious issue among theorists
of European integration. Scholars have debated the degree to which the EU operates
along federalist lines since the Treaty of Rome (1957). This issue will be examined in the
context of each of the sections below.
Burgess argues that although “the EU is not intended to become either the USA or
a Switzerland writ large… a complex interaction between economic and politics…by the
member states of the EU…has resulted in a new kind of federal union the like of which
has never been seen.” 339 He believes this demonstrates that the influence of federalism in
post-war Europe was not “merely transitory” as critics have alleged, but has “in reality…
displayed a strong continuity [on the] thought and practice [of unifying Europe]
throughout the subsequent half-century.” 340
Chryssochoou affirms this when he asserts that “there may well be different but
equally federal sets of principles and structures composing a federal polity, which
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nevertheless need to be seen in a wider symbiotic perspective.” 341 In other words, federal
systems may differ from one another, taking their unique significance and innerregularity from the respective entities that comprise them, while still remaining federal
arrangements. Despite “considerable variation in purposes, identities, cultural traditions,
financial resources, political and constitutional symmetry, organizational logic, conflictresolution

mechanisms,

constitutional

amendment

procedures,

power-sharing

arrangements,” Chryssochoou identifies “the democratic representation of all
participating units… as a common defining property” of all federalist arrangements.” 342
Burgess thinks the structural organization and functioning of Europe’s major
intergovernmental institutions reflect federalist notions of collaborative governance. In
the election of representatives to the European Parliament, the overriding powers of the
Court of Justice (ECJ), the principle of Qualified Majority Voting, the independence of
the European Commission from member-state governments, and the accession process
for EU membership he sees manifestations of federalist principles operative in the EU.
Regarding the evident character and functioning of the contemporary EU he writes that
the principles of federalism have undeniably transformed the continent, whether or not
that fact is readily and fully acknowledged as such:
Europeans [now] have to recognize and deal with the emerging federal reality that
is staring them in the face. Together the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties
have combined to build upon Monnet’s Europe by accelerating and accentuating
its federal direction. [C]onsiderable institutional and policy evidence has
accumulated to substantiate the claim that the EU already constitutes a federal
Europe. 343
That the constitution of 2005 is presently being promulgated into law by a treaty process
strengthens Burgess’ claim. 344
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By the early to mid-1950s scholars theorizing international politics were turning
their attention to the exciting prospect of political and economic integration among
sovereign nation-states. Formal integration was increasingly seen as a serious potential
solution to the traditional rivalries and ructions that spawned the cataclysmic conflicts
that had devastated the European continent twice in a span of little more than three
decades. Working in the field of political science, which was itself relatively new as an
academic discipline, early integration theorists attempted to articulate a cogent,
parsimonious model of Europe’s integration process that could serve both to explain it
and provide predictive power.
Those practical objectives of the nascent integration which had been attained by
the mid-50s, while largely effective for the state actors involved in their respective areas
of cooperation (ECSC and EURATOM—which merged in 1967— cooperation was
largely limited to the realm of energy technologies in atomic power and raw materials
allocation within the strategically significant coal and steel sectors), had given rise to the
need for more centralized authority structures. In the course of the study’s unfolding new
theoretical responses arose as novel challenges presented themselves and unforeseen
needs created by integration processes arose. Innovation also occurred whenever the
prevailing theoretical paradigm came to seem inadequate. Efforts to explain any number
of evident facts or important dynamics compelled academic advances. But the federalist
impulse was not universally shared, and examples of failed efforts at federalism
abounded. A useful alternative and convincing challenge to the post-war federalist
approach was functionalism, a theoretical perspective that had arisen from the Europe’s
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tumultuous inter-war experience of the 1930s. It emerged on the scene in the mid-1940
and resonated widely for over a decade.
Rosamund writes that “like federalism, functionalism was a branch of the broad
movement that sought to theorize the conditions for ending human conflict and which
found intellectual space in the turbulent political climate of the 1940s.” Functionalism, as
the theoretical perspective came to be known, was initiated by David Mitrany as a
theoretical response to multiple crises, particularly the organized mass conflict of the
twentieth century’s world wars, and unresolved threats to international peace and life on
the European continent. It was an inter-war theoretical effort conceived to meet the
challenge of alleviating the underlying sources of conflict in the international state
system. In his seminal 1943 work A Working Peace System, David Mitrany had
idealistically asserted “peace will not be secured if we organize the world by what divides
it.” 345
Mitrany’s functionalist analysis was meant to suggest a practical way out of what
he perceived to be inherent limitations to the nation-state and the failed international
system it had given rise to. 346 He postulated that cooperation between states in specific,
functionally linked activities would (and had, albeit in nascent form, proven to) be more
effective than unilateral state action:
The essential principle is that activities would be selected specifically and
organized separately, each according to its nature, to the conditions under which it
has to operate, and to the needs of the moment. It would allow, therefore, all
freedom for practical variation in the organization of the several functions, as well
as in the working of a particular function as needs and conditions alter. 347
This approach would account for the fact that “not all interests are common to all, and
that the common interests do not concern all countries in the same degree.” Therefore,
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Mitranian functionalism was conceived as an alternative to the discredited political
unions of the past, which had bound “together some interests which are not of common
concern to the group, while cut[ting] asunder some interests of common concern to the
group and those outside it.” 348
Among his central aims was to conceive a viable means of productively utilizing
the very competitive incentives that often produced counter-productive conflict between
territorially defined nation-states to ramify mutually beneficial assistance. He did so by
emphasizing the common benefits attained through self-interested mutual aid in
accomplishing certain specified functions. 349 He suggested that this joint effort in defined
areas of activity could be accomplished by shifting the source of state legitimacy and the
basis of the international system away from territorially defined unions, to the efficient,
cooperative performance of necessary functions toward the fulfillment of each nation’s
respective needs. This would give rise to “collective rational thinking” toward problem
solving and possibly conflict resolution. 350 He thought of functional cooperation as an
unexpectedly simple way of fixing what was fundamental broken with the international
system:
Instead of breaking up government mechanically into a pyramid of subordinate
territorial areas, we need for our new ends rather to dissect its tasks and relevant
authorities on lines that correspond to and fit those tasks. Instead of keeping up
the old and barren attempt to establish a formal and fixed division of sovereignty
and power, a division which changing conditions continually puts out of joint, we
could with a little insight and boldness distribute power in accordance with the
practical requirements of every function and object. 351
Mitrany saw such a strategy as a workable way of mitigating the structural rigidities built
into international politics that hindered cooperation between states and complicated the
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settlement of conflicts thereby. However, with regard to certain tensions this produced,
Chryssochoou states that:
[T]he ‘functional imperative’, as the basic law governing the evolution of the
European integration process, rejected the inevitability of constitutional
requirements and fixed divisions of functional and political authority, and instead
focused on problems which… cannot be solved separately by each government
acting alone.
The intuitive reasonableness of the method is apparent. Yet for its striking simplicity it
was no less revolutionary as a means of reorganizing the basis for relations between
nation-states to promote more effective cooperation between human societies.
Another positive consequence of functionalism was that it would potentially
enable the development of supra-national authorities without impinging on the autonomy
of states. According to Henig’s general observation,
…postulates, and makes a virtue of, integrated decision-making structures
operating within defined sectors, such as coal or agriculture. Within those sectors
there [would develop] ‘supra-national’ institutions but elsewhere governments
and states [would] retain their traditional authority. …A degree of functional
integration may [therefore] be compatible with a broadly inter-governmental
approach [to integration]. 352
Yet as Henig also observes, “early proponents [namely Mitrany] of integration argued
that successful operation of supra-national structures [produced by functional
cooperation]… would generate a demand for more.” 353
Qualified by technical expertise, specialists in various issue areas would comprise
assemblies to determine policy and political action, a style dubbed “management
committee government” that Mitrany believed would naturally assume democratic
characteristics. Such cooperative decision-making among experts would lead to greater
efficiency in the administration of services by functional agencies. This would create
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felicitous conditions out of which, he presumed, such committees of experts, whose
authority would be legitimated by their knowledge, would constitute pressure groups
whose shared sense of responsibility would prevail over any partisan affiliation or
ideological doctrine.
Mitrany believed such mutual cooperation would gradually lead to integration as
national governments and citizens recognized the benefits of deepening material
assistance between states. The logic of functional integration would enhance the
freedoms of all participants, providing strong disincentives to any act potentially
disruptive of the process. Therefore it held practical advantages over more idealistic
alternatives for integration, such as a potentially fractious and exclusionary “union of
peoples” based on a tenuous “promise of peace” as proposed by Kalergi’s Pan-European
movement. 354 Elements of the sort of technocratic expertise in government and mutual
cooperation between states advanced by Mitrany are quite evident today at various levels
of international society. Among IGOs, the EU in particular functions through organized
working committees, independent investigations and commissioned studies.
Mitrany, via these positivistic notions of human reason and progress (the faith of
scientism), was responding to the problems generated by the historic shift in European
governance that concluded World War One, which saw many of the continent’s imperial
monarchies dissolved or transformed into mere figureheads of state. Thus he was
motivated to provide a critique of certain intrinsic impediments to federalist attempts at
integration, “the common defects of sectional unions”, including what he dubbed
continental and ideological unions. He also developed his functionalist alternative in
contrast to the failed League of Nations system. 355
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An early opponent of a qualified state centrism who precociously emphasized the
“material interdependence” of states, Mitrany’s contribution was to explicate how a
functionalist notion of authoritative legitimacy toward cooperative, incremental
integration could transform traditional, representative voting democracies. 356 The latter
were inferior precisely because any segment of the mob could raise a candidate to power
within a declining (kakistocratic) form of “government by politicians”. In the age of latemodernity secular and “democratic” political authority—the dominion of charismatic
ascetic-consumerist priests—had replaced former, de-legitimated sources of institutional
power, but had not yet established effective means of administrative control. This created
a volatile situation in which the tenuous authority of states was easily contested by
opposing democratic forces. In the best scenario it lead to the mismanagement of
societies and their conflicts, and increased the possibility of widespread disorder. While
still advocating similarly democratic institutional means, Mitrany sought to reverse
accepted wisdom concerning the division of sovereignty and power, asserting that:
instead …of asking by whom should sovereignty and power be exercised, we
should rather ask upon what objects they should be exercised; …in other words,
the real question is not ‘who are the rightful authorities,’ but rather ‘what are the
rightful ends – and what the proper means for them?’
He suggested that the basis of authority itself be transformed so as to “derive from the
performance of a common task” rather than “the possession of a separate ‘right’. 357
Functionalism would enable “the application of carefully examined, but not
necessarily politically structured, strategies for transcending (national) territorial
boundaries in tackling issues of a technical nature,” that would ineluctably build
international institutions.358 These in turn would induce a normative transformation to
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mitigate conflict in the world by stimulating a shift of popular loyalty from the nationstate to un-dogmatic international institutions created to perform specified tasks in the
common human interest. Recognizing that:
Empire and League having failed to find a way to an active international unity,
because outstripped in different ways by the growth of social life, some reformers
would now try federation; yet the very number and variety of the schemes
proposed, limited territorially or ideologically, show that a scheme that might
bring all peoples together cannot even be through of,
Mitrany believed a functionalist approach to international integration would create “a
peace that would bring [nations] actively together”. What was required above all for a
peaceful existence between increasingly co-dependent states was “[t]he growth of new
administrative devices, and especially of planned public action… in the international
sphere.”
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However optimistic his approach, Mitrany took the category of “expertise” for
granted, reifying power / knowledge regimes and the technocratic rationality they
reproduced as a just and desirable basis of a new method of social administration and
normatively transformed international order.
Nietzsche would have been immediately suspicious of such a rationalistic method
for the governance of human communities and would certainly have thought it all-toohuman. Yet given the widespread decadence of the age he likely would have supported it,
as a means of eroding the authority (and popular veneration) of the state. Such an
administration of affairs seems to echo utilitarian concerns and is bound to reproduce
many of the distortions that inhibit the becoming of the best. While attempting to contend
with the tendency of “nation-states to uphold certain sorts of dogma which distract policy
from the maximization of public welfare,” and which when regarded “as a given, …
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impose an unnecessary inflexibility [upon] thinking about how the requirements of
human beings could be served” 360 the functionalist solution shares the primary
assumptions about the ends of human community of liberal-modern idealists. It also
replicates in quasi-utopian terms the view, that at the inter- or supranational level the
highest purpose of political community lies in its acting to effectively ameliorate the
banal, commonplace struggle individuals experience in meeting their mundane, if
essential needs; an objective that had already been adopted by that coldest of cold
monsters, the nation-state (at least in the industrialized world, where it was most
thoroughly instantiated).
The base impulse to rule over others for its own sake in a negative will to
nothingness as nihilistic power was unconsciously reiterated – if in an inverted manner –
in functionalism’s reduction of human life to sets of material requirements that could
most effectively be met by rational means. Though Nietzsche’s experience of the FrancoPrussian war was traumatic, and he viewed the war and its outcome as abhorrent, it did
not fundamentally alter his view on the value of conflict for society. Peace, in and for
itself, was he believed a reactive value motivated by the slave’s desire for a insipid
comfort and rejection of the natural rank order of types (Rangordnung). However
repulsive and cynical the official justifications for organized warfare may have seemed to
him after his traumatic experiences behind the front lines, campaigning against conflict
seemed equally repugnant to him. Nietzsche’s rejection of the pacifist trends of his time
is complicated: despite having later come to see the manifold dangers in unified
Germany’s growing power and its imperial ambitions as one of the disastrous
consequences of the Franco-Prussian war, condemning warfare generally and advocating
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its ban from the realm of possible human activities was a life-denying strategy more
likely to compound the original problem than to progress mankind into a utopian future.
Though Nietzsche viewed the wars between modern European nation-states as
wholly reactive, futilely destructive and symptomatic of his—and by extension, our—
epoch’s decadence, they were also for those very reasons, unfortunately necessary; a
continent wide peace, if attained, would be plausibly more harmful. Moreover such a
peace would be doomed anyway, for by preserving a toxic status-quo it could overcome
neither the unnatural desire for radical equality through the annihilation of authentic
difference nor the ressentiment born of weakness and rationalized via slave-morality that
motivated such a desire. The all-too-human contradictions generated by modernity’s antinatural ideals would exacerbate the underlying sources of conflict throughout European
society, a notion Mitrany corroborates.
Rather than crudely conceiving the organization of political community as a
means to abolish suffering and conflict through the mutual attainment of common needs,
Nietzsche thought it should structure a culturally specific and salubrious agon within
which each might attain the highest of which they are capable for the greater enrichment
of culture – and its infrequent efflorescence – and the thriving of the exceptional geniuses
it may eventually produce. Nietzsche’s view on the peace of our time (the motivation for
which he anticipated and extensively critiqued) has important implications for the
understanding his philosophical oeuvre imparts vis-à-vis the tenets and aspirations of an
ultra-liberal-modern project such as the formal unification of Europe and the institutional
apparatus of the European Union.
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Again, the functionalist thesis of European integration envisioned a world of
technocratic experts supervising the creation and administration of a newly prosperous
Europe. Its institutions would be designed to produce a civilization constituting the most
effective feeding trough at which its constituent masses would ever have gorged. It would
maximize efficiency across numerous areas of production and administration, resulting in
a peaceful sort of well-managed “utopia”; an appealing pasture to provide as much
contentment as devisable, one in which the herd would happily stay – having found their
place and being too fearful of jeopardizing their material security (re: comfort) to
undertake dangerous ventures or risk even a necessary conflict. To underscore this
critical perspective on the theory’s concern with maximizing public welfare, Rosamond
reminds us that “Ernst Haas alluded to the idea that functionalism bears some
resemblance to the Marxist-Leninist aspiration of replacing the ‘government of men’
[whose primary concern is that of preserving their power] with the ‘administration of
things [in pursuit of the common good through the management of political
economy]’”. 361
Furthermore, Mitrany himself acknowledged the prevalence of irrationality in
prevailing methods of political organization and conflict (mis)management, yet
proclaimed his faith in man’s ‘social nature.’ Functionalism failed to contend with the
likely unwillingness of the masses to relinquish the “enfranchisement” they enjoyed via
representative institutions within the nation-state framework in any practical way. 362
Even in Nietzsche’s productive period, the increasingly enfranchised and impudent
crowd would never willingly relinquish the democratic processes they had “won”, having
become accustomed to expressing their putative collective agency through them. Nor
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would they have stood by as those newly acquired “rights” were supplanted by issue
specific supranational assemblies comprised of reputed experts. 363 The growing
prominence of the state as a “new idol,” which, with or without popular support defends
its own prerogatives and cultivates fervent and insidiously reactive forms of nationalism
and patriotism to sustain the loyalty of its subjects, would not be so easily challenged.
Bismarck’s Reich had demonstrated this to Nietzsche less than a century earlier.
With delusions of ideological neutrality (a common conceit among the apostles of
scientism) premising his favored program for Europe’s integration, Mitrany’s supposedly
dogma free functionalist approach advanced a sophisticated replication of herd values
and failed to effectively contend with the fundamental source of the reactive power it
sought to alleviate. I refer to the corruption that the spirit of revenge (conceived in
Christian–Platonic form as an opposition to difference and becoming—“the injustices”—
of life), symptomatized in a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power, introduces to
the bodies and the behavior of intrinsically weak individuals. It initiates a harmful
deformation of instincts prevenient to the production of “rational” experts.
Against federalism Mitrany argued that “the organization of a federal group
would have to be rigid, arid so therefore will be its relations with other similar units.”
This led him to identify a paradox he thought inherent to federalism and problematic for
any genuinely viable international system of states:
In so far as successful it would engender a group patriotism, thus in the end
reproducing in all political essentials the relationship which has existed between
states and the League [of Nations] rather than that between a state and its local
bodies, or that of a federation to its members. The center of gravity of the new
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international life, that is, would again be misplaced, unless the scope and
authority of the smaller units were to be correspondingly lesser that those of the
wider grouping – and in that case they could not be close federations. 364
Yet despite recognizing some of the problems of federalism with regard to his aim of
realizing a new international society through coordinated, functional action, his
functionalist alternative did not seem to recognize that the solution it provided fused
ideals developed on the basis of existing trends of cooperation. His alternative hints at the
obsolescence of states, and possibility of overcoming the nation-state system in favor of
“a union of peoples”, whose “functional representation [could be managed] somewhat on
the lines of the governing organs of the ILO”. 365 In its affirmation of liberalism and
democracy Mitrany’s alternative was already conditioned by the values and forms of
political life which, at the state or macro-political level, he seemingly opposed. There is a
sense in which his vision of a functional organization unconsciously symptomatized
many problems of creating / maintaining effective order in an increasingly complex
international society organized around the nation-state which, however defective or
harmful constituted the most (only?) practical unions of peoples in the mid-1940s.
Rosamund observes four general sorts of critical responses to functionalism.
According to his summary, functionalism assumes “that the determination of needs is an
objective and technocratic exercise”, making it “difficult to see how functionalist logic
would work in the normal conditions of a market economy”. Indeed, making the
determination of needs “an objective and technocratic exercise” would create the danger
of constraining the very articulation of need in society, unnaturally formalizing its
expression by sanctioning only those expressed according to the dictates of the
bureaucratic organization(s) that would emerge (the disastrous five-year plans of state
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controlled economies such as the former Soviet Union, with the shortages of basic goods
and the stubbing out of innovation and experimentation that resulted, immediately springs
to mind).
Second, Mitranian functionalism entails a naïve faith “in the ability of human
beings and governments to move in rational directions”. This objection refers in part to
the likelihood that groupthink, or a myopic form of accepted wisdom would arise within
such groups of experts’ empanelled to determine solutions to socio-political problems.
That is, their own inherently limited perspectives or worldview (Weltanschauung) would
come to inhibit their ability to consider viable possibilities outside the disciplinary
epistemic regime that would simultaneously constitute the technocratic authority of their
knowledge and describe its limit – a limit they would be unlikely to perceive.
Third, as Haas later observed, functionalism “has a poor record of prediction,”
although, Rosamond states, this could be argued to be invalid, as functionalism is taken
by some to be “about advocacy rather than prediction”. Yet it is difficult to see how such
a putatively positivist advocacy can be efficacious if it completely lacks any predictive
power; moreover, can advocacy be strictly separated from a desire for some specific
future outcome, which necessarily involves a thought experiment in which values and
implicit, if not explicit predictions (if only weak ones) are involved? Forth, functionalism
is perceived by many to lack scientific rigor. But this has been attributed to the possibility
that, having emerged out of (methodologically imprecise) idealist debates of the inter-war
period, “Mitrany’s …intended audience was not always an academic one. 366
While being a fairly consistent advocate and defender of science, Nietzsche would
have been skeptical of 20th century efforts to “fortify” the social studies with the
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imprimatur of science and probably seen it as a symptom of bad-conscience. 367 And the
aforementioned areas of criticism still do not attend the problem of what sort of will-totruth the Functionalist model sought to develop and institutionalize, reifying as it did
some of the most reactive aspects of status-quo knowledge-authority structures, the state
system that legitimated them and the anti-natural forms of hierarchical power that
resulted in a naturalized spirit of revenge.
The school of functionalism has been an influential strain of European integration
theory throughout the past fifty years, both as the intellectual precursor to neo-functional
integration theory and for having significant influence on other, more recent schools of
thought, such as interdependence and regime theory. Functionalism’s relevance persists
because its approach to collective problem solving continues to be so widely applied at
all levels of national and international society. 368 This is to say, it continues to satisfy
important dimensions of the prevailing pathos of truth.
Populist objections that EU methods are anti-democratic are easily overcome (i.e.:
made irrelevant) via functionalist techniques of bureaucratic organization. According to
the disciplining authority of the prevailing power / knowledge regime that reifies its own
self-serving rationality, when popularly elected representatives of the herd empanel
specialist committees or appoint experts to governmental and intergovernmental agencies
tasked with recommending a policy course via studied consideration, negotiating
settlements and agreements or making determinations of fact, a popular (or “democratic”)
imprimatur is conferred on their decisions by extension, and their will may be said to
have been realized democratically. In our dominant, post-Weberian culture of
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technocratic rationality, any objections to the privileging of bureaucratic expertise are
likely to be dismissed as unreasonable, if not insane.
The bureaucratic organization of governmental and civil authorities according to a
technological rationality which ramifies the prerogatives of a hegemonic epistemic
community divides competencies into various areas of expertise that must, in the macropolitical spheres of life, be recognized as a defining characteristic of European
modernism. The Western (i.e.: European/Anglo-American) habit of systematizing
knowledge, in tandem with a corresponding legal culture for the management of human
resources and institutions has developed as an effective mechanism for the enforcement
of accountability according to a particular will-to-truth. This strict standardization of
conduct and apportionment of responsibility represents another unifying feature of
European-ness, a characteristic feature of European Gemeinschaft. Together these
organizational features, as modes of being, are symptomatic of the underlying ethos of
seemingly disparate European cultures. Conventional globalization is in no small part the
exportation of this methodological framework for organization in myriad applications and
disparate forms to polities outside the Western world where it developed
autochthonously. Thus the globalization complex exhibits key elements – albeit largely
reactive ones – of the unifying ethos at the core of the prevailing idea of Europe where it
is imposed (as in the colonial era) and/or adopted (as in our post-colonial period) beyond
Europe’s cultural frontier.
Despite being, to varying degrees, mimetic manifestations of ‘Europeanization’,
the imposition/adoption of this unifying ethos outside of Europe through globalizing
institutions, processes and forces (throughout the colonial and our post-colonial era) is
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multiplying its core (exclusionary) concept(s) of organization in frameworks for sociopolitical inclusivity. These frameworks, as institutional instantiations of a particular mode
of life, actively interpolate (annex) the other and hybridize belonging in a particular
setting or milieu, through the interpretive screens that are the autochthonous cultures that
they encounter. The European ethos central to the globalization complex thereby gives
rise to new forms of becoming that are wildly diverse and which contain at their core a
seed from which protean expressions of an elemental ‘good Europeanism’ might
germinate. This ethos—however problematic in ideological terms its imposition or
adaptation outside of Europe may be—has had quantitatively and qualitatively
discernable benefits. It continues to develop in unexpected, positive and active ways,
through the realization of abstract potentials of globality.
Specific to Europe, a primary concern of integrationists over the last seven
decades has been the contentious issue of what sort of institutional apparatus is most
conducive to the unification of the continent, and how it might be perfected. It must be
said that the bureaucratic method of building and managing common institutions through
a technological rationality is, in all its dimensions, an essential element and expression of
the prevailing idea of Europe, and has proven adaptable enough to persist through various
transmutations of institutionalization. It is therefore to be celebrated as demonstrative of
the agreement of elites among [European] peoples in their common acceptance of
diversity facilitated by institutions at once flexible and efficacious enough to preserve a
higher order through its preservation of a miscellany of types.
As such the EU’s hierarchic, bureaucratically organized and technocratically
executed method of integration counter-intuitively exemplifies important concerns of
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Nietzsche’s own idea of Europe. For, although imperfectly, it does in some part account
for his interest in and support of the abolition of divisive nationalisms and instrumental
utilization of the best aspects each people, cultural realm (e.g.: Romantic, Germanic,
Slavic, etc.) and religious tradition (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, etc.) has to offer the
continent as a whole, to comprise an ethos for its elevation. Nietzsche’s ideal for
Europe—‘good Europeanism’—is implicit in his idea of it. Its highest potential was to be
realized via a radically life-affirming anti-essentialist overcoming of the slave moral
values that had straight-jacketed individuals, communities and entire peoples over much
of the preceding fifteen hundred years.
The identic categories that developed in that time comprised the primary basis for
belonging within the respective communities they delimited, inherently limiting
possibilities for becomings therein. A naturalization of ethnic and national prejudices,
exclusionary notions of community conditioned perspectives among groups and nations
across the continent in largely counter-productive ways. Conversely, Nietzsche’s idea of
Europe presents a vision of a Europe that accounts for and affirms difference whilst
defusing the hatred and suspicion spawned by deleterious stereotypes so that the greatest
number may thrive relatively unconstrained by the irrational chauvinisms of the past.
Although chords of this high-mindedness may be heard in the shallow political
correctness so prevalent in the spectacles of our day, Nietzsche’s vision was far more
deliberate and (according to the tenets of his vitalist notion of the political and power
ontology) conscientiously grounded in reality – that is man’s authentic nature. His sights
were set on a farther horizon, Europe’s eventual unification, the need for which
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coextended with the distant aim of overcoming the debilitating political organization of
life inflicted upon the healthiest through the values of liberal modernity.
A genealogical critique of the major theories of European integration requires
consideration of their historical context; the generation and response of its institutions to
dynamic events of which it was a part. In examining the unfolding of Europe’s late-20th
century process of political cooperation, social integration and more formal economic
unification (all of which Nietzsche anticipated), as well as the activity of theorizing these
activities, it should be noted that the character of Europe’s common institutions both
resulted from and influenced events at the level of individuals, parties, regions, memberstates, and non-members within and outside of Europe. Beyond indicating a particular
outcome of contending wills to power and the trajectory that has set Europe on, or the
psychological setting within which those wills arose or the relative degree of health it
symptomatizes among Europe’s constituent peoples, it is the result of the whole of
occurrences in the world leading up to it and happenings throughout the duration of its
existence to the present, which are obviously far too complex to adequately summarize
here. Nevertheless, an attempt to provide an overview is necessary to comprehend the
context of these transformative occurrences.
As the benefits of cooperation achieved through the EC became evident by the
1960s, closer economic cooperation was pursued and political integration began to seem
to many both inevitable and predictable. In 1965, the Treaty of Brussels (effective in
1967) provided a common institutional framework for the “three Communities,” namely
the ECSC, EEC and Euratom. Previously each of the communities had a separate Council
and Commission (or High Authority in the case of the ECSC), but the Brussels Treaty
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combined their powers into a single Council of Ministers (after 1994 the Council of the
European Union) and a single Commission. Thus the present institutional character and
shape of the future EU had begun to emerge. The organization was then known simply as
the EEC, and its closer integration intensified philosophical and partisan political debate
within and between each member state over whether the community’s mandate should
eventually supercede its members’ national sovereignty or whether it should emphasize a
more inter-governmental character of cooperation between politically distinct but closely
associated states.
The Luxembourg compromise followed a brief crisis instigated by French
President De Gaulle’s veto of EEC’s effort at budgetary reform on the basis that it was
too supranational. 369 This compromise established the recognized right of member states
to veto any legislation that a national government believed impinged on critical areas of
national sovereignty or vital security interests. De Gaulle’s veto was a reassertion of the
prerogatives of national self-determination, which seemed at the time to put a brake on
the potential depth of Europe’s functional integration.
This establishes the backdrop for the next major theoretical perspective to emerge
on European integration, and it is among the most influential to date.

Neo-functionalism
Neo-functionalism became the dominant theory in integration studies in the early
1960s, in part to account for inadequacies in the functionalist school of thought. But it
also occurred in response to the behavioralist challenge across the social sciences. In an
effort to answer basic questions such as why integration processes might occur, and how
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might they be made desirable or encouraged, neo-functionalism took the development of
common institutions in Europe as the focal point of its examination. With their attention
on Europe, scholars in this theoretical school strove to explain certain integration
outcomes. This begged certain questions however, such as how exactly any conclusions
the neo-functionalist perspective reached could be universally applicable, even in the
abstract, outside the European cultural realm (broadly construed) and its particular, if
internally varied, historical and social contexts.
Neo-functionalism also drew upon the behavioralist trend in social science
research to offer a provocative and seemingly useful explanatory thesis for the
Community’s integration dynamic. This entailed an intensification of faith in scientism,
through:
the growing impulse to render the study of social phenomena more ‘scientific’.
This meant that theories were devices for generating testable hypotheses and that
theoretical evaluation would be bound up with the extent to which research driven
by the theory in question produced a depiction of ‘reality’ that confirmed or
denied the hypothesis. 370
The behavioralist trend transformed notions of academic legitimacy in the social sciences
and the form of its inquiry. Disciplinary authority became dependent upon the
parsimoniousness definition of a problem and the application of rigorous scientific
standards and statistical methods in research to produce quantitative results. Proponents
of the approach believed that it defined the terms of a successful demonstration of the
“accuracy” of a theoretical approach. From a Nietzschean perspective, it was a
sophisticated if philosophically problematic performative enactment of an ideal of
scholarly objectivity: the mimicking of the positivistic orientation compelled by the
discourses of scientism.
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In brief, neo-functionalism, much like its functionalist predecessor, emphasized
the interactions of diverse actors pursuing a variety of interests and stressed processes
over outcomes. It asserted that technical cooperation in specific areas of shared concern
would have a spillover effects, or positive ramifications for further mutual aid in other
sectors and activities. This would generate a cooperative momentum that would affect
numerous areas of economic and social governance as well as political authority, leading
to closer cooperation and transparency, mutual trust and ever-deepening integration. 371
Ernst B. Haas and Leon N. Lindberg were the major figures of the neo-functionalist
school from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. In attempting to provide a Nietzschean
analysis of the neo-functionalist development in theorizing European integration I will
focus primarily on the former (Haas), utilizing his works and contemporary critical
assessments of them.
Ernst B. Haas’s The Uniting of Europe, which first appeared in 1958, became a
landmark text on Europe’s integration process and a starting point for his influential neofunctionalist view. The theory that emerged held that as disparate and competitive nationstate actors collaborated in various policy realms, whether functional or otherwise, new
and relatively independent transnational competences would arise between them. At this
early stage in Europe’s integration Haas observed that the process was occurring
primarily along economic lines. However, he acknowledged even then that “economic
integration, however defined, may be based on political motives and frequently begets
political consequences. The existence of political motives [for economic integration]…in
Western Europe is clearly established.” 372 Cooperation leading to political integration
was likely to occur more gradually.
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Through a “process of bureaucratic interpenetration, usually referred to in the
literature as engrenage,” the converging demands of states would necessitate the
establishment of central authorities to manage cooperation. 373 This would incrementally
build trust to create a basis for greater loyalty between rival political entities, fostering
the prospect of ‘good-Europeanism’. The mitigation of nationalist chauvinisms and
xenophobic prejudices would ultimately alleviate any basis for conflicts between states,
which would lead to the rational prioritization of mutually beneficial cooperation over
narrow, national self-interests to maintain the beneficial dynamic of ever-greater
exchange (understood in terms of mutual aid) across ever-expanding domains of activity.
The anticipated result was a mutual reinforcement of expanding shared interests,
one that has, arguably, been incrementally realized throughout the process of European
unification. Such collaboration would lead to changed perceptions and expectations as
well as a transformation of identity within each community involved (re: nation-states
acting as sovereign actors), as they came to recognize and enjoy the practical benefits of
cooperation. Following classic economistic reasoning this increase in material prosperity
and existential security would continually generate the rational desire for further
integration, necessitating additional cooperation and providing a renewed impetus for
integration, ad infinitum.
As Rosamund puts it, “neo-functionalism’s appearance coincided with the
development of pluralism in political science [and] in many ways …can be read as a
pluralist theory.” 374 Indeed, Haas himself had written “it is the thesis of this study that the
processes implied in integration are merely a special expression of the logic of pluralism
…which tends to lead toward the formation of countervailing aggregates of economic
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interest, freedom of organization and bargaining in western Europe.” 375 On the premise
that “functional integration requires pluralism” 376 it was the neo-functionalist’s view that
such pluralism was initiated by elite socialization, in which high-ranking officials seek
the cooperation of their peers in neighboring states in order to resolve problems or reach
agreement in issue areas of mutual concern. Working together to manage international
problems, these elites would create an impetus for mutual management that would take
form in agencies combining the knowledge, perspectives and talents of each states’ most
influential members. 377
Prior to 1944–1945, the impulse for such cooperation extends back to early
modern Europe in a developmental process punctuated by (at least) three transformative
events, the peace of Westphalia (1648), the Congress of Vienna (1815) and the Treaty of
Versailles (1919). 378 But the neofunctionalists asserted that a far more profound degree of
trans-national cooperation was occurring following the second World War, one that was
gradually subordinating the nation-state itself to the prerogatives of an emergent, supranational economic community and ultimately a unified polity as well. Chryssochoou
observes, “An essential part of the neo-functionalist strategy was the identification of the
Community method as the new modus operandi of the general system.” This method, he
explains:
…consisted, inter alia, of high levels of elite socialization, joint lobbying
activities by organized interests, the Commission’s right of legislative initiative,
the involvement of national governments in complex negotiations at the European
level and a certain culture on the part of the Commission for upgrading the wider
Community interest. 379
Old forms of discipline (in the Foucaultian sense of a constructive and interactive
dynamic process of power-knowledge relations) took new guises to moderate norms and
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expectations as an incrementally transformed power–knowledge regime, one dynamically
symptomatic and productive of the changed jurisdictions and institutional character of the
authority it mediated.
To restate: as mutual policy formulation and collaboration generated its own
momentum, the neofunctionalists perspective was fortified by an observable increase in
the need for cooperation as spillover between issue-areas occurred. Moreover, as elite
interests converged upon a generally agreed upon understanding of the project of
integration, it became easier to transform the attitudes of the masses – to bring them
onboard as it were, as well. Voter sentiments across member states were gradually
transformed in favor of the EU as it increasingly sought their imprimatur. This occurred
not only through an increase in direct voter involvement in determining the future course
of the union via referenda and the election of parliamentary representatives but also
through the extensive marketing (spectacularization) of putatively common Europe-wide
objectives. This was plainly evident in the late 1980s and 90s.
To legitimate their agenda, EU elites and other arbiters of integration consistently
promoted the prerogatives and interests of EU institutions, e.g.: their continued
development and the eastward expansion of the Union. Validating their intuition that the
beneficial affects of elite socialization – the optimism of the post-war Western European
ethos, which was crucial to developments that would culminate in the EU – the media
willingly perpetuated the desire to make the EU a reality. It did so through mass-media
support of the view that optimism would be catching as the benefits of regional
cooperation were realized, and this would transform the attitudes of average European
citizens.
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The aforementioned new European ethos was gradually legitimated and
mainstreamed among publics of the EU’s member- and aspirant-states. To gain broad
acceptance an democratic idea of Europe, one amenable to the all-too-many, was
promoted. By appealing to the timorous and the spiritual dwarfs through populist values,
the highly sublimated ressentiment of ascetic-consumerist priests—whose primary
objective was a unified European market—exploited the herd’s susceptibility to crass
consumption. This was a secularized, slave-moral compensation for the absence of any
greater metaphysical grounding for existence in the wake of World War Two and the
Holocaust, let alone the death of God.
As the neofunctionalists identified, the primary aim of conventional advocates of
European integration, has been to maximize profits by facilitating economic flows
through centralized (quasi-federal) supra-governmental institutions. From the perspective
of these “flies of the marketplace” greater coherence and efficiency in the management of
a trading bloc or region and the broader global system of which each is a part is
intrinsically rational and desirable. Such ideals are asserted via the cacophonous and
bedazzling spectacle that masks the inauthenticity generated by the artificial and
exaggerated desires it cultivates. These originally Christian–Platonic ideals, sublated
through secularization, provide existential meanings and ontological purposes to passive
nihilists in a hyper-decadent age typified by a ‘cynical, enlightened falseconsciousness’. 380 According to the dictates of the New Economy ‘free market
fundamentalism’ every human need is fulfilled by consumption, and every period of life
is defined by it: childhood, education, work, marriage and family, and death.
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As a means of perfecting this set of ultra-liberal-modern, anti-natural ideals,
Europe’s conventional economic and political integration enhances activities and forms
of life that systematically deflect those endowed with healthy instincts and strong drives
from their authentic selves and opportunities for radical self-overcoming (acts of
becoming-other). However, as I try to show below, Europe’s integration and the broader
forces of globalization also generate unanticipated, abstract potentials of globality that
may enable the healthiest free spirits to become who it is they are. These transformative
conditions for becoming are also shown to be the invariable result of the achievement and
extension of the objectives of ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. 381
The neo-functionalist premise that the procedural sorts of consensus building
characteristic of national parliamentary political systems would be expanded to the
supranational level and thereby displace the international state system’s power based
relations was attacked as naïvely idealistic. Against the neo-functionalist thesis it was
argued that the relevance of states and their long-established sovereign power in a largely
anarchic international system would not be diminished by the limited consensus occurring
between states in Western Europe, which would itself eventually breakdown and thereby
demonstrate once more the efficacy of the nation-state as the best tool for cultivating and
maximizing liberal values and freedoms. 382
Regarding Haas’ late (2004) defense of neo-functionalism and his assertion that it
was no longer obsolescent, Rosamund remarked that:
The recovery of neofunctionalism from its reputation as a failed academic
experiment is rather more than an exercise in academic excavation. The fact that it
was buried in the first place is indicative of a tendency within the present scholarly
community to produce narratives of the field’s history that draw robust boundaries
between past errors and present rigor. In the wrong hands this can induce all
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manner of closures and the establishment of claims that effectively outlaw
particular kinds of work. Beyond its (recovered) analytical salience,
neofunctionalism was/is a remarkably open-minded intellectual project that drew
sustenance from across the spectrum of the social sciences. 383
This states a limitation of the field that originates in the prevailing conception of truth and
the best means of deducing it. The straight-jacketing of possible trajectories for theoretical
investigation can only impair the field further.

Transactionalism
Through the 1950s and early 1960s an alternative theory to the then dominant
functionalist and neo-functionalist schools of international integration was being
developed by Karl Deutsch and his peers. Dubbed “transactionalism” for what he
identified as a key dimension in processes of international integration, it became
influential within the field in the mid-1960s. The behavioralist emphasis on “testing
theoretical conjectures against empirical data” that intensified the discourses of scientism
and the positivist orientation it conferred on and the social studies. Nonetheless this very
much appealed to Deutsch, whose works, “assembled and analyzed a large amount of
statistical data on population movements, language assimilation and the flow of
international transactions such as trade and mail.” 384
In three of his major works, Nationalism and Social Communication (1953,
reissued in 1966), and Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (1957),
Communication Theory and Political Integration (1964), Deutsch examined nationalism,
and its complex relationship to social learning, more broadly. He did so in order to
explicate it as a determining factor in integrative developments between sovereign
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communities. Key to the largely positive communal ethos created by nationalism was a
more or less shared mental state reinforced by we-feelings and intentions at once
productive of and naturalized by a shared language and worldview (Weltanschauung).
Enhancing the frequency and effectiveness of communication between states was
critical for Deutsch. “The guiding hypothesis of transactionalist work on integration was
that a sense of community among states would be a function of the level of
communication between states.” 385 The ways in which nationalism was formative of the
bonds unifying a community and how such a powerful force could be constructively
managed so as to facilitate—rather than inhibit—the formation of multi-national polities
to mitigate the chances of warfare between countries were motivating concerns for
Deutsch. Therefore one of his primary concerns was explicating NATO in terms of how it,
along with other institutions and geo-political dynamics was giving rise to a “transatlantic
‘security community’ rather than on European integration, per se.” 386
According to Deutsch the character of security communities differed according to
two major types: the pluralistic and amalgamated. The former he considered to have
arisen from formal agreements between states short of creating any supranational
institutional authority “to produce a ‘sense of security’ among the relevant populations,
whereby the resolution of conflicts through violent means would be replaced by mutually
acceptable methods for their peaceful settlement.” 387 According to Rosamund:
Pluralistic communities required only three conditions to exist: compatibility of
major values among the units, a capacity for politically relevant groups to respond
to each other’s stimuli without violence and a ‘mutual predictability of the relevant
aspects of one another’s political, economic and social behavior’. 388
As all of these conditions were present throughout the hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal232

-modern, transatlantic region in the post-war era, such a pluralistic community—however
cynically rationalized and/or maintained—was imminently attainable.
In addition to theorizing how the generation and fulfillment of expectations
between diverse communities corresponded with the regularization of value norms and
functional practices Deutsch attempted to demonstrate how, via such reciprocal
affectivity, this would create the predictability and trust necessary for the development of
an actual ‘sociopsychological community’. 389 One positive and predictable result of
increasing transactions of a certain sort would be a palpable change in the disposition
among the respective publics of the communities toward one another. Deutsch called this
“social learning” and considered it crucial in the formation of a larger people—a
propaedeutic stage conditioning the possibility of a multi-cultural, transnational society or
pluralistic community. 390 Over a long period fundamental changes in popular attitudes and
prejudices would occur through gradual social learning to foster, over generations,
increasingly friendly relations between former rival states. 391
The creation of common frameworks for institutional cooperation (like NATO)
between separate nation-states was a necessary condition for the sorts of interaction
Deutsch thought productive of greater comity between peoples. Preliminary to this “a
process of social integration [which] lead[s] to the formation of ‘pluralistic’ security
communities,” must occur, which upon further development via a “community of social
communication” leads “to amalgamation.” 392 As Chryssochoou states, “community
feelings, and the emergence over time of a ‘community of values’ at the larger level of
aggregation, were seen [by Deutsch] as the result, rather than the cause, of closer links
among participating units.” 393
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Deutsch cites fourteen conditions of varying importance for both pluralistic and
amalgamated security communities. The essential factors as he lists them are:
“compatibility of major values” and “mutual responsiveness” between prospectively
amalgamating units. Non-essential factors include: a distinctive way of life, a
complementarity between “core areas and their capabilities”, at least one core area of
which needed to exhibit “superior economic growth”, and between whose members there
exist “expectation[s] of joint economic reward”. In this general setting Deutsch would
expect to find (in no particular order) a “wide[ning] range of mutual transactions”
facilitated by “unbroken links of social communication” fostering the “greater mobility of
persons” and resulting in a discernable “broadening of elites”. Furthermore, Deutsch
believes it helpful but nonessential that states forming such communities become
“reluctant to wage ‘fratricidal’ war”, a condition he thought natural to the increased
civility between them. The presence of an “outside military threat” could provide a strong
incentive for forging a security community, as could pre-existing “strong economic ties”
and “ethnic and linguistic assimilation”, but these latter conditions weren’t necessary for
integrative processes to occur (as the recent break up Serbia and Montenegro into separate
states served to demonstrate). 394
Deutsch asserted that the greater amity arising between peoples in security
communities would increase reasonableness in problem solving by fostering an instinctive
preference for mutually agreeable outcomes between them. In the beneficial conditions
encouraged by improved and regularized transactions within a security community, social
challenges and political problems (potential sources of conflict) would automatically be
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dealt with in a calmer manner.
“The resolution of conflicts through violent means would be replaced by mutually
acceptable methods for their peaceful settlement. [T]he particular attitudes of the
actors involved… would create a certain culture of cooperation which, through the
forging of further and closer communicative links among them, would make resort
to war highly unlikely.” 395
Within the expanded, neoteric community, the mentality of its constituent peoples toward
the utility of violence as a means for problem-solving and the uses of force more
generally, would themselves be transformed. An effectively functioning security
community would pacify its public, making it largely averse to inter-communal
fighting. 396 Views from within the community toward nations outside of it are a different
matter.
Yet another effect of transformed expectations due to social learning among the
member-states of pluralistic security communities is the modification of the norms and
practices of states outside the community. As the disposition of nations within a pluralistic
community undergoes transformation, their methods of engagement with states on the
outside of their community change as well. A transference of values gradually occurs
thereby that infect and ways of interacting, conditioning the possibility for future inclusion
of new members within the community and greater pluralism. This communication of
norms and practices takes passive and active forms. On a social level it happens passively,
through human mimesis resulting through myriad forms of contact. In the economic arena
it occurs actively through the regularization of trade and standardization of production. So
too its transmission is active in the political realm, as transformed expectations concerning
the conduct of international affairs change the behavior of states. The communicable sense
of mutual sympathy and trust arising from pluralistic security communities spreads
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between peoples as nations “inoculate” themselves with the attitudes of their neighbors
through ever closer contact. This “contagious” effect is plainly evident from the EU’s
recent expansions and palpable among the societies at its penumbra today. 397
In a logic related to that of Mitrany’s functionalist thesis, Deutsch believed that,
“once pluralistic community formation [had] taken place, political elites [might] opt to
build common supranational institutions, thereby producing ‘amalgamated security
communities’ (essentially federal unions)”. 398 This sort of formal integration shared all the
necessary sociopsychological features of a pluralistic security community. But the
amalgamated security community represented a much deeper degree of integration. As
such it was dependent:
in considerable part upon the relationship of two rates of change: the growing rate
of claims and burdens upon central governments as against the growing –in some
instances, the insufficiently growing—level of capabilities of the governmental
institutions of the amalgamated political community. 399
As such, “amalgamated communities were vulnerable to a number of potential
destabilizing factors.”
Rosamund notes Deutsch’s identification of six, those being “increased military
burdens, …rapid increases in social mobilization and political participation within the
component units, …shifts in social differentiation, a decline in administrative capabilities,
a closure of political elites and a dissonance between government action and societal
expectations.” 400 In other words, Deutsch anticipated that the efficaciousness of an
amalgamating community could be undermined by the inability of the existing institutions
of a component unit to adequately respond to or contend with rapid changes in the
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prevailing attitudes and behavioral expectations of a component unit’s (member-state’s)
constituents.
In the view of German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, an important distinction
needs to be made with relevance to Deutsch’s idea of the “more advanced form” of polity
attained through the creation of a “living and organic collective entity… whose ‘norms of
order’ are based upon ‘concord’” and the “rational coming together of ends that remain
individual.” This qualitatively distinguishes the amalgamated security community from its
weaker counterpart—the form of society attained in a pluralistic security community. The
amalgamated form is better understood via the notion of a Gemeinschaft, a
sociopsychological community comprising a “stable form of association… that rests on
the concept of ‘one people’”. Conversely, the pluralistic security community is more
easily achievable, as it consists of the co-existence of formally separate units—or states—
in limited society with one another. As a Gesellschaft, or conventionally agreed society it
“rests on the concept of contract.” 401 Whereas Gemeinschaft results from mutual
convictions that unite people, Gesellschaft comes about in order to fulfill instrumental
aims.
As Gesellschaft was simpler to attain, and increased familiarity between
cooperating units, it was also likely to increase trust over time. As trust increased the
“network of mutual transactions” occurring between the units involved would grow
commensurately. Rosamund observes that “Deutsch was interested in Gemeinschaft as a
condition of integration. The end point of integration, from this perspective, is a sense of
community – a qualitative leap from pacts, treaties and alliances among states.” 402 For that
leap to occur however, interactions would have to foster a high degree of responsiveness
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corresponding with the respective capabilities of the units. As noted above, as transactions
increase, attitudes and behavioral expectations are transformed as actors become
comfortable with one another. The ‘we-feelings’ and we-intentions of their merging
mindsets can accelerate demands that outpace the capabilities of the units – that is, exceed
their responsiveness – and potentially frustrate the integration progress thereby. In order
for an authentic Gemeinschaft to succeed these crucial “cognitive shifts” would have to be
managed so as not to exceed the capacity of amalgamating units—states—to cope with
them. 403
Aware of the possible utility of functionalist methods of integration toward the
ultimate attainment of an amalgamated security community, Deutsch observes that:
Functionalism, it appears, is a device that has been widely used both in successful
and in unsuccessful movements toward amalgamation, somewhat a functional
devolution and decentralization have been used in successful and in unsuccessful
attempts at secession. The outcome in all such situations seems mostly to have
been the result of other conditions and other processes—depending largely on
whether functionalism mainly was associated with experiences of joint rewards or
of joint deprivations—with functionalism in itself doing little to help or to harm.404
He concludes with some ambivalence that functionalism would neither hinder nor
necessarily facilitate the development of more comprehensive amalgamation between
states. Because conditions and circumstances vary so widely between units (states) and
across time, Deutsch largely avoids specific prescriptive criteria for the institutionalized
integration of communities.
Chryssochoou observes that, “Deutsch was not particularly concerned with the
institutional configuration that the integration process would bring about, or for that
matter with processes of formal institutional change.” 405 More important than the sort of
formal arrangements that engendered necessary trust, was the actual development of a
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shared sense of security between peoples toward a similar mindset that would, in turn,
foster common interests and analogous we-feelings and intentions between them to aid the
desired integration of their communities. Deutsch’s “emphasis is on a different level of
analysis: the development of a sense of community at the popular level.” 406
Out of his ostensible faith in science however, Deutsch maintained the dubious
belief that the particular degree of integration between states could be determined by
measuring “the volume, context, and scope of international transactions over multiple
ranges of social, economic, cultural and political areas.” Moreover, he thought the rate of
communication between units in these broad areas could be used via a “statistical tool
called the ‘index of relative acceptance’,” to measure:
the ratio of extra-regional relative to intra-regional communication and
transactions. Integration is indicated by a higher volume and range of
communications between community members than between members and
outsiders. The more varied and numerous the transactions among a group of states,
the more pronounced and solid the international community is likely to be. 407
Of course all criteria for adducing such ratios would of necessity be determined arbitrarily
and any meaning attached to them would be the subjective product of those decisions.
Additionally, the impossibility of ever attaining an intrinsically objective stance on the
matter in question, through some measure in the ratios of “communication and
transactions” must be acknowledged and regarded as dubious—even to the extent they
result in truth-apt claims about the world. As all estimations of the affective power of the
communications and transactions in question, their respective ratios to one another and
their resulting effectiveness are ultimately a product of the observer’s imagination, they
would produce inherently relativistic, or intrinsically biased, results. It is highly likely that
no scientifically neutral perspective on the activity in question is possible.
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This critique stems from Nietzsche’s (Heraclitean) view that there are no static
phenomena in the world. The dynamism of human activity and the continually
propagating nature of communication make its effects enormously difficult to accurately
quantify, to derive complete date from or generate firm conclusions about. One might
draw general conclusions about past occurrences, but attempts to extrapolate on the basis
of such a broad survey for predictive purposes would be in vain, for one could not
confidently assert anything on such a contestable foundation.
Yet, with regard to ascertaining truths about reality—the world as it actually is—
that vanity symptomatizes the conceits propagated by the conventional discourses of
scientism, which are loathe to admit that the fetish they make of science (in the Western
Socratic tradition emphasizing the attainment of knowledge) is a strategy to deny that
what they create—every result they produce—is art. In creating their world, be it an
integrated Europe or some other socio-political arrangement on the continent, they get no
closer to possessing any intrinsically objective truth. 408

Concordance Systems Analysis
In the early 1970s Donald Puchala presented a critique of the emerging narrative
of integration via a new perspective on the problem of theorizing it. Dubbed the
‘concordance systems’ model of analysis, Puchala proposed it both to account for the
deficiencies he identified in the theoretical approaches that had preceded it, and to account
for the best insights of each. He strove to do so in a way that synthesized some key aspects
of contradictory viewpoints on the “different parts, dimensions or manifestations of the
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phenomenon” according to an innovative perspective. In explaining his motivations he
observed that:
More than fifteen years of defining, redefining, refining, modeling and theorizing
have failed to generate satisfactory conceptualizations of exactly what it is we are
talking about when we refer to ‘international integration’ and exactly what it is we
are trying to learn when we study this phenomenon. 409
Puchala proposed a theoretical stance to mitigate the conceptual confusion he believed to
be plaguing the field. By doing so he hoped to provide a definition of the integration
process itself as well as the task of examining international integration.
Toward that “new conceptualization” he adopted a pluralist, quasi-perspectivalist,
critical stance in tackling this objective, arguing that:
…conventional frameworks have clouded more than they have illuminated our
understanding of international integration. No model describes the integration
phenomena with complete accuracy because all the models present images of what
integration could be or should be rather than what it is [or what is occurring] here
and now. 410
Of course, “theorizing” what is, meaning present discernable existents, or the transitory
being of an entity or phenomenon’s becoming, is impossible to do in isolation from
broader contexts in which it exists, i.e.: what actually happens in the world. This
underscores the fact that dynamic social processes are, arguably, impossible to reduce to a
parsimonious explanatory model. Nevertheless, Puchala endeavored to provide a simple,
if conceptually rich and pioneering model.
Concerned with whether theorist’s European integration were merely entertaining
themselves with intellectual fashions or attaining substantive knowledge of their subject of
inquiry, Puchala endeavored to advance an explanatory theoretical framework for better
comprehending Europe’s integration. His ‘concordance system’ approach comprised a
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sort of analytical pastiche, which conceived the developing community in terms of a new
kind of political arrangement in which political activity was best understood as occurring
at various levels of society specific to the spatial-temporal relevance of diverse issue areas
affecting each particular level. This occurred in accordance with the differing degrees of
involvement among respective actors at and/or between those levels and depended upon
the continually varying influence capability of actors at any one level within “a particular
kind of attitudinal environment”. 411 These levels were defined along state-centric lines, in
terms of their activity in relation to the nation-state. His notion thereby underscored the
continuing primacy of the nation-state in the complex entity emerging through the
“concordance system”. 412 The main levels of activity Puchala identified were the subnational, national, transnational and supranational, wherein modes of cooperation enabled
positive-sum interactions between actors toward pragmatic policy convergence and
authentic consensus between states and peoples.
The reality of the nation-state’s predominance in the existing international system
and its primary role in bringing into being anything new (such as a supranational
community in Europe) constrains what can be conceived with regard to what political or
economic integration is producing in either normative or theoretical / conceptual terms.
The desire to keep his analysis to the normative dimension and largely eschew the
theoretical (which he believed had muddied previous analyses) clearly limited Puchala’s
willingness to extrapolate about how changes in the interdependence of autonomous states
would alter notions of state-sovereignty, territorial integrity and understandings of
citizenship, belonging and community, as well as concepts of self and otherness, the
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justice (or just-ness) of these conventional forms of inclusion and exclusion, and what
changes such altered views might generate. Recognizing that integration theorists had to:
…stop testing the present in terms of progress toward or regression from
hypothetical futures, since [there is] no way of knowing where or how
contemporary international integration is going to end up,
Puchala went a long way in suggesting the positive explanatory potential of the
concordance system he had theorized, asserting that the ‘distinctive attitudinal
environment’ cultivated by a long period of growth in mutual understanding among the
members of a concordance system working for same shared desires so as to enjoy
communal rewards was bound to have transformative effects on the nation-state itself. 413
This implied an inexorable process of change to the primacy of nation-states in the
concordance system and by extension its conceptualization and understanding of
international politics. Though he doubted that integration via increased interdependence
would result in the radical assimilation of diverse peoples as many of his contemporaries
hoped, he did anticipate that significant changes would occur in the relationship between
peoples and their governments. Among these, the semi-autonomous and interdependent
actors at various levels were seen to employ bargaining techniques predicated on full
disclosure of pertinent information to attain mutually reinforcing outcomes, either
between peoples and their governments or between nations.
Puchala’s theory provides a pragmatic framework for conflict resolution and
problem solving, as he maintains that the exclusion of coercion or unilateral demands
between actors describes the pattern of customary behavior that concordance systems
engender. That ‘exclusion of coercion’ would seem to edge toward the idealistic if it were
not narrowly referring to the threatened use of instruments of war; otherwise it does not
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ignore the real differences in power between states that structure their relations, especially
their interdependence and cooperation. For instance, France and Germany will always,
and, many would argue, rightly should have more influence upon EU affairs than
microstates such as Malta or Cyprus.
It is obvious however that the former great powers do dictate to and/or coerce the
latter members of the community through diplomatic means, manipulation of institutional
arrangements and the disproportionate force of their influence over the community; they
regularly do employ tactics to achieve their desired objectives. Nevertheless, the
populous, powerful states must compromise to varying degrees with their weaker comembers in the Union and have structured the democratic, agonistic process of legislative
approval on qualified majority voting as well as establishing other institutional checks and
balances to ensure continued concordance. Less powerful member-states are thereby
assured of not being overrun or ignored by larger states when the stakes are especially
high. The insights of ‘concordance system’ theory therefore continue to provide powerful
analytic tools for comprehending the activities and development of the EU.
Puchala’s somewhat strange adherence/devotion to the primacy of the nation-state
(as a desire to preserve?) raises interesting questions about the theory and his agenda in
positing it: namely, why does the prospect of nations of people assimilating in certain
conceptual realms and the nation-states’ increasing obsolescence trouble him so? As
Chryssochoou observes, Puchala refuses to allow that the consequences of his own theory
might be “the negation of the nation-state.”
Rather [Puchala states], ‘nation-states can be preserved as distinct entities only
through the international pooling of resources to confront problems that challenge
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their separate existence.’ Likewise, Puchala explicitly states that ‘mass populations
within the concordance system need not be assimilated into a supranationality’. 414
But it is unclear either that states can only be preserved in this way or that populations
need not be assimilated. Neither possibility is necessarily so, and the latter could be
desirable.
Puchala’s partisan, ideologically driven prejudice for preserving the state is
evident here – as with nearly every theorist of European integration – and reveals certain
fears of change that hint at reaction: Puchala does not want the process of integration,
which he has persuasively explicated and thinks mainly positive, to run away with itself
and become threatening to his perception of the best sort of (status quo) political
organization or the ontological features of the nation-state upon which he feels
existentially dependent.
Such a privileging of the nation-state form and the global community of sovereign
nations its universal imposition from the early 16th to the mid-20th centuries brought
about, has normalized a thoroughly entrenched international system of theoretically
autonomous and equal states that holds its own standardized practices and legal norms as
intrinsically good. Through a self-justifying logic it systematically excludes and/or
forcibly homogenizes difference and (consistent with its tradition) seeks power over
others in the name of security. In so doing it simultaneously validates and enforces the
perception that the nation-state is the highest, most legitimate and most desirable
formalized institutional structure for the organization, maintenance and preservation of
community that a people can aspire to attain. This perception reveals the pre-ontological
foundations of the contemporary (European) nation-state system. By extension it also
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illuminates certain causes of the existential angst that arises among its most ardent
ideological proponents in response to the problem of failed states as well as the frequently
disastrous consequences that result when a state breaks up in a disorderly, contested
fashion, as in the former Yugoslavia, among other places. 415
The rigidity of attitudes and reactive dispositions generated by identic affiliation
with the nation-state (through discourses of patriotism, etc.) compel by necessity the
defense of the reactive principles subtending the nation-state. This is analogous to
Deleuze’s notion of dual capture, in which the state form re-territorializes (i.e.: coercively
interpolates to repress) all acts of becoming-other; confining and dissipating active forces
for which its own complex incongruities are always-already conditioning the possibility.
When effective these homogenizing reactive forces operate so automatically that desiring
is contained within the acceptable parameters of a stultifying condition of becoming
same.
This majoritarian form of desiring is sustained by a will to truth symptomatized by
the hegemonic statist logic that has been universalized over the previous century via the
nationalization of the world. This European cultural form (the nation-state) produces
conflicting conceptions of selfhood and group belonging via modes of exclusion that
result in violence. The reactive need to define oneself and ones’ community against an
outside other ossifies antagonistic stances between groups, both within and between
disparate polities. This is the primary challenge to be overcome in the present stage of the
political development of humankind—one Nietzsche associated with the aim of great
culture—and the most constructive and hopeful aspects of the European unification
process and its potential. Good Europeans are advanced in their achievement of this aim
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by their recognition that, “There is no unified essence in the light of which we might be
tempted or prompted to sum people up, close the books on them or presume to measure
them in any fundamental way.” 416
Examples of this include occasions when a sub-national minority group within a
multi-ethnic, multi-national state demands greater political autonomy or outright
independence. Such factional challenges call into question the territorial-based political
legitimacy (sovereignty) of the state, according to the very same statist logic that
maintains it. This brings the existential basis of the state into dispute. In so far as the
disgruntled faction defies the privileged prerogatives of the state’s sovereign legal
authority, it is not by any means a necessarily authentic or innovative minoritarian
movement characterized by active force in a positive will to creative destruction as
generative power.
Rather, it is nearly always the opposite: a desire originating in ressentiment and
expressed through reactive forces that re-affirm the statist logic with which it coheres.
This is to say that such pseudo-revolutionary secessionist movements occur according to
the same logic of particularistic ethno-national identic affiliation that serves to legitimate
the territorially defined nation-state form, and its notionally coextending sovereignty as
recognized in international law. Therefore almost without exception, autonomy seeking
separatist movements always already replicate the very forces which they believe to be
“oppressing” them.
The EU itself exemplifies the contradictions ineluctably generated by statist logic.
It attempts to diffuse the worst potential consequences of this in advance through a
number of mechanisms. For example, it has systematically created a legally binding
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citizenship status for all individuals rightfully residing within the community that provides
them with guaranteed political, social, economic and cultural rights and strives to foster
“affectio societatis—a feeling of identification with the Union as a whole rather than
simply with the member states”. Notably, it does so while simultaneously, and somewhat
schizophrenically, trying to ensure the inviolable sovereignty of its member-states. 417
Despite the implicit suggestion that EU citizenship subordinates or makes redundant the
conventional citizenship conferred upon its member-states’ residents by their respective
national governments, the EU continues to guarantee specific protections for regional and
cultural minorities within those sovereign nations, again replicating the logic of
particularism and suggesting that national citizenship is in certain instances problematic
for certain classes or groups of individuals. The most efficacious and prosperous nationstates (the preeminent polity) in the world today are those capable of co-opting the
disparate interests of their constituent peoples or minority factions. The EU does so
consistently, if haltingly; in Deleuze’s helpfully innovative language, by generating
another set of striations across the varied social spaces of Europe that function to delimit
and re-capture differences capable of endangering the project and homogenize the
increasingly quiescent area it describes.
It is the authentic overcoming of the debilitating, exclusionary logic of the nationstate form through creative experimentation and disruptions that corresponds with
Nietzsche’s praise of thymotic non-conformism and associated ‘good Europeanism’. The
experiments of Nietzschean attempters are most likely to succeed when they disrupt the
ability of the state to interpolate, or make majoritarian, all desiring or potential becomingother. The authentic transmutation of reactive values through metamorphosing active
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forces, in its genuinely de-centering radicality, goes unrecognized as a challenge to the
established order and its reigning ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. This is
because the latter comprehends power only in terms of overt domination over others and
coercive means of control, as ways of limiting the irrepressible growth of human life. It
cannot countenance an effective exteriorizing of a smooth, heterogeneous space conducive
to free play and becoming-other across a genuinely dynamic social field.
Despite Puchala’s insight into the relatively dynamic functioning of conventional
states and the inter-relating of actors within concordance systems, his concern for
preserving the nation-state, expressed in the form of an objection to other possibilities, is
resonant with archaic, essentialist reifications of identity rooted in geographic, historical,
linguistic, ethnic, nationalist, religious, particularism that almost invariably has all-toohuman affects. It privileges what is out of a fear of the unsettling change necessary to
create a natural and life-affirming polity. Though Nietzsche recognized each of these
common identifiers as important to, even constitutive of, individuals and communities, he
saw that they must be understood (that is affirmed) in their proper context and ultimately
overcome as the defining attributes of a wholly formed person, or higher type. The statist
logic of the concordance of the system Puchala describes belies his acquiescence to it.
Puchala’s reiteration of the primacy of the state tells of the anxiety that integration
processes were then generating (as they continue to do), anxiety aroused by change
potentially challenging to established traditions including that of the nation-state as the
preeminent form of political community. The tradition of nation-state supremacy in the
international political life of humankind was reinforced by the regime’s ability to
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ontologically presence the values of liberal modernity and coherently ground the
autonomous rationality enabled thereby.
Like other theorists of European integration who “fall back” on the comforts
provided by the existent state system, Puchala was unable to identify a similarly rational
basis for political authority in the hypothetical absence of the state, or in the empirical
facts integration was producing on the ground (which pointed to the ultimate obsolescence
of the state) reactively diverted attention from the potentially nobler objective of
integrating the continent according to a meaningful, overarching idea of Europe based on
the rarer noble traits, shared aspirations and willingness of its exemplars. These include
the accommodation of authentic difference within the context of a naturalistic, materialist
ethos that increases the pathos of difference within themselves and between types.
Later, “Puchala conceived of the EC as a ‘multi-layered political system’, which
governs the behavior of political actors across local, national and regional levels.” 418 The
success of it as a system depended upon agreement on those levels and the mandate of
higher political authorities. The community’s effective functioning required “joint
decision-making at the regional level but also on the subsequent ability of national
governments to implement those decisions in the face of resistance from domestic polities
and societies.” 419 Puchala identified the significance of contrasting methods of persuasion
and accord to the expansion, deepening and viability of that process.
As a developing political system originating in mutual compromises between
sovereign states, the EC comprised a set of supranational institutions with very limited
autonomy. Yet although based on intergovernmental cooperation, their logic suggested to
many that they would continue to develop along increasingly supranational lines. The
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debate between over this issue eventually took the form of opposing disciplinary camps
and became a central issue within the field in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and
continues to the present. Puchala’s conception of the EC as a concordance system wherein
interactions are comprised at various levels by distinct measures of autonomy and overlap
tended toward the latter. His conception of the EC as a system of governance anticipated
important comparativists and governance approaches to integration in the middle and late
1990s.
The horizon of possibilities for conceptualizing European integration was revealed
by Puchala’s work to be more expansive than it had previously been thought by arbiters of
integration. His ‘concordance system’ analysis arguably disclosed the complex multilevel
activities occurring through and constitutive of integration processes. His framework also
anticipated many theoretical insights to come, particularly those interdependence and
multi-level governance theories. Perhaps most indicative of its wide influence, it would be
used by partisan exponents of both state-centric approaches and advocates of
supranationalism.

An early intergovernmentalist perspective
Stanley Hoffmann was among the first to offer a sustained critique of the neofunctionalist thesis through a neo-realist theory of high and low politics comprising an
intergovernmentalist perspective. His was another of the critical voices to effectively cast
doubt on the depth and extent to which integration would really transform the fundamental
ways in which European states interacted. Responding in part to the ‘Luxembourg
Compromise’ of 1966, which brought France back to full participation in Community
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affairs after a period of calculated distance instigated by De Gaulle’s reinvigoration of
French nationalism, Hoffmann interrogated neofunctionalist arguments that understood
cooperative processes to gradually foster greater trust, collaboration and unity.
Hoffmann was pessimistic regarding the prospects for political integration twenty
years after the end of World War Two, observing:
The nation-state is still here, and the new Jerusalem has been postponed because
the nations in Western Europe have not been able to stop time and to fragment
space. Political unification could have succeeded if, on the one hand, these nations
had not been caught in the whirlpool of different concerns, as a result both of
profoundly different internal circumstances and of outside legacies, and if, on the
other hand, they had been able or obliged to concentrate on ‘community-building’
to the exclusion of all problems situated either outside their area or within each
one of them. 420
This set of observed facts was largely accurate when published in 1966, but it would
require some modification just twenty years later, when the Single Europe Act was being
negotiated. The ineluctability of time that European nations’ could not stop would itself
prove aspects of Hoffmann’s pessimistic observation faulty. For while states must
obviously contend with the prevailing circumstances of the present (time) and their
situatedness in space, the impossibility of stopping time or escaping “the whirlpool of
different concerns” does not totally inhibit them from engaging in some degree of
community-building, either.
Hoffmann went on to show how the more sanguine neo-functionalists neglected
crucial historical context that just as plausibly demonstrated the opposite, concluding that
“post-war Western Europe was grappling with the contradictory logics of integration and
diversity.” The principle of national self-determination, it seemed to Hoffmann, would
inhibit the depth of unity any member state of the community could tolerate. By
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“repudiating the central idea of a continuum from economics to politics,” the “teleological
confidence” of neofunctionalism appeared to overlook the primacy of particular domestic
interests (understood according to politics traditionally conceived rather than in
technocratic terms) in forming the impetus for integration. 421
His recognition of the extent to which domestic and global pressures contribute to
centrifugal tendencies rather than encourage a convergence of interests led to his ‘logic of
diversity’ thesis, which stressed the international system’s tendency to produce diversity
rather than synthesis among its units. International cooperation expanded the range of
diversity and complicated the interests of actors, hindering the synthesis of policy and
impeding integration. Hoffmann sought to explain why in certain areas integration could
occur without much controversy whilst in other issue areas integration threatened the
autonomy of governments and would be determinedly resisted.
The suggestion that efforts toward greater cooperation between states would
produce additional obstacles to the integration of the continent challenged the presumption
that functional spillover would automatically occur between the institutional entities and
bureaucratic divisions of disparate state governments. Hoffmann’s analysis of these
inherent tensions led to his distinction between “high” and “low” politics, for which his
work of the 1960s was notable. By ‘high politics’ he referred to the areas of foreign policy
and strategically important trade policy determinations sacrosanct to national elites. In the
realm of ‘high politics’ progress on policy reforms (political cooperation, trade
liberalization, etc.) were likely to be difficult and decision-making protracted as states
would be unwilling to make concessions or to compromise where preserving the status
quo served the power and prosperity of a society’s ruling class.
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‘Low politics’ by contrast referred to those areas of policy wherein compromise
was more easily achievable. For instance, in the sphere of trade liberalization the easing of
tariffs and lifting of other protectionist barriers could be accommodated in ways (e.g.: by
eliminating import quotas and deregulating sectors of production, etc.) that opened
markets without jeopardizing elite perceptions of theirs or the nation’s vital interests. The
realm of “low politics” was where Hoffmann believed change was most likely to occur,
“because it was a way of retaining control over areas where intersocietal (as opposed to
interstate) transaction was becoming the norm.” 422
Rosamund states that it was, at least in part, against the neofunctionalist’s
assertion that supranational institutions would transform the consciousnesses of peoples
and thereby generate enthusiasm for integration on an ever greater or expanding scale so
as to displace historical national allegiances. In so far as Hoffman’s logic of diversity is
concerned, he argues that:
[T]he Monnett-Haas logic would only work where integration could guarantee
perpetual positive sum outcomes or, to use neofunctionalist terminology, where
interests could be upgraded in common for perpetuity. Permanent gains over losses
might work in the arena of economic integration, but Hoffmann maintained that it
could never prevail for political integration. 423
Hoffman, as Rosamund observes, recognized that national elites, operating according to
long-established norms governing both the interstate and intersocietal dimensions of
European society, would encourage only limited transaction—or degrees of incremental
integration.
Put differently, Hoffman identified the instinctive spirit of revenge, or instrumental
reason, operative among the ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment who, having
arrogated to themselves the power to rule, would authorize the implementation of such
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change. Each hesitant step toward integration would come via and simultaneously indicate
a subtle transformation in the bio-power-knowledge regime, whose function is the
disciplining of the community’s economic life.
Conceived through the narrow rationality of perpetual positive sum gains (which
likely guaranteed little else but continued insecurity and fear of the other), the logic of
integration paradoxically inhibited its extent. These arbiters of the status quo imposed
strict constraints on the process of change so that any changes would be gradual, lest they
stimulate becomings that could not be contained by the molar, governing complex they
oversaw. That sort of loss of control would not be a positive sum outcome. At the level of
“low politics” some policy adjustment for increased openness was desirable, as it enabled
national elites to maintain and (I would argue, following the premise of Hardt and Negri’s
thesis of Empire developed more than three decades later) to strengthen their control over
areas of life where international cooperation was increasing.
Hoffmann’s prolific contributions on Europe’s integration evolved perceptible
over the next three and a half decades. In views published with Robert Keohane in 1990,
his conception of the European community was that of a developing confederation (a
proper sympolity), as exhibited in the intergovernmental character of its institutions whose
emphasis, they in part argued, ought to be placed upon the creation of a common
framework for cooperation rather than community-wide regulations. 424 On Hoffmann’s
part this constituted an acknowledgement of Europe’s transformed condition that
maintained much of the spirit of his mid-1960s skepticism on the prospects for genuine
supranational community. At that time he had pessimistically observed an intrinsic
dilemma in the crucial process of legitimating such a new, unifying polity; that between
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the impossibility of forcibly imposing new political arrangements and the inevitable
disagreements that would arise over conflicting self-assessments of national interest:
The “New Europe” dreamed of by the Europeans could not be established by
force. Left to the wills and calculations of its members, the new formula did not
jell because Europeans could not agree on their role in the world. The failure of an
experiment made under apparently ideal conditions tells us a great deal for it
shows that a unification movement can fail not only when a surge of nationalism
occurs in one important part but also when differences in how the national interest
is assessed rule out agreement on the shape and propose of the new supranational
whole. 425
However correct his identification of the difficulties entailed by efforts to meld the
disparate conceptions of national interest among European states and simultaneously
manage the dangers of nationalism to political unification between sovereign nationstates, it prematurely declared a decisive end (“failure”) to the project (“experiment”). It
also wrongly assumed that disagreement over “the shape and purpose of [a] new
supranational whole” could not be overcome through decades of collaboration and
incremental compromise, or at least subordinated to greater national self-interests.
Yet the (then) EC’s uncertain if persistent integration prompted Hoffmann to assert
its increasing resemblance to an imperfect confederation between “bruised nations, [who]
have traded visible and distinctive power for diffuse collective influence”. By the early
1990s the EC’s development, as a set of economic and bureaucratic arrangements,
convinced him that “the policy of European integration will [not] be abandoned: there is
no turning back.” 426
The incremental and limited sort of integration to which the EU’s members have
been willing to agree, as Hoffmann and Keohane identified, given rise to a school of
European integration theory dubbed the confederalist model, which as included notable
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scholars such as D. J. Elazar. Elazar dubs his own notion a theory of “postmodern
confederation”. Chryssochoou finds Elazar’s notion of confederation, “a new style
confederation of old states” particularly apropos on some levels. 427 However, it is difficult
to disregard the curious prefix ‘postmodern’ as the EU is an apodictically modern affair,
but given the enormous complexity of the EU this phrase would provide a largely accurate
and concise characterization of the organization’s possible trajectory. Yet Elazar’s
conception of ‘postmodern confederalism’ was not hypothetical or futural. 428 The term
“postmodern” in this context is unlikely to persuade those who understand the EU—
accurately I think—to be comprehensively modern, or that anything more than a superstate can deliberately result from the EU’s current trajectory, as it does not transmute
either the modern presuppositions of the nation-state model or its privileging within the
existing (state-centric) international system. If anything it ramifies the (un-Nietzschean)
reification of identic particularisms upon which the state idol is based. 429 Nevertheless, the
innovative contributions of post-modern scholars to integration theory are taken up below.
In all probability there is no way to neatly define the integration process. As noted
above, the problematic nature of conceiving parsimonious definitions of Europe or
differing aspects of its complex integration processes is not merely conceptually
problematic, but symptomatic of a reactive desire (will-to-truth) expressed via the
(ant)agonistic endeavor to assert a unified comprehension of the EU—to achieve (i.e.
impose) agreement around one common understanding. (The desire for parsimony in
defining as complex entity as Europe is at odds with Nietzsche’s general perspectivalist
epistemological stance as well as his quasi-cosmopolitan idea of Europe, which is
inclusive of the continent’s diversity and the inherent difficulty of defining it.)
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Since Hoffmann and Keohane advanced their confederal thesis (well before the
Treaty on European Union in 1992), the regulatory provisions of EU law, via the Acquis,
have grown exponentially. This has occurred in response to an identified need for greater
codification of rules and norms, to specify consistent Union-wide procedures and to
nuance policy implementation, but it has grown unwieldy according to many critics.
Despite recent popular opposition to the Constitution (an unfortunate product of precisely
the sort of populist misapprehension to which I refer above), it now appears that
something more supranational in character than a confederacy is developing in Europe,
even if classical realism better captures aspects of the power politics that continue to
determine its integration than either the neofunctionalist or supranational-institutionalist
theses have done.

Haas’ Theoretical Reassessment of the mid-1970s;
A particularly important development in the unfolding of European integration
theory—and one with great salience to my argument—was Haas’s mid-70s recognition of
‘the obsolescence of integration theory’. In his article of the same name Haas recognized
the limitations of neofunctionalism, particularly with regard to its limited applicability to
cases outside Europe, which as a culturally and historically related agglomeration of
highly developed industrial societies had certain unique features distinguishing it from
other regions and cultural realms. These include its intellectual, scientific and legal
traditions, its capitalist, socialist and communist economic systems, democratic traditions
and its emerging cosmopolitan, pluralistic ethos. More importantly for theorizing
generally, Haas cited the inability of European integration theorists to specify a dependent
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variable and by extension to ascertain what an accurate prediction might be, as the
terminal conditions advanced by scholars of European integration could at best be
speculative ideal types.
As Rosamund elaborates, they were attempting “to explain something that did not
yet exist and whose existence could only be postulated.” This was not to assert the
irrelevance of integration studies or to dismiss the explanatory power of some of its
various schools’ core theoretical concepts, but was meant to signal “a turning point in the
way [such] phenomena should be conceptualized.” Haas’s awareness of emergent, guiding
logics to the EC’s development compelled a transformed understanding of the complex
political system it comprised within a developing global order that it was dynamically
affecting. Actual events in the world had continually undermined confidence in theorized,
putatively “deliberate attempt[s] to bring about regional economic (and thus political)
enmeshment among a group of West European countries.” 430
This revelation on the part of one of the most influential and brilliant international
politics theorists constituted a profound acknowledgement of the limitations of such
theorizing that was extraordinarily brave in an academic field devoted to the project that
activity comprised and which the project in turn legitimated. It also represented a quite
significant hermeneutical shift as well, in so far as it recognized the ultimately subjective
position from which all such perspectives on the truth of the matter (European integration)
originated, not just Haas’s own neofunctionalism per se, but the very endeavor of
abstractly theorizing integration according to a universal, final form in general. The
perspective Haas advanced by way of this critique provided a disconcerting and untimely
heuristic device with which his contemporaries would thereafter have to contend.
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Intentionally or not, it exposed a danger inherent to the desire for truth, which is
that the underlying will it symptomatizes is often so strong—a commitment to it at any
price—that it blinds its seekers to the complexly situated contingency of their pursuit of it.
Noting the innate drive to grow in power through discovery, Babich asserts that “Science,
as the embodiment of the Will to Truth at all costs is itself an expression of the Will to
Life at any price. As such it opposes what is changeable in life in its search for the
ultimate truth of thing.” 431 This insight is particularly applicable to the social sciences,
especially when they are dominated by the objectivist stance of positivism, which forgets
its own starting point in an unconscious striving “to gain power over nature… and the
‘wild animal’” man. 432
Salient to a critical understanding of theories of European integration as well as to
the work of Haas is a conclusion of Nietzsche’s, aptly summarized by Babich: “truth is an
error—or better, a species of errors—and knowledge a fictionalization of the world.” 433 If
the goal of his earlier neo-functionalism and the project of theorizing of European
integration more generally had been to postulate a parsimonious theoretical explanation of
why sovereign states within a certain region integrate their economies and political
institutions, Haas now saw this intellectual aim as unattainable in objective terms, be they
defining the motivations for it (i.e.: shared security interests, geographical features or
cultural traits), or the ultimate aim of the integrative process. Although Haas likely would
not have taken his own conclusions so far, they point toward Nietzsche’s sense that
“science cannot tell us why scientific knowledge is worth knowing; the activity of science
presupposes the value of truth.” 434 And what truth, or truths, per se, do theorists of
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European integration affirm and/or strive to illuminate? It is quite likely that ideology
more effectively explains this than any objective scientific inquiry.
In some way underscoring the difficulties inherent to the inquiry, Haas later
asserted that the phenomenon of social complexity generates what he dubbed turbulence.
This refers to the instability and uncertainty which occurs among actors in compound
networks wherein competition and interdependency in various ratios confuse actors’
pursuits of objectives, and muddle the sort of discussion and negotiation that facilitate
mutually desired cooperation. It is fairly easy to see how such a notion of turbulence could
by extended to aptly describe the problematic activity of theorizing European integration
itself. The assumptions of social-science theorists never quite capture the dynamic
processes under their consideration, and with every modification to their precepts “reality”
as they have created it, is revealed to be insufficient explanatorily.
There is an element Dionysian tragedy in their inevitable failure to discover any
‘Truth’ to vindicate their passion; an inquisitive desire to know the world as it is prompts
them to continually start again, as it were, and reformulate their principles in order to
make another attempt. The most Dionysian among them know all the while that dynamic
human activity proceeds of it own accord and the world moves on, compounding a
complexity always already beyond the horizon of our comprehension, which it is their
hope to expand so as to see into a barely imaginable distance.
Haas’s “commitment to truthfulness” enables him to act, wittingly or not, as an
“agent of the self-overcoming of the ascetic ideal” that underlies many of the aims and
purposes of European integration theory. 435 His mid-career critique of the inquiry and his
own former stance constitutes a positive will to creative destruction as generative power,
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the active force in which distinguishes him from many of his colleagues. As Rosamund
observes, just as the EC could be depicted as a ‘coping strategy’ for contending with
different levels of turbulence (inter-governmental, etc.), Haas’s expanded perspective and
the heuristic capacity it supplied (by aiding the discovery of truths about our interpretive
activity – the hermeneutics of desire – and the actual problem solving that enables or
impedes) functioned as a coping strategy for those theorists seeking truths about the
complicated phenomena of integration. 436
Crucial aspects of conventional theorizing were then and still remain inherently
reactive, constituting an all-too-human attempt to limit the emergence of existents – that
is, to restrict what can be, either in thought or practice – by, in the case of theories of
European integration, (re-)fitting the continuously evolving reality of integration to a
preconceived notion of “what it is”, or how or what it ought to be, regardless of whether it
in fact was or is so. This by extension problematizes whether or to what degree actual
events can ever be said to be outcomes predicted by a particular theory. The difficulty lies
in how, if at all, the “success” of a prediction can be adduced with any certainty given the
inevitable disputes that arise over fundamental matters such as concept formation and
historical analysis, as well as more mundane dilemmas such as the methodological basis
and veracity of particular data sets, their relevancy and/or applicability to a certain
problem or issue, and a researcher or theorists’ choice of independent and dependent
variables, all of which bear upon our estimation of the predictive power of a theoretical
approach.
Social and political processes are ultimately too dynamic to be comprehensively
described by the theories upon which we rely; major schools of thought such as those
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examined here succeed in being persuasive by providing a story or explanation of the
world that seems to correspond with what we identify as reality. They achieve legitimacy
by arising through and continually re-situating themselves within a web of discourses—
“the literature”—that attains authoritative hegemony. Qua academic discipline a collective
constraint largely determines the development of the knowledge to which its respective
schools are devoted thereafter. An obvious paradox to this is that it is the desire (of
political scientists and international relations scholars) to illuminate (in this case social)
reality that constitutes their sustaining passion (eros) and spurs their inquiry. The conceit
common to all of the sciences lies in the presumption of their arbiters to present a true
picture of the processes they analyze.
Moreover, such conventional theorizing can be said to be reactive in terms of what
it “allows” for, or does not, as the case may be. 437 This related concern regards what kinds
of knowledge a theoretical perspective, and the discipline of which it is a part, permits and
in the case of theories of European integration, what sort of socio-cultural and political
forms of life it takes Europe’s integration to be, and to rightly be capable of, producing.
This is to recognize the conceptual blinders on any perspective and problematize the way
it (a theory) unwittingly describes its own notional limits of permissibility. In the case of
theories of European integration it is in the multiplicity of types, the plurality of
communities and forms of governance to which integration could give rise, over and/or
between member-states, their national institutions and their respective populaces, that
was/is ultimately unpredictable (as it was/is an incomplete and constantly complexifying
process).
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Many of these problems are inherent to any effort at theorizing, particularly in the
social sciences, as what is studied is never static and therefore never entirely predictable.
But by the mid-70s it had become evident that too many facts integration contradicted the
theories, which were themselves discovered to be symptomatic of the ambition to contain
becoming and limit – in the guise of authoritative, ostensibly “predictive” modeling – the
possible futures of integration thereby. The familiarity, security and seeming rationality
provided by traditional nation-state politics, understood conventionally as contending
power relationships along conceptual binaries such as self and other, the inside (one’s
community) and the outside (the foreign or other), etc., conditioned ways of interpreting;
they also structured the variety of hermeneutically “viable” stances – the desire for certain
forms of integration – one could entertain, describing EIT’s horizon of legitimacy. But
this self-imposed conceptual frontier put the authority of European integration theory (as a
nascent power-knowledge regime) and, by extension, the arbiters of integration itself
somewhat outside of what was really happening. At the numerous levels of integration,
the mentality of citizens toward their community and the collective attitudes of diverging
and converging communities toward the political organization that sought to reorganize
their economic and political management were becoming thoroughly transformed in
unanticipated and unmanageable ways.
Also in the mid-1970s, as Haas was arguing that integration processes should be
properly understood in the broader context of regional and international politics,
interdependence emerged as an important theory of within the field. Earlier
behavioralistic portrayals of Europe’s integration as a predictable process were gradually
modified to admit of relations within the international system that fomented change to it
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and compelled adaptation among myriad political actors to those transformations. There
was a growing awareness that the functionalist and neofunctionalist linear images of
integration couldn’t account for some of the challenges the European process Europe
faced. These compelled modifications of the dominant discourse through which the
process was retrospectively comprehended, presently understood and futurally conceived.

A note on Interdependence Theory
Two of the primary exponents of the interdependency concept were Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye, who sought through three collaborative works across the
decade, “to challenge the dominant state-centric image of realism by presenting a picture
of a diffuse global order characterized by multiple actors among whom states were
important, but not alone.” 438
The phenomena of interdependence could be discerned between all political actors
and at every level of political life and its theorists tried to understand the dynamical
complexity of myriad competing interests in the global political economy. Specifically,
they wanted to adduce the ways in which interdependence facilitated or hindered
integration. The term itself conveyed the perception “that ‘integration’ had lost its
meaning as a guiding concept” and suggested an effort to set new priorities for solving
collective-action problems. 439 By not taking for granted any particular telos or end for
integrative developments the emerging school of Interdependence theory drew
comparativists of other regions and integration processes. It shifted “the emphasis from
questions of formal institution-building and constitutional engineering to those concerning
the management of pressing realities as a response to the rapidly changing conditions of
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market forces and the global economy.” 440 Unlike neofunctionalism, “which had been too
tightly associated with the Community model and method,” interdependence theory had
no normative link with any international institution that might have distorted the
perspective of intergovernmental exchange it presented. 441
In Power and Interdependence Keohane and Nye assert that state’s would have to
continually redefine their national interest due to increasing interdependence between
them and that this, combined with the influence of international institutions already
facilitating greater cooperation, would encourage the growth of common regimes and
formal institutions between nations. This is aptly summarized as “the practice of
mutualism in the management of complex relations that result in a policy mix.” 442 That
this observation struck students of integration as insightful may seem curious now, but it
indicates the intellectual rigidity in mainstream thinking about the issues of states’
determination and pursuit of their (so-called and highly problematic) national interests
within political science generally, preceding the early 1970s. Yet by examining ‘the multiactor complexity of the system’ interdependency theory bodied forth a much needed
critique of realism, challenging the latter’s pathological emphases on crude power and
force toward the achievement of security in an international environment whose
ineliminable political context is anarchy. 443
Interdependence does not ignore the importance of the principle of national
sovereignty or resulting practices of autonomy between national political authorities, but
comprehends them in terms of how structural or systemic properties of the international
arena condition the sort of interactions states have as well as the kinds of cooperation that
may arise through their lively and varied relations (supranational, transnational, etc.).
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Chryssochoou states that although interdependence theory “claims to offer a pragmatic,
ideologically free alternative to the study of the politics and economy of the Community
regime,” it has received “a fair amount of criticism” centered on its depiction of ‘the basic
political properties of the Community system’. Specifically, this included its emphasis on
the role and influence of supranational institutions, which would prompt much debate and
controversy in so far as it arguably (as was argued) serves certain ideological tenets and /
or objectives of the advocates of the particular form of political integration now occurring.

The Contemporary Debate
Since the early 1990s two major strains of thought concerning European
integration have been persuasively reinterpreted. Drawing upon Stanley Hoffmann’s logic
of diversity with the ethos of the school of realism in international politics theory, Andrew
Moravcsik has created a niche for himself and become a major figure in his own right as
the most prominent (and some allege, only) arbiter of the liberal intergovernmentalist
approach within the sub-discipline of European integration theory. Moravcsik is primarily
concerned with developing causal explanations of national preference formation and interstate bargaining objectives. Thus his objectives, as with those of all the major theorists
covered in this section, entail an interesting embrace and employment of the faith in
science (which I maintain becomes particularly dubious when methodologically translated
into “empirical” analyses of a subject by the social sciences) that Nietzsche found
hermeneutically problematical and epistemologically naïve. As will become clear,
Moravcsik’s major works body forth a will-to-truth symptomatic of a will to power that
however consciously, elides the heuristic objections that might be raised against it.
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The second strain of thought to which I referred above is the school of
supranational institutionalism, led in part through the collaborative efforts and individual
works of Alec Stonesweet and Wayne Sandholz. Together these scholars attempt to
demonstrate the empirical veracity of their thesis that liberal intergovernmental
compromise and cooperation are crucial but preliminary processes in the EU’s
development. What they believe to be more significant to and fundamentally altering of
the political landscape of the continent is the emergence of a supranational layer of
authority in Brussels and Strasbourg to which the governments of the sovereign nationstate members are duty bound and subordinate. They contend that the formally
institutionalized power structures of the continent are changing authorial relations
between national governments and their citizen-constituents, between European states and
between Europe vis-à-vis the EU, and the rest of the world in ways that challenge
traditional notions of sovereignty and possibly even nation-statehood.
A debate about the nature of the EU’s development, outward expansion and innerconsolidation; the character, functioning and authority of its institutions and of various
tensions underlying the project animates many of the differences between these two
schools of thought. I begin first with an overview and critique of Moravcsik’s analysis of
European unification as best characterized as a liberal, intergovernmental process. As
Schimmelfennig observes, liberal intergovernmentalism “is a ‘grand theory’ seeking to
explain the ‘major steps toward European integration’ in a multi-causal,” and
parsimonious theoretical framework. 444 As such it reinforces the positivist orientation
conferred by the discourses of scientism on the study of social processes, furthering the
will-to-truth that reifies reason and excessive explanatory economy in an effort to make
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the “truth plain” and the world (in this case, of human activity) appear more orderly and
neat than it is.
In ‘The Choice for Europe’ Andrew Moravcsik set forth a clear articulation of an
analytical approach to European integration. He theorizes that integration is occurring
primarily through intergovernmental cooperation and compromise, a gradual pooling of
sovereignty that has given rise to the EU in its contemporary form. According to this
view, integration is a state-driven process, in which the resulting supranational institutions
are wholly dependent on the sanction of member-states for their existence and efficacy.
The constituent member-states of any such body may, according to his theory, reverse
their imprimatur at any time and withdraw themselves from the organization. The nationstate retains its primacy (approaching the status of a fetish) despite the appearance of an
ever more integrated and integrating world.
Rosamund notes that “Moravcsik sees himself working in the liberal tradition”, on
“three core assumptions” about international politics. These, paraphrasing Moravcsik,
include the existence of self-interested, risk-averse rational actors (autonomous
individuals or groups); governments comprised of subsets of domestic interest groups
agonistically striving to achieve different aims, which constrains the abilities of states
internationally; and the behavior of states (their patterns of conflict and cooperation)
reflect their interests. 445 This is apt, as these three assumptions express dominant concepts
within international politics theory more generally, as they convey key tenets of the liberal
notions from which they arose.
Moravcsik’s analysis shares important features with the realist school of
international politics, including an emphasis on state actors and their putative rationality.
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It relies on the influential two-level game model developed by Robert Putnam to describe
the relationship between domestic politics, or national preference formation and relations
between states at the regional level, or strategic bargaining. 446 In the tradition of
rationalist-institutionalism, it employs bargaining theory and a functionalist account “to
explain the establishment and design of international institutions,” in terms of how they
manage and overcome the first- and second-order problems of international
cooperation”. 447
Liberal intergovernmentalism attempts to clarify both the link connecting national
preference formation, inter-state bargaining and the cooperative conduct that results and
the relations between states and the international organizations of which they are a part.448
Toward that end the framework Moravcsik developed allows him to examine dynamic
practices and integrative outcomes in terms of a supply and demand process. As
Rosamund summarizes it, the supply side refers to the domain of interstate bargaining
while the demand side consists of national preferences for interstate cooperation. This
perspective on dynamic inter-state cooperation has interesting implications for the liberal
intergovernmentalist critique (or minimization) of the role supranational institutions play.
Specific to the European scene, Rosamund asserts that:
[L]iberal intergovernmentalism… assign[s] an important role to institutions as
facilitators of positive sum bargaining. States benefit from and use the institutional
environment of the EU for purposes of domestic legitimation and the pursuit of
preferences. This seemingly applies to supranational institutions such as the
Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice … [which] tend to
operate within the boundaries set by member-state preferences, although the
exploitation of differences between member-states provides a definite opportunity
for entrepreneurial supranational activity. 449
The subtle exploitation of differences between member-states is one way supranational
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institutions might act beyond the designated mandate of their member-states, such as
when an institutional body’s rules compel certain initiatives or build a certain logic that
gradually conducts the preference formation and policy-agendas of the member-states.
The three EU institutions Rosamund cites above are prime examples of where this has
occurred both as forces for the centrifugal building of the community and a cohesion
policy to make that effective. Indeed, the Commission, Parliament and Court have
transformed the way EU member-states interact (the international or multi-national level
of governance within the community) and the way they separately conduct their domestic
affairs. 450
Moravcsik expanded on the classic intergovernmentalist view that “national
interest[s arise] in the context of [a] sovereign state’s relative position in the states
system”, to emphasize the agonistic give and take at the domestic level, between state and
disparate elements of society, through which the national interest is actually generated. 451
“Liberal intergovernmentalism treat[s] the state as a unitary actor according to the IR
tradition because it assumes that national governments develop a consistent preference
order as a result of domestic political bargaining and that domestic actors do not play a
significant independent role in negotiations beyond the state.” 452 However, in the case of
the EU particularly, the cultural, social and civil rights’ protections guaranteed to
autonomous regions, distinct minority groups and individual citizens provide any group or
private person so defined legal recourse through the Court of Justice against his or her
government. This is just one factor casting the traditional treatment of the state as a
unitary actor in doubt.
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Chryssochoou argues that the liberal intergovernmentalist vision differs from
earlier state-centric accounts of European integration by virtue of the fact that it “enlarges
the range of intellectual opportunities for going beyond ‘unicausal theorizing’ by
integrating…

[elements

of]

regime

analysis,

negotiation

theory

and

intergovernmentalism.” 453 It combined central concepts of these schools of thought to
establish that the process through which the national interest of a state actor comes to be
identified is more complicated than had been previously recognized, demonstrating the
significance of competition between disparate interest groups, political parties, and
various constituencies at the domestic level. It is this knotty process that provides the
background of each state actor’s respective strategic interactions with other states in the
regional community. He states:
The underlying demand for cooperation, not the entrepreneurial supply of
information, imposes a binding constraint on [inter-state] negotiations. Efficiency
is relatively unproblematic because interested governments are able to act as their
own political entrepreneurs. Instead negotiators focus primarily on the distribution
of [anticipated domestic] benefits [between the respective bargaining states],
which are decisively shaped by the relative power of national governments,
understood in terms of asymmetrical policy interdependence. 454
In other words individual governments and their leaders cannot, at the “supranational”
level of the international organization, effectively pressure other state actors or “impose
binding constraints on negotiations” between them. 455
Naturally the respective interests subtending the individual aims and agendas of
each state actor and sub-state actors within them, in the complex process of inter-state
bargaining differ. The presentation of their interests (the exposure of differences) is
moderated by the larger intergovernmental framework that restrains agonistic engagement
in the interests of cooperation, as well as self-interest in such an institutional setting which
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compels them to posture and bargain according to how they estimate of the strength of
their positions as compared to that of their respective negotiating partners.
While cooperation is the common objective among members of a regional
community, the definition of a successful outcome and the means of achieving it depend
on state actors’ relative influence and dependency therein. So too, the decision process
over whether to air a difference and how to do so is largely determined by complex
decision-making procedures A range of factors determines whether that divergent agenda
may become an issue. In addition, the form of presentation a differing or contrary
perspective takes partially determines the character of the debate that follows, as well as
the durability of it as such: be it a long-term source of contention (such as the CAP), a
briefly bracketed matter that a state actor may return to at a more propitious moment, or
one that evaporates from the memory of the state that sets it aside. The point is that the
autonomy of states in regional communities with supranational institutions is often
constrained by the supervening authority of those institutions. This can be constructive or
frustrating depending on the agenda pursued.
However, this truism is somewhat at odds with an aforementioned principle tenet
of liberal intergovernmentalism. As Moravcsik asserts:
Strong supranational institutions are often seen as the antithesis of
intergovernmentalism. Wrongly so. …In the intergovernmentalist view, the unique
institutional structure of the EC is acceptable to national governments only insofar
as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over domestic affairs,
permitting them to attain goals otherwise unachievable. 456
This underscores the intergovernmentalist account of the existence of supranational
institutions, even in light of the enhanced mechanisms for subsidiarity between the
national parliaments and the EU as provided by the Lisbon Treaty.
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Yet, in Heideggerian terms, Moravcsik here takes an appearance (the purported
acceptance of national governments which announces itself without authentically showing
itself) for apodictical fact (reality). While it is true that national governments would be
loathe accepting institutional structures certain to weaken their control, the EU clearly
does ultimately have precisely that effect, whether as a result of rulings by the Court or
legislation passed by the Commission. In many ways the EU seems (in the Heideggerian
sense) to accommodate itself to its member-state’s governments. However, the suggestion
that membership may only strengthen a state’s national authority ignores a wealth of
contradictory indications. 457 It also, perplexingly, implies that aspirant states do not
recognize that important aspects of their national sovereignty will be subordinated to EU
institutions upon their accession—or that current member-states do not. The requirement
of meeting the Copenhagen criteria and prerequisite preparations for implementing the
dictates of the Acquis (upon accession) effectively compels a degree of compliance and
subordination of national prerogative.
An analogy to intergovernmentalism can be drawn to the establishment of
sovereign political institutions in the US. Intergovernmentalism is what the US envisaged
for itself through the Articles of Confederation, which proved dysfunctional and were
replaced by the federal Constitution in 1787, which affirmed the federal government’s
supreme authority over the laws of all the republics’ constituent states. Supranational
institutions such as those comprising the EU differ in a significant sense, from
intergovernmental ones. Yet the EU acts as a supranational authority over its memberstates in much the same way as the federal government of the US does over the states –
which also enjoy equal status, representation and a degree of autonomy within the union.
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The fact remains that once a state accedes to community membership it cannot
remain unaffected by community decisions thereafter. Its choice of adopting community
provisions, which many states neighboring the union have done of necessity, particularly
with regard to trade policy (e.g.: Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Croatia, Turkey, etc.) is
effectively eliminated. Member-states are legally obliged to accept the decisions and
rulings of the community’s institutions; neighboring states are compelled by self-interest
to accommodate them. Although any member of the EU could in theory withdraw from
the community, no formal mechanism yet exists to accommodate such a move. 458
Intergovernmentalists downplay the significance of supranational institutions and
forces to assign them a more limited performative role than most integration theorists or
schools of European integration theory believe they actually play. In so doing Moravcsik
emphasizes the “link between domestic and regional politics… [that connects]
intergovernmental theory with domestic sources of legitimacy.” 459 As an actor of his own
ideals whose stage, as it were, is scholarship, Moravcsik’s well argued views probably
help to legitimate the EU among some “Euroskeptics” within the community. They may
also serve to facilitate its expansion by easing the reluctance of those who oppose it on
nationalistic grounds.
Moravcsik contends that this enhances ability of national governments (state
actors) to satisfy domestic demands through intergovernmental (inter-state) bargaining.
He explains how member-nations in a loosely confederated or cooperative unions—
namely the EU—conceive, pursue and attain their goals. Relative differences of power
between state actors across various matrixes of common concern constitute a key affective
determinant of their relevant interests. The vectors (relative magnitudes and directions) of
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their compound interests and the conventional power they may expend to attain policy
goals are loosely coordinated by broad frameworks for compromise and cooperation.
Asymmetrical interdependence is the central structural dynamic within the EU,
conditioning the institutional environment. Key features and means for managing
asymmetrical interdependence include:
treaty-amending negotiations [that] take place within a noncoercive system,
transaction costs of generating information and ideas are low relative to the
benefits of interstate cooperation [and] the distribution of benefits reflects relative
bargaining power [so that] the power of each government is inversely proportional
to the relative value that it places on an agreement compared to the outcome of its
best alternative policy—its ‘preference intensity’. 460
He maintains that on this basis negotiated outcomes are:
likely to reflect three specific factors: (1) the value of unilateral policy alternatives
relative to the status quo, which underlies credible threats to veto; (2) the value of
alternative coalitions, which underlies credible threats to exclude; and (3) the
opportunities for issue linkage of side-payments, which underlie ‘package
deals’. 461
As long as member-states benefit from cooperation, according to logic of
intergovernmentalism, actors will accept occasional setbacks to their prerogatives and
forego solutions outside the institutional framework comprising their interdependent
condition. It also suggests however, that states will entertain unilateral policy alternatives,
alternative coalitions and package deals to achieve their aims if the stakes are high enough
to them or they are persistently blocked due to asymmetries of power that frustrate their
ability to attain desired outcomes. 462
Differences of power between actors are a significant determinant of outcomes in
inter-state bargaining within a highly regulated cooperative institutional framework such
as the EU, and this, somewhat paradoxically suggests that self-generated institutional
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constraints (anticipated or otherwise) inhibit defections, radical change to the existing
framework

that compels acceptance of the instrumentality and ultra-liberal-modern

reification of reason that co-extends with the statist logic of the intergovernmentalist
perspective.
Intergovernmentalists (assuming there is more than one) recognize that
membership in regionally integrating bodies and/or international organizations results in
quantifiable benefits that actually increase domestic perceptions of legitimacy within
states and internationally as members of those regional communities and organizations to
which they belong. 463 This is a persuasive argument that Moravcsik supports with
compelling evidence from specific cases in which smaller, poorer countries within the EU
negotiated their policy preferences against more powerful member-states. 464 That
associations such as (or particularly) the EU strengthen their members relative to the
position they would hold outside of the integrating regional community entails a logic of
reliance at odds with certain intergovernmentalist claims, however. For it is an
acknowledgement that makes his opposition to the contentions of the supranational
institutionalist perspective somewhat curious, as over time the obligations of membership
come to supersede a state-actors’ full autonomy, as innumerable examples from the
contemporary EU and its 60 year history demonstrate.
However, Rosamund notes that there is “a deeper issue concern[ing] the normative
status of intergovernmentalism or state-centric forms of analysis. Theories can be
construed as rather more than heuristic constructions through which academics order the
world. They can also be seen [understood] as forces in the world that they describe.” 465
This—as I have maintained throughout—is a common danger to European integration
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theorizing (and in the social sciences more generally), one in which the advocates of a
theoretical perspective believed to possess objective empirical veridicality unwittingly act
as its ideological proponents. Rosamund affirms this central contention of my Nietzschean
critique when he asserts, in the context of intergovernmentalism, that theories come to
reflect “a political preference held by a range of actors within the EU… [and develop into]
a set of propositions that help to provide rationalizations for what particular actors do.” 466
This corroborates my contention that theorists of European integration are neither
objective about the empirical facts they bring together to substantiate their arguments nor
intellectually dispassionate in making their respective analyses. The dominant positivist
orientation of the political science discipline prevents many of them from recognizing the
virtual impossibility of doing so. Additionally, their lack of detachment from the subject
of analysis further jeopardizes their claims of approaching it in an objectively neutral
spirit of scientific inquiry. These conundrums inhibit their recognition of the complex
ways in which their own political views are implicated in the perspectives they adopt and
the positions they advocate. Their ideological indoctrination within the very same (or
discursively synonymous) socio-political milieu they study and their personal investment
and/or stakes in the knowledge–power regime in which they participate as scholars makes
them apt to act—if only unconsciously—as partisan devotees of a particular, highly
disciplinary will to truth that closely corresponds with the metanarrative and
corresponding value structure of the EU. 467
This is an actuality Nietzsche identified when he noted what “every great
philosophy so far has been: a confession of faith on the part of its author, and a type of
involuntary and unself-conscious memoir”, suggesting that there is no objective
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perspective on the world capable of capturing the capital “T” truth, only the drive for
knowledge craving mastery over its subject. 468 The precise nature of Europe’s integration,
its institutional development, the functioning and character of those bodies, the
tremendously complex roles of member state governments, regional and local authorities,
etc., is best discerned through a broad survey of numerous perspectives on the topic, a
critical examination of their shared background assumptions (e.g.: the tenets comprising
the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity) toward a view of the will to truth they
advance and a careful combination of their finest insights.

Supranational institutionalism
Moravcsik’s intergovernmentalist theory persuaded many that the neofunctionalist analysis was beset by theoretical weaknesses, but it also prompted a
response, in part intended to defend and bolster the veracity of certain neo-functionalist
insights and to account for perceived flaws in Moravcsik’s own theory.

Known

informally as the “supranational institutionalist” theory of European integration, the
approach is indebted to the fields’ neo-functionalist predecessors.
In assessing the importance of supranational institutions to Europe’s present order
under the aegis of the EU and its integration processes, Chryssochoou observes that they
have had a discernable:
an impact on the behavior of national governing elites and domestic policy actors,
while at the same time becoming important venues for the resolution of conflicts…
[they] can play a meaningful autonomous role in the European policy process,
albeit periodically, in furthering the scope of the common functional arrangements
and imposing constraints on rule-based state behavior… [and] they possess
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agenda-setting powers that limit the capacity of states to exercise formal political
control, collectively or individually, over integration outcomes. 469
In addition, the history of the Commission, and arguably the European Parliament (with
the eventual ratification of the Lisbon Treaty), demonstrate that supranational institutions
accrue authority as the integrating community that produced them (in this case the EU)
expands.
Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholz are perhaps the most prominent exemplars
of this perspective. Together they published an article in 1997 challenging the veracity of
Moravcsik’s ‘liberal inter-governmental’ thesis entitled European integration and
supranational governance in the Journal of European Public Policy. It is important to
note that they are not uncritical of neofunctionalist approaches either, which lends
additional force to their arguments. They “problematize the notion, strongly implied by
neo-functionalist theories, that integration is the process by which the EC gradually but
comprehensively replaces the nation state in all its functions.” In so doing they also sought
to “reject the comparative statics of intergovernmentalists as a mode of analysis incapable
of capturing crucial temporal elements of European integration.” 470 Their broad critical
framework allows them to synthesize various insights from different perspectives and to
posit thereby a more nuanced explanation of integrative processes. Among their primary
concerns however, is that “the exclusive focus on grand intergovernmental bargains can
lead to serious distortions of the historical record,” citing examples of how “integration
always proceeded… despite the Luxembourg compromise [or] the divergence of state
preferences.” 471
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Chryssochoou asserts that “the post-SEA era [has been] marked by renewed
institutional dynamism, [which has] prompt[ed] contemporary scholarship to cast doubt
on realist state-centric claims for viewing institutions as ‘passive, transaction-cost
reducing sets of rules’ designed to facilitate intergovernmental bargains.” 472 Confirming
this, Rosamund notes how “[Stone Sweet and Sandholtz] pitch their framework as a less
state-centric and more supranational alternative …deploy[ing] the image of demand and
supply sides to integration.” Rather than disputing the significance of transaction costs
they argue that “the role of transnational exchange is central to generating demands for
regulation and governance capacity at the European level. Supranational institutions work
to supply those things.” 473
Against Moravcsik’s challenge to the neo-functionalist school, they do not think
“intergovernmentalism displaces neo-functionalism, but rather relies on a causal argument
developed by the neo-functionalists”. 474 They argue persuasively that “empirical research
supports the transactions-driven theory of European integration” they propose, one in
which “the term ‘intergovernmental’ is useful as a description of a specific mode of
decision-making within the EC policy process…[b]ut which does not require [them] to
adopt or accept of ‘intergovernmentalism-as-theory’.” 475
Transactions become institutionalized according to how “demands generated in the
transnational domain stimulate a response from the decision-making institutions.” 476 As
the degree and kind of transactions occurring differs between sectors of activity and
disparate national economies, determines how they will be coordinated. “Variability in
levels of transborder transaction and intra-EU exchange,” 477 understood through Stone
Sweet and Sandholtz’s

supranational perspective, as a “transaction-based theory”,
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coherently explains why “integration proceeds faster and farther in some policy areas that
in others.” 478
Moreover, they state that their theory “also explain[s] the general direction of
integration in the common market, [and] account[s] for the decisively neoliberal (promarket) character of recent events like the 1992 program and the Maastricht provisions on
economic and monetary union.” 479 According to Rosamund they reread “Haasian
functionalism… as a form of institutionalist analysis.” In the analysis, “institutions acquire
legitimacy through both their own efforts to promote supranational norms and the
lobbying activities of interests that seek access to public officials in pursuit of their
goals.” 480
The central argument of Sandholtz and Stone Sweet’s thesis was that “once
movement toward the supranational pole [along the continuum they describe between
intergovernmental bargaining and the emergence of supranational institutions] begins,
European rules generate a dynamic of their own, which we call institutionalization.”481
The transformation undergone by institutions through processes of intergovernmental
bargaining are central to their understanding of the emergence of supranational dynamics
that condition states’ desires for deeper cooperation, and further supranationally driven
integration. They acknowledge that “actors behave in self-interested ways”, but take as
given that “both the interests and the behaviors [of state actors] take form in a social
setting defined by rules”. This is not to deny the agonistic way in which institutions as
systems of rules arise, however, for they recognize that “new kinds of transactions or
behaviors, disagree[ment] as to what rules require, and dispute resolution processes
compel their “constant evolution”. 482
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It is this on-going process of institutionalization at a level at once between and
above state actors that compels and deepens involvement. Thus it is in part through
“institutionalization [that] EC policy domains can become more supranational without
some, or at times a majority of, governments wanting it or being able to reverse it.”483
This logic of institutionalization is, they assert, “crucial to understanding integration as a
process …for as European rules emerge and are clarified and as European organizations
become arenas for politics, what is specifically supranational shapes the context for
subsequent interactions.” 484 This presents a major challenge to the intergovernmentalists’
logic, which has difficultly accounting for the dynamic process by which state interests
are conditioned by the politics generated within the supranational institutions of which
they are a part.
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz consider the role of treaty-based policy domains in
terms of how they advance supranational governance, asserting that they originate with
the “advantage of [having] a legal basis in the Union’s fundamental rules”. But integration
processes outside formal policy domains also increase the authority of Europe’s
supranational institutions, as their impetus stimulates the latter to expand their formal
spheres of influence. In fact, the EU continually re-negotiates aspects of its treaty-based
policy domains to deepen and refine the political striations of its homogenizing space. In
doing so it seeks to anticipate, capture and channel differing forces in a relatively uniform,
specified direction. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz refer to article 236, which authorizes the
EU to “establish supranational governance to achieve the general objectives of the
Community.” 485
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In other words the EU not only generates affects that always-already concur with
and advance its aims, but its creators explicitly sanctioned the interpolation of forces,
potential events of becoming-other, that differed from the plain objectives of the
community. This indicates the ways in which the EU was, by over-lapping institutional
and legal means, created to normalize developments. It normalizes both conceptual and
corporeal developments, limiting them (in the name of enhancing diversity!) to a
becoming-same inside its territorially defined area, which is comprised of a conceptually
delimiting sovereignty that physically defines belonging in accordance with the
geographical limits of its member-states. In addition it conditions culturally enforced
values and corresponding idealized subjectivities—compelling conformity—outside of its
borders. The latter entails a systematic interiorization of the EU’s outside (particularly
those nations geographically abutting it) that has been crucial to conditioning the
possibility of the EU’s formal expansion. 486 It does so according to the quasi-imperialist
statist logic and legal mechanisms of which it may credibly be understood as the highest
realization. 487
Rule following and treaty compliance constrain member-state governments, which
exert limited influence over their production—influence declining as the union expands its
membership. 488 The Commission and the Court (ECJ) can make decisions that memberstates are obliged to implement. “National courts, guided by ECJ decisions, can compel
their governments to comply with EC rules they have opposed… [and this] rule-centered
logic of institutionalization …suggests why it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, for
governments to reverse shifts toward supranational governance that have occurred.”489
According to the theory these shifts inevitably occur as a product of intergovernmental
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bargaining and cooperation (transactions) where the formal integration of key economic
and political functions is systematically pursued. Rosamund further affirms this point by
stating, “transnational activity is the generator of spillovers because the growth of
supranational rules and the increased responsiveness of central institutions of governance
reduces the costs of transactions. Moreover, the existence of particular patterns of rules
and rule-making creates a strong institutional logic for persistence of those patterns.” 490
Interestingly, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz consider the relevance of two
“languages” that captures how “new transactions entrench interests”. 491 The first of these
is the notion of path dependency, which helps explain part of the dynamic behind
institutional change. On this they concur with Paul Pierson, who argues that institutional
change is a “‘path-dependent’ process”, explaining that,
Once institutional and policy changes are in place, social actors adapt to those
changes, frequently making substantial investments in the process. A policy
turnabout [thereafter] would entail the loss of these sunk costs, thus raising the
costs for governments seeking to unwind supranational governance.
The very process of adaptation entails a transformation of norms and practices that
gradually gain the acceptance of their practitioners. Reversing this transformation of
attitudes and expectations is equally significant to the costs of administrative changes.
These

transformations

gradually

strengthen

supranational

institutions.

Chryssochoou writes that
European integration has often led to unintended consequences’ regarding the
growth, influence, and competence acquisition of supranational agencies, largely
at the expense of national executives which can no longer act as gatekeepers. 492
However, the extent of such unintended consequences is not limited to supranational
agencies or national governments, but induces affective changes throughout integrating
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societies. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz consider this dynamic in even more abstract terms,
observing that “the process of adaptation to change in complex social settings also
produces unintended consequences that are difficult to unwind. Thus institutional and
policy outcomes become ‘locked in,’ channeling politics down specific paths and closing
previously plausible alternatives.” 493
The perceived erosion of national authority – which in many domestic political
milieus is translated into the frequently incoherent rhetoric of “diminished state
sovereignty” – generates a great deal of anxiety in certain (mainly conservative and/or
nationalist) circles. While it is true that “[t]he European policy-making arena increasingly
relies on a distinctive set of collective policy norms and everyday regulatory practices”,
the member-states—particularly those twelve who joined the EC before the SEA (1986)—
have been intimately involved in the construction of that area. 494 Member-states who
joined in 1995, 2004 and 2007 willingly undertook the domestic institutional reforms
required to accede to the union and accepted any consequent erosion of their state
sovereignty in so doing. With a few exceptions in some policy areas, the previous
member-states had already made concessions to EU precedence via treaty agreements.495
So while it is the case that a highly complex transference of authority has and is occurring
between the member-state governments and the EU institutions (said by many to comprise
a supranational level), it has been conducted through consultative processes or occurred as
a consequence of such processes. For the foreseeable future the controversy may be
irresolvable, as it is not merely an empirical question, but lies in determining which
direction the transfer has tended to go, and whether and to what extent it constitutes a
transformation of the nation-state system in Europe.
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Critics have noted that gaps in the control exercised by state authorities over EU
bodies could be problematic both for the member-states’ and the EU’s perceived
legitimacy. In his historical institutionalist critique Pierson “focuses on factors that are
likely to create considerable gaps in member-state control [over European institutions].
Four are of fundamental importance: the autonomous actions of European institutional
actors, the restricted time horizons of decision makers, the large potential for unintended
consequences, and the likelihood of changes in COG [Chiefs of Government] preferences
over time.” 496 However, each of these aspects of change in institutional competence and
preference ordering is very likely to give rise to negotiated responses and political action
in an agonistic process that frequently succeeds in modifying their more undesired effects.
Although this usually amounts to buffing down the rough edges as it were, given the
adaptations that growth in the influence of EU institutions compels, myopically
nationalistic or state-centric thinkers still resent the allegedly “foreign” imposition of
change on their communities.
The second “language” Stone Sweet and Sandholtz consider in assessing how
member-states may contend with the power of supranational authorities, is the principleagent metaphor employed by Mark Pollack, which shows how “the administrative and
oversight mechanisms [that] principals (member governments) use to rein in agents (the
Commission) can be costly and of limited effectiveness. Furthermore, agents can exploit
divergent preferences among multiple principles, especially under more demanding
decision rules, like unanimity. 497 Stone Sweet and Sandholtz assert that “the pathdependence and principle-agent logics reinforce [their] argument that institutionalization
in the EC is not reducible to the preferences of, or bargaining among, member
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governments. The expansion of transnational society pushes for supranational governance,
which is exercised to facilitate and regulate that society. Once in place, supranational rules
alter the context for subsequent transactions and policy-making.” 498 Stone Sweet and
Sandholtz’s thesis also provides an interesting means of comprehending dynamical
aspects of globalization, particularly as it relates to institutional cooperation, overlap and
collaboration. 499

New Institutionalism and Multi-Level Governance
From the late-1980s to the present decade a number of theoretical challenges to the
received understandings of the dynamic processes of European integration have been
postulated by scholars dissatisfied by the dominant discourse. As Eilstrup-Sangiovanni
notes, “[t]he dispute between supranationalists and intergovernmentalists over the role and
impact of regional institutions is no longer the only fault line in European integration
debates. During the past 15 years, a number of rival perspectives have emerged which
challenge established integration theories.” 500 These schools have sought to challenge all
the presuppositions of conventional integration theories, going so far as to expose as
bogus the metaphysical fictions that serve as their bases. They have largely drawn upon
philosophical methods developed outside of the disciplinary confines of political science.
Among the more influential schools of thought within this unconventional camp
are a group of perspectives generally placed together under the heading new
institutionalism. Although linked through some essentially similar concerns they consist
of quite diverse historical, rational-choice and sociological strands. Chryssochoou
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summarizes the divisions of theorizing within the influential new institutionalist
movement succinctly:
Historical institutionalism treats institutions as instances of both formal and
informal interaction and as ‘systems of norms, including conventions, codes of
behavior and standard constraints upon behavior”; rational choice institutionalism
tends to define institutions as formal legalistic entities and sets of decision rules
that impose obligations upon self-interested actors’; sociological institutionalism
emphasizes the cognitive properties of institutions, that is, the way in which
institutions influence behavior, whilst stressing, the mutual constitution of
institutions and actors. 501
A general emphasis on the role and significance of institutions for shaping the
developments of polities is the unifying theme between them. However, given their
“diverse disciplinary starting points,” Rosamund thinks it may be somewhat disingenuous
to speak of new institutionalism as a as a distinct movement, and notes that each
subdivision provides a quite different explanation for how institutions matter. 502
In evaluating and working within the broader context of new-institutionalism,
Mark A. Pollack has done work on important issues. Among these the principle-agent
issue, as discussed above, and the subject of comitology as it pertains to new
institutionalist approaches, are prominent. 503 The former concerns the problem of
escalating institutional authority and autonomy, and generates controversy according to
how intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists understand the motives driving
integration and the often expanding role of the institutions it creates. 504 The latter,
comitology, he says it “emerges as a key area in which rationalist and constructivist
theorists provide competing accounts and hypotheses on a common empirical terrain,
which offers the unusual prospect of direct, competitive empirical testing… [that] requires
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researches to deal with serious methodological challenges” of both definition and
measurement. 505
Another recent theoretical approach is that of Multi-level governance (MLG). This
examines the function of authority as it has been dispersed through the numerous
institutions comprising the EU. It is concerned with how power operates “between levels
of governance and amongst actors and where there are significant sectoral variations in
governance patterns [European, national, regional and local].” 506 Multi-level governance
emphasizes the emergence of a complex Euro-polity in which diverse political agonisms
in a cooperative framework determine policy outcomes.
A central text in this strand of integration theory is Hooghe and Marks’ Multi-level
Governance and European Integration (2001), in which they define their objective as
adducing the significance of the immense increase in both “the scope and depth of policy
making at the EU level”, for “the political architecture of Europe”. They are particularly
interested in the kind of political order that this trend is creating and whether it will foster
a consolidation of member-states or ultimately weaken them. 507 Hooghe and Marks
challenge state-centric understandings of integration, asserting that “the core presumption
of state-centric governance is that European integration does not challenge the autonomy
of national states.” They pose the “alternative view that European integration is a politycreating process in which authoritative and policy making influences are shared across
multiple levels of government—subnational, national and supranational.”
Without rejecting the importance of national governments they contend that no one
form of political entity “monopolizes European-level policy making or the aggregation of
domestic interests”. 508 With a distinctive perspective on the interactions taking place
290

between European institutions and actors they envisage a unique polity taking shape on
the continent. Hooghe and Marks recognize that “while national governments are
formidable participants in EU policy making, control ahs slipped away from them to
supranational institutions… Individual state sovereignty is diluted in the EU by collective
decision making among national governments and by the autonomous role of [the EU’s
primary institutions].” 509
Paraphrasing an assertion by Hooghe and Marks, Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch
write that “the intellectual challenge of the multi-level governance model is that it does
not describe the dispersion of authoritative competence across territorial levels but draws
attention to the interconnection of multiple political arenas in the process of
governing.” 510 Authoritative competence is a manifold, emergent product of numerous
spheres of political activity interrelating with one another with relative autonomy,
irrespective of their formal divisions or hierarchic standings within their respective
member-state polities or the EU. Chryssochoou writes that:
Although it is not claimed that supranational institutions will eventually supersede
the member state executives, or that national governance arenas will be rendered
obsolete by a process of “transnational interest mobilization” …multi-level
governance amounts to a multi-layered polity, where there is no center of
accumulated authority, but where changing combinations of government[al] level
engage in collaboration. 511
From the perspective of multi-level governance analysis, the EU is evolving into an
potentially authentic ‘post-sovereign’ or post-modern polity in which rather than a new
level of authority atop a modern hierarchical order usurping the authority of the state and
roles of various governance structures within it, each level—from what conventionally
would have been considered “lowest” to “highest”—interact separately. Conceptual and
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formal political boundaries that previously defined relations of power are crossed and
inter-penetrated in a process that diffuses political authority. Rosamund asserts that “MLG
is about fluidity, the permanence of uncertainty and multiple modalities of authority –
suggesting an association with postmodernity.” 512
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni observes the close similarities between the MLG “depiction
of the task specific, overlapping and intersecting institutional jurisdictions” for contending
with policy problems overarching policy networks with Mitrany’s functionalism, the goal
of which “was to diffuse political power through delegation to non-majoritarian, singleissue authorities or agencies, which would rely heavily upon technocratic expertise and in
which ‘functional problem-solving rather than political bargaining would dominate.” She
also offers an interesting criticism, asserting that MLG “suffers from many of the same
weaknesses [that beset Mitrany’s functionalist approach].” In her estimation these
problems include “administrative feasibility [due to] high transaction costs”; problems of
“democratic legitimation [among institutions where] regulatory efficiency and functional
problem solving capacity” are emphasized above all else. 513
These may be quite valid concerns but I believe that by better contending with the
complexity of the multifarious political processes generated through European unification
the multi-level governance approach more effectively captures the character and
dynamism of integrative processes than its rivals. It strikes me as a promising way
forward that seems less colored by ideological advocacy than many of its competitor
schools and therefore avoids much of the theoretical circulatory that has plagued much of
European studies and theories of European integration as a field.
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Consociationalism
Chryssochoou (whose critical review of European integration theory I have
utilized as a primary source in this work) is himself a prominent proponent of a strand of
theory known as consociationalism, a conceptualization of political relations within and
between states that has been employed to analyze the nature of group autonomy in terms
of political rule-making, consent and legitimacy within multi-constituent or pluralistic
democratic polities since the 1960s. Nugent describes it as a “variation of the core statecentric model” of integration theory. 514 “The idea of consociation grew out of political
scientists’ concerns with how deeply divided societies could achieve governing
stability.” 515 The approach has recently been reinvigorated through its application to the
institutional operation and political nature of the EU.
Chryssochoou traces the term (consociatio, Latin for “associating together”) and
concept back to the late 16th century in the works of Althusius and Bodin who debated in
their works the principles of sovereignty and the proper organization of public life.516
“Originally developed – notably by Arend Lijphart – to throw light on how some
democratic states which are sharply divided internally are able to function in a relatively
smooth and stable manner… consociational states are [typically] portrayed as feature[ing]
societal segmentation …[with the segments] represented in decision-making forums on a
proportional basis …[wherein] political elites dominate decision-making processes …[that
are] taken on the basis of compromise and consensus… the rationale [of which] is the
preservation of segmented autonomy within a cooperative system.” This set of
assumptions is said to “provide valuable insights into central features of the functioning of
the EU” by its proponents.” 517
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Chryssochoou defines consociationalism “as a strategy of cooperative conflict
resolution, whereby the elites transcend intergroup fragmentation through negotiated
agreements or settlements based on a politics of accommodation.” 518 The framework takes
elite decisions as primary and as the end of politics, and relegates citizen participation to a
secondary consideration. Democracy is important for the legitimation of elite decisions,
but in an effective consociational system it is strictly representative by design. The
public’s enfranchisement and democratic processes cannot be permitted beyond a certain
point, to obstruct the attainment of mutually beneficial outcomes. In a consociational
system stability and enhanced collaboration between actors is a consequence of experts
negotiating the details of agreements for further cooperation. Taylor sees the
consociational model as useful for “explain[ing] the nature of the balance between
fragmentation and cooperation/integration in the EU, the mutual dependence between the
member states and the collectivity, and the ability – which does not imply inevitability –
of the system as a whole both to advance and maintain stability.” 519
Against neofunctionalist assertions about the erosion of the nation-state by a the
power of broader, community-wide prerogatives, Chryssochoou describes the EU as a
“confederal consociation, by which he means a system in which there is ‘the merging of
distinct politically organized states in some form of union to further common ends without
losing either national identity or resigning individual sovereignty.” 520 Chryssochoou
himself explains that “[C]onsociational arrangements …require neither a ‘sense of
community’, nor a popular affirmation of shared values, much less the existence of a
single and undifferentiated demos united by the overarching power of a higher civic ‘weness’.” 521
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“Lijphart’s model of consociational decision-making anticipate[d] government by
‘grand coalition’ (rather than by majority) and the existence of veto powers for each of the
constituent elites.” The four primary features of a consociational democracy he identified
are the grand coalition, the mutual veto or ‘concurrent majority’ rule, ‘proportionality as
the principle standard of majority rule and segmental autonomy in a federalist
framework. 522 He thought that for a consociational form of democracy and by extension,
presumably, a consociated group of democratic states to function effectively, the political
“society [they comprise] has to be divided, with minimal communication between
separate segments.” 523 Communication would therefore run vertically between the citizens
of states and their respective elites along formalized hierarchical lines, and horizontally
between the respective elites of the consociated units. Ultimately then “[t]he development
of attitudes and values among the ‘decision-receivers’ [or citizen-constituents of a polity]
is of lesser importance compared with developments at the level of the ‘decisionmakers’.” 524 Chryssochoou illuminates the statist logic inherent to the consociational
approach, in addition to its expansion of its hierarchical ethos. His perspective evinces the
way in which the ultra-liberal-modern state form continuously machinates to protect its
prerogatives by intensifying the authority of the power-knowledge regime constituting it
and actualized through a coextending regime of violence regularized through an everbroadening and subtle array of affective forces.
His theory of confederal–consociationalism can therefore be understood as an
attempt to account for aspects of both the intergovernmental and, to a lesser extent, the
supranational institutional takes on integration. It underscores the fact that states are far
from disappearing as a result of their limited integration and increasing synonymy within
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the EU. However, Europe’s economic and political assimilation, under the aegis of the
EU, clearly indicates an expanded form of statism that replicates on a much larger
territorial / geographic scale, the metaphysical presuppositions of the state, as well as its
anti-human identic and existential dualisms.525 This is not to assert that difference has
disappeared entirely, but to say that the elements of authenticity constituting traditional
differences are being systematically interpolated and diminished according to the
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. Its over-riding metanarrative—predicated on the
logocentric imperative of radical equality—continues amalgamating the desires of everless-disparate Europeans until all that remains of the continent’s traditional diversity of
types are slightly varying simulacrums of difference mediated by the spectacles of
consumerism which the EU arose in part to serve. 526 The EU can be expected to succeed
so long as its over-arching simulacrum of meaning and purpose, sustained by the
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity, continues to allay the existential ennui and
nausea inducing bad faith that would otherwise attend the intensified nihilism of our
hyper-decadent epoch.
Importantly for its application to the EU, particularly given the efforts by EU
institutions since the early 1990s to foster a common European identity, is the fact that
“the process of macro-level loyalty building’ should not be associated with the integration
or amalgamation of the component publics into a common political form that overrides
citizens’ ‘fixed primary loyalties’.” 527 In other words, while the EU strives to generate the
appearance of novel, shared characteristics between and a corresponding sense of
belonging among the 500 million citizens in its 27 member states, it does so according to
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the metanarrative of ultra-liberal-modernity, continually invoking its discourses to appeals
to the vast majority of the population who have long been indoctrinated with its tenets.
In doing so the EU re-describes the respective national histories and traditions of
its member-states to portray them as always having corresponded with its ultra-liberalmodern creed. It seeks thereby to incrementally replace such immutable conceptual
edifices and the myopic worldviews they sustain with what the EU promotes as a more
plastic and cosmopolitan notion of selfhood. This includes translating liberal ideals and
modern expectations into practical norms by expanding notional awareness of the other,
increasing the scope of responsibility and enhancing possibilities for becoming. 528 The
faith of Europhiles is that this will allow the cultural differences of disparate groups to
flourish and even permit them a significant degree of self-rule via semi-autonomous
authority structures, such as ethically distinct regions within multi-cultural nations such as
Belgium or Spain. The federal dimensions of the confederal consociation provide a
broader rubric of norms, rules and institutions within which a partially elected, partially
elite coalition of representatives from every members-state can jointly govern the union as
a whole. 529
“What is absolutely essential to the functionality and policy responsiveness of the
plural polity is a priori acceptance of the need for cooperative shared rule among the
group leaders.” 530 For many critical theorists this “essential” condition fails to allay
problems over the just legitimation of rule and the accountability of the decision-makers –
the slave-moral impulse to assign blame rhetorically beautified as responsibility. This is
particularly problematic when statist logic and ultra-liberal-modern values come to seem
contradictory, in cases where the self-determination of a people is at odds with the
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sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation. However, some argue in response to such
concerns that in a consociational system, “the faith of democracy lies more in a belief in
the principle of compromise itself than in the principles of open and responsible
government.” 531 Such a belief has ameliorated political conflicts between disparate groups
within multi-ethnic states, and between neighboring states with trans-national minority
constituencies (e.g.: ethnic Albanians in Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia [Kosovo]),
so long as it was maintained.
Yet many examples from recent history, including the breakup multi-ethnic nationstates such as the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, (as well as ongoing conflicts in
Sudan, Pakistan, India, etc.,) demonstrate that the confidence such a belief requires is
difficult to instill in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural polity, and nearly impossible to
enforce once factionalism dominates. 532 The multi-ethnic ideal is often an ideological
fiction promoted to justify the dominance of a hegemonic group whose leaders who aim to
maintain the prevailing statist order. And it is often challenged by opposing leaders
pursuing the same statist logic, with conflict and gratuitous human misery, resulting.
However, membership in the EU does not alter the formal sovereignty of its memberstates, who remain formally independent and largely autonomous in the conduct of their
domestic affairs so long as the domestic legislations of member-state governments consist
with EU norms. The EU has multiple institutional means of guaranteeing the rights,
prerogatives and legal recourse of minority groups and individuals who believe their
member-state government is abusing them. 533
Such a view would resonate well with Nietzsche’s own political sentiments if he
could be certain that the best, whose “freedom is a freedom for creative work and not
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simply an unbridled satisfaction of desires”, were actually able to rule according to their
eros. 534 However, according to his vitalist politics he would perceive the contemporary
political reality in the Western world, as conceived by consociationalists particularly, as
another slightly innovative justification of existing anti-natural liberal democratic
arrangements. The motivation for the consociationalist thesis would be to nuance
rationales for modes of being / forms of life that already consist with the dominant ultraliberal-modern ideological apparatus.
Nietzsche would have decisively rejected the prevailing hyper-decadent order and
its ‘cynical, enlightened false-consciousness’—in which ascetic–consumerist priests of
ressentiment arrogate to themselves the conceit that they are best qualified to rule—as
antithetical to the aim of fostering the higher culture necessary for authentic human
becoming and greatness. 535 The reign of ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment
always already consists with the ethos of slave psychology—providing a moral
rationalization to the herd’s leveling of mountain and valley across the natural landscape
of human types. The diversity of the species is diminished and its potential attenuated to
achieve an ideological and political goal consistent with a morality of taming designed to
emasculate would-be profligate geniuses likely to oppose such anti-natural aims.
Historically, rulers have deemed some degree of social leveling necessary for the
administration and governance of human masses, across diverse cultures and widely
separated epochs. But in the 20th century the bureaucratic management of human societies
has taken this apparently basic inclination to new levels of sophistication and given rise to
correspondingly novel means of transgression. The defiance of stultifying socio-cultural
norms and ossified political authority is urgently needed in a hyper-decadent age.
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As a nuanced means of organizing social life and contending with the proliferating
challenges of complexifying communities, “Consociationalism,” writes Chryssochoou, “is
best captured by the term ‘consensus elite government’ – in systems of common
management and joint decision-making operating within a multi-level political order as
currently represented by the Union.” 536 The “elite” to whom Chryssochoou refers, are of
course, philistine economic optimists whose accord originates in their preoccupation with
security and the prosperity of the crowd. According to the precepts of certain democratic
theories the legitimacy of these sallow managers derives from the putative “justness” of
the institutions they administer and their ability to respond to the multitude’s banausic
demands and reduce its suffering (understood as “fairness”). 537
In so far as the prevailing system of governance in the central organs of the
globalization complex could be characterized as a confederal consociation of subtly
differing but substantively similar (ideologically analogous) democracies, it would strike
Nietzsche as among the very worst sorts of political organization for the realization of a
natural socio-political order. He would see it as one that diminishes human potential by
enforcing an enfeebling ideal of (ersatz) security to enable more consumption. This
striving after security, the necessity to create a sense of shared wellbeing that never
succeeds in overcoming (re: eliminating) authentic sources of insecurity, such as the
conventional illusion between self and other and the metaphysical fictions perpetuated by
the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity, sustains counter-productive sources of
insecurity and accords with the simulated existential meaning and ontological purpose it
circulates to naturalize its ultra-liberal-modern ideals. The anti-naturalism inherent in our
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contemporary, dissipative values immiserates not only the healthy, but also needlessly
exacerbates the suffering of the weak and botched—though they cannot know it.
The depiction of European integration that develops out of the consociationalist
perspective has it that the EU “is not about the subordination of the component states to a
higher central authority, let alone a new regional state, but rather it is about the
preservation of those state qualities that allow the subunits to survive as distinct
collectivities, while engaging themselves in mutually rewarding interactions.”538
Furthermore, it “claims to offer a linkage between the elite-led nature of European
integration and the EU’s manifest lack of democratic character. The institutional and
decision-making architecture of the EU has manipulated the integration process so that
states continue to manage the processes of community building.” 539 This is to say the
consociational perspective, understood as advocacy, maintains something of the statusquo vis state sovereignty, validates certain key insights of the liberal intergovernmentalist
perspective on integration and naturalizes its—and the broader discipline’s—mania for
rationalism. It illuminates dimensions of European integration that are antithetical to the
ethos of Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeanism’, as “the pro-activity of [the EU’s] elites
seriously inhibit the capacities of integration from below that could help create a European
demos.” 540
To the extent that this is true, it is clear from a Nietzschean perspective that the
wrong elites are running the show. Moreover, consistent with Nietzsche’s intense aversion
to liberal-modern democratic populism, these conventional elites are the so-called “higher
men”, the self-described “libres penseurs” (free thinkers), who “to a man... still believe in
the ‘ideal’”, like those whom he was so contemptuous of in the late 19th century. 541 They
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dominate politics in Europe today—as they have at least since the end of World War
Two—out of a striving for conventional power that originates in a schizophrenic variety
of ressentiment that exacerbates secularized slave-moral indignation. 542 They believe in
the democratic legitimation, by “appeal to the egoism of the masses”, of a technocratic
bureaucracy that directs all the functional operations of everyday life toward the
automaton-ization of the human herds they manage, to serve (as Nietzsche put it in an
early essay) the interests “of a self-seeking, stateless money aristocracy”, to whom he later
referred as ascetic priests of ressentiment. 543
With 27 member-states the partisan divisions within the EU polity are exceedingly
varied. A plethora of political parties vie to achieve their aims, from strictly national
parties, to transnational ones that form coalitions to affect politics at both the national and
supra-national levels of the Union. The so-called “Euroskeptics” and “Europhobes” come
in many varieties and represent myriad factions within the continent’s disparate
communities and cultures. But to generalize, they tend to perceive the EU as little more
than an institutional and legal framework for the operation of an influential cartel of ruling
elites (relatively defined) that legitimates its own machinations through its policies and
dominance of EU institutions.
They may for religious reasons oppose what they perceive to be the EU’s
secularizing effects, or, if xenophobic nationalists, for its liberal social and immigration
policies; if socialists, its advocacy of trade liberalization; if neo-liberal economists, the
farm subsidies provided by its Common Agricultural Policy, etc. The extent to which any
of these groups’ respective assessments of the EU are accurate is debatable. As the views
motivating much of this opposition tends to be a product of reaction (on top of the
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reaction that spurred the creation of the EU itself) that ramifies cynicism, the defensibility
of their agendas as authentically agonistic life-affirming expressions of a positive will to
creative destruction as generative power, is doubtful.
However, it is true that its officials are subjected to ever-greater scrutiny as a result
of demands for increased accountability among its constituent publics. The EU’s
legislators and bureaucrats are governed by institutional rules and accountability
procedures established by the EU’s Fraud Prevention Office as well as numerous
management and regulatory committees, and agreed by treaty between member-state
governments. Proposed changes to European institutions—particularly more recent efforts
to increase democratic accountability and institute more direct citizen rule—threaten the
elite-managed consociational order. In view of this it is unclear that the consociationalist
view will persist in offering a compelling explanation for integration processes as this
happens, as current trends suggest a normative momentum driving it toward making the
EU more transparent and answerable for greater European civic responsibilities.

Three recent theoretical approaches: Social Constructivism, Discourse Analysis and
Post-modernism
Lastly, I will mention three important and innovative perspectives that have
emerged on the stage of European integration theory largely in the last two decades. These
warrant attention because they have provided critical insights that have, with muchdebated efficacy, intervened upon the sequential accretion of knowledge resulting from
and symptomatizing the will to truth distinctive of the mainstream field (as explicated
above). In so doing they have disturbed the striated space of the epistemic community
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comprising European Union studies and the major(itarian) theories of European
integration, posing new challenges to its status as a normalizing research tradition. While
not necessarily creating the smooth, heteronymous space across the territorialized social
field most conducive to authentic becoming-other, these theoretical perspectives are
shredding the veil that long shrouded the essentializing conceits of the mainstream while
strongly resisting re-capture by conventional statist discourses of Europeanization. As a
result they are arguably moving the field in exciting directions, making possible a deeper
interrogation of the fundamental precepts of the discipline itself, its conceptual strengths
and weaknesses and the ideological presuppositions of the EU project.
The inter-related approaches of social constructivism, discourse analysis and postmodernism developed in response to concerns raised by philosophers who were in part
inspired by Nietzsche and/or responding to the critical tradition he instigated. 544 These
philosophers include Jacque Derrida, who deconstructed the function of language and the
ineliminable metaphysical logos at its center; and Michel Foucault, who applied a
Nietzschean notion of genealogy to the socio-political construction of the subject through
disciplinary regimes of power and knowledge. Foucault’s work has been very influential,
due largely to his overt concern with the nature of the political, which makes it more
palatable to conventional political scientists (who still resist taking it seriously), whereas
Derrida’s more philosophically challenging—and unsettling—insights have yet to make a
similarly deep or broad impact on the field.
The social constructivism school of integration theory, as Thomas Risse has noted,
has been influenced by Foucault. 545 He describes “constructivism as based on a social
ontology which insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social
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environment and its collectively shared system of meanings (‘culture’ in a broad
sense).” 546

He goes on to assert that “social constructivism occupies a—sometimes

uneasy—ontological middleground between individualism and structuralism by claiming
that there are properties of structures and of agents that cannot be collapsed into each
other.” 547

While

“the

prevailing

theories

of

European

integration—whether

neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, or ‘multi-level governance’—are firmly
committed to a rationalist ontology which is agency-centered by definition,” social
constructivists examine how the illusion of such agency (which Nietzsche recognized as
resting on metaphysical fictions) is sustained through the occluding of the material
conditions of its own possibility. 548
The constructivist perspective “emphasiz[es] the interests of actors [which] cannot
be treated as exogenously given or inferred from a given material structure. Rather,
political culture, discourse and the social construction of interests and preferences
matter.” 549 Risse argues that social constructivist model provides insights and nuance to
our understanding of the EU and integration processes, particularly with regard to the
materialization and precise character of a European identity and the place of national
identities in the context of an emerging ‘Europeanness’. He says:
First, accepting the mutual constitutive-ness of agency and structure allows for a
much deeper understanding of Europeanization including its impact on statehood
in Europe. Second and related, emphasizing the constitutive effects of European
law, rules and policies enables us to study how European integration shapes social
identities and interests of actors. Third, focusing on communicative practices
permits us to examine more closely how Europe and the EU a constructed
discursively and how actors try to come to grips with the meaning of European
integration. 550
Risse goes on to consider the role of culture and ideology in the development of social
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identities as a basis for political community as well as their historical contingency and
malleability, in ways quite analogous to what I have done here, albeit from a Nietzschean
perspective. This leads Risse to take seriously the potential in disparate national cultures
for a pan-European collective identity and he provides compelling examples to show that
they exist. 551
Discourse analysis is another recent and especially promising development in
integration studies. Ole Wæver is a notable proponent of this theoretical approach to the
EU. It is primarily concerned with how discourses circulate, legitimate and naturalize
meanings. This has to do with understanding how sets of fundamental value assumptions
about the world, the transmission of which often occurs through acculturation and are
implicitly understood and shared, are effectively realized through formal and informal
institutions. Discourse normalizes individuals and enforces itself through systematic
socio-political procedures to persecute and exclude difference. This can occur in a formal
sense through legislation, and informally through the perpetuation of mores and taboos.
The power of the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity—the action of which
has been the subject of critique throughout this work—is augmented socio-politically
through the resonance of its egalitarian ethos with slave moral ressentiment. The
ideological instantiation of its anti-natural ideals compels and simultaneously covers-up a
culture of abjection and conformity that impairs genuine becoming (becoming–other). In
hegemonic ideological form it has synthesized the post-Enlightenment and modern
discourses of universalism, liberalism, secularism, progressivism, and rationalism, and
serves to naturalize scientism’s privileging of mechanistic causality and the positivistic
orientation it confers.
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Wæver states, “discourse analysis looks for structures of meaning. ‘Things’ do not
have meaning in and of themselves, they only become meaningful in discourse. As a
consequence, it is problematic to ground one’s analysis in ‘given’ subjects or objects
because both are constituted discursively, and one should therefore study this process of
constitution first.” 552 This insight productively problematizes conventional notions of
agency. However, Wæver is careful not to reify discourse, noting that “discourses exist
and are reproduced and transformed through practice”, they do “not stand apart from
‘reality’, [but are] embedded in reality in the sense of actions, materiality, and
institutions.”553
Wæver recognizes the philosophical origins of discourse analysis in political
theory as lying in the incomparable thought of Nietzsche via Derrida’s poststructuralism. 554 It was Derrida (after Nietzsche, who demonstrated the self-referentiality
of all so-called grounds) who recognized that in the course of structure, sign and play, the
closure of meaning is ultimately impossible.” As Derrida recognized in his
groundbreaking work ’Of Grammatology’, this is because systems of meaning are always
already incomplete and unstable, for one sign refers to another until we, the examiners,
reach an aporia that compels recognition of the absence of any foundation or logos is
evident. This is quite analogous to Nietzsche’s (and Zarathustra’s) most abysmal thought
concerning truth, an idea that prompted his radical examination of how truths, which are
ultimately all subjective, function to create and sustain meanings that cover-up their own
lack of foundations and the absence of any grounds for positing non-tautological truths.
The play of signs is a process of an eternal referring back to still other signs. It is
an asking “what does that mean”, ad infinitum. Derrida, following Nietzsche’s
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unpublished 1872 essay ‘On Truth and Lies in an Extra-moral Sense’, (which he cites)
reveals the ultimate absence of a grounding referent, with profound implications for
epistemology, hermeneutics and ontology, among other things.
The inherent limitations of language, and through its development, discourses, for
creating meaning, leave interpretive gaps and conceptual spaces in which possibilities for
transformation may occur. It is the function of discourse to sustain meanings, in
disciplinary fashion, that inclines it to become ideologically coercive, but even at its most
coercive it is intrinsically vulnerable. As Wæver notes, “partial fixations of political
meaning are constantly attempted and make up much of the dynamics of politics, but any
such attempt always has a loose end, an opening for a possible re-articulation.” He uses
the concept of democracy as an example of the way in which “a surplus of meaning
enables a competing articulation of democracy through a neo-liberal discourse.” 555 The
same applies however, for sacrosanct notions in international relations theory such as
anarchy, sovereignty and self-determination.
Discourse analysis is a powerful means of cutting into the ideological conceits of
integration theory and deconstructing certain foreground assumptions of conventional
political science. The implications of this are potentially radical in terms of the creative
and productive challenges they make possible. It is the task of ‘good Europeans’ to exploit
these gaps and openings, to develop the loose ends and surplus meanings as they realize
their life-affirming idea of Europe.
Post-modern perspectives combine the insights of social constructivism and
discourse analysis with a critical deconstruction “of meaning and the ontological
constitution of selfhood”, alterity and otherness. 556 Post-modern critics are, after Jean308

François Lyotard (a critic of modernity and advocate of postmodern conditions of
knowledge 557), incredulous toward meta-narratives (particularly hegemonic ones), such as
the belief in emancipation via the democratic state form and prosperity through neo-liberal
capital process; a story legitimated by the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. Van
Ham asserts that “postmodernism is both a condition of knowledge and the self-conscious
stage in the evolution of modernity.” 558
Postmodernism, such as it is, problematizes the epistemological assumptions and
methodological practices of scholarship by “bid[ding] farewell to the notion of
comprehensive rational knowledge and continuous progress which formed the basis of the
Enlightenment. …It is at dis-ease with the assumption that history is an unending and
logical process toward industrialization, urbanization, rationalization, bureaucratization
and the growth of individualism within the context of state formation [and rejects] the
notion of history as a unitary process with the ‘West’ at the political center of gravity.”559
Significantly, postmodernity challenges the conceits of scientism that dominate the
generation and legitimation of cynical knowledge in our hyper-decadent era. “Postmodern
science is postpositivist”, and anti-essentialist as it “heralds the death of foundationalism
and instead proposes” relativism as a more accurate stance from which to evaluate
culturally specific concepts, practices and desires, as well as with regard to efforts to
understand morality and truth claims, i.e.: values. 560
A century before “postmodernism” erupted onto the scene, Nietzsche had asserted
that all truth is perspectivally contingent and historically situated, which is to say that
truths are never objectively independent except from a subjective point of view.
“Postmodernism” would likely have amused him, for even as many of his insights have
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been applied to disparate aspects of the social world through it, its proponents often miss
the crucial point that truths are essential for life. That said, it is in the main consistent with
his over-arching skeptical endeavor; postmodernism does not seek to “advance”
knowledge, per se, for as Nietzsche observed, “in the end one experiences only oneself (Z:
III-1).” It seeks rather to better comprehend how knowledge arises and functions, without
belief in any claims to transcendent truth. Nietzsche believed only the strongest could
tolerate this terrible “truth”, and that the disposition it would likely foster among the weak
would be especially ruinous, concurring with a thoroughly nihilistic worldview. Given the
ethos of passive nihilism in this negative will-to-truth, our so-called postmodernism would
likely have struck Nietzsche as epitomizing an age too dissipated and weak to posit
values. He would have taken it as evidence of the ersatz enlightenment, or “happy false
consciousness” typifying our hyper-decadent age. 561
The resignation of the hebetated automatons comprising the masses in the
contemporary West belies the ever-quickening pace of life and irrational exuberance
produced by the liberatory promise of science and economistic optimism. The insights of
post-modernity have augmented alienation through massification and the devaluation of
all values, intensifying the negative effects of modernity, rather than providing any
practical means to move beyond it. From a critical Nietzschean standpoint, the alleged
move to the postmodern is a misnomer and would have been more accurately described as
an intensification of liberal-modern values, generating a “super-modern” condition.
This condition—not to mention its likely political implications—would have
struck Nietzsche as especially perilous, as the relativism it promotes further exposes the
meaninglessness of existence to an already dissipated populace who need meaning
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provided for them to avoid suicidal (or homicidal) annihilation. Even if it is always
already heteronymous and inauthentic in nature, the meaning and purpose provided by the
media–consumer spectacles, simulated prosperity and simulacrums of equality of
opportunity and enfranchisement provide a semblance of (hyper-decadent) stability. When
the relativism generate by post-modernism “trickles down” into the collective
consciousness of the all-too-many, it poses the danger of compounding the absurdity of
the everyday, intensifying alienation and despondency. Nevertheless this cannot diminish
existing resources (either individual or social) for authentic becoming, just make them
inaccessible to the vast majority. 562
Many political theorists are now writing on international relations and Europe and
its formal integration from a postmodern stance. Authors who have made significant
contributions from this theoretical stance—or something approximating it—include
William Connolly, James Der Derian, Zygmunt Bauman and Slavoj Žižek, to name a few.
John Ruggie, who first conceived the notion of embedded liberalism as an
explanatory framework for the post World War II Western-led capitalist economic system
and democratic state order, has asserted that “the EU may constitute nothing less than the
emergence of the first truly postmodern international political form.” 563 Although not a
dedicated postmodern himself, Ruggie has contributed some parallel insights and
contributed to the engagement of international relations theory with postmodern thought.
For instance he has observed, in Nietzschean fashion, that the EU is a “multi-perspectival
polity”. 564
R.B.J. Walker is among those theorists who have more explicitly affiliated his
work with postmodernism. He has written about the metaphysical background
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assumptions that unconsciously inform much of contemporary integration theory,
asserting:
[W]e have difficulty imagining politics in other terms than those given by Hobbes,
by a metaphysics of horizontal and vertical lines, by the assumptions of a
sovereignty we may all be ready to dismiss but which still authorizes our account
of what and where politics must be. The very existence of a theory of international
relations, as of the political theory to which it is counter-posed, depends precisely
on this for its authorization. Europe presents a situation in which neither side of
this spatial divide has very much to say, except to repeat the stories that have kept
them apart. Theories of European integration are an effect of this divide. Many
people still struggle to force Europe into the apolitical categories these theories
have produced. This is an effect of an idealization of political life rooted in a
misplaced claim to know where Europe is. 565
The facts of Europe’s integration, particularly when taken in the broader context of
globalization, confront us with the difficulty of comprehending a politics that has moved
us beyond the classic metaphysical assumptions of political science (in the works of
Hobbes, et. al.). We are, rather quixotically, already living in its midst yet unable to
sufficiently image it. We do not yet adequately comprehend the new conditions of our
social world—that is, our language is insufficient to explain it.
Since the early 1990s it has been the case that more of the work done in theorizing
European integration has had to contend with the insights and problems of postmodernism
than the conventional, “mainstream” of the field would be pleased to admit. This suggests
that the anti-foundationalist trend challenging the received wisdom of political science,
specifically its dominant model for theoretical explanation consisting of “clear and
testable distinctions between dependent and independent variables”, will continue to
develop. As it does it will invariably continue to erode the grounds upon which confidence
in impartial and unbiased “Truth” has rested by uncovering the lack of any fixed meaning
to those grounds and their (somewhat fictive) stature. This has and will continue to
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profoundly alter the discipline, including European integration theory. 566 This
development will compel a new shared awareness, or we-consciousness, about the
reactive nature of the will to truth that formerly motivated the discovery and
rationalization of political facts in knowledge discourses, as well as the task scholars
ought, in the future, to perform. 567

Part Three: Conclusions
The mainstream theorists of European integration, whose principal ideas are
briefly summarized and critiqued above, are not accurately understood as performing
customary science or philosophy. Rather, these scholars engage in knowledge creation of
an important sort that “occurs” somewhere in-between the two and rarely avoids
replicating the ideological precepts of the context in which it is generated. They should be
considered a hybrid type; a scholarly sort of whom Nietzsche would have been distrustful
and perceived as symptomatic of our ultra-liberal-modern epoch. 568
The persistence with which theorists of European integration try to explain and
understand the EU is itself noteworthy. The determination to elucidate the complex and
dynamical social, political and economic processes of European integration is itself
symptomatic of a will-to-truth that enlists truth in the service of political ends and/or the
advancement of a privileged ideology. It appeals to the authority of moral values operative
within the macro-sphere of the political—the assumptions of ‘truthlikeness’ constitutive
of the epistemic community and corresponding consciousness, of which their various
schools are a part. 569
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Appeals to reason and objectivity in determining and evaluating evidentiary
support enlisted to substantiate or prove theoretical claims often serve to mask other
phenomena, such as the social–scientific setting in which truths are produced and what or
whose interests they serve. Socially constructed knowledge is often self-replicating and
redundant as “institutions influence behavior by providing cognitive scripts, categories
and models that are indispensible for action, not least because without them the world and
the behavior of others cannot be interpreted. 570 Existing practices and the consciousness
they both reflect and transform—which comprise a broader sociogenic framework—raise
questions that supporters of those practices answer by reference to the corresponding
ideological presuppositions. The desire for answers that conform to and corroborate their
consciousness (more often than not) results in explanans that function to perpetuate the
practices (explicandum), etc.
Significantly (for anyone concerned with the possibility for veracity and
objectivity in the social sciences) this makes it easy to overlook all the subtle ways in
which a dominant paradigm or set of discourses serves to validate an ensemble of
perspectives that similarly legitimate the same fundamentals—beliefs about the highest
human goods, the best form of political organization, the rights of individuals, etc. The
need for pragmatic agreement for the sake of regulating the social life of complex
communities notwithstanding, it does so by determining in advance what counts as
legitimate evidence and how the facts should be (correctly) interpreted in making the case
it has itself framed. 571 That doesn’t mean theorists engaged in examining the social world
are unobjective per se, just that conscientious social scientists ought to remain cognizant
that “institutions become the mechanisms through which the world is rendered meaningful
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to social actors”; in other words what is ‘objectively’ comprehensible is always-already
institutionally conditioned, their insights included. 572
The problematic nature of claims to veracity and objectivity (statements of truth)
in evaluation is underappreciated in the social sciences. In fairness it would be difficult—
given the practical aim of understanding social phenomena—to proceed otherwise.
Nevertheless, doing so often leaves explanatory lacunae, whether as a result of the use of
empirical data or inadequate accounts of concept formation. This is, in part, where the
problem of and/or need for establishing a specified, shared framework for analysis
arises. 573 Unacknowledged differences in linguistic usage (definitional disparities) and
dissimilar heuristic frameworks (evidentiary criteria, the determination and interpretation
of facts, etc.) may explain certain arguments between disparate theories of European
integration. It is possible that many of the field’s ongoing arguments have resulted from
contrasting methods of analysis, rather than empirical deficiencies, per se. Given the ready
access every theorist has to empirical data, this possibility is compelling. However,
“empirical data” can easily be challenged as well.
Critical insights of this sort—the contingency of a perspective for knowledge (and
life)—are not new in international relations or theories of European integration, but they
vie for attention with the privileged empiricist prejudices of the ‘rational choice’
mainstream. Nietzsche made parallel—and still relevant—insights over a century ago:
Our new "infinite."— How far the perspectival character of existence extends, or
indeed whether existence has any other character than this; whether existence
without interpretation, without "sense," does not become "nonsense," whether, on
the other hand, all existence is not essentially an interpreting existence—that
cannot, as would be fair, be decided even by the most industrious and scrupulously
conscientious analysis and self-examination of the intellect; for in the course of
this analysis, the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectival
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forms, and solely in these. We cannot look around our own corner… But I think
that today we are at least far away from the ridiculous immodesty of decreeing
from our angle that perspectives are permitted only from this angle. Rather, the
world has once again become "infinite" to us: insofar as we cannot reject the
possibility that it includes infinite interpretations. 574
Mainstream political science (the highly influential aforementioned ‘rational choice’
school and that ilk) would have made Nietzsche less optimistic, however, as its
proponents generally strive to demonstrate the apodicity of the ‘Truth’ they discern
through the application of quantitative methodologies they often defend with dogmatic
zeal. This brand of doctrinaire scientism inherently opposes Nietzsche’s insight that the
world may include infinite interpretations in favor of a rigid and ossifying notion of
‘Truth’. However, contemporary developments in the social sciences, including
theoretical insights provided by ‘outliers’ to the political science discipline would, as
noted at section two above, give him reason to hope that the knowledge creation in which
the social sciences are engaged is developing in potentially life-enhancing ways. 575
The un-waning desire to fully explicate the EU simultaneously risks limiting
Europe’s becoming via the will-to-truth motivating it. Such a desire always-already
corresponds with and so risks augmenting, what is. It may unintentionally reproduce
institutional constraints on what the EU may (otherwise) become. This tendency is
deflected, or covered-up, in integration theory via its self-serving presentation as objective
scholarship and its self-justifying rhetoric of detached inquiry. Its largely positivistic
orientation and correspondence with the discourse of scientism convinces many of the
veracity of their work and perpetuates the discipline and expertise.
The perceived efficacy of mainstream theories of European integration has much
to do with the authority of the discipline itself and its reception in that context. Its
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theoretical approaches persuade by conceptually narrowing perspectives on a given
subject so as to obfuscate certain implications of their contingent (subjective) veracity, as
well as the tautologous nature of their assertions of empirical fact. In the specific context
of integration theory this would mean the facticity of the EU. 576 Despite the evident
deepening of the field that has occurred over the past six decades (as the genealogical
doxography above critically explicated), developments in the mainstream schools of the
field indicate a growing awareness of and discomfort with the uncertainty of its theoretical
and heuristic precepts. 577
The genealogy of the major theories of European integration demonstrates the
progressive emergence of dis-ease among its proponents, whose efforts to limn all aspects
of integration lead further into self-referentiality and conceptual lacunae. This is evinced
most clearly in the frequent suspicion they voice over their own inability to formulate
comprehensive and / or predictive explanations of the dynamical processes of integration
or to account for them in the positivistic terms set forth by their shared theoretical
presuppositions. 578
However, Nietzsche’s vitalist politics provides us with a unique perspective on the
ongoing frustration, or dissatisfaction, among those at the leading edge of European
integration theory. The problem, which is epistemological (in terms of how we interpret
and understand the EU) and ontological (in so far as we confer certain sorts and degrees of
agency on its institutions) and in large part a product of the inability of conventional
theorists to effectively contend with the limitations imposed by state-centric concepts that
have dominated traditional IP and mainstream European integration theory. These longprivileged notions, which include sovereignty and anarchy, rights and duties, and self317

determination, etc., are institutionally instantiated juridical concepts that through centuries
of use have become realities of contemporary political life, the quasi-metaphysical “truth”
of which is forgotten or ignored.
Many conventional theorists fail to recognize these notional truths as part of the
soil in which their interest in explaining and understanding the EU grows. As such they
take the interpretive elements of transcendental truth associated with them for granted.
The transcendental truth of these notions serves to naturalize and edify our collective
notion of political legitimacy and in part as a result of this has come to be believed in
dogmatic fashion by the ideological adherents of the state-centric worldview
(Weltanschauung), which aptly applies to most mainstream political scientists. This faith
that things are the way they are because there is a natural and as such inherently just basis
for their being as they are – the state of the world as it seems to be – compels some form
or degree of academic reiteration among them, and as it largely corresponds with political
reality – the nature of organized political life – these iterations serve to re-legitimate
reified discourses.
This faith in the natural basis for and justice of the fundamental precepts of the
international nation-state system (and supra-national communities of states such as the
EU) gives rise to acceptance of it. By extension, most conventional integration theorizing
unconsciously symptomatizes its author’s – and the field’s – decadence, as it advances
representations of the phenomenon that always-already correspond with an ideologically
privileged interpretation / explanation of it.579 Multiple, mutually validating simulacrums
arise that reveal their own inability and/or unwillingness to think outside the theoretical
(ideological) presuppositions that dominate the field. Among conventional theorists it also
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suggests their related inability to recognize the forces (volitional desire expressed in a will
to power) they reactively contend with and involuntarily embody, making them complicit
in the ongoing effort to (re-)naturalize hegemonic ascetic-consumerist ideals. This is
reflected in the frequent insufficiency of the empirical evidence invoked to ground their
theoretical contentions, which is anyway cited to buttress arguments that rationalize and
perpetuate deeper (quasi-metaphysical) confusions of cause and effect.
The philosophical equipollence of views—the thesius cum antithesi—produced by
competing debates within the mainstream discourse of European integration, would
prompt a thorough-going skeptic (or ‘good European’) to refrain from arguing for the
superiority (i.e.: greater explanatory veracity or truthfulness) of any one among them.
Such a stance is prerequisite to adopting and deploying the diagnostic method
(perspectival framework) bodied forth by Nietzsche’s vitalist politics. A ‘good European’
would rank the perspectives that have emerged through the evolution of European
integration theory, along with all alternatives – liberal or otherwise – according to their
affective power and its enablement of an active being-towards authentic Dasein, that is to
say, the salubriousness of the values the perspectives respectively symptomatize. They
would adopt a critical stance from which to adduce the maximum utility of each
perspective and selectively fuse the most efficacious features of them into an
instrumentally practical appropriation according to how social conditions and historical
circumstance may be exploited according to the affective power it contained / enabled.
Their aim in so doing would be to utilize the effectiveness of such an amalgamation of
perspectives as a tool for managing the masses and supplementing the forces of ascending
life that it fostered for the best.
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Like fun-house mirror images theories exaggerate certain features of the process
while minimizing others, reflecting distortions of understanding in their analyses of
European integration. In so far as they constitute a broader account-giving endeavor they
alter perceptions of unification. The perspective they provide inevitably accords to a
particular set of desires, and the dominant discourse—or will to truth—supplements the
affective reactive force expressed in its negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power.
‘Good Europeans’ would deem the whole range of mainstream scholarship theorizing
European integration an ideational expression of Europe’s decrepit instinctual
organization at the macro-level of the political, the compensatory action of which is the
amalgamation of Europe’s nation-states and peoples. Both the EU’s establishment and the
current moment in its development of internal consolidation and enlargement (deepening
and widening) represent a reactive institutional instantiation of this more fundamental
development in the politically-driven becoming-same of the species man.
This reaction (supervised by contemporary ascetic-consumerist priests of
ressentiment according to secularized slave-moral values) is not entirely negative or
unproductive, as it serves to stimulate myriad informal under- or unregulated forms of
integration some of which are likely to be uncontainable and actively transform the
mentalities of certain exceptional Europeans in ways the EU’s formally laicized juridical,
institutional and organizational value frameworks cannot hinder. It is in this changed
mentality – and the creative, form-giving conative disposition it generates – that such rare
individuals are becoming able to exploit abstract potentials of globality, providing them
the resources to effectively cast doubt upon customary confidence in and reliance upon the
traditional nation-state form of sovereign domestic authority, and other central tenets of
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the hegemonic international order. It is through such changed ways of thinking that the
reactive bases for (underlying metaphysical fictions of) the existing international order is
likely to be overcome.
When the dominant schools of integration theory are examined through
Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutic (the means by which his vitalist politics and
power ontology attain practical applicability), each of their respective theoretical postures
are understood by ‘good Europeans’ as coextending with some partisan segment of, or
sub-agenda within, the “standard” ultra-liberal-modern meta-narrative concerning the
democratic state form vis the possibility of institutional integration. 580 The
Deconstructivist and Post-modern This preponderating discourse (and all the various
iterations and complexifications of it echoed in European integration theories since the
1950s) has for six decades guided the incremental economic, political and social
integration of Europe’s institutions to decide and make sense of priorities, define the terms
of the integration debate, confer and enforce its legitimacy, and establish the ideological
framework around which the EU’s institutions have arisen, all the while habituating the
European herd to the continent’s integration. Within this ultra-liberal-modern metanarrative, hyper-decadent political discourse (which gives voice to a ‘cynical, enlightened
false-consciousness’), the spectrum of difference between unabashed support for
integration and strident opposition to it has been deliberately exaggerated to maintain the
simulated political agon crucial to the spectacle of the project’s democratic legitimacy. 581
Organized political opposition to integration is systematically discredited across
the continent by the EU itself. Some opponents to the EU, or advocates of enhanced
national sovereignty, are marginalized as nationalistic throwbacks of a forgotten era
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and/or outright xenophobic bigots. In fairness, some of them are anti-immigrant
xenophobes and racist bigots, and irrational fears about the integration of the continent
and the inclusion of peoples from outside their countries in an expanded European society
seem threatening. Examples of this abound and the cases such as the nationalist parties of
the UK (BNP), France’s National Front (FN), Holland’s Party for Freedom (PVV) and
Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) exemplify reaction on the far-right. However, more
mainstream opposition to the expansion of EU powers is evident in the plebiscitary
dramas of Denmark’s passage of Maastricht, Ireland’s ratification of Nice and Lisbon, and
the French and Dutch rejection of the constitution in 2005 referenda, as noted above.
The EU and sympathetic member-state political elites have so far managed to
rebound following each “defeat”, usually by re-holding the referendum until they achieve
the outcome they desire. Yet the forces opposing the quasi-federalist dream of a politically
unified Europe continually adjust and find sustenance in an ability to exploit popular
reaction to perceived threats emanating from as well as beyond the bureaucratic behemoth
in Brussels. These include fundamentalist Islam, the supposed resistance of some
immigrant communities to fully assimilate, the putative threat posed by non-European
immigrants to European traditions and culture, the demographic risk of declining birth
rates and anticipated dearth of workers posed to the future prosperity and security of the
continent, etc. All of these are however fairly transparent pretexts for galvanizing support
for strategies of reactive exclusions which rely upon and foster irrationality. Nevertheless
they resonate with an increasing number of the parochial European herd for whom the
benefits of the EU project seem too abstract and/or threatening.

322

At the level of the political micro-sphere, theories of European integration are
mimetic performances of their scholar advocates’ desires and ambitions. These desires
originate in and edify far-ranging political forces at the level of the macro-sphere and
strengthen their facility to interpolate become all modes of being (a becomingcomprehensive). In the specifically European context, this drive, expressed via abstract
theorizing, is essential to realizing the “involuntary” aim (as a macro-level volitional
urge), of the EU’s economic and now political and social integration of the continent. In
addition, from an impartial perspective it can be said that to some extent – the degree of
conscious complicity or willingness varying between individuals – those theorizing
European integration have contributed to the anti-natural leveling of various human types.
Their liberal ideals (like those subtending the EU) emphasize equality over difference so
as to homogenize diverse modes of life and becoming, insofar as their work reinforces the
logic of the project. The primary rationale for this is conflict avoidance (conflict being
conceived as wholly negative) for the mitigation of suffering (a desired benefit). However,
recent theorists have challenged the staid dichotomous interpretive framework contained
in the overarching ideological discourse that had largely limited debate to the statist
concepts within which the EU was conceived. This enables some transcendence of
questions that long animated conventional argument about the veracity of contending
accounts of the EU and debates over integration (e.g.: neo-functionalist versus realist, or
intergovernmentalist versus supranationalist).
Whether the project can transmute its ultra-liberal-modern original impulses and
become a genuine and perhaps original example of post-modern nomothetic legislation,
remains to be seen. By re-examining and re-conceiving key objectives and central identic
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issue of the project of unifying the European continent some present researchers and
future scholarly theorists may transform the epic political experiment in which their
contemporary peers (or more conventional predecessors, as the case may be) served as
ideological apologists.
The EU is by any measure an impressive collaboration to determine the future of
the continent and by extension, humankind. A compound power constellation, or
polymeric community, its increasing power and influence is felt everywhere today. It
functions as a specter in much of the world, its aura haunting the consciences of tyrants
and stirring oppressed peoples yearning for greater freedom. It is beginning to be
perceived as a paragon of rational governance to be emulated and is a desired destination
of the subjugated and displaced – in much the same way as the US has been for the past
two centuries. Recently it has challenged the US to uphold human rights throughout the
world and to match it in its social welfare provisions. As the meta-discourse of ultraliberal-modernity is universalized via the globalization complex, the EU represents itself
as a bastion of tolerance, cooperation and prosperity, as well as a counter-part to or
substitute ideal for America. Yet this describes the reception of its sophisticated simulacra
on its outside, its mystique. It is animated by entrenched forces of reaction attempting to
perfect and disseminate neo-liberal capitalist process and a democratic political order.
Whether it continues to be dominated by these anti-natural ideals and their arbiters or can
be transformed from within to serve the development of authentic cultural forms and the
aspirations of more cheerful and courageous individuals in Europe and throughout the
world depends on good Europeans to revalue the decadent values on which it is based.
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Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and general theory of decadence grew out of a
deliberation over how we ought to live together. It should be relevant to anyone earnestly
interested in adding to their perspective on the political, the project of political integration
and the EU. Against those who would assert that it lacks the apodicity provided by an
empirical foundation, I maintain that there is no more “objective” a reason to take the
tenets of ultra-liberal-modernity as more credible or an apodictically truer depiction of
reality than Nietzsche’s vitalist notion of the political. And if one accepts Nietzsche’s
critique of liberal-modernity and its moralization of life / construction of reality (as much
of continental and American thought implicitly does), then a refusal to seriously consider
the implications of his vitalist politics and power ontology would be, at the very least,
anti-intellectual. Nietzsche’s perspectivalism would have inclined him to support the
EU—despite its ineliminable decadence—in terms of its potential to unify Europe,
whatever flaws or however reactive and all-too-human the EU may currently be. The EU
too can be overcome but serve in the meantime as a stepping-stone to the post- or
transhuman future.
To return to the subject of how good Europeans might subvert and hijack the
project to steer it toward their noble aims, Elbe remarks that the reactive will-to-truth
bodied forth by the EU and codified in its Acquis Communitaire, according to its
founders’ and contemporary arbiters’ designs, “would have to be firmly resisted” by ‘good
Europeans’, as:
…the functionalist wager on European integration has culminated in a European
Union that can no longer be seen as the embodiment of ‘good Europeanism’ in the
way Nietzsche understood it. 582
However, I think it implausible to assert (and do not believe) that “the functionalist wager
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on European integration” ever embodied Nietzsche’s notion of ‘good Europeanism’.
Rather, it employed similarly noble sounding rhetoric, which by the mid-1940s had
become a part of the popular consciousness of a trans-national educated class of bourgeois
Europeans (rightly) horrified by the destruction of the continent wrought by two major
wars in little more than three decades.
Such rhetoric and the “high-minded” ideals it was thereby meant to suggest,
contrary to Nietzsche’s understanding, perfectly fit an ultra-liberal-modern agenda of
promulgating a slavish project predicated on perfecting and universalizing a set of norms
originating in a combination of post-Enlightenment, liberal Anglo–American and
continental political traditions. These standards validate themselves through an ersatz
discourse of inclusivity that functions to gradually homogenize and ultimately annihilate
genuine difference. It has entailed creating a hegemonic “modern”, pseudo-cosmopolitan
identity conducive to neo-liberal capitalism and representative democracy as practiced in
the West (not, obviously the Soviet Union) before the war.
But the EU, from its inception onward, has been something Nietzsche’s ‘good
Europeans’ would instrumentally support as a vehicle for reaching their long-term
objective of overcoming it. ‘Good Europeans’ would strive to perfect and refine the
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and the ongoing project of European integration
which ideologically instantiates it, knowing that some future inheritors of their legacy
would strive just as passionately to transfigure (re: creatively destroy) it in order to realize
their own, even nobler idea of Europe. Each such development, the inventive annihilation
of a declining order and establishment of a new, more vital political arrangement,
exemplifies successive generations’ desire to realize their own self-perfection and thereby
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augment the perfection of the species. No such achievement (or failure, as it inevitably
shall be) ever completely embodies the highest ideals or creative capacity of superlative
individuals, but this does not diminish the brilliance of their exploits. They would not
naively expect the consummately cynical ascetic-consumerist priests of resentment typical
of our hyper-decadent era to conceive a project to their sincere liking.
Only recently has the EU come to resemble anything Nietzsche might have
considered worthy of being reservedly hopeful about and then only for the direction its
latest development suggests as a ‘molar aggregate’ (a superfluity of singular multiplicities:
its citizens, local communities, regions, member-states, and all their varied activities,
organizations and departments) striving to contain ‘virtual and diverse relations of alterity’
whose ‘machinic interfaces are engendering disparity’ that inevitably burst the parameters
of its authority and subvert its mechanisms of control. 583 In its negotiated assertion of
prerogative and precedence over above the member-states and their sovereign national
right to exercise control over its organs, it is unwittingly cultivating a transformation of
conscience and of the prevailing ethos among its multiple units, in addition to the sorts of
resistances it is producing or may yet enable through the abstract potentials of globality.
Understood as a formatively critical instantiation of broader globalizing forces, EU
expansion is an integral feature in the process of extending the geo-political imperatives of
molar globalization through the deeper integration of territories and social unity of
peoples – furthering unto perfection the agenda / logic of its liberal presuppositions. More
conventionally, that the EU is frequently and somewhat accurately derided as “fortress
Europe” to connote its original and ongoing efforts to protect its internal markets from
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outside competition (as for example through the Common Agricultural Policy, among
other subsidies and import tariffs) does not conflict with but rather ramifies this thesis.
The highly regulated inauthentic agonism fostered by the world-wide capitalist
market 584, as a fascist concretion, functions to automatically capture and interpolate any
deviation from or defiance of its values and re-stratify every becoming-other according to
its constitutive grid, thereby immunizing its ideological presuppositions from challenge.
However, with the exponentially increased potentials for self-creation generated by
globality the effectiveness of its operation is eroded, giving rise to escapes and
corresponding possibilities that the best might exploit for their own (and humankind’s)
perfection and going down. It may happen that their occasional successes will create new
socio-political power-constellations that force the capitalist system to adapt itself to their
creative acts, which gradually transform it if only by compelling it to interpolate a
broadened spectrum of difference. 585
This futural being-towards a transhuman condition—an ongoing process of
becoming who it is they are—mediates between what they have been, what they can
potentially be and what it is they envisage. The disposition it entails is elemental to good
Europeanism. Its proponents simultaneously affirm their native volition (with varying
degrees of authenticity correlating to their fearlessness) and attempt to direct some quanta
of the force they discharge (with varying degrees of efficacy depending on their strength)
in accordance with—and to a lesser extent, to realize—their passion. Only a few
extraordinary exceptions or lucky strikes will ever seriously challenge the status quo. The
passion of most healthy exemplars—arising within the predetermined terms of ultra-
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liberal-modernity’s broad ideological matrix—is likely to wane as they succumb to
interpolation by reactive forces.
Plucky individuals of great health may exploit the economic reality these ‘flies of
the marketplace’ have created to profit monetarily in order to pursue higher purposes,
feigning conformity to the prevailing ascetic ideals, and admiration of its nummamorous
personifications. 586 Opportunities to exploit the weaknesses of the meta-discourse of ultraliberal-modernity increase when those obsessed with earning and hoarding money through
pecuniary mechanisms take the universality of their own nihilistic desires for granted.
Those who succeed in infiltrating dominant institutions are more likely to subvert them.
When the economic system falters, as in the economic bubbles of the past decade and the
ongoing global financial crisis they produced—dissenters are empowered to exert
influence for change. 587
Whether these courageous comedians of the ascetic ideals achieve conventional
success or monetary wealth—the “financial independence” that comprises the highest
ideal of freedom among contemporary slaves—or not, their radical experiments with and
kynical mockery of the injurious norms, mores and conventions that dominate the
contemporary life of their communities toward their own perfection are likely to stimulate
others. As their eros (passion) and askesis (discipline) spurs others to undertake acts of
self-creation, they legislate nomothetically. In affirming “the grand economy of life as it
is, without subtraction or addition”, these “‘artists of the future’” may overcome the antinatural moral order that under the false agon of the conventional globalization complex
which obtunds the instinct for strength. 588 As Conway observes,
Hence the central paradox of Nietzsche’s perfectionism: the enhancement of
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humanity and the enrichment of ethical life are dependent upon the exploits of
“immoral” exemplars who hold no conscious or intentional stake in the lives of
those whom they succor and renew. In fact, he insists, these exotic specimens must
be allowed (and indeed encouraged) to free themselves from the chains of
conventional morality if they are to contribute to the permanent enhancement of
humankind. 589
The EU, as a complex set of institutional arrangements and rules (a macro-political molar
aggregate) that produce a tangible way of life with corporeal effects, may be usefully
manipulated to comprise the broad cultural product of an aesthetic pursuit by a (relatively)
small number, including activists, artists, philosophers, social-science theorists, other
norm-entrepreneurs and perhaps even the odd statesmen, whose own self-perfection was
and / or is dependent upon its realization.
As the EU’s evolving social practices form and simultaneously symptomatize an
emerging mode of life (however dissipative and exhausted), a few exceptions may realize
new methods of human perfectibility through their play with and violations of the EU’s
conceptual and customary boundaries and “remind some others of the powers and
perfections resident within themselves” by so doing. (Nietzsche anticipated this, as the
citation from HH: II–2, 292 above demonstrates.) 590
“The philosopher,” as Conway elaborates, referring to Nietzsche’s highly qualified
sense of the term, “involuntarily generates an excess of expendable affect … transgressing
any conventional boundary between public and private domains.” But (the struggle
involved in) self-overcoming for moral perfection “remains essentially ‘private,’ its
sumptuary residue enters the public sphere as an invitation and temptation to others”, that
“may eventually contribute to the founding of the positive law of a community, but only
in the event that the recipients of this invitation endorse it as such.” 591 There is a very real
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sense in which this is what social-science theorists do within the conceptual confines of
their academic disciplines. Theorists of European integration actively contribute to the
creation and development of the EU as they interrogate and give articulation to the
process of European unification. As ideologically biased soothsayers, “scribbling slaves of
the democratic spirit and its modern ideas”, they are at once historical and scientific
fictionalists whose interpretations of events simultaneously affect our comprehension of
the past, our emplacement in the present (ubiety) and are formative of reality to come.592
They are militant ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment
For example, Moravcsik’s highly influential work ‘The Choice for Europe’ may
have provided compelling evidence to take seriously his use of the liberal
intergovernmentalist approach “to explain the ‘grand bargains’ that have punctuated the
EU’s evolution”. 593 Yet despite utilizing a non-comparativist method of analysis,
Moravcsik arguably entrenched long-operative understandings of Europe’s integration
process, in an attempt to rely “on the Community’s past to predict the Union’s future”.
Such an objective begs many questions about the priorities of the theorist, such as
why an “objective” analysis wouldn’t first attempt to unpack the agreement concerning
the community’s past or interrogate the ideological assumptions subtending it.594
Nietzsche’s perspectivalist stance would suggest that such a task would require an
unimaginably complex formula. Any genuinely comprehensive attempt would quickly
become too freighted with variables and known unknowns to be considered practically
complete. It is no apocalyptic insight that social science, like its “hard science” cousin,
always deals in vagueness and truthlikeness. For a “thorough” understanding of the
political what are needed are unconventional artist–philosophers capable of genealogically
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examining the subject, such as the good Europeans Nietzsche hailed. Given their
indoctrination into the cult of scientism, mainstream theorists of European integration are
quite unlikely to become good Europeans in the Nietzschean sense.
Given the ideological prejudices that prevail within the academic discipline of
political science, international relations and European studies (and which correspond with
and actualize the assumptions of ultra-liberal modernity) and the normal form of academic
incest characteristic of the average-everyday activities of those fields, progress is likely to
be very slow. Against the strong resistance of the prevailing statist, liberal ideology and
corresponding mindset of conventional practitioners, it is probable that salubrious
theoretical innovations capable of generating significantly transformative concepts and
practices will result in the not-so-distant future. The Nietzsche-indebted “post-modern”
approaches explicated above suggest as much. Such a development is arguably more
likely than it was twenty years ago.
Due to their propensity to adhere to professional convention and to fall back into
the inauthenticity of easy dogmatism, Nietzsche did not think scholars imbricated in an
academic culture of conformity would be likely to transform the world in salubrious
ways. 595 He thought they were particularly incapable of overcoming the decadence within
themselves, a necessary precondition to revaluing the reigning ascetic-consumerist ideals
of our day. As Conway notes (citing GM: III – 23):
‘Men of science’ are not the free spirits [Nietzsche] seeks, for their signature faith
in truth bears witness to their underlying belief that truth alone can redeem the
human condition. This belief in turn betrays the conviction that the human
condition stands in need of redemption, a conviction symptomatic of decadence.
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…A genuine alternative to the ascetic ideal must neither promise nor anticipate the
redemption of the human condition. 596
The desire to realize abstract potentials of globality in order to augment the fullest
flourishing of humankind’s healthiest specimens is not making such a redemptive promise
but arises as a consequence of the effort to cultivate the proper conative disposition
necessary for the ultimate attainment of a higher (re: more natural) condition of culture for
the authentic—non-linear—becoming of every individual.
However, I maintain that the discourse analysis and constructivist critiques of
integration theory and European unification suggest that their authors might become good
Europeans, that is kynical ironists. They are subverting the mainstream hegemony of the
rational institutionalism and may well emerge as schismatic dissenters from the doctrines
of ultra-liberal-modernity in time. Whether the academics currently working at the edge of
the field do or not, their exciting insights point the way toward future challenges to the
relative ideological uniformity that has characterized much of the mainstream discipline.
A nervy theorist of European integration—or handful of them—may someday soon
succeed in ablating certain conceptual conceits that presently dominate its conventional
discourses. 597
Authentic becoming, as a process of self-emancipation from “inhibitory
metabeliefs” is a practical aspiration actively pursued by the strongest, as opposed to a
salvific program of “liberation” in which the all-too-many may participate, for it is
dependent upon the necessary sort of striving enabled by the correct—if rare—instinctual
organization of drives and impulses enjoyed by the healthiest individuals. 598 It is the
comprehensive decadence of the weak majority inclines their “leaders” to propose
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redemptive ideals, prompts the herd to have faith in such anti-natural promises and
simultaneously prevents all of them from ever being so “redeemed,” as it were.
With regard to the question of “whether Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘good European’
simply take[s] us back to a metaphysics of immanence”, albeit one opposed to the postEnlightenment liberal-modern metaphysical realism predicating the statist logic of
Europe’s integration, Elbe observes that:
Although Nietzsche does not offer his readers a new ‘meaning’ of the European
idea along traditional lines, he does provide them with a vision of the ‘good
European’ that generates its meaning by experimentally putting the will to truth
into question. 599
That will to truth is realized via an ideologically enforced univocality of reason that
prioritizes economistic concerns represented as emancipatory and programmatically
fixated on the aim of ever-increasing material prosperity (re: consumption). Nietzsche’s
idea enables us to deconstruct the current project of European unification and envisage
alternative, genuinely life-affirming priorities. According to the conative disposition or
anticipatory resoluteness of good Europeans those alternatives naturally concern
enhancing the agonistic project of self-overcoming and self-perfection; the becomingauthentic through yes-saying to life with a good conscience (which entails Dionysian
acceptance of suffering and the cruelty inherent to valuing).
At the macro-political level this endeavor, undertaken by the strong, seeks to
create values and institutional mechanisms (norms and practices) that bestow meaning
upon existence by enhancing our limited autonomy while binding us to a community. By
extension, our sense of purpose is enhanced as such sociogenically coherent political
arrangements enable greater authenticity. A profusion of types results from broadened
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opportunities for becoming. This in turn maximizes the elevation of the best—those
capable of truly prospering.
This political schema differs radically from the false-emancipation promised by
ultra-liberal-modern discourses of freedom (the free-willing, independent, self-ruling
subject) and egalitarianism (predicated on the notion of universal equality), which tempt
the all-too-many to passively succumb to decadence and serve as lures to selfzombification. 600 Nietzsche doesn’t desire the complete elimination of avenues for
resignation unto self-destruction of the botched and the failures, just the creation of
additional socio-political means by which the healthy may thrive.
However, in our superficially prosperous yet increasingly abject, hyper-decadent
age, it is the multi-party, putatively representative, constitutional democracies ensconced
in the neoliberal, “free-market” capitalist order (i.e.: Empire) that collectively constitutes
the hegemonic globalization-complex, and the EU as a major instantiation and arbiter of
its prerogatives. It is this supremely cynical regime which kynical good Europeans—as
healthy individuals—seek to transmute. In doing so they may attain their highest potential
while re-naturalizing the political by making it authentically agonistic. 601 Inevitably
unpopular among the ironically impaired and the all-too-many apologists for the status
quo, they are unlikely to attain high office. Yet this aim—and their buffoonery—
corresponds with their own and their community’s becoming–authentic, and by extension,
their and its moral and political perfection. 602
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BOOK THREE
A Nietzschean Perspective on Globalization and Globality
Introduction: The utility of Nietzsche’s vitalist critique to an analysis of
globalization
Nietzsche’s critique of liberal-modernity provides a framework for deconstructing
the axiomatic narratives of our era. Applying it thusly reveals the overt and subtle ways
in which the technology, trade and communication driven action of contemporary
globalization systematically universalizes the nihilistic values of ultra-liberal-modernity,
the hegemonic meta-discourse of our age. “Globalization” is a general—even vague—
term for a broad array of affective forces and interrelated power assemblages that defy
parsimonious explanation. Hence there is much—and from a Nietzschean perspective
often redundant—debate about what precisely it is. Throughout this work I specify and
analyze the ideological basis for its governing precepts. The phenomenon of globalization
refers to a polycentric power constellation comprised of diverse institutions, processes
and forces that emerged from and extend Western practices. In its operations it appeals to
Western rationalism for validation, and is presencing the West’s decadence around the
world. 603 I therefore refer not to globalization, but to ‘the globalization complex’, so as to
avoid essentializing one dimension of it or reifying the phenomenon.
In this book I examine its specific manifestations and affects on life, then
explicate globality—the changed consciousness or mentality to which globalization has
given rise—and its transformative potential. What the various, though similarly reactive,
336

forces of globalization fundamentally have in common is a shared will-to-power
originating in a slave-moral axiomatic. It has advanced a certain mode of capital process
(the neo-liberal variety favored by the ‘Washington Consensus’), privileging free-market
democracy, and transmits Western attitudes and modes of being. The globalization
complex initially accrued disproportionate material wealth and benefits to the West—
affluent developed nations of the industrialized and post-industrialized north—whence it
originated. However, its effects now threaten the economic “prosperity” of the West itself
through deindustrialization and structurally generated insecurity in the financial and
banking sectors of the global market.
In transmitting decadent (secularized Christian–Platonic) Western values, often
by coercive means, the globalization complex generates various political effects across
multiple dimensions of socio-political life. 604 Its institutions, forces and processes value
in ways that invariably disrupt the practices and subvert the moral standards of
autochthonous cultures in non-Western regions of the world. As indigenous knowledges
are disturbed the forms of life they sustain are irrecuperably altered and made susceptible
to annihilation. 605 However, its valuations also inhibit the creative becoming of
individuals already living in its primary loci (the West), while representing their
operation as providing the most effective means for the attainment and maximization of
individual freedom. 606 Its sublimated violences preclude the possibility of effectively
challenging the ultra-liberal-modern axiomatique subtending it. 607 This puts certain of its
main practices at odds with the axiomatique from which they derive validation, a
contradiction always-already overcome by (primarily material) enticements to nihilistic
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resignation—a passive acquiescence that over time develops into craven complacency
and stupefying contentment with the status-quo. 608
The globalization complex ideologically interpolates any resistance to its
prerogatives in fulfilling its purpose: the lucripetous quest for lucre. However, through its
worldwide propagation of the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity, uneven
intensification of its leveling ethos and halting transformation (exclusionary othering) of
traditional forms of life, the institutions, processes and forces of globalization
continuously give rise to unanticipated abstract potentials of globality. These are
possibilities for the creative destruction of stultifying and politically disempowering
normalization which is achieved through social indoctrination (public education,
churches, the military, etc.) via narratives of equality and opportunity (which cover-up
the cronyism and privilege that keeps the worst mob factions in charge of government),
simulated enfranchisement and spectacles of ersatz-freedom through consumption that
are circulated by the globalization complex.
A principle aim of Nietzsche’s philosophical project was that of illuminating the
way in which values facilitate or impede life’s flourishing. His chief political concern
was that of the fundamental question of “what ought humankind to become?”609
Responding to the diminution of culture and life in Wilhelmine Germany—and Europe
more generally—he considered how authentically agonistic forms of socio-political
organization may invigorate life for the attainment of an ennobling culture. 610 Toward
this end he sought to inspire his readers to become good Europeans. As such they would
be better able to contend with the degeneration of life brought about by the anti-natural
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values of our hyper-decadent age. This task required a complete revaluation of the
liberal-modern values that were debilitating Europe. 611
The subversive capacities emergent in globality—a result of socio-political
enhancements to the native volition or powers of loftier types—prompts imaginative
forms of dissention from conventionality. Globality’s unlimited potentiality invariably
complements the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness of humankind’s
healthiest exemplars, providing a means for their authentic self-expression, re: the
discharge of their vital force. It spurs inventive resistances realized in yes-saying kynical
acts of radical self-creation through which the values rationalizing conventional
globalization may be productively destabilized. Globality supplies a way for would-be
comedians of the ruling ascetic-consumerist ideals of our age to become who it is they
are.
Consistent with Nietzsche’s vitalist critique is his radical philosophical
assessment of traditional Western notions of subjectivity and agency, particularly as these
notions are informed by conventional assumptions about mechanistic causality. Nietzsche
savages the metaphysical fictions that had been conceived to rationalize causality and
reify agents as such. 612 Nietzsche maintains the cause of an action is added after its
occurrence, “a self-deception of vanity after the event”, 613 and settles instead on the
naturalistic view that “Individual human ‘agents’ are simply the embodied media through
which the will to power amorally propagates itself.” 614 What factual evidence could be
cited as motivate for or sustain such a critique? As with all the great Western
philosophers who posited an ultimate referent or logos before him, be it Plato’s forms,
Leibniz’s monads or incomparable insight, Kant’s transcendental ego, Hegel’s world
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spirit, etc., Nietzsche can provide no empirical proof of his thesis. Conway acknowledges
that,
His diagnosis of modernity may strike us as scintillating, provocative, even
persuasive at times, but we have no epistemic warrant to following him in
pronouncing it true. 615
It was his persuasive and arguably accurate assessment of his and Europe’s historical
situation which provides his wary judgment and corresponding technique of evaluation
with credibility.
Nietzsche’s identification of the great potential and distinctive brand of turmoil
typical of his age are themselves symptoms of his own besetting decadence, as Conway
also observes. However, they provide a useful framework for thinking about political life
that ultimately affirms largely desirable objectives for humankind, whatever the selfimplicating paradoxes its flawed author indeliberately bodied forth by them. This is
particularly salient in the present age of globalization, both for evaluating and
transforming the affective force of the decadent Western (European) values the
globalization complex disseminates universally.
Nietzsche’s theory attains a perspectivally credible “objectivity” inside the critical
philosophical framework in which it arose, and which explains why the aforementioned
metaphysical fictions are less efficacious for comprehending the world than is his vitalist
understanding (symptomatology) of the affects. Nietzsche was concerned with
illuminating how “a moral judgment is illusory insofar as it erroneously identifies
individual ‘subjects’ as the source or cause of the agency they involuntarily
propagate.” 616 By extension he sought to establish the irreversibility of the decadence
particular to European life in his lifetime, the era of late-modernity, a fact attributable to
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the affective power of the nihilistic forces dominant then and which he predicted would
intensify until they culminated in a worldwide calamity in the next (twentieth) century.
This aim had the practical utility of conveying the urgency of a comprehensive
revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe) and spurring those capable of
implementing it into action. Nietzsche believed his particular nuanced variety of vitalism
was capable of illuminating these phenomena and providing as objective a basis as could
be conceived for a fundamental revaluation of our epoch’s dominant, anti-natural values.
According to his vitalism—and corresponding politics—the virtues of an era indicate its
ascending or declining life and the condition of its health:
In its measure of strength every age also possesses a measure for what virtues are
permitted and forbidden to it. Either it has the virtues of ascending life: then it
will resist from the profoundest depths the virtues of declining life. Or the age
itself represents declining life: then it also requires the virtues of decline, then it
hates everything that justifies itself solely out of abundance, out of the
overflowing riches of strength. 617
By these criteria he determines the health of modernity, a brief overview of his critique of
which is necessary to establish primary points of his conception of the political and its
applicability to EU expansion in the context of globalization.
The core of this philosophical framework lies in his genealogical critique of
morality, originating in a psychological theory of the unconscious instincts and drives,
their correspondence to human strengths and weaknesses, and role in generating the
ressentiment and bad-conscience which largely characterize the politics of Western
civilization. The highly original effort he provided in his mature work toward a
genealogy of morality captures the “essence” of his view of moral systems: that they are
created, evolve, get overthrown and indicate the relative health of the society that
spawned them. If we accept his total rejection of all “universal values” and “transcendent
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truths,” ancient idols he demonstrates the hollowness of by striking with a hammer of
skeptical criticism, then the salience of genealogy to any serious inquiry into values is
clear. A comprehension of how and for what reasons certain values evolved, including
the interests they serve, is crucial to adducing their significance for life.
The revaluation he desired (which would reinstate healthy quasi-pagan virtues
usurped in the West by decadent Judeo-Christian morality and Platonist metaphysics) and
explication of the Judeo-Christian inversion of good and bad, from which Europe’s
present anti-natural state arose, produced the famous distinction of master and slave
moralities that later evolved into a healthy / decadent dichotomy. Nietzsche advocated
reversing the Christian–Platonic order (which in secularized form served as the
ideological basis of globalization) to restore the natural hierarchy between individuals
and the hierarchy of moralities it had eliminated. He grasped the opposition this objective
or counter-ideal would encounter due to the entrenched decadence and slave morality of
modern Western society. Furthermore he recognized the violence of thought as action,
against the “conscience-vivisection” that contributed to the decrepitude of our age,
achieving it would require. 618
In ‘On the thousand and one goals’, Zarathustra asserts the link between
esteeming the world, an indispensable human action that imbues existence with meaning,
and the simultaneous creation of values. Furthermore he elaborates on the violence
invariably entailed by changes of values:
Only man placed values in things to preserve himself – he alone created meaning
for things, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself ‘man,’ which means: the
esteemer. To esteem is to create: hear this you creators! …Through esteeming
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alone is there value. Change of values – that is a change of creators. Whoever
must be a creator always annihilates. 619
Zarathustra would overturn the prevailing moral order to emancipate individuals from
their subjugation to the morality of the weak, confer upon the ego its rightful good
conscience and put it to productive use:
The delight in the herd is more ancient than the delight in the ego; and as long as
the good conscience is identified with the herd, only the bad-conscience says: I. 620
Such facultative individuals would “go under” to create virtues in which “the fire of love
and the fire of wrath” would glow, thereby setting a goal for humanity to provide it
purpose. From Nietzsche’s meta-ethical theory of morality his critique of modernity
emerges. According to Nietzsche the last spiritually healthy, culturally generative epoch
in Europe was the Renaissance, exemplified by the proliferation of arts he takes as
symptomatic of the invigorated human spirit characteristic of the period. Nietzsche
contrasts this with the reactive, anti-natural forces that produced Luther and the
Reformation and conditioned European culture for the Enlightenment. 621
Nietzsche identified modernity as an epoch characterized by increasing decadence
and decline; hence everyone born into the era was, to some varying degree, certain to
exhibit symptoms of these unhealthy defining characteristics. No one could completely
escape modernity’s degenerative effects, and Nietzsche recognized his own
contamination by them, a dynamic Conway documents and interrogates in his work
Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game. Liberal-modernity is in large part a product of the slave
moral revolution in values against masterly instincts. Nietzsche famously explicated slave
morality’s role in naturalizing ressentiment (as the “spirit of revenge”) and the bad-
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conscience (through guilt), its cultivation of herd instincts, subjugation of humanity and
exclusion of the strongest individuals in society from governing institutions. 622
On the development of herd instincts in men and the simultaneous growth and
role within communities of an essential morality for the maintenance of order and
continued prosperity, Nietzsche observed:
By morality the individual is taught to become a function of the herd, and to
ascribe to himself value only as a function. As the conditions for the maintenance
of one community have been very different from those of another community,
there have been very different moralities; and in respect to the future essential
transformations of herds and communities, states and societies, one can prophesy
that there will still be very divergent moralities. Morality is the herd-instinct in the
individual. 623
The herd instinct is not necessarily slavish in its character, however, but lends itself to the
emergence of such a morality when the mediocre majority adopts anti-natural ascetic
ideals and corresponding values and succeeds in imposing them on its betters.
Every morality describes a set of (disciplinary) values particular to a people (and
integral with its culture) and delimits social relations among its members accordingly:
Wherever we meet with a morality we find a valuation and order of rank of the
human impulses and activities. These valuations and orders of rank are always the
expression of the needs of a community or herd: that which is in the first place to
its advantage - and in the second place and third place - is also the authoritative
standard for the worth of every individual. 624
Autochthonous moralities, the ethos and nomos native to a social organism, (as opposed
to those imposed from outside) symptomatize a mode of life felicitous to the greatest
becoming of each within the natural rank order of types (Rangordnung) a moral system
generates. That culturally specific rank order of types enforces and thereby legitimates
the moral order necessary for a coherent social entity.
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Moral systems develop out of the instinctual arrangement of impulses and drives
at the macro-level of the community. By instantiating a rank order of values a morality
gives expression to the shared native volition that, so affirmed, unites individuals in
community. It also ensures that future members of the community feel an inborn duty to
preserve the morality that serves as its basis.
The moral systems of indigenous peoples everywhere outside the AngloEuropean “West” are threatened by the narratives propagated by the meta-discourse of
ultra-liberal-modernity via the institutions, forces and processes of the globalization
complex, which coerces the adoption of its principles. That reactive powerconstellation—predicated on anti-natural and quasi-imperialistic, decadent Western
values of secularized Christian-Platonic morality—make its tenets axiomatic by
interpolating the norms and subverting the mores of autochthonous cultures. 625
From this vitalist perspective the willful adherence of a community’s members to
its/their prevailing moral strictures serves to indicate the health of the society more
generally. At the micropolitical or individual level, an autochthonous morality determines
the worth of a person according to how effectively he can conform to its behavioral
strictures and carry out its regulations (here Nietzsche anticipates what Foucault would
label disciplinary regimes). “[D]epending on the agents in question, all ascetic techniques
are potentially both coercive and empowering.” 626 In a naturally ordered polis an agent’s
performative enactment of his community’s morality code determines his success within
it and, to a certain extent, the likelihood of his attaining his own moral perfection.
Collectively, a culturally cohesive populace strives for political perfection through its
performative enforcement of its morality’s instinctual organization of social drives and
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impulses. These are expressed via (exclusionary) ascetic ideals that valorize the
community’s political preferences. 627
These conclusions were enunciated throughout Nietzsche’s condemnation of
liberal Enlightenment values that emphasized equality and rights. He took the disposition
underlying such values for the secular rationalization of a creeping slave morality
designed to ingratiate the ressentiment of the many, and beyond this to recognize the
futility of the “redemptive measures designed to cure the ills of modernity” he had
previously prescribed. Conway states that in his post-Zarathustran writings Nietzsche
“…acknowledges that the institutions of modern Europe are simply too corrupt to serve
in the macropolitical capacity he had mistakenly reserved for them [in his earlier works]
…that, independent of the macropolitical resources at his disposal, he is in no position to
orchestrate the redemption of modernity.” 628
Nietzsche did not distinguish between varieties of liberalism, which strikes some
contemporary political scientists as problematically unnuanced. However, it should be
understood that he generalized about liberalism not to elide the existence of differences
between various factions of liberals in his own era (the range and diversity of which has
only increased in the century following his death), but to speak of those broad traits he
identified as characteristic of all varieties of liberalism and its particular, unifying ethos.
Nietzsche believed modernity’s dissipative affects would compel the most decadent (or
radical) socialistic consequences of the liberal ideology and diminish future European life
thereby.
Nietzsche anticipated the further degeneration of socio-political life in the West,
which he believed would have to completely exhaust itself before a new regenerative
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order might be founded. Albrow acknowledges that, “He recognized the crisis of the
modern and foretold what has become the postmodern.” 629 His thought, a diagnosis of the
destructive course the nihilism of his age had set mankind upon, bode ominous portent in
the prognosis Nietzsche described for Europe in the centuries to come. But it also hinted
at the ongoing struggle that could evolve more of the strong, ‘good Europeans’ he
envisaged. Their efforts at self-overcoming would remain at the micropolitical, or
individual level. Conway states:
In a strong age overflowing with vital energy, externalized in the institutions and
festivals of a healthy people, lawgivers would have neither the need nor the
inclination to restrict their legislations to the political microsphere. But in a
decadent age unable to sustain the vitality of a people’s signature institutions,
lawgivers have no choice but to legislate from within the political microsphere. 630
Struggling to legislate to the greatest extent possible the inner, instinctual ordering of
their impulses and drives through regimens of self-overcoming (willfully self-prescribed
askesis), their experiments and prankish acts may serve to augment the overcoming of the
decadence of their age even as they only strive to perfect themselves. “In some
extraordinary cases ascetic disciplines will have a fortifying, fructifying effect on agents,
inadvertently endowing them with unanticipated freedoms and affording them greater
political latitude.” 631 These strong exceptions abide by the instinctual ordering of the
drives and impulses comprising their native volitions (and expand the pathos of distance
within themselves and between themselves and others) to preserve and enliven what is
noble in themselves and their community as well as their progeny (literal or otherwise).
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Part One: Globalization and Its Unanticipated Production of Globality
Globalization is a widely, and some would argue loosely, applied term. The
significance and historical distinctiveness of the set of inter-related economic, social and
political developments comprising the phenomenon to which the word is applied have
been much-debated. It remains contested and difficult to succinctly define, for there is
little agreement about the precise character of the norms, practices and trends it describes
or—if they even exist—the extent of their influence. Definitional disagreement is
particularly evident between disciplines concerned with the phenomenon, especially the
fields of economics, political science and sociology. So while most political scientists,
economists, sociologist, government officials, business leaders, investors and technophiles
acknowledge that it is occurring there are diverging conceptions of what it is and
explanations for what drives it. What globalization means, how it should be defined and
how accurately the term, so defined, can be applied in a particular context are questions of
interest across academic disciplines. What they broadly share, despite their diversity, is a
set of assumptions that point to the operation of certain hegemonic discourses and powerknowledge regimes informed by the ultra-liberal-modern metanarrative of our hyperdecadent epoch.
As defining globalization is such a complex and controversial task, I combine
multiple perspectives here to describe the phenomena from a Nietzschean stance, while
striving to avoid reductionist, economistic explanations. I think the dangers of such
generalizing are likely to be less problematic than those of more conventional attempts to
precisely define the “truth” of this exceptionally complex phenomenon which refers to our
continually changing, increasingly dynamic and inter-connected world. Van Ham asserts
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that “there is an analytical parallel to be drawn between the processes of globalization and
European integration, each following the fundamental, unwritten but clearly understood
laws of late capitalism.” 632 He further argues that Europeanization can in part be
understood as a response to globalization, “that the process of European integration is to
be understood as globalization on a regional scale, as well as a defensive response to the
world-wide trend of growing economic interdependence”. 633 I argue here that the latter
(European integration) augments the forces, processes and institutional development of
the former (“world-wide” globalization), bearing in mind that “[t]urning globalism into
the deus ex machina for European integration would be too shallow and naïve an
analysis”. 634
The correspondence between varying interpretations, explanations, and definitions
of globalization broadly lies in their common recognition of a cognitive transformation
among individuals within those societies where the related phenomena are occurring. The
history of Western economic expansion and commensurately increasing global trade is
often, and correctly, taken as a starting point for analyzing the phenomena. Haider Khan,
writing from a critical political-economist’s standpoint, considers the dynamic processes
encompassing globalization and the variety of forms they take in disparate national
contexts to be generating new instabilities within developing—and by extension—
developed—economies. In a fairly lengthy remark worth citing in full, Khan recognizes
the problematic nature of defining the phenomenon in a way that adequately situates it in
its proper historical context, asserting that:
It is because of such complexities that the term ‘globalization’, which is so much
in vogue today, has to be used with caution. When viewed historically, it appears
that globalization is a contradictory process of international economic integration
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that was severely interrupted by the First World War, the interwar depression, and
the Second World War. The emergence of the Bretton Woods framework can be
seen as a way to integrate the world with respect to trade while controlling with
flow of private capital. The demise of Breton Woods has set in motion forces of
capital account liberalization that are often the most visible aspects of
‘globalization’. However, even this process is fraught with new instabilities […] as
evidenced by the Mexican and – more recently and even more dramatically – by
the Asian financial crisis. 635
Capital account liberalization, which typifies the economic dimension of globalization,
has been a mixed-blessing for developing economies and has for the past twenty years at
least, challenged the ability of the major international economic institutions to contend
with its effects. 636
Khan refers to two major financial crises of the 1990s that resulted from growing
instabilities generated by increased capital flows. Similar predicaments arising from
certain contradictions and inherent vulnerabilities exacerbated by processes of
liberalization (in the form of debt securitization and other financial instruments) now
threaten to undo some of the practices driving economic globalization itself. The risk of
economic turmoil resulting from liberalized practices in international finance led to the
ongoing US sub-prime mortgage and global financial crisis, as dubious home loans were
bundled together by the thousands, rated as relatively secure, and passed up through the
international banking system, causing turmoil, in Europe particularly, when they proved to
be under-capitalized as their holders defaulted en masse.
Globalization has empirically demonstrable effects on institutional practices
ranging from trade and finance to political cooperation and conflict where its influences
are readily seen and commonly scrutinized. The liberalizing processes it signifies
affectively condition the expectations of governments, corporations and individuals, from
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investors to consumers, as they ramify the ideological meta-discourse of ultra-liberalmodernity and its associated narratives. Furthermore, a plethora of evidence substantiates
its ramifications on social order, cultural transformation and group and individual identity.
At some discernable level this now includes nearly every human community. 637
Although the meaning of globalization is contentious it is generally agreed to be a
set of phenomena originally instigated by European exploration of the world and
perpetuated by the forces, institutions and processes this intercourse spawned. Following
Khan, I take its current manifestation as having originated in Anglo-European imperial
colonization, the prerogatives of which were gradually sublimated and formally
transformed via the creation of a post-war international order at Bretton Woods, San
Francisco and Potsdam.
The character of contemporary globalization was further modified by decolonization, a process in which direct control over the domestic affairs of numerous
African and Asian peoples was previously exerted by Europeans was ceded to newly
independent authorities of sovereign states. However, these new nations remained heavily
reliant in most cases on their former imperial overlords, and this relationship of relative
dependency also colored the forces, institutions and processes of globalization. Many
former European colonies have remained on the periphery of the globalization complex,
as mere cites of resource extraction. This has left many of the nation-states created in the
wake of de-colonization in deeper poverty than they endured under European rule and
persistent political instability that casts doubt on the West’s commitment to the ultraliberal-modern values it espouses and its advocacy of universal human rights.
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Khan is critical of overly enthusiastic portrayals of globalization. And it is
certainly true that the Western media disseminate a generally unnuanced and valorized
impression of the phenomena, ideological function of which I address below. As Khan
noted in the citation above, the economic dimensions of globalization have produced some
contradictory effects with self-defeating built-in potential. He explains that:
It is necessary to treat the rhetoric of globalization with caution. At best, we are
experiencing a ‘fractured’ globalization. Integration of financial markets, for
example, can lead to great benefits for all in a truly liberal world of equal actors.
However, in a world of unevenness the evolutionary paths may lead to crisis
unless institutions are designed properly. Leaving everything to the markets may
produce the supreme irony of ultimately leading to crises which prevent some very
important capital and commodity markets from functioning. 638
This notion of a “fractured globalization” is quite apt, both with regard to the unintended
consequences of unrestrained market logic and to the effects of globalization on
developing – non-Western – societies.
While the reception of globalizing institutions, forces and processes is certainly
not uniform between the nations and cultures it transforms, the economic impetus of
globalization in summa aims for homogenization in production and uniformity in market
openness. This, as I will argue further below, has the effect of fracturing autochthonous
communities by introducing foreign values and practices. 639 Significantly, this includes
the rupturing of the authentic relation between individuals and their cultural practices (and
its indigenously mediated evolution) by interposing new spectacularized forms of ultraliberal-modern desire that circulate and validate simulacrums of existential meaning and
simulations of ontological purpose.
What is less controversial about globalization is that it entails the forced adoption
of certain economic and political practices toward their universal hegemony, and the
352

imposition of a corresponding socio-cultural form of life that profoundly alters
autochthonous values and knowledge. Forced may at first seem too strong a word, but the
incentives to comply virtually compel states wanting to engage in international trade and
exchange to tow the line, as it were. This adoption of Anglo-European practices tends to
commence rather informally, with the hybridization of cultural forms and organization. By
the estimates of some this amounts to “undeveloped” poor nations conceding much of
their power of self-determination to the aforementioned hegemonic economic and political
forms, a process which culminates in the significant transformation of indigenous cultural
norms and even the annihilation of distinctive national characteristics.
This occurs through a multitude of seemingly innocuous and even banal everyday
activities, the variety and frequency of which are constantly increasing. Some obvious
examples include international travel, borderless communication, liberalized financial and
monetary flows, increasingly freer trade and commerce, and the commensurately
increasing global commonality – one might even assert, ubiquity – of corresponding
Anglo-European nihilism. The very reactive forms of desire and inauthentic modes of
being that gave rise to the forces, institutions and processes comprising the contemporary
globalization complex disseminate the ethos of Western decadence worldwide.
The affective forces of globalization vary and its effects are uneven across
cultures. On close examination it is clear that a wide variety of responses to the
prerogatives of globalization distinguishes its reception in disparate places and at different
times. Also varying widely are the culturally specific means of their implementation
which are determined by locale, climate, level of existing infrastructure and numerous
other factors. Yet as a city, region or nation become more “globalized”, or thoroughly
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integrated into the conventional globalization complex, its peoples’ desires, expectations
and ways and means of fulfilling them come to resemble those of peoples in every other
place so integrated. Hence, despite its enormous complexity globalization is a powerful
force for standardization in the world. Part of the reason it is such a contentious issue and
faces organized opposition is that it systematically homogenizes practices and
expectations in a development that invariably eliminates differences and annihilates
meanings, reducing many aspects of human experience to a cold cash nexus (to borrow
the apt Marxian phrase) and advancing one-dimensionality. Through the adoption of ultraliberal-modern values globalization cultivates the baneful, hyper-decadent ethos that is
diminishing the West.
Globalization is frequently misconstrued as “Americanization” due to the
considerable role the US plays in the dissemination of its ultra-liberal-modern values. The
US has also enjoyed its place at the center of the complex (the aforementioned
constellation of institutions, processes and forces) and has arguably been the key nation in
propagating it commensurate with its active support of greater European integration. The
conflation of America with globalization originates in a dual sense of envy and desire for
things American, especially its culture of affluence, individual freedom, and readily
available consumables. The seemingly pervasive influence and presence of the US
following World War Two and its perceived hubris as the world’s only super-power
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the cold war, produced a great deal
of reaction and antipathy towards it and its values, as well. Globalization it is frequently
and correctly equated with and/or indicated by relative degrees of “Westernization”, but it
is always far more complex than this oversimplification conveys. What is meant here is
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that any adequate understanding of the phenomenon must account for its molar
development as an integrative process, one that has an array of effects on the lives of
individuals, communities, international politics and nascent global society. Furthermore,
as individuals and communities undergo the adaptations it necessitates unexpected
possibilities, means of subversion and rhizomatic opportunities for becoming-other arise
in what I have introduced above as the abstract potentials of globality.
The initial impetus prompting globalization was synchronically emergent from the
hierarchically relational nation-state order and the formally distinct, competing sociocultural milieus comprising it. The intra-ordinal nature of the nation-state system and
character of its development had largely determined the general disposition of the future
globalization complex (i.e.: its forces, processes and institutions), long before they were
realized in their present form. Globalization, therefore, should not be conceived of as a
transordinally determined unfolding of a diachronic set of relations, as it is not generating
the higher-level properties distinct from those upon which it is based, which one would
expect of such a process. In so far as it indicates a horizontal development across time, its
conventional growth primarily consists of innovation to generate greater momentum
toward the fulfillment of its overarching aims (laissez faire free-trade and
democratization) and to enhance the efficiency of processes already long underway.
These practical innovations, their operations and their admittedly interesting
history should not distract us from their place in the larger historical narrative; their
common feature is their utility in augmenting the prerogatives of globalization, namely the
dissemination of ultra-liberal-modern values. From a macro-level perspective therefore,
globalization exemplifies the amplification of a technological rationality that
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operationalizes the fetishized liberal state, putting into practice—disparately and badly—
the philosophical ideals of emancipatory metaphysical realism that ground it. The
ideological juggernaut of globalization fosters the “becoming-same” of individuals and
societies, banalizing alterity and encouraging the passive acceptance of semblance through
(paradoxically) frenetic activity (i.e.: economic production). Its central aim is to
perpetually increase levels of consumption, a reactive drive symptomatic of underlying
forces implemented via the negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power of the
dominant ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. In Freudian terms it is an obvious, if
no less remarkably feverish enactment of Thanatos, the death instinct, and realizes a selfdestructive form of wish-fulfillment; in Heideggerian terms it is an enhancement of and
further temptation to fallenness and inauthenticity.
Insofar as globalization represents the enforcement of convention and the
continual standardization of all material production in accordance with the herd value of
leveling (which it extends and compels universally), it develops through specified
international treaties and contracts that determine with a high degree of specification the
permissibility of acts. These agreed conventions also provide for regulatory norms that
compel self-scrutiny through negative incentives in addition to formal policing. Therefore
the conventional globalization complex represents the vertical, molar expansion (the
perfection, if you will) of an existing system of order. Events within and between its
numerous formal and informal entities are related through an intra-ordinal regulatory
framework, which connects various aggregates (international organizations such as the
UN, OSCE, and WTO), supranational polities such as the EU and traditional nation-states)
of socio-political aggregates (nation-states, sub-national regions and localities), and
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economic and business units (TNCs and MNCs, etc.) that seeks to instantiate a universal
order through legal regimes established on the foundational precepts of international law
such as sovereignty. 640
The EU is synchronically homologous and intraordinally supervenient to the
globalization complex that aforementioned impetus produced, all of whose subsidiary
elements and parts are conditioned by axiomatically related laws, norms, customs and
international institutions.641 In short, despite a fair degree of relative variation among its
disparate features, the EU, like the institutions, forces and processes of globalization with
which it consists, corresponds with the ultra-liberal-modern impetus that subtends them
all. To correctly identify the nature of the globalization complex and the character of its
innumerable machinations is to recognize the diversity of interactions among
multiplicities of multiplicities of multiplicities, which give rise to transordinal potentials
of globality.
The globalization complex itself is primarily comprised of (and entirely driven by)
nation-state

actors,

international

organizations,

transnational

and

multinational

corporations, regulatory agencies and a plethora of corresponding social norms, customs,
law and institutional regimes, all of which originated in the ultra-liberal-modern values of
the West. It seems to enhance human activity by facilitating certain kinds of technical
expertise and practical capacities that contribute to particular actions and enhance its
prerogatives, actions mechanistically performed in unison, choreographing human activity
into a machinic dance which it rewards. This seeming is a simulation of the enhancement
of the type man through the veneration of the herd animal’s ever-increasing labor, a
“progressive” focus on material (pecuniary) wealth that enforces anti-natural ideals
357

consistent with a rejection of suffering and cruelty and the illusion of an other-worldly
supersensible beyond that denies the tragic, Dionysian dimension of life. Globalization’s
simulation of empowerment via increased activity understood as production which it
compels by inculcating desire and proportionally increasing his activity is thus selfvalidating. It rewards the productivity it praises, but its empowerment is bogus. It is the
ersatz freedom of falling back into the Publicness (the tranquilization, idleness and
inauthenticity) of ‘the They’.
The conventional globalization complex is the most comprehensive and farreaching instantiation of the slave-moral leveling impulse yet. It is (re-)making the worldstructure of lived experience, the distinct elements of which—irrespective of various
differences of place, time or culture where they are superimposed—hang-together with
seeming coherence. Through the intertwined ideological discourses of modernity and
liberalism—its primary components—it seeks to universalize equality (through the
enforcement of legal rights, property, civil and human, and the elimination of disparities—
reconceived as inequities—of wealth) and the abolition of suffering (emancipation from
oppression, etc.), all from pity (development discourses, etc.).
As a radical extension of the average-everydayness of the Western herd-man it is
the historicality of ‘the They’, universalized. The freedoms its spectacular appearances
make ready-to-hand (capacities it enhances or enables) paradoxically announce the
hidden-ness of that which its discourses cover-up, i.e.: modes of being and forms of life
that have been buried either through active suppression or their own obscurity. Its putative
freedoms consist with the technological rationality (a mimicking of mathematical logic) it
reifies; the appearance of which announces that authentic freedom is precisely what is
358

lacking. The absence of genuine freedom is the main impulsion or incitement to the
simulacrums it generates and which are crucial to its preservation—the continual
validation and extension of the values upon which it developed. In summa, it constitutes a
macro-level intraordinal and synchronic framework that effectively constrains individual,
micro-level, becomings.
However, it is (un-paradoxically) also this very set of relatively repressive
conditions which stoke the form giving fire expressed in that inventive and defiant
disposition characteristic of the positive will to creative destruction as generative power
enacted by the strongest. It is indeliberately giving rise to re-conceptualizations of the
agon by the healthiest exemplars of our age that are likely to challenge, co-opt and
redirect it in unforeseeable and authentically life-affirming ways. This is where potential
for a genuinely transordinal condition lies; it is the real possibility of generating
diachronic, abstract potentials of globality, the realization of which will transmute the
hyper-decadent values of our ultra-liberal-modern, manic age. It is this prospect for selfovercoming to become what one is, an ongoing process of becoming-other, or authentic
Being towards ones ownmost potentiality-for-Being, that I will examine later.
Three primary aspects of globalization may be distinguished which together
comprise a complex. These have profound ramifications for economic, political and
cultural life wherever globalization’s numerous and superficially incongruent but deeply
unified and mutually reinforcing discourses extend their reach. In so doing I generally,
albeit critically, adhere to aspects of both the post-modern and strong globalization theses.
Globalization is therefore understood as both symptomatic of the perverse desire for a
universal containment of becoming-other (an anti-natural restriction of Being-in-the-world
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for a Dasein) and its enactment through the worldwide extension of a set of bracketing
categories that delimit norms of sameness and construct and codify the familiar through
reactive co-optations of difference, interpolations upon / into alterity and the enclosure of
all otherness that could hypothetically threaten the predominance of its (globalization’s)
hermeneutic of desire.
First among these are globalizing processes. These include innovations in science,
communication, transport and technology that transform human life in varied from myriad
and occasionally profound ways ranging from the instantaneous exchange and
dissemination of ideas (ideology) through the “global media”, 642 to the transformation of
proximities and corresponding banalization of distance brought about by the advent of
mass international travel, 643 and the ability to observe events in near real time from
anywhere in the world. The emergence and proliferation of webcams and digital and
wireless networks and the resulting realm of cyberspace is significantly altering human
relations, comprising an additional conceptual and experiential dimension of
globalization. This includes our growing comprehension of human physiology and health
needs, the global environment and efforts toward its regulation / preservation, 644 and the
even extends to the cosmos we inhabit via satellite surveillance and the militarization of
outer space. Significantly, all of these characteristic processes of globalization change
individual expectations of the future, the way people conceive of themselves, their
opportunities (for education, employment, accumulation, etc.) and their place in the
world. 645
An emergent global culture is seen by many to be transforming local, regional and
national identities where peoples both adapt to and resist transformations in global
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relations. 646 Importantly, processes of globalization include evolving informal norms and
practices generated in response to global connectivity as well as opposition to the
perceived threats it presents. Bleiker refers optimistically to the “discursive dimension of
social change”, occurring “in the fusion of the local and the global” (in assessing the fall
of the Berlin Wall and collapse of communism), however, the ultra-liberal-modern
globalization complex more frequently instigates the fragmentation of traditional
community, homogenization of cultures and the intensifying hegemony of a quasiimperialistic Western order, operations it hides both by its narrative of liberation and its
shameless triumphalism. 647
Globalizing institutions refer specifically to formal organizations and actors in the
international realm such as the UN, etc., and less formal norms and practices. Subsets of
such institutions include those directly establishing and/or policing international
governance and order, such as the UN, its agencies and the controversial ICC. Regional
security organizations whose ideological thrust coextends with the globalization complex
and human rights regime include NATO, the WEU and SEATO. These link the defenses
of their member states in formal alliances. In addition to binding them in reciprocal
obligations they (deliberately or not) make coherent aspects of their foreign policies to
increase reliance and assure security. Direct military cooperation occurs through joint
strategic planning, regular combined training exercises and deployments to conflict zones
or interventions. 648
Various IGOs such as the OSCE, the Commonwealth and the COE are equally
overt globalizing institutions, and play an important role as they coerce adherence to
democratic values, enforce human rights norms and impose (substantive and/or moral)
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punitive sanctions for violations of them. They thus perform the role of ordering sociocultural, economic and political norms to increase familiarity and deepen mutual
confidence. Importantly, these include human rights, which are often said to provide a
moral warrant for the imposition of Western values, in addition to providing an additional
layer of authority to the developing international system and future basis for expanded and
deepened supra-national governance. There is great overlap between these globalizing
processes and institutions. This is particularly evident in the simultaneous (and largely
unpredictable) ways they affect everyday-life of individuals through the changes and
innovations they propagate globally.
Forces of globalization refer to the less certain consequences of the latter two in
combination with one another, and the effects generated by them as a distinct phenomena.
This includes transformed normative practices and informal cultural trends, taboos, mores
and conceptions of justice, etc., and especially refers to the complex ways they indicate an
altered consciousness which itself becomes a dynamic of globalization. 649 Forces of
globalization also illustrate (and the term should convey) that these collective phenomena
produce a momentum that may accelerate, moderate, or occasionally obstruct the
prerogatives of more “formal” globalizing institutions and processes. These forces,
indicative of the ongoing, if largely molar growth of human consciousness, are mainly
reactive, concentrating the prerogatives of liberalism. Against this trend, “globality
restores the boundlessness of culture and promotes the endless renewability and
diversification of cultural expression rather than homogenization or hybridization. 650 By
enabling perceptive individuals to occasionally illuminate previously unnoticed adjacent
possibilities, abstract potentials of globality indirectly produce opportunities for active
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becomings. Thus forces of globalization inadvertently give rise to new and unimagined
possibilities and potentials for human becoming, the nisus of globality, and ultimately
transform the institutions and processes that originally produced them.
The aforementioned aspects of globalization primarily result from human action
(whether deliberate or otherwise) understood as originating in the fear, guilt and pity
advanced by reactive forces that retard human life and more broadly characterize our
distorted contemporary agon. As it exemplifies the unifying institutions of contemporary
Europe, in some measure the EU suggests the negative potential of the burgeoning
supranational state form to become an ultra-powerful “new idol.” In part a consequence of
the general inability to value decisively or effectively, the decadence and resignation of
globalization’s relativism simultaneously rouses and hastens both standardization and
unification without regard for political borders or geographic location. Though this gives
rise to numerous resistances, the majority of are reactive and ultimately futile in the larger
scheme of change the globalization complex compels. 651
The globalizing process creates fleeting mirages of diversification and
fragmentation which incline some scholars to see in globalization itself plainly positive
potentials, but such naïve (or nefarious) optimism furthers ideological ruses that serve to
abolish authentic diversity. The globalization complex validates itself by reference to the
notions of equality and fairness that are central to the narratives comprising the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. These narratives serve to placate indigenous
populations whose traditional forms of life and autochthonous culture are imperiled by
globalization. Rationalizing an anti-natural axiomatique, the precepts of ultra-liberalmodernity immunize the globalization complex fairly well from accountability for its
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deleterious effects, by extension. Though as the liberal-modern ethos which it spreads
deepens within a population, the complex must work harder to maintain its state of
exception. 652
In examining the “political foundations of the global [human rights] regime”,
Donnelly observes that it is “composed of widely accepted substantive norms, largely
internationalized standard-setting procedures, and some general promotional activity, but
very limited international implementation, which rarely goes beyond information
exchange and voluntary accepted international assistance for the national implementation
of international norms.” He attributes the lack of international enforcement to “conscious
political decisions.” These decisions preserve the statist logic of the international system,
ensuring that the global human rights regime is characterized by “normative strength and
procedural weakness”. 653 The substantive norms comprising the regime instantiate postEnlightenment ideals (“a conception of human beings viewed as free, autonomous persons
entitled to equal concern and respect”), and the metadiscourse of ultra-liberalmodernity. 654
The emerging global human rights regime described by Donnelly has powerfully
transformed (and continues to alter) the expectations and attitudes of peoples outside the
Anglo-European cultural realm. Sometimes in contention with other, non-Western
conceptions of rights, it has raised demands for rights and/or easing the reception of
economic and political reforms in ways that do not always consist with the conventional
prerogatives of the institutions, processes and forces of the globalization complex. Yet it
is, as Donnelly accepts, liberal-modernity and the technological society to which it gave
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rise that simultaneously generated the “need” for human rights, as such.
[P]rior to the creation of capitalist market economies and modern nation states, the
problems that human rights seek to address, the particular violations of human
dignity that they seek to prevent, either did not exist or were not widely perceived
to be central social problems. 655
Somewhat ironically, markets and states are today the primary violators of human dignity,
the contemporary notion of which developed in large part as a response to the political
excesses, gratuitous violence and caprice of European monarchical regimes that preceded
the nation-state as the dominant form of polity in Europe.
The quintessentially modern concept of “inalienable rights” emerged almost
simultaneously with the precepts of the secular democratic state as an alternative to erratic
monarchical rule, beginning in the 17th century. 656 Today the global human rights regime
and the globalization complex are effectively indistinguishable in some important ways,
as the former serves as a philosophical foundation and justificatory basis for certain
practices of the latter (e.g.: the promised prosperity of economic liberalization and
enhanced freedom of formal political enfranchisement, democratization, etc.).
Donnelly acknowledges that the notions of “equality, autonomy, and equal
concern and respect” which the global human rights regime seeks to fulfill and preserve
“are very abstract values that can be realized in a great variety of ways”. As noted above,
they arose in response to the “major perceived threats to human dignity”, and have
transformed our understanding of human dignity as they have evolved. To good
Europeans the developments that gave rise to the need for dignity and corresponding
rights to preserve it indicate the irreparable decadence of the presently unifying European
civilization(s). This was also indicated by the inability of European traditions to sustain
365

themselves, as the Enlightenment and proto-modern revolutions in America and France
demonstrated. However, as contemporary “human rights emerge[d] out of the political
struggle for human dignity and indicate the principle directions of [that] struggle,” which
“is but one more side of the interaction between moral ideal and political reality that lies
at the heart of the practice of human rights,” there is no reason to think that a free spirited
good European couldn’t adopt these ideas to their own project of revaluing the ultraliberal-modern values of which they are presently a part. 657 While uncomfortable with the
presumption of these related concepts of dignity and rights—the putative basis for each of
which implicitly casts doubt on the basis and/or viability of the other—they nevertheless
must contend with their powerful effects on contemporary reality. 658
This “new type of philosopher and commander” could employ a minimal threshold
of duties understood as comprising a new Apollonian ideal, a restorative, post-modern
mythos for our nihilistic age. This could be predicated on a popular recognition of the
qualia distinctive of human-being; characteristics inhering to every person considered—
however fictively—as an individual, irrespective of how noble or base, healthy or ill.
Authentically agonistic socio-political institutions and economic processes could then be
evolved to instantiate genuinely meritocratic results—in which the best attain the highest
rank—through more or less democratic practices. 659
This might serve as a means of “teaching humanity its future as its will,” one
“dependent on a human will, to prepare [humankind] for the great risk and wholesale
attempt at breeding and cultivation”, prevenient to the overcoming of the species man.660
There is no reason that such a conception should forever continue leveling mountain and
valley, i.e.: eliminating the natural hierarchy of types, or subordinating the greatness of the
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rarest, noblest blooms of human potential to the herd’s “deadly hatred against suffering in
general,” a hatred that shows itself “in their faith in the morality of communal pity”. 661
In accordance with the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity 662 and the related,
positivistic orientation conferred by scientism with which they ideologically correspond,
the globalization complex and human rights regime have, apodictically, eliminated much
of the material deprivation and scarcity that has inhibited human development and
flourishing throughout the course of recorded human history. The paradox of this
development, which I have cited throughout this work, is that it has—as morality—
occurred through a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power; the native volition of
“the weaker, more delicate, intermediate existences [who] need to take sides against that
gloriousness of life and strength”, that results in diminution of the type man.663
Nevertheless, this spiritual dwarfing of humankind via the elimination of authentic
difference – or molarization of becoming-same – and the loss of meaningfulness bestowed
by suffering through relative economic prosperity provides a space for the exceptional
type, who may come to recognize that “the continued existence of the [anti-natural,
dissipative] rule is the precondition for the value of the exception [re: themselves].” 664

International institutions and globalization
The EU, an IGO conceived as single-market economic bloc, has evolved into a
multi-level supra-national organization for the socio-political unification of its member
nation-states through the broadening and deepening of ultra-liberal-modern ideals.
Regional blocs with similar origins and parallel aspirations, such as the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), are now striving to develop in a similar direction,
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despite a reluctance to fully embrace “Western” standards of democratization and human
rights. 665 From a liberal-optimist perspective this provides further evidence that a
fundamental transformation of the nation-state and international relations via regional
integration stimulated by the forces of globalization, as “part of the dialectic of historical
transformation” is underway. 666
Another major, regionally oriented IGO, The Organization of American States
(OAS), has faced the challenge of combining the disparate wills of quite weak nationstates in a group inherently dominated by the “hyper-power” of the United States, wherein
a residue of the Monroe doctrine continues to prejudice the policy views of the
organization’s most powerful member toward the rest of the region. The recently
established African Union (AU) is attempting similar economic policy coordination
between its member-states and even envisages the distant possibility of the beleaguered
and chronically impoverished continent’s political integration.
Inter-governmental organizations such as the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, which became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development in 1961, played an important role in the reconstruction of post-war Western
Europe by supervising the distribution and management of Marshall Aid Funds. This
established the basis of Western Europe’s economic prosperity. Other IGOs to play major
roles in Europe’s post-war development and the concurrent emergence of the late-20th
century’s globalizing processes and forces were the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD), the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO which oversees the
workings of the General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These institutions have
dominated post-war attempts to compose and stabilize the European continent and the
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world economy, by promoting free trade and encouraging particular forms of
development. The association of globalization with the U.S. arises from the neo-liberal
model imposed worldwide via the so-called “Washington consensus”. This refers to the
agreement among a group of influencial Western exponents of conventional economic
liberalization strategies and development policy. It is associated with “market
fundamentalists”, the ideologists of neo-liberal economic theory. 667
Following the Second World War, globalizing institutions and the processes they
promoted and supervised systematically transformed the diverse yet interconnected realms
of international finance, trade, production, and labor and development practices. In
Europe, where post-war reconstruction in the West had, with American encouragement
driven cooperation and, arguably, integration, the European Monetary System was created
in 1979 to further enhance the coordination of economic policy and augment the EC’s
self-determination.

Such

cooperative

inter-governmental

institutions

proliferated

throughout the world in the decades following the Second World War.
The period saw the creation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963,
which morphed into the AU in 2002; the Association of South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in 1967, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional body of Persian /
Arabian Gulf emirates and states launched in 1981, NAFTA (1993), the Indian Ocean Rim
Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) in 1997, and FTAA (ongoing), the G-8,
G-10 and G-20, among others. Each of these attempt more or less effectively, to spur and
coordinate free-market growth by agreeing on and implementing frameworks for regional
and multi-lateral cooperation and legislating multilateral economic rules on a plethora of
issues that, their advocates have it, foster greater and fairer exchange. Increasing
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familiarity and transparency make for more regular and calm political dialogue, which it is
argued, improves trust and increases security.
Worldwide economic growth—which among many of the globalizing processes
occurring in the world today is the principle dimension these institutions were conceived
to advance and manage—occurred so rapidly in the decades following the war that many
of the aforementioned institutions have been challenged to adapt to the pace of
development and the increasingly sophisticated instruments of finance and exchange, sets
of interrelated processes which they were conceived to regulate and further but which
have become somewhat inscrutable due to the instantaneity of exchange in contemporary
trading. The accelerating speed of activity in international trade and finance and the
changes generated there from increased exponentially in the decade following the collapse
of the Soviet Union, with unprecedented economic growth occurring simultaneously in
the developing nations of South-East Asia.
The overheated, poorly regulated and relatively corrupt economies of South-East
Asia, dubbed “tigers” by the international media, were, by the late 1990s, due for a
correction. This came in the unfortunate form of a severe financial crisis that dented the
region’s developing economies. It was brought on by currency speculation and the
panicked outflow of foreign capital from markets in Jakarta, Bangkok as well as through
trading on the Singapore bourse, beginning in mid-1997. Its effects would last until
approximately 2002. This crisis, whose cause was complex and truly global in origin, was
a serious setback for the economies of Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea, forcing them
to turn to international creditors and among the IGOs mentioned above, the IMF, to assist
their recovery. This meant submitting to the terms and conditions demanded by the IMF, a
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source of contention in the domestic politics of each state that compounded the serious
political turmoil across the region. As anger intensified, coming to border on open
revolution in Indonesia, the Asian masses demonstrated almost as vehemently against the
economic stipulations of the IMF, which were perceived by critics and many on the street
as callous and laden with risk—namely the potential to deepen the region’s financial
hardships.
In Malaysia the government under then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad
responded by deliberately ignoring the advise of the IGOs and “Washington consensus”.
Rather, he introduced a controversial program designed by his finance minister that
imposed strict capital controls on Malaysia’s markets and trading of its currency (the
Ringgit) as it pegged the nation’s exchange rate to the US dollar. Though condemned by
free market partisans, this action successfully shielded Malaysia’s domestic economy
from further pressures from foreign exchange markets, the volatility of which would likely
have inhibited economic recovery or even aggravated Malaysia’s woes by raising its
interest

rates

(Hashim).

The

measures—which

went

against

the

orthodox

recommendations for managing fiscal crises and the IMF’s own conditions for assistance
to nation’s in debt default—were based on the very principles of Keynesian economic
theory that, in part, served as a foundation for the initial post-war international economic
order. Such a strategy is now seen by some as a plausible alternative to the conventional
advice dispensed by bureaucrats of the IMF (Khor). 668
This international economic crisis of the late 1990s would lead to currency
devaluations and the specter of debt default in Russia and Brazil, as well. In the early part
of this decade (2001) Argentina, among other nations, would experience similar shocks
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due to debt default. The hyper-inflation that resulted fomented a dramatic increase in
poverty that led to social unrest and political turmoil. The IMF responded as it always had
in such crises, by offering more loans which were the original cause of the problem, and
correctly or not came to be blamed both by the leaderships and publics of the affected
countries. A result of these tumultuous events the aforementioned IGOs, particularly the
IMF, faced intense criticism on many fronts. To longtime critics of its structural
adjustment programs in the development field and those who thought its lending practices
to nations in financial trouble counter-productive a consensus emerged. As a result the
prestige, effectiveness and relevance of both the IMF and Washington consensus have
arguably been diminished. The skepticism originates in a perception that they are largely
ineffectual both at anticipating crises and dealing with the exigencies of them when they
do occur. 669
Opposition to the thrust and hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism and myriad other
prerogatives of globalization has coalesced in non-governmental organizations such as the
World Trade Forum, first convened in Porto Alegre, Brazil in January 2001. The
disruptive ramifications of free trade, unregulated portfolio investment and other foreign
direct investment (FDI) practices for fiscal stability and monetary policy, as unpredictable
fluctuations in exchange values and interest rates prompted by speculation in currencies
and/or derivatives threaten economies, social cohesion and political stability have
intensified contemporary controversies over the (in)justice of unbridled markets as
globalization—and the anti-essentialist mindset generated by globality—initiates what
may be a new stage of capitalism. 670 In response, some critics suggest and/or refer to
possible alternatives to the “dominant paradigm that theoretically and ideologically
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underpins contemporary globalization.” 671 From the perspective of Nietzsche’s vitalist
critique of the political and power ontology, these trends, debates and proposed policy
alternatives are shown to be deflections from how they actually compound and amplify
decadence, adding to the problems that they mis-identify.
Myriad rules, norms and agreements overlap the competencies and jurisdictions of
the major globalizing institutions and interconnect through universalized legal regimes
(free capital flows, air transport, shipping, etc.), free trade agreements like NAFTA,
protocols of international diplomacy, and the widely perceived need for international
cooperation. Other globalizing institutions determining the course of planetary
transformation include MNCs and TNCs. Corporations operating internationally exploit
processes of globalization (such as technological innovation, advancements in
communication, legal regimes and disparate national health care and labor standards, etc.),
to disseminate and standardize practices and norms wherever they engage in business.
Moreover, they surreptitiously conduct surveillance on their employees to enforce
compliance. 672 The largest TNCs have the power to influence significant concessions
from the governments of states in which they do business. They can even pressurize
political change in heavily indebted poor counties due to the latter’s corresponding
vulnerability and desperation, 673 yet most capital investment continues to be directed
toward highly industrialized economies as global hierarchies of production materialize. 674
Global media and communication transforms world politics, increasing some of
the most reactive affects of globalization by introducing the values associated with
Western notions of rights, enfranchisement and consumption. 675 Increased contact and
trade is facilitated by formal treaty negotiations between states at the international level
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(e.g.: NAFTA, the G-8, WTO, etc.) and between private corporations, producing mergers,
etc. Governments (singly and in cooperation with one another), international
organizations, global corporations and the coextending culture industry continuously
engage in numerous forms of propaganda or marketing to universalize their moribund
values which they mask with ideologically interpolating, molar discourses of productivity
and growth. Their campaigns serve both to inculcate perceptions of need and reify values
that challenge indigenous belief and exchange systems, anesthetize any alternative senses
of significance and eliminate autochthonous wisdom. This entails the “dissolution” of
traditional identities in a process of “cultural fragmentation” that even threatens political
allegiances—particularly to the nation-state—within the primary loci of the globalization
complex. 676
Globalizing institutions and related processes enforce a “culture ideology of
consumerism” that disseminates, through “imperialist media” (advertising and popular
culture mediums such as music, film and fashion), homogenizing forms of desire, beauty
and conceptions of the good across cultures. 677 It simultaneously dominates information
flows (and thus attitude formation) through ideologically corresponding and virtually
uniform television news broadcasts that present selective representations of political
dialogue and violence. 678 Alternative perspectives struggle to effectively challenge
hegemonic views and attitudes, though efforts are made. 679
As an expansion of the nation-state, as “coldest of all cold monsters,” globalization
is “essentially” a difference eliminating machine. Its complexity (an infinite, fractal
micro-dialectics sustained by and sustaining a decadent order) at once intensifies
simulacrums of genuinely agonistic relations while compelling collaboration in its project
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and general acquiescence to its prerogatives. While problematically describing it as
“Empire”, Hardt and Negri have correctly observed that the globalization complex strives
to be totalizing. But the active collaboration and acquiescence it demands of ordinary
individuals becomes more difficult to achieve as its own complexity (and by extension the
actual rather than simulated conflict it generates) increases. The becomings it compels,
however dissipative and reactive it may be, then give rise to a dilemma wherein malaise
and nostalgia for status quo being (such as the ideals of liberal modernity) intensify
nihilistic resignation, a circumstance induced by the contradiction between the
globalization complex’s false appearances and reality.
The globalization complex gets ensnared in its own affective cultivation of
Publicness and the absorption of individuals in ‘the They’, alienating those conscious
enough to perceive Being-in-itself (understood as Being towards ones ownmost
potentiality for being) as presently there. Although most resignedly accept, that is fall
back into their reduced condition, a few rebel. Among these latter few are ‘good
Europeans’, whose very skeptical, inquiring disposition inclines them to rouse against
uncritical group think. Through the totality of their involvements in the globalization
complex they gain awareness of their ‘Being towards’ the thing that has itself been
uncovered thereby: their own subversive capacity vis-à-vis the juggernaut of hyperdecadent, ultra-liberal-modern values that is imposed universally by the globalization
complex. This significantly, entails the means (which were always ready to hand) for
acting on it, via their realization of abstract potentials of globality: affirmations of
difference through the cultivation of change. Enactments of globality require ones’
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particular temporal engagement as a Dasein in the world by way of futural projections of
the possibilities one finds present and to which this engagement gives rise.
As Nietzsche anticipated, such extreme nihilism could lead to the self-destruction
of humankind if forceful iconoclasts do not transfigure globalization’s ultra-liberalmodern meta-discourse to initiate a new, anti-dialectical epoch of authentically agonistic
“grand politics”. 680

Part Two: The systematic universalization of European decadence via the
globalization complex
In order to better comprehend the salience of Nietzsche’s vitalist conception of
the political to an analysis of the EU in the broader context of globalization and the
potentials for individuals within and outside the EU to become ‘good Europeans’ through
the abstract potentials of globality, it is necessary to examine the ways in which
Nietzsche’s general theory of decadence and of its expression in late-modern Europe
illuminate the dynamics of dissipation in our age of ultra-liberal-modernity and the subtle
ways in which it anticipated the all-too-human intensification of nihilism by conventional
globalization.
Nietzsche variously supported aspects of 19th century European colonialism and
criticized imperialist quests for booty. 681 In the latter case he perceived colonial
competition as a nationalistic strategy devised by ascetic priests as a means of distracting
an enervated herd and to “profit” on the increasing malaise weakening European
society. 682 Democratization represented a relinquishing of master’s prerogatives and a
pandering to ever more impudent masses across the continent. It was symptomatic of the
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same “sickness of will distributed over Europe” that found different expression in
military adventures abroad. The 19th century bane of decadence invariably led to a
nihilism that would require:
“not only wars in India and Asian involvements to relieve Europe of the greatest
danger facing it, but also internal eruptions, the explosion of empires into small
fragments, and above all the introduction of the parliamentary imbecility,
including the obligation upon everyone to read his newspaper at breakfast.” 683
In this passage Nietzsche is at once serious and sarcastic, suggesting the course such
terrible shepherds unwittingly pursue and its inevitable “resolution” in destruction.
Undisciplined by the strongest, who are also afflicted with the herd’s decadence and thus
prevented from fully actuating their strength, their solutions only compound their
problems before the crises they cause are relieved by cathartic catastrophes. Ambitions of
national greatness utilized the herd’s addiction to ressentiment and bad-conscience to
bolster the authority of ascetic-priests by inducing in them euphoric hallucinations of
emancipation through the increased (conventional) power and wealth to be gained from
Empire. Nietzsche himself acknowledged a propensity to such reactive sentiments among
the best:
We ‘‘good Europeans’’: we too have our hours when we permit ourselves a
warm-hearted patriotism, a lapse and regression into old loves and narrownesses –
I have just given an example of it – hours of national ebullition, of patriotic
palpitations and floods of various outmoded feelings. 684
It cannot be entirely surprising that national identity will continue to play an occasionally,
sentimentally significant part in the lives of ‘good Europeans’. They would not, however,
fail to understand these emotions outside their correct, encompassing context: that of the
shared ethos and nomostic cultural traditions (law, custom, norm and habit) that
undeniably connect them to their fellow Europeans.
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Similar relapses into counter-productive foreign policy objectives afflict states
both weak and strong in our post-modern era, but globalization’s simulation of natural
competition results in a hyper-real simulacrum of agonistic order that has succeeded in
attenuating the most deleterious consequence, namely global conflagrations. Leaders of
the herd 685 corrupt the social domain of struggle and rivalry that would naturally reveal
superior individuals, but the active forces globality generates exploit their machinations,
deluding them as well. Inherently weak and only capable of inferior (reactive-contingent)
freedom, the herd is provided an anti-natural, hyper-decadent simulation of existential
meaning and ontological purpose that re-presents their slavery as “freedom”.
On freedom and equality, it must be recalled that Nietzsche rejects the liberal
principle of the innate equality of human beings as an example of secular slave morality’s
tendency to “level mountain and valley”, but promoted a nuanced variety of elitism
contingent on the merit of individuals. On freedom he asserts, “each considers himself
most free where his feeling of living is greatest; in passion, in duty, in knowledge, in
mischievousness respectively. The theory of freedom of will is an invention of ruling
classes” (our contemporary ascetic—consumerist priests and herd leaders). 686 This
contempt of ruling classes includes the “elites” of his own era – Europe’s pusillanimous
monarchs and contented bourgeois; utterly vapid and incurably decadent pseudo-leaders.
The mob (rich and poor alike) wants itself considered equal to the best, as Nietzsche
observes in criticizing Utilitarian ethics:
They would like with all their might to strive after happiness, I mean after
comfort and fashion (and, at the highest level, for a seat in Parliament), which is
at the same time the true path of [their] virtue. Not one of all these ponderous herd
animals with their uneasy conscience (who undertake to advocate the cause of
egoism as the cause of the general welfare – ) wants to know or scent that the
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‘general welfare’ is not an ideal, or a goal, or a concept that can be grasped at all,
but only an emetic – that what is right for one cannot by any means therefore by
right for another, that the demand for one morality for all is detrimental to
precisely the higher men, in short that there exists an order of rank between man
and man, consequently also between morality and morality.” 687
The order of rank that separates man from man had itself come to seem unnatural to the
libertine European elites of “la belle epoche”, as a thoroughly romantic notion of the
general welfare had come to provide a malignant preoccupation with and raison d'être for
the perilous revolutionary politics of the day.
In his rejection of the “general welfare” Nietzsche none-too-subtly impugns the
theoretical contrivance central to the works of Rousseau, for whom he occasionally
expresses

contempt. 688

Nevertheless,

according to

Nietzsche’s

(possible mis-

)understanding, he held that notion to be spurious, inextricably linked as it was with a socalled “general will” the consistent enactment of which Rousseau did allege was essential
to the former condition’s maintenance, responsible for inflaming the radicalism that had
proven ruinous to Europe after Napoleon’s defeat. 689 It also alludes to the contempt
Nietzsche had for the later utilitarianism of J.S. Mill, who shared with Rousseau a strong
interest in eliminating suffering as equated in the slave moral sense with intolerable
injustice.
Predisposed to decadence by their innate weakness, the masses oppose any natural
order of rank from instinctual ressentiment and a corresponding, culturally naturalized
bad-conscience, which they strive to institutionally instantiate into law. They pursue this
objective to reverse nature’s hierarchy to overwhelm and keep themselves in command of
the strong, healthy individuals to whom they are otherwise vulnerable and forcibly
subordinated. Furthermore they seek to codify equal rights into law, a program to which
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they confer the imprimatur of modern science so as to bolster and ensure its
injunctions. 690 Their goal can only be accomplished when decline has sufficiently
weakened the strong:
Our virtues are conditional on, are provoked by, our weaknesses. “Equality,” as a
certain factual increase in similarity, which merely finds expression in the theory
of “equal rights,” is an essential feature of decline.
The notion of equality and discourse of equal rights is expressive of declining vitality
because it can only emerge in an age when the strongest are so dissipated that they can no
longer impose their prerogatives to maintain a natural rank order of types (Rangordnung).
The same forces determine the character of the political realm:
All our political theories and constitutions – and the “German Reich” is by no
means an exception – are consequences, necessary consequences, of decline; the
unconscious effect of decadence has assumed mastery even over the ideals of
some of the sciences. … The decline of life, the decrease in the power to organize,
that is, to separate, tear open clefts, subordinate and super-ordinate – all this has
been formulated as the ideal in contemporary sociology. Our socialists are
decadents, but Mr. Herbert Spencer is a decadent too: he considers the triumph of
altruism desirable. 691
Nietzsche’s contempt for the secularized Christian virtue of altruism (which comprised a
central feature of Spencer’s ethics) was consistent with his vitalist analysis of the political
and power ontology. He saw altruism as constituting a long perfected mask or strategy of
re-presenting the slave’s spirit of revenge and desire for equality, a sentiment in vogue in
England in the mid- and late 19th century.
Until the slave revolt in morals overturned the natural order (which was largely
effectuated in the West when Rome officially adopted Christianity in c. e. 312) the most
independent ruled over society. Lacking the instinct for self-determination, the herd was
forcibly made obedient by “the artful hammer blows of conquerors”. In considering the
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violent origins of the state Nietzsche asserts that it was masters organized for war who
unhesitatingly lay their “terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in
numbers but still formless and nomad.” Long after these civilization-founding acts, the
slaves usurped authority, taking the decline in instincts that enabled their victory as a
rational and/or divine basis for their rule that reflected social progress toward an
improved moral order:
The decrease in instincts which are hostile and arouse mistrust – and that is all our
“progress” amounts to – represents but one of the consequences attending the
general decrease in vitality: it requires a hundred times more trouble and caution
to make so conditional and late an existence prevail. Hence each helps the other;
hence everyone is to a certain extent sick, and everyone is a nurse for the sick.
And that is called “virtue.” Among men who still knew life differently – it would
have been called by another name: “cowardice” perhaps, “wretchedness,” old
ladies’ morality. 692
Here Nietzsche articulates his despair via contempt for the general pacification of man
that accompanied the democratization of society and politics. The consequent malaise
that had overtaken European society was an expression of the enervating values that
naturalized the atrophy of healthy instincts. The strength of will and independence of
hardy individuals’, demonstrated through their instinct for freedom, was diminished and
repressed, incarcerated within them until it was only able to discharge itself inwardly,
that is, upon itself: that, and that alone, is what the bad conscience is in its beginnings. 693
Despite his romantic hyperbole, Nietzsche fierce rejection of pacifism, much like
Machiavelli’s, rejects gratuitous violence but entails a cognizance of the utility of limited
violence through strategic application. 694 Occurrences of violence are primarily
considered in terms of the spirit from which they arise:
The evil of the strong. – The act of violence as a consequence of the passion, of
anger for example, is to be understood physiologically as an attempt to prevent a
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threatening attack of suffocation. Countless acts of arrogance vented on other
people have been diversions of a sudden rush of blood through a vigorous action
of the muscles: and perhaps the whole phenomena of the ‘evil of the strong’
belongs in this domain. (The evil of the strong harms others without giving
thought to it–it has to discharge itself; the evil of the weak wants to harm others
and to see the signs of the suffering it has caused.) 695
Although Machiavelli’s Prince would deliberately employ violence to achieve a desired
end (the pacification of a principality, for instance) the suffering it causes is not done so
for its own sake but to achieve a higher end. According to Nietzsche, the truly effective
Prince would discharge his will involuntarily. One in possession of the instincts
subtending such a native volition would have no need of a guide book such as
Machiavelli’s! And as for those who would benefit from such advice? They would likely
fall into the category of the weakling who harms others to see what suffering he can
cause.
The notion of an unconscious discharge of strength would seem to be at odds with
a “strategic application” of violence; in healthy society’s the strong unconsciously focus
their strength into endeavors that increase their power, but in decadent societies they must
consciously direct this will into acts that achieve this via a strategic utilization of
predominant reactive milieu. They strive to make their actions active by overcoming that
which marks them with the degenerative qualities characteristic of their era. 696
Nietzsche’s politics emphasizes that order must be imposed to prevent anarchy and to
structure a society from a formless mass.
The only curtailment of “freedom” this entails occurs among those who naturally
possess a strong will when they are prevented from exercising it. Nearly two millennia of
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herd (mis)rule had thoroughly naturalized this state of affairs by Nietzsche’s lifetime:
A morality of the (naturally qualified) rulers is, however, most alien and painful
to contemporary taste in the severity of its principle that one has duties only
towards one’s equals; that towards beings of a lower rank, towards everything
alien, one may act as one wishes or ‘as the heart dictates’ and in any case ‘beyond
good and evil – : it is here that pity and the like can have a place. 697
The inculcation of desire for “freedom” among the herd only produces slave dreams of
liberty.
The prerogative of determining the social order “justly”—which is to say,
naturally—belongs to the healthiest, because they have the will (strength for freedom; not
the “freedom” per se) to do so, and because their instinct for self-determination entails a
comprehension of the ultimate significance and desirability for mankind in their doing so.
It is this latter understanding (which resonates with oft chided patriarchal and hierarchical
forms of authority) which is absent from the herd’s misguided desire for freedom: as it
lacks any awareness of its own disposition, the herd’s desire for freedom leads to
debilitating chaos and explains their coexisting need for subjugation and demand for
leaders to rule them.
Contemporary European society (to include, via a geographically extended
cultural realm, Anglo-European North-America, Australia and New Zealand, etc.), in
which ascetic-consumerist priests rule out of the spirit of revenge, are the cumulative
product of the reversal of values that privileged slave morality over natural order. This
gradually induced the schizophrenic “recognition” of the desirability for the best to
command and simultaneous disdain for any hierarchizing authority, with the result that
the worst govern a coarsening society characterized by an ever increasingly boorish
culture that panders to the lowest common denominator (an ochlocratic kakistocracy, that
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is: rule by the worst mob factions). The analogy of mental illness is appropriate. In our
ultra-liberal-modern era the unmitigated simulacrum is a hallucination symptomatic of
collective psychosis. While striving to overcome themselves to become who it is they are,
the objective of healthier, more fortunate specimens in globality must be to medicate the
herd with a modified variation of the simulacrum to counterbalance dangerous swings
between delusive mania and paralyzing depression that squander society’s energies and
prevent its effective ordering.
Nietzsche considered efforts to raise the mob’s awareness of its own
wretchedness or to “expose” them to the reality of their miserable (and allegedly
repressed) condition at once counterproductively cruel and stupid. He therefore despised
formulators of fictive, dialectically self-validating emancipatory programs that incited the
masses to rebel against their putative “oppressors”. Nietzsche describes as “cursed
seducers” and “scholarly oxen,” those such as (Plato’s) Socrates, St. Paul, Martin Luther,
Kant, Mill, as well as all 19th century dialecticians and socialists, as having galvanized
the herd’s spirit of revenge through work’s that resonated as expressions of the negative
will to nothingness as nihilistic power, and thereby validated the impulse to ressentiment
and / or (re-)dedicated the masses to slave-morality.
In a natural order the strongest provide the masses outlets for the expression of
positive forces in ennobling cultural projects through which they may emulate their
highest exemplars. Through a sublimation and contortion of entropic reactive forces in
our ultra-liberal-modern era multiple simulacrums normalize perceptions of happiness
through acts of consumption, so that the herd finds pleasure in striving for material
rewards. Numerous, overlapping and ever-intensifying neo-liberal practices distract,
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absorb and counter-intuitively enable them, across socio-economic and class divisions, to
satisfy desires originating in and circulated by increasingly more sophisticated spectacles
of desire. 698 Established on a foundational narrative consisting of principles of legal
equality and inalienable, universal human rights, the hegemonic simulacrums of capital
process decrease the instinctual fear and timidity of the herd to provide them with an
ersatz, albeit productive, sense of power as well as a schizophrenic sense of anxiety (to
keep them working) coupled with a narcotic feeling of security 699. As a result even those
with the healthiest constitutions, the strongest individuals, presently succumb to
prevailing slave-moral herd values that are antithetical to their native volitions. These
would-be exceptions are left wracked with a bad-conscience in the midst of the crowd
which coerces conformity with its values. But it also makes them timid and
unthreatening, perceptions that can be used, given the right conditions and opportunities,
to mask their innate power.
Nietzsche’s futural vitalist politics aims to cultivate conditions for maximal
functioning of a pan-European society through the ethos of ‘good Europeanism’, which
must be understood as both a psychological temperament and corporeal abode hospitable
to the development of the noblest faculties of every authentic individual—the ethos
propaedeutic to ‘good Europeanism’. He likens the ideal conditions for the breeding of
free spirits to “a tropical region” or a hothouse conducive to the development of “strange
and choice plants”. 700 The necessary environment for their flourishing would in a real
sense arise spontaneously wherever the Übermenschen happened to meet. Recognizing
one another’s “free conscience in those things that today are most undervalued and
prohibited,” they spur one another to greater feats of self-perfection in brief instants and
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chance encounters. Or they might break their solitude to seek longer moments of
mutually fortifying companionship in prearranged meetings or even communal
arrangements of more extended duration. In whatever form they develop communities
“with [their] own sphere of life”. 701
Whatever the interval of their enlivening encounters, the event of their meeting
would always conduce—in ways however unexpected or seemingly insignificant—with
the eventual emergence of an authentic philosophical camaraderie capable of sustaining a
higher culture for the fullest flourishing of humankind’s most vigorous specimens. These
are the “masters of the earth” of whom Nietzsche speaks (and about whose character and
purpose Hitler and the National Socialists fundamentally misunderstood / misconstrued),
as Dionysian artists and philosophers; a “race” to whom all free spirits belong, defined as
a type by the similar instinctual organization of their drives and impulses symptomatized
by their individual, native volitions—the distinctive and rare conative disposition or
anticipatory resoluteness that confers “an excess of strength for beauty, bravery, culture,
manners to the highest peak of the spirit” and enables them to go “beyond good and
evil”. 702
This would (as Nietzsche suggests and Heidegger, in a different albeit related
context makes explicit), require the creation of a particular mode of dwelling in the
world—a spiritually mature consciousness of their distinctive emplacement and shared
experience of ubiety as ‘good Europeans’—that would foster the lived-environment and
care-structure necessary for overcoming the hegemonic, all-too-human discourses
enforced by the globalization complex—the unnatural ascetic values of our day. 703
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As artist-warriors who battle apathy and resignation—the resistance they need to
overcome to become who it is they are—they have the will to take responsibility for
themselves, and in so doing they attract like types whilst repelling the weak, to create an
environment for the breeding of a higher species man. The war they wage is what teaches
them to be free (to paraphrase Nietzsche: TI: IX-38). It is through the struggle of that
combat that their inherent, covalent bonds ineluctably, magnetically, draw them, the
rarest exceptions, together. Through their recognition and development of the qualities
and proximal conditions most conducive to the formation of the healthiest types, they
attain value by exploiting those they are able to dominate and honoring the victor.
Becoming indifferent to hardship, cruelty, deprivation, even to life… The peoples
with any value at all became valuable, and not through liberal institutions: great
danger made them into something deserving of respect, the danger that first made
us know our resources, or virtue, our arms and weapons, our spirit, – the danger
that forces us to be strong … First principle: you must need to be strong, or else
you will never become it. 704
In our era it is from the universal imposition of a European cultural residue, the decadent
anti-natural slave-morality that sustains the herd’s ressentiment and bad-conscience that
those whose native volition imbue them with healthy instincts find themselves needful of
strength. The strength they must develop by actualizing the full complement of their
instinct, drives and impulses, is ultimately the will to resist—to gird themselves against—
the liberal institutions that impair culture’s proper life-affirming function and squander
the potentials of nascent, more authentic modes of life.
In the ideal community envisaged by ‘good Europeans’, one in which the
independence of each is guaranteed by the shared and respected need for an authentically
agonistic setting for the egoistic maximization of self by all, the best might realize their
387

extraordinary potential relatively unmolested by ascetic-consumerist priests of
ressentiment so as to emerge from their practicum invulnerable; capable of resisting and
simultaneously defusing the dangers posed to their nascent greatness by the leveling
conformity imposed by the herd. 705
As aforementioned, Nietzsche maintains that since the Christian-Platonic (slavemoral) inversion of classical Greek, pagan virtues, widespread decadence has
handicapped the rare, healthy exceptions that do occur, whether within or outside of the
mob. The class structures of the contemporary world that have resulted from the antinatural values perpetuated by the Christian-Platonic will-to-truth continually deprive
those endowed by nature with a superior instinctual organization of productive outlets for
expending their force. Quite opposite the caste distinctions required in the Law of Manu,
which Nietzsche praised for their hygienic discipline and cultivation of particular cultural
forms of life, our modern categories of class comprehensively corrupt and/or retard the
becoming of the best types; whether poor or rich, provided a top-flight, mediocre or
inadequate education, or whatever level of income attained, our modern class categories
thwart the potential greatness of would-be free spirits.
Class distinctions in our ultra-liberal-modern world ramify its pervasive
decadence, frustrating the best individuals’ will to power and condemning them to the
predilections of the mediocrity-loving herd. The inversion of the natural order of rank
(that otherwise might have enabled them to reach a healthy, authentically agonistic
society’s top echelons) stymies the dynamism these individuals, turning their strength in
on themselves. Incapable of resignation and uninterested in the crowd’s approval they are
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especially vulnerable to being afflicted with ennui. 706 They may despair or rage, become
anti-social, be condemned as criminal or deemed insane.
Unironically, these outcomes intensify decadence throughout society and amplify
its reactive force in myriad expressions of negative will to nothingness as nihilistic
power, furthering the perverse ultra-liberal-modern “cause” of ascetic-consumerist priests
of ressentiment. This all-too-human agenda endeavors to realize the radical equality of all
human beings, or the elimination of meaningful differences, through technological
rationality and the standardization of all desire. This also entails a selective equivocation
of rank and natural distinctions, a process operationalized and perpetuated through a web
of popular discourses, which combine to exercise discernable affects on the political
organization and functioning of Anglo-European societies, as Nietzsche notes:
‘Equality’ (a certain factual increase in similarity that the theory of ‘equal rights’
only gives expression to) essentially belongs to decline: the rift between peoples,
between classes, the myriad number of types, the will to be yourself, to stand out,
what I call the pathos of distance, is characteristic of every strong age. The
tension, the expanse between the extremes is getting smaller and smaller these
days – the extremes themselves are ultimately being blurred into similarity … All
of our political theories and constitutions (very much including the ‘Reich’) are
consequences, necessary results of the decline; the unconscious effects of
decadence have even come to dominate the ideals of some of the sciences. 707
Nietzsche goes on to volunteer a scathing criticism of the discipline of sociology,
socialists and Herbert Spencer himself for the uses they respectively made of their own
instincts of decay. The social sciences, as they would come to be known, were emergent
in late-19th century academe and exemplified the nihilistic will-to-truth already evident to
Nietzsche through discourses of scientism (what today might be referred to as physicsenvy), with its emphasis on empiricism, its conference of a positivistic disposition on
scholars and its initially distinctive statist logic (a logic that arguably persists in the
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disciplines of political science and international studies). Nietzsche thought harmful this
will-to-truth, especially when enforced through broader sets of norms, or universalized as
a foundation for sociological value judgments. Furthermore, the statist logic that came to
prevail globally through the (post-1945) San Francisco – Bretton Woods international
system was counter-productive to the development of the quasi-cosmopolitan ethos
characteristic of his ‘good Europeanism’.
Nietzsche repeatedly suggests that whenever a society degenerates sufficiently a
very real danger exists that strong individuals with damaged instinctual urges validated
by a culture of decadence might succeed in gaining power. Familiar with the rabid antiSemitic proto-fascists of his day, this is likely how Nietzsche would have understood the
rise to power of the Nazis in Germany. In circumstances such as those present in a
dissipated post-war Germany, where bitterness arose over the crippling terms of peace
imposed by the Versailles treaty, tyrants may exercise their strength nefariously,
intensifying a nihilistic order by focusing the volitional resources of the herd on enemies
either within or outside of their society. Nietzsche anticipated the dangers posed to the
future of Europe from the symptoms of decadence in his era:
Today, when the herd animal alone obtains and bestows honors in Europe, when
‘equality of rights’ could all too easily change into equality in wrongdoing: I
mean into a general war on everything rare, strange, privileged, the higher man,
the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, creative fullness of
power and mastery… 708
The extremism of the Nazi annihilating will-to-level equaled that of the Soviets, though
toward putatively differing ends. Scholars of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory,
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno recognized these two contending ideological
movements as not entirely antithetical extremes of the same liberal project, but, also after
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Nietzsche, saw that the advanced capitalist, post-industrial societies of the West, and in
particular the United States (a realm that now includes the European Union and the
highly developed economies of the Asian Pacific rim and which comprises the centers of
the globalization complex), though an arguably more moderate instantiation of the same
liberal-modern phenomenon, posed a potentially equal danger to the noblest potential of
mankind precisely through its facades of self-imposed, institutionalized restraint.
Nietzsche realized that the preeminence of the herd’s negative will to nothingness
as nihilistic power, as symptomatized in widespread social decadence, has historically
preceded paroxysms of violence in which a corrupt slave-leader can become capable of
taking over, and inevitably in such cases, of driving the lemming society he commands
over a cliff edge of self-destruction (as in Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia). 709 Although
Nietzsche recognized that the conquering exploits of an ascendant people enjoying
superlative health can be productive and salubrious (even, counter-intuitively, for those
over whom they triumph), these spasms of suicidal violence are nearly always ruinous to
the higher culture sustained by the society which they destroy from within. In the spirit of
the anti-essentialist, quasi-cosmopolitan ‘good Europeanism’ he envisaged for the future
of mankind, Nietzsche stridently opposed the most pernicious chauvinisms of his era,
asserting:
We who are homeless [i.e.: ‘we who belong to no particular nation’] are too
manifold and mixed racially and in our descent, being “modern men” and
consequently do not feel tempted to participate in the mendacious racial selfadmiration and racial indecency that parades in Germany today as a sign of a
German way of thinking and that is doubly false and obscene among the people of
the “historical sense”. We are – and let this be our word of honor – ‘good
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Europeans’, the heirs of Europe, the rich, oversupplied, but also overly obligated
heirs of thousands of years of European spirit. 710
After discrediting the irrational prejudices subtending the conventional values of the
disparate herds of Europe, such ‘good Europeans’ resolve to live with conditions of
uncertainty (which is to say that they recognize that there is no other choice, if they are to
live authentically) and posit a non-essentialist, anti-reductionistic account of human
existence that is not specifically attributable to any conventional state of being, but which
must be cultivated through disciplinary regimes of self creation and experimentation
(auto-poiesis) that facilitate the maximal passion (eros) of every individual toward their
ultimate, individual excellence (arête). Itinerant wanderers who freely traverse unfamiliar
locales, cross socio-political frontiers and transit conceptual borders to chart surprising
physical, psychological and conceptual topographies of their own creation, Nietzsche
hoped that his intrepid ‘good Europeans’ would thereby disseminate their continually
interrogated values in opposition to moralizations of life that tend to petrify into
dissipative convictions.
The obligations of such free spirits include maintaining the values and ideals of
their noble idea of Europe—an idea more broadly comprehensible as a view to the
possible future of mankind—through its continual, agonistically achieved reinvigoration,
so to perpetuate it into the future and ensure its perduration. As orchestrators of
contestation and revealers of latent human potentials as well as undiscovered avenues to
possible perfections they exert a will to power capable of radically altering familiar
political concepts and the geographies which they entrench, generating new sovereign
spaces and socio-political realities. Their willing produces an aesthetic perspective on life
and corresponding disposition that challenges enfeebling, media-generated simulacrums
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of the present via new re-presentations—novel political myths—to rejuvenate authentic
health and affirm difference (becoming-other). They enhance their own type and
condition the possibility of a sustained higher culture from which emergent geniuses
capable of augmenting the maximal thriving of the species man might draw succor and
cultivate an agonistic milieu for its best (strongest) members.
‘Good Europeans’ thus become artists who envisage the future and act to realize it
through their creative labors. Through the abstract potentials of globality they develop a
shared sense of confraternity (Verbruderung), with like-minded individuals who they
come to recognize and appreciate. They may or may not share their own particular ubiety
with all these individuals, but are affirmed by the differences they discover as a
revelation of the variety of alternate possibilities for existence. These are interrelated
aspects of a mentality actualized through their corporealization (embodiment) of the
higher culture they seek to personify; itself the spiritualization of a broader societal
acculturation initiated by their transformed corporeality. 711
According to the values of ‘good Europeanism’, the juridical state of exception
would disappear as those who sought to universalize their own tyrannical will-to-truth
were made to persuade their peers of its preeminent worthiness. At the highest levels of
society, where a radical skepticism toward all truth claims would intuitively prevail, they
would invariably fail. None would be afflicted with ressentiment in the sense in which
the all-too-many are today. Therefore none would seriously advocate anti-natural
hierarchies or employ a corrupt state apparatus to advance their own narrow, egoistic
agenda while insulating it from challenges, holding outside agonistic engagement through
a systematic exclusion of healthier challenges—brought by their would-be betters. By
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applying some (presently impracticable?) variety of the state of exception consisting of
the exclusion of any exclusionary practice likely to inhibit salubrious and authentic
becoming-other, no individual would be unrecognized by or held outside the law, per se.
Those who would corrupt the authentic agonistic order by imposing an unnatural,
notional foundation for truth would simply be powerless and likely be deemed delusional.
Those moved to argue that such exclusionary practices paradoxically entail their own
forms of cruelty and constitute a “tyrannical” will-to-truth (the intrinsic dilemma of all
forms of political organization that strive to maximize liberty), would always be welcome
to advocate alternatives, consistent with the agonistic ethos of the invigorated polity. In
this way Nietzsche’s aristocratic elitism can be seen to conduce with a thoroughly
agonistic political organization (such as a radical democracy), as Hatab so brilliantly
elaborated.
In the futural politics of Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ the state of exception
applies equally to those who employ irrational chauvinisms to define themselves in
opposition to others in purely negative, exclusionary terms, as it does to those who take a
wholly ironic stance toward themselves. The former fall under the state of exception
because they embrace the cruelty of valuing unproductively, in that their valuations do
not serve the purpose of self-examination and are therefore nihilistic; the latter for
threatening the condition of possibility for positing values of any sort (often out of an
unwillingness to be so cruel).
The persecution of difference (the political problem of otherness), as the most
intractable vestige of reactive force expressed via a negative will to nothingness as
nihilistic power, is at last to be overcome at both the micropolitical (individual) and
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macropolitical (community) levels through broadly inclusive and constructive principles
whose shared aim is the combination of the best traits exhibited in myriad
personifications of difference that evolve through continual agonistic challenges.
Nietzsche’s European spirit identifies such a pluralistic objective and translates it back
into philosophically materialist and naturalistic terms that reject anti-natural liberal
ideals.
Globality, a product of reaction to the imperatives of globalization, generates
active forces and potentials that globalizing institutions and processes seek to co-opt, and
whose demands they act to fulfill, if lately and imperfectly. As globalization’s
institutions, processes and forces are compelled to enact and exemplify the liberal values
with which they represent and insinuate themselves and from which they derive their
legitimacy, they are continually retranslated through numerous mimetic acts. In this way
the globalization complex’s regulative values, methods of production and means of selflegitimation may be co-opted through their own process of transmission and applied to
unexpected innovations and uses. A positive perspective suggests that the at once easily
universalized and subtly coercive organizing principles of globalization may be made
inclusive of every racial, ethnic and cultural realm and may produce truly great
individuals from any of them. The simulacra they sustain coercively direct the attention
and energies of the herd into productive activities that create positive means and
opportunities for empowerment that the strongest may exploit. Thus the healthiest may
actively realize their potential even as all boats, as it were, rise. As the generative power
of the EU, a locus of globalization’s forces, naturalizes the ressentiment and bad
conscience of the multitude, it simultaneously enables the possibility for self-overcoming
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by the fiercest individuals. But from a negative perspective, the abstract potentials of
globality may also be put to nefarious uses, such as terrorist acts and other forms of
violence that are then seized upon as legitimating pretexts for the reinforcement of
globalization’s most all-too-human reactive prerogatives and the expansion of an
Orwellian “big-brother” society of hyper-surveillance and control.
Thus globalization’s profusion of simulacra provides a crucial template to account
for the anti-natural liberal expectations of the herd (the ideological remainder of postenlightenment humanism) and empower the best to overcome and adjust its simulation of
reality. In the post-modern age of globality the healthiest may thus become normentrepreneurs capable of nomothetic (custom making) acts, of advancing culture as
“artist-philosopher militants” 712 and of breeding an invigorated species man to spur
humanity to new heights as “warrior-genealogists” 713. Conversely, the most reactive and
nihilistic may also be empowered to commit heinous acts of indiscriminate barbarity.
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Section Two: Globality and the Revaluation of Declining Values
Part One: Globality
An unanticipated product of globalization is the aforementioned condition of
globality, a largely abstract phenomenon with concrete manifestations theorized by many
prominent international relations and globalization scholars, including Martin Albrow,
Roland Robertson, Ulrich Beck, Marc Augé and Martin Shaw, among others. I fuse
significant elements of the most compelling definitions of globality in the context of
Nietzsche’s analytical framework detailed above to demonstrate how his good Europeans
might identify and exploit the abstract potentials it presents and transmute the reactive
forces of the conventional globalization complex thereby. Their aim is to hasten
mankind’s self-overcoming toward a transhuman future, and globality, I seek to show,
may be used as a means to achieve that.
Also combined in my definition of globality is an appurtenance of certain of
Gilles Deleuze’s (Nietzschean) conceptual innovations, specifically the event, the
haecceity and multiplicity. Not a simple paraphrase of discarded base / superstructure
arguments such as those advanced by structuralist critical theorists of political economy,
the distinction I describe between globalization (and the complex of forces, institutions
and processes sustaining and perpetuating it) and the abstract potentials comprising the
condition of globality is a thoroughly Nietzschean one.
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In this section I review prominent conceptions of globality to situate my own
amalgamated notion of it and demonstrate its relevance as a means for subverting
conventional globalization and its salience to the project, broadly conceived, that
Nietzsche set for future wanderers and spiritual nomads. I do so to establish how the
dynamic potential of globality should be understood from a Nietzschean perspective
(according to his vitalist politics and power ontology) as ramifying the active forces
expressed through a positive will to creative destruction as generative power by presentday good Europeans. I shall then explicate how Nietzsche’s good Europeans—where ever
they happen to be physically located in the world—might identify and exploit those
potentials through regimes of self-discipline (askesis) that spur others, according to their
disparate capacities and enthusiasms (eros), to engage in similar nomothetic acts of selfcreation (auto-poiesis).
To reiterate, globality is the unanticipated potential arising as a consequence of
globalization’s organization of human bodies and their myriad activities in and as they
are constructive of a hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern world. Globality can in part be
conceived of as consisting of spaces created inadvertently through conventional
globalization, the latent capabilities of which go largely unrecognized. These unutilized
spaces or capacities are the spandrels of globalization’s architecture, a byproduct of its
construction of international life.
On a global scale traces of it are evident in multiple, dynamic interactions spurred
by the ideals and corresponding form of life the globalization complex universally
imposes. It consists of subtle and overt resistances, creative appropriations, subversive
inversions and the adoption of camouflage to defy the prerogatives of globalization. It is
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symptomatized by a positive, radically life-affirming world-view (or Weltanschauung)
typified by active celebration and encouragement of difference. It is detectable if looked
for, but requires certain conceptual corrections of what passes for “reality” in order to be
properly understood, like dark matter, the presence of which can only be discerned by its
bending of the light of distant objects that passes through it.
The growing relevance of globality and its affective power as an emerging
disposition of new modes of being in the world is confirmed by Albrow, who writes that
globality,
brings human endeavors into relation with the extent and materiality of the globe
as a whole. Political and economic activity calculate on global scope and
consequence, which the global forces released by the aggregate impact of human
activity on the environment react back on that very activity. Globalism becomes a
main aspect of the meaning of human life. 714
Globality arises via interactive, concernful engagements with difference and the
becoming-other that is making possible new meanings, kinds of play and forms of
expression as power. It, as well as the global age whose advent it signals, is largely
analogous to the creative self-overcoming pursued by Nietzsche’s free spirits or ‘good
Europeans’. Albrow himself goes on to acknowledge Nietzsche’s anticipation of critical
aspects of its prevailing ethos, stating:
Nietzsche had intimations of it [the Global Age] in speaking of an ‘age of
comparison’ where various views of the world, customs and cultures can be
compared and experienced simultaneously [Albrow refers here to HH: I-23]. He
suggested moreover that there would be no need for everyone to think alike in the
manner of Kant’s universal morality. He seemed to intimate that both the nationstate and universal order, point counterpoint of modernity, would be
surpassed.” 715
By referencing Nietzsche’s critique of Kant’s categorical imperative and desire to
philosophize for a future ‘beyond good and evil’, Albrow hints at the even deeper
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significance of globality as the prevailing—and distinctly Nietzschean—ethos of an
emerging global age. Amenableness to difference and an apposite ability to productively
contend with the challenges it poses conditions the particular temperament necessary to
recognize and exploit abstract potentials of globality. By extension, the outlook conferred
by it aptly captures the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness of good
Europeanism—the greatest hope of our age.
Further connections to Nietzsche’s prescient anticipation of what are arguably the
most radical features and emancipatory potentials of contemporary life under the
dissipative, hegemonic globalization complex, are explicated by Ulrich Beck. Beck
writes of Nietzsche’s identification of it as an intrinsically agonistic, historically
incremental process, a development of natural capacities through the broadening and
amassment of human experience. He states, “the globality that Nietzsche sees before his
eyes does not suddenly arise all at once, but includes centuries of living with and against
one another.” 716
The ethos of contemporary globality, according to Beck, is indicated by
Nietzsche’s project of destroying the prevailing decadent values of late-modernity via
their comprehensive revaluation. Beck therefore asserts that:
[F]or Nietzsche, the destruction of values is evidently not an end in itself; it is
supposed to create the space for rejoicing and laughing together [Mit-Lachen] in a
process of cross-cultural (and ‘cross-truth’) dialogue – through others whose
masks one has pulled on, through the masks one has oneself become and sees
with the eyes of others… so that there is space for a simultaneous reduction and
expansion of moral standards and demands… tolerance radically reconceived and
practiced in two directions at once: reduction of one’s own sovereign moral
territory in order to seek cross-cultural dialogue with others and others’ truths...
opens up the opportunity for a global morality of tolerance. For Nietzsche… that
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contact with the certainties of others can take place in an experimental sphere of
experience and action. 717
That experimental sphere correlates directly, in Beck’s estimation, with the everdiversifying abstract potentials of globality.
It is a realm in which Nietzsche’s free spirits, wherever located, become who it is
there are. This requires them to inhabit an originally European conceptual framework, for
which the manifold discourses operationalized by the globalization complex serves as
point of entry. It is one descended from that within which Nietzsche’s critique of
liberalism and late-modernity, the Christian–Platonic will to truth and European
decadence occurred. From this conceptual vantage point healthy ‘spiritual nomads’ may
interrogate, assimilate, disrupt and subvert those essentialist discourses whilst
simultaneously challenging the dominance of the globalization complex’s institutions,
forces and processes. They thereby subject it to hybridic alterations through myriad
engagements with difference, productively othering—or destroying—it in multiple,
transcultural and ultimately life-affirming ways. Across disparate settings such
individuals produce new forms of life through the creative destruction of their former
values (values discredited by the globalization complex), as well as those Euro-centric,
universalizing values imposed from the outside.
On the positive side of the evaluative ledger suggested by Nietzsche’s vitalist
politics, the aforementioned creative co-optations by the strong instill a new appreciation
of difference (if even primarily of their own), corresponding with the ethos of Nietzsche’s
‘good Europeanism’. On the negative side it may generate reactive responses that exclude
the other by way of an intensification of globalization’s conferral of European nihilism.
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This Falling back into the Publicness of the They (to put it in Heideggerian parlance), is
symptomatic of weakness—the ill-constituted instinctual organization common to
declining forms of life (typified by human herds and their slave moral values systems,
e.g.: the Abrahamic and Buddhist traditions), and results in the petrification of types
according to essentializing (and always-already anti-natural) ideals. Such responses risk
fomenting ideological extremism and hostility to all difference as evidenced by formerly
common and arguably still latent Euro-centric colonialist prejudices of superiority and
the agendas of some contemporary terrorist groups.
However, the positive, life-affirming response to the reactive pathos of the
globalization complex requires exceptional health, the conative disposition or
anticipatory resoluteness involuntarily expressed in the native volition of free spirits. It is
only possible through rigorous self-examination, exceptionally broad experience of the
world (experience that may be brought to the most isolated places through globalization)
and an inter-active appraisal of and engagement with it. The unpredictable, syncretic
fusing and/or disruption of disparate traditions and worldviews constitute actualizations
of the abstract potentials of globality, which are latent in the encounters between the
Euro-centric globalization complex and its outside.
Beck further suggests that Nietzsche believed productive cross-cultural criticism
to be essential because “[o]nly self-legislation and self-questioning can together open us
up and strengthen us for the challenges of international life.” 718 Nietzsche, who lived and
worked between four European countries, certainly appreciated the expanded and
enriched perspective on the world and humankind’s diverse condition attained through
the living of an international life. His vitalist politics and perspectivalist epistemology
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developed directly out of this broad experience and enabled him to partially foresee the
dynamic Bildung and corresponding openness of the Weltanschauung characteristic of
contemporary globality.
Martin Shaw defines globality similarly, but with a more specific concern with
globalization’s creation of the global, a futural condition that he sees actively
transforming everyday socio-economic and political life in quantifiable and qualitatively
demonstrable ways.
New relations of politics, economics and society, as well as of the national and
international aspects of all these relations … [have] begun to be seen as a new
principle or structure of social relations, increasingly actual as well as practical.
Globality… is the condition or state in which things are global. The idea of
globality represents the global as something increasingly achieved, real and
manifest, globality represents not just certain trends within the modern world, but
a new condition or age in which the latter is brought into question. Globality
represents a sufficiently fundamental shift in the very principles on which modern
social organization is built for us to question the continuation of modernity.
Globality does not just dissolve, but supplants the classic modern framework.
Globality is not merely a late – or disintegrative – form of modernity but a new
structure of society and thought. 719
Although globality may have the potential to supplant the classic modern framework and
arguably is doing so, it undeniably has a very long way to go. This is largely because it
evolved out of the ultra-liberal-modern tenets of globalization, and each innovation and
transmutation of reactive globalizing forces and processes is gradually re-territorialized
or co-opted by the institutional framework describing the globalization matrix.
The amalgamic notion of globality I employ substantially draws from Beck’s,
Albrow’s and Shaw’s conceptions respectively, but takes it as a continuously changing
set of hybridizing, manifold potentials and creative opportunities that give rise to a
transformed conative and cognitive disposition. The new condition Shaw describes is
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developing as a set of qualia transforming attitudes around the world. It is empirically
demonstrable through some of its effects, but outward signs of changed expectations over
the last few decades do not entirely corroborate the claims of a thoroughly transformed
mentality postulated by certain over-excited exponents of technological innovation and
ever-increasing speed. The most “globalized” citizens of the world are likely to be
automaton herd creatures of bad-conscience emulating the ascetic-consumerist priests of
ressentiment they idolize. They are afflicted with a “dishonest mendacity” vis-à-vis the
values they enact; they are the good people whose success justifies what they do, and so
they are wholly uninterested in shifting “the very principles on which modern social
organization is built.” 720
It is usually the case that in order to achieve conventional success within the
machinations of the globalization complex its guiding principles have to be uncritically
towed. Questioning the foundational tenets of the discourse is the first step to ostracism
and “failure” in the conventional sense. Rejecting the value-terms of globalization
automatically disqualifies one for participation; “team-players” are what are needed in
the global marketplace. Individuals are made into cogs in a much bigger machine, which
for the all-too-many is a sufficient basis for the one-dimensional meaning and purpose
they require. However, for the more sensitive exceptions, free spirits and good
Europeans, it is likely ruinous. In our thoroughly democratic, ultra-liberal-modern age the
globalized citizen-zombies would likely support any measures, however anti-natural, to
preserve their comfortable, if insensitive, existence.
In considering the notion of the “globalized locality,” Martin Albrow sees
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globality as a condition in which:
Images, information and commodities from any part of the earth may be available
anywhere and anytime for ever-increasing numbers of people world-wide, while
the consequences of world-wide forces and events impinge on local lives at any
time (‘globality’). 721
While “Albrow is skeptical of postmodern deconstructions of the social change wrought
by globalization,” he considers the role it has played in replacing modernity with a new
supranational, or “universal” discourse. This seems curious as universalism is one of the
five principle doctrines (along with modernism) of post-Enlightenment liberalism.
Eade, et. al., describe exciting phenomena that would seem at odds with classical
modernity and its significance, but as the last decade and a half have demonstrated,
largely reassert those meanings in little altered form. In that globalization is ushering in a
truly ‘global age’ they assert it entails:
The deterritorialization of traditional concepts, their disaggregation and
resynthesis, their extension ‘to embrace new realities’ and their global
operationalization as well as ‘the generalization of local concepts to the level of
global relations and their assimilation into a transnational discourse. 722
Of course, conventional globalization perfectly consists with the Enlightenment tenet of
universalism, which typifies and constitutes a fundamental aspect of the ideology of
liberal modernity.
The reactive impetus of globalization processes—which symptomizes the
negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power of the ascetic- consumerist priests of
ressentiment—does lead to deterritorialization of autochthonous cultures and traditions
and their resynthesis with ‘Western’ modes of production and consumption. Although
this has quantifiably disruptive effects and fosters qualitatively measurable reaction, it
also intensifies agonism in those cultures and encourages redefining identic categories
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and notions of selfhood in both positive and negative ways. In the long term this
externally imposed negotiation of values should prove fructifying. But what the positive,
futural dimension of this in fact describes is the abstract potentials of globality not a
significant transformation of the all-too-modern globalization complex. Similarly, for
Ulrich Beck, “[g]lobality means that we [are] living …in a world society in the sense that
the notion of closed spaces has become illusory. No country or group can shut itself off
from others. Various economic, cultural and political forms therefore collide with one
another, and thing that used to be taken for granted (including in the Western model) will
have to be justified anew.” 723
Roland Robertson focuses on how globality deepens “the scope and depth of
consciousness of the world as a single place,” which is positively demonstrated by greater
physical connectivity and communication that shrinks geographical proximity, spatial
relations and time differences between persons, groups and events. It also inverts and/or
(re)combines traditionally global, regional and local realms to diversify the sociocultural-political roles individuals may inhabit. The case for globality is fortified at the
subjective level by evidence of parallel transformations of attitudes toward the “foreign,”
enlarged contexts for understanding difference and the variety of responses to cultural
forces each reciprocally generates within the other. “Globality …is modernity on a global
scale”, the discourse of which “consists largely in the shifting and contested terms in
which the world as a whole is defined.” 724
Robertson theorizes the production of “glocalities.” These arise from converging
‘flows of information and ideas’ that create transformative possibilities through
conceptual innovations of the practical dimensions of life. Proof of the cognitive change
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that results exists in the growth of collective consciousnesses that link / familiarize
individuals from disparate regions of the world in innumerably diverse assemblages of
shared ambitions, desires and concerns. Such changes in knowledge / awareness lead to
further changes in consciousness, and potentially, expansions of the possible.
‘Glocalization,’ is the term Robertson employs to describe the relationship
between the macro and micro levels of human community in globalization, taken as the
“simultaneity and the interpenetration of what are conventionally called the global and
the local, or – in more abstract vein – the universal and the particular.” 725 Robertson
considers how the interpenetrating forces of globalization encourage a “universalization
of the particular and particularization of universalism,” that transforms the politics of
culture, especially in terms of contentious debates over globalization’s cultural
homogenization. 726 These issues are of particular importance to my Nietzschean analysis.
Difference, or the elimination of it, leading to what as a result of globalization and
globality, is the crucial question here. As the culture of globalization diffuses
particularisms, identities are destabilized. Individuals discombobulated by the shattering
of their illusions of identic permanence then seek compensation for their sense of ennui
and nausea in spectacles of meaning and simulated purpose. These are readily provided in
the form of mediated desires fulfilled through the consumption of products. A renewed
sense of security—and ersatz identity—can be found in the corresponding cultural of
conformity supplied by the very capital processes imposed by the globalization complex.
The shared presuppositions that inform such a “transnational discourse” or notion
of “world society” lie in (and are symptomatic of) the reactive (ultra-liberal) ideology of
globalization, which it extends universally and imposes across cultures, rather than in
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globality, per se. A thoroughly post-modern conception, globality is “concretely”
understood as a phenomenological transmutation of the cognitive capacity developed
through Enlightenment liberalism in the era of ultra-liberal-modernity (culminating in
globalization discourse), and as such is an ideologically neutral conceptual paradigm and
opportunity for becoming-other that multiplies comprehension(s) of our varied, “shared”
realities. Distinguished by its plasticity (an affirmation of the relativity of all “truth” that
enables the fruitful suspension of certainty and conviction; an eruption of
consciousnesses; mutating understandings of the fragmentariness of “subjective” identity;
creative exploitations of the compression / “transcendence” of spatio-temporal relations),
it rejects any semblance of “progress,” allowing instead more definite opportunities for
growth than the injurious values of our epoch’s ultra-liberal-modernity.
Globality is a new condition for and great stimulus to life. Among the conceptual
characteristics salient to its transformative affectivity, globality changes individual
experiences of haecceity. In a related context Deleuze invokes the notion of the
haecceity, which he in part derived from Duns Scotus’ notion referring to the “this-ness”
or unique quality of an entity or object that distinguished it from others of a type.
Deleuze’s idea bears upon the way in which latent globality inheres to conventional
processes and forces of globalization, specifically the subjective ways in which they are
experienced by individuals. Through it we may understand that in striving to realize a
Nietzschean idea of Europe (an “order” conducive to transitioning humankind to a posthuman future), good Europeans must first achieve an enhanced awareness of the dynamic
ways in they are acted upon by globality (via the notion of haecceity or event) through
their emplacement in the world, or ubiety, and the significance of it as constructive of
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their identity, worldview (Weltanschauung) and prospects for becoming. “However much
Nietzsche acknowledges the power of physical geography, he does not endorse any form
of geographical reductionism or determinism.” 727 In asserting that globality constitutes an
emerging form of shared consciousness, I do not mean to argue that it is a reified form of
nous (mind), but that it exists through an increasingly dynamical shared awareness
manifested in enactments of the potentialities to which it gives rise. 728
Globality’s development corresponds with the experience of untimeliness in
Nietzsche’s thought – the abstract potentials of globality describes a haecceity of certain
spontaneous transfiguring cognitive and emotive capacities that arise within globalizing
practices, and are realized and acted upon in / as moments of untimeliness. Deleuze’s reconceptualization of haecceity helps elucidate globality’s somewhat intangible basis and
character. It should be understood as “a mode of individuation distinct from that of a
thing or subject,” synonymous with both “a plane of content and a plane of
expression.” 729 Globality (as a complex haecceity) facilitates productive networks of
forces that in turn give rise to events – affective capacities, incorporeal and bodily effects,
actions, instants of becoming, etc. – that is, the exercise of will to power in its totality. It
comprises a framework for the metamorphosis of things and subjects, allowing for
“diverse assemblages” of active forces that proliferate “multiplicities” and abet
becoming. As globality enables the transmutation of globalization’s deleterious
(enslaving, subjugating) complexes, the latter’s ability to control becomings and
constrain difference is diminished.
This evolving culture and aesthetic of globality amplifies the nisus (native
volition or striving of an entity to expend its force and become other) of that which – and
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some of those whom – globalization’s tyrannical signifying and ordering inhibits, limits
and weakens. In the contemporary European context this energizes the creative pursuit of
change and augments the generation of ‘qualitatively new emergents’. It develops the
sense of “world-historical irony” essential for would-be comedians of the prevailing
ascetic-consumer ideals to prankishly lampoon and seriously challenge the negative
characteristics of conventional European integration and EU expansion as instantiations
of the reactive globalization complex. 730 As an exponentially enhanced set of capacities
for becoming, the abstract potentials of globality symptomatize the nisus of free
spiritedness characteristic of good Europeanism. 731
Against the perception that Nietzsche was uncritical of the ethnocentric biases
informing the imperialistic European worldview which prevailed during his lifetime,
Shapiro asserts that Nietzsche:
[Q]uestions the primacy of the European historical approach, with its ethnocentric
emphasis on development (made into explicit philosophical method in Hegelian
thought): the latter is a recipe for failing to understand the multiplicity of peoples,
the diversity of philosophies and the art and culture of the globe. 732
Not to be misconstrued as a meta-narrative replacement for modernity, globality’s
abstract potentials are at once a catalyst for and means of overcoming it, to be realized by
individuals whose enhanced affective capacity can transform and/or rearrange and/or
destroy the processes, institutions and forces of globalization.
Globality creates opportunities for the most inexorable individuals (those capable
of making innovative use of globalization’s justificatory metanarratives) to restore
humankind to great health. Experimenting with its potential they may realize
unforeseeable expansions of diversity, interconnections between people, and surprising
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combinations of active forces. However, the probability that the positive effects of
globality will be seized upon and realized more broadly to bring about new civic duties,
responsibilities and cultural norms as a basis for the reorganization of macro-political
community is always already partially contingent upon the quanta of force other lesshealthy individuals are capable of expending, both for the resistance they may exert to
block change as well as their inability to effectively contend with (discharge) the new
forces generated by the actions of innovators. The very existence of the weak – as
inefficient capacitors – is endangered by the force of dramatic social change.
The prospects that such commanders of new values may successfully transfigure
our era’s suicidal nihilism improve in proportion to the increased cognizance of globality
their creative acts and greater force of will produce, which gradually enables the weak to
discharge their vitality positively. While it is the objective of mankind’s exemplars to
actively combat ascetic priests of ressentiment (who are instinctively threatened by
globality), passivity, impotence and resignation make the herd-masses they lead largely
irrelevant in a number of regards. As, according to Nietzsche’s understanding, the most
salubrious developments are involuntarily performed and transmitted by erotic
individuals, who thereby stimulate and encourage other exceptionally robust types, a few
generations will be required for the re-ordering of life required to instigate an age of
“great politics.” In the present globality is energizing the most resilient, unsubdued types,
providing them with a contextual setting in which they may effectually utilize their
immense volitional resources to create new values and inspire others to join them.
While globalization propagates societal infirmity, debilitating even the hardiest
human specimens, it counter-intuitively gives rise to globality and enables, as a
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consequence of chance, the nimblest geniuses to transfigure our global cultural crisis and
the individual malady globalization signifies. Over time the self-overcoming / becoming
(value creation) of these pioneers will stir (the meager eros of) less healthy individuals as
well, those more incapacitated, timid types whose vitality is more effectively frustrated
by the hyper-decadence of globalization. The personal, local, national, international and
global struggles of brave “cultural physicians” comprise the foundational acts of a new
harmonious culture. As weaker types are inspired to follow, the “fight” against decadence
is ramified and grows in strength.
The community resulting from the legislations of great artist-philosophers will, as
its power grows, transition mankind into a dynamic future era upon which we are at the
cusp. In the meantime, the efficient self-regulation and surveillance of disciplinary
regimes and punitive methods of carceral control exercised by existing institutions,
combined with simulated political enfranchisement and simulacrums of existential and
ontological fulfillment (all symptomatic of the ressentiment and bad-conscience of our
hyper-decadent epoch the exemplars described above combat), will suffice to subdue and
satisfy the vast, dissipative “majority.” This is necessary to avoid dangerous
revolutionary excesses in the present, so that the herd, by whose own self-directed
violences (indifference, delusions of contentment, resignation, etc.) might implode in
suicidal paroxysms of unrestrained self-loathing, if prematurely challenged by the best.
The transfiguration of the herd’s sustaining meanings and its illusory horizon
must include the illusion of their preservation, which is the maintenance of the status-quo
until the point that the multitude accepts the instigation of a system of natural instincts
and drives corresponding to a set of customs and norms generated by the new cultural
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realm. The feckless masses may then fulfill their function: to work (if unwittingly) at
bettering the species by collectively contributing to the production of geniuses.
Albrow, Robertson and Shaw’s related notions of globality provide a means of
conceptualizing the ethos of our transitioning, ultra-liberal-modern era. Refracted through
the lens of Nietzsche’s vitalism, it is abstract potential characterized by an ascending
trajectory of dynamic forces expressed as positive will to power. Globality is
synonymous with the unbounded nisus of human becoming, the volitional resources in
human capabilities and re-cognition of how they may be actualized. It finds expression in
Nietzsche’s own prescribed ascetic practices (solitude; agonistic friendships; writing and
reading the self; attention to one’s environment and nutrition; and dancing, as expounded
by Hutter) – techniques that enable acts of self-creation (auto-poiesis) which are
inherently defiant of slave-moral ascetic-consumerist values as positive becomings that
enhance Being-toward-ones-ownmost-self. Practices that conduce with realizing
globality’s transformational potentials, they also comprise a technique for comically
mocking and thereby discrediting the anti-natural ideals of globalization.
Though it is impossible to anticipate the affective force of ones’ speech or actions,
or to precisely calculate the effects they may have in the world, the driving eros of
creative acts invariably arouses the passion of others, ramifying the volitional resources
required for the founding of a new epoch. Our evolving estimations, which in periods of
great cultural vitality derive from the acts of esteeming that arise from that mode of being
toward ones very ownness adopted by the strongest, are ultimately a consequence of their
epiphantic experiences (such as realizations of globality’s abstract potentials in our own
era). Their estimations generate and confer values and meanings.
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These estimations convey the struggle (or suffering) and inequality (pathos of
distance) inherent to the effort of becoming authentically beautiful (the maximization of
vitalizing force that emanate from healthy life-forms spontaneously), – that which
corresponds with the dynamic passions, augments the positive will to creative destruction
as generative power, and by extension the “agency”, as it were, of courageous iconoclasts
to whom weaker types are instinctively drawn. Our esteeming of the beautiful—an effort
to vivify existence against the constraints imposed on becoming by the asceticconsumerist herd values that are enforced by the globalization complex—constitutes the
formative basis of self-creation in what ‘good Europeans’ of the present hope is the
dawning age of globality.
These dynamics appear via the impetus to self-overcoming and the pathos of
distance within extraordinary individuals (the political microsphere) through their
distinguishing conative disposition and society (the political macrosphere) via the
transformed ethos, shared expectations and mentality that follows. The momentum ‘good
Europeanism’ and its consequent globality generates through its spreading conative
disposition describes an emergent mode of being and new aim for the political: the
ongoing, agonistic striving to become-authentic as one’s ownmost self, that is (a
Heideggerian echo of Nietzsche’s call to) an increasing desire among the best to become
who it is they are.
Such an ennobling effort is distinctly opposed to resigned acceptance of ones
average-everydayness in the dissipative, difference annihilating environment of
globalization. It is through the continuous renewal of eros and awestruck wonder with the
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world by “adventurous Gewaltmenschen” that the transversally graspable ethos of ‘good
Europeanism’ as globality—as a futural condition of humankind—arises. 733
The empirically demonstrable results of globality (in innumerable micro-level
acts of creation, defiance and subversion that reciprocally condition the changing ethos
and opportunity structure at the macro-level) lead me to optimistically posit a pragmatic
strategy for overcoming and transmuting globalization’s destructive (all-too-human)
effects. This comprises a Nietzschean praxis that utilizes classical skeptic philosophical
thought and Foucault’s Nietzschean notion of ‘techniques of the self.’
Nietzsche resuscitates and engages arguments on being and non-being, that in
textual form date back at least as far as Plato’s dialogue ‘The Sophist’, to challenge the
more recent Western concept of the “individual” in ways that assist a nuanced
comprehension of the role he sees single persons (as complex and conflicted unities)
playing at the micro-political level of (social) life. No person is wholly sovereign or
“individual,” rather we are each a “dividuum,” that is, a multifarious and complex entity.
It would be more accurate and truthful to write individual to connote a Nietzschean
comprehension of the composite entity of a person.
Our reduction to a “self” and others to like singularities confounds our
appreciation and comprehension of the complexity each of us contains. This exposes
another cruelty of existence: we are compelled to generalize about ourselves according to
dominant characteristics and traits, which thereby inflict an identity that ignores the
diversity comprising every person. At the macro-political level of (communal) life the
same over-simplification applies in essentializations based on ethnicity, gender or
cultural characteristics or political party affiliation or the reification of the nation-state.
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Analogous to the illusion of the individual in possession of a distinct identity or “soul”
culminating in anthropomorphizations of nations (as a personification of collective will
which Hegel argued had evolved to such a stage through different modes over millennia
via the zeitgeist or “world-spirit”) and the similarly reactive effort to forge a new
common identity of a “European.”
This effort is seen by contemporary ascetic-priests as advantageous to the
promulgation of the bureaucratic, commercial and popular culture being devised to create
new bonds capable of supplanting the respective national identities of the EU’s member
states that, it is argued, have long impeded the integration and unification of the
continent. Following Richardson, vis-à-vis Nietzsche’s conception of “persons and
societies as synthetic wills,” I assert that just as individuals struggle to master their own
disparate wills (to “unify” the drives and impulses through a regulatory instinctual
framework,) by developing them into a synthetic will at the micro-political level, a
striving at the macro-political level occurs as communities struggle to achieve a synthetic
will of their individual members, giving rise to politics and political life.
In the case of the EU, the ways in which its advocates contend with the tension
between wanting the EU’s “citizen–constituents” to internalize a reductively “unifying”
identity across national borders and its concurrent institutional effort to devise
mechanisms of inclusion to account for the broad spectrum of difference throughout the
EU’s member states often mirrors the dilemma with which (so-called) “individuals” in
Europe must contend in reconciling themselves to their own reductive, imposed forms of
being. It also exposes a fundamental paradox – or hypocrisy – of liberalism, which
sustains the faulty philosophical presuppositions and logic “grounding” these
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existentially reductive and divisive notions of selfhood and agency while maintaining the
putative equality of all. The tenets of liberal modernism prevent persons, conceived as
individuals, from giving a coherent account of themselves as members of disparate
communities; they also, arguably, prevent persons from authentically experiencing
themselves by cultivating a lived denial of their own intrinsic complexity as well as that
of others.
The bad-conscience and ressentiment this inauthenticity aggravates is
exponentially magnified at the level of EU institutions (as a multifarious, albeit molar,
macro-political organism) inducing schizophrenic behavior at numerous levels of the
micro- and macro-political spheres of life within the emergent European polity. These
must be alleviated through a revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe)
instigated by vigorous good Europeans who, empowered by globality are capable of
instantiating a naturalized political order for the highest flourishing of culture.
The good Europeans envisaged by Nietzsche could only achieve this by
exploiting the simulated existential meanings and ontological purposes the EU provides
its citizen-constituents through spectacles of prosperity that seemingly validate the
foundational ideals intrinsic to its legitimacy. Its institutions—bureaucratic instantiations
of instrumentalized reactive force sustaining a spirit of revenge symptomatic of decline—
function as macro-generators of ressentiment and bad-conscience. The conventional
globalization complex, as a myriad of institutions, processes and forces disseminating,
naturalizing and enforcing hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern values, is typified by
such characteristics. Yet, although it is an essentially all-too-human process, it also gives
rise to opposite, form-creating potentials that, properly seized upon, encourage
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transmutations of globalization’s deleterious effects. A radical result of the critical
engagement with and the rethinking of Empire (by those with the strength for it) is a
cognitive transformation that stimulates experimentation to produce qualitatively new
emergents, globality’s life-affirming amplification of striving, impetus and desire
suggests an optimistic “Nietzschean” strategy for overcoming the enervation of asceticconsumerist values in our era.
As aforementioned, globalization is widely deployed term that comprises a set of
inter-related phenomenon. There is much disagreement over the nature of the distinct
aspects of it, its separately complex economic, political and social dimensions, and these
are collectively even more difficult to define. Minimally agreeing that it names a
discernable and ongoing worldwide happening at least, it is necessary to conceive it in
general and particular terms corresponding with its features and there effects at the
global, regional, national and local levels, respectively. Processes of globalization occur
and globalizing institutions operate without regard for political, geographic, cultural or
temporal boundaries. Myriad competing power constellations strive to realize themselves
and their motivating ideal with little regard for traditional socio-political structures. These
agglomerations of interests (transnational movements, corporations, non-governmental
organizations, citizen activists, professional societies, etc.) vie for dominance within and
outside of sovereign nation-states simultaneously. They are giving rise to new, largely
unmapped and unregulated spaces for becoming thereby.
According to Nietzsche’s vitalism, globalization is properly understood as a
complex (abstract body) of socio-cultural events generated and maintained by the
dissipative instinctual system that governs the weakened drives and impulses of our
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hyper-decadent age. As Appadurai asserts, its varied phenomena consist of ideologically
reinforcing institutions, processes and forces that in innumerable combinations stimulate
and comprise emerging planetary ideoscapes, ethnoscapes and technoscapes. 734 These
constitute flows that overrun former conduits of power and channel their force into new
forms of life. These emerging global social, political and cultural phenomena challenge
existing forms of order, which struggle to interpolate and systematize them. But with
their capacity for ordering exceeded by new practices, the existing conventional power
structures fail to adequately contend with or impede their transformation of reality (a
gamut of sometimes interrelated and sometimes disparate realities).
Complicating things further, the varied prerogatives of these continually evolving
power constellations may concurrently reinforce, contradict and conflict with one
another. 735 The major globalizing institutions have compelled a transformation in
relations between states through their facilitation of cooperation across a diverse range of
issues. 736 Yet the ethos of their practices remains very much the same. In the areas of
business, trade and finance, the interests of myriad international, national and
nongovernmental organizations including MNCs and TNCs have promulgated a universal
post-Fordist/Taylorist, or late neo-liberal economic model. 737 The prerogatives of this
regime shaped trading rules and policy to determine the course of economic globalization
– the imposition and hegemony of ultra-liberal-modern values.
Expressed through both institutions and processes of globalization are
international regimes, constituted by normalizing practices instantiated through formal
treaties and informal agreements. These include air, postal and shipping conventions that
establish regimes of conduct to normalize universal standards. 738 Specific to processes of
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globalization are technological developments such as the internet, mass air travel and
communication capabilities that dramatically reduce geographical distance and temporal
space. A ubiquitous mass media disseminates interconnected narratives that privilege and
reinforce Western values.
Global social, environmental and dissident movements are also identified as
globalizing processes—if of an alternative “counter-hegemonic” variety. Finally, forces
of globalization describe the values and ideals, expectations, norms and attitudes aroused
by the aforementioned institutions and processes of globalization. These correspond with
numerous spectacles of identity, freedom and empowerment through representation,
mimesis and consumption, the decadent means by which Empire provides simulacrums
of existential meaning and simulated ontological purpose to the masses. 739
Globalization in its present form is the culmination of an exponentially
accelerating development over the past four centuries. It has occurred in conjunction with
an aggregation of the macro-level drives and impulses characteristic of postEnlightenment liberal-modernity that universalized the state form. 740 Originating in
diverse components of the Western European cultural realm, the assemblage of forces
that would engender in the forces, processes and institutions of globalization ineluctably
extended into and transformed all areas and regions of human life. Much of the increased
velocity of change propelled by globalization has occurred across the past two centuries.
This has had the noted effect of compressing time, both as it is subjectively experienced
and as it objectively reduces production time, distribution time, and the wait for
information. The dramatic shrinking of geographical distances and the conceptual space
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separating people through innovations in transportation and communications coincided
with and ramified these developments.
These developments constitute measurable improvements in the everyday
material conditions of human life, including advances across numerous indices measuring
aspects of human welfare. In Nietzschean terms the institutions, processes and forces of
globalization are logical extensions of the enlightenment pathos for rationalism and
“certainty” expressed via a will-to-truth. The consequences of this will-to-truth have not
been entirely negative, but through disciplinary regimes for organizing life—and
sophisticated forms of akrasia that naturalize inauthenticity—they exercise a bio-power
over individuals by sublimating the ressentiment and bad-conscience their subjects
performatively enact. From this perspective, globalization is an assemblage of
interrelated, fundamentally negative developments that continuously naturalize and
spread dissipative nihilism via the doctrine of neo-liberal consumerism. Similarly
ingravescent conditions hastened the decline of Europe’s vitality through the early
twentieth century, as signs of the same dissipation appeared outside the continent and its
cultural realm. 741 In our own age the globalization complex (or “Empire”) represents the
latest mutation/intensification of the syndrome, a diversely symptomatized infection that
now afflicts disparate cultural traditions outside Europe and debilitates ascending forms
of life with the contagion of (essentially European) decadence.
However, an unanticipated development from out of experiences with
globalization (innumerable continuous negotiations, resistances and modifications of the
norms, practices and understandings of everyday life) is the abstract potentials of
globality. Irrespective of national origin or location, those who may enact and expend the
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superior forces necessary to maintain a tragic, Dionysian worldview (tragic
Weltanschauung), may (consciously or not) realize abstract, positive potentials of
globality through their experience of immersion in the decadent environment of
globalization. As both a new perspective on contemporary life and a practical strategy for
contending with globalization’s deleterious consequences, globality arises not in
dialectical tension with the globalization complex, but rather as a conceptual entry point
to a new, successor epoch to modernity. 742 It is symptomatized by a transformed
consciousness produced through recognition of the accelerating interconnectedness of
contemporary life (and its concurrent transfiguration of Empire).
Awareness of this altered/altering consciousness has prompted political scientists
to distinguish between globality as a phenomenon related to but different from
globalization. As aforementioned, Shaw defines globality in the context of globalization’s
creation of the “global,” in which an altered mentality generated by “new relations of
politics, economics and society,” gives rise to changed—and potentially enhanced
affective capacities. Shaw’s notion of transformed structures of social relations and
relations across diverse realms of human activity suggests the abstract potentials, changed
mentalities and enhanced conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness to which (and
as I have asserted) the state of globality gives rise. It is a condition actively transforming
social life in the present. 743 Among the capable few, globality confers a comprehension
of the how a fundamental shift in the dominant principles of and constitution of the world
may be affected. These individuals may enact those potentials to ultimately produce new
social forms and modes of being that foster creative conceptions of becoming that are
either active or reactive.
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Examples of the former, instances of reactive force expressed in a positive will to
creative destruction as generative power, might include the application of information
technologies to subvert conventional power structures by undermining confidence in
them, or to organize and enhance education, alternative forms of trade circumventing
regulated capital process and to disseminate ideas. Conversely, globality’s abstract
potential may be seized upon to intensify reaction. Examples abound of globality’s
escalation of the negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power among diseased types. It
is exemplified in the manner religious and political militants manipulate the same
networks and information technologies to carry out terrorist attacks. Still others
appropriate it to engage in computer hacking and identity theft – activity which the very
networks that give rise to globality enable and which is not dependent on the social
position or geographic location of the individual, as it is to a far more significant degree
in the organization of conventional (reactive) globalization.
However they utilize the potentials of globality that they identify, they are not
limited to their specific emplacement in the world, but can transcend their ubiety and in a
digitized sense, actually become ubiquitous—exercising their power everywhere
simultaneously. In explicating his related notion of the “globalized locality,” Martin
Albrow asserts that globality:
involves a new kind of connectedness, where events can have simultaneous
effects anywhere on the globe, in which immediate response to a message can be
given and obtained irrespective of distance, in which products and services are the
outcome of a global division of labor, where identical products and services may
be obtained anywhere in the world, or where images and icons receive recognition
worldwide. 744
This remark acknowledges the materialist conception of economic connectedness in the
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world that is essentialized as the objective of globality, particularly by neo-liberal
ascetic—consumerist priests of ressentiment who reify the expanded marketplace as the
font of all that is positive in the recent development of mankind.
However, such an exponential and on-going increase in the global exchange of
goods and services, while positive from the standpoint of consumption and corresponding
improvement in living standards through the fulfillment of human nutritional
requirements, etc. is but a precondition for the actualization of globality’s transformative
potential. The awareness of increased connectedness Albrow sites is significant as such a
precondition and ramifies the identic transformation achieved by increased familiarity
with foreign cultures, customs and perspectives. At the most rudimentary level, what an
individual with the native vitality to imagine alternative becomings for him or herself
may glean from such superficially mundane or even trite experiences as an exotic
restaurant meal or a television news report from an obscure corner of the world cannot be
anticipated. The usually unrecognized task is to extract the eudemonic significance
inherent in ordinary experiences so to construct meaning and purpose for ones’ life from
them.
Even if, following Baudrillard’s thesis in Simulacra and Simulation, the “reality”
we are presented with is an intensely mediated series of representations, or copies of
copies, and our understanding of it and sense of ourselves in relation to it is hyperreal, for
better or worse a certain enrichment of life, nolens volens, also occurs despite whatever
dissatisfactions many will read into such a state of affairs. 745 The ideas and
understandings that might arise from the act of reading a fictional story set abroad or the
experience of befriending an exchange student in ones’ community or traveling abroad
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are entirely contingent and ultimately unpredictable, but the likelihood that novel
alternative becomings might emerge from out of such experiences among healthy
individuals (whose health is indicated in part by both their eagerness for such
diversifying experiences and their receptivity to them) is decidedly greater as a result of
the possibility for increased perspective provided by such latently broadening
experiences.
The hyperreal representation of reality also multiplies by many times our
opportunities for (re)conceiving the world; and even if at many removes from its source
in life, there is no obviously greater reason to fear we know less about “reality” as such
because our impressions of may be grounded on representation, as reality is always
already a partly unique and partly shared product of our individual and collective
interpretive engagement with the world. These experiences, moreover, in both their
number and variety, are indisputably facilitated by greater material exchange. They are,
one can quite easily argue, positive effects of neo-liberal capitalism, or conventional
globalization and its recently hegemonic, yet evolving, political rationality for the
organization of life—the ‘bio-power’ of the globalization complex.
Albrow references the massification (a social phenomenon first theorized by the
critical theorists of the Frankfurt School) that has simultaneously subverted opportunities
for authentic individuality and banalized difference, as well as the normalization achieved
by imposed universal standards and the regularity of production and consumption that
equates the desires and, by extension, experiences of people in disparate parts of the
world. Though the deleterious effects of such transformative events may be exaggerated
by critics whose alarm is heightened by romanticized views of indigenous cultures and a
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desire to preserve certain lifestyles that the inhabitants of said cultures will not or cannot
maintain, the modus operandi of neo-liberal processes (as with its historical precedents)
is impulsive and inconsiderate of that which may impede it in pursuing its objective,
namely monetary profit.
Against the myriad damaging effects of neo-liberal capitalism, 746 whose
simulated existential meanings and ontological purposes desensitize individuals to their
authentic desires and divert them from acting according to their genuine instincts and
potentials for becoming, and which inculcate the majority with the coarse
ascetic/materialist herd values of Empire, opportunities for realizing globality’s potential
are presented when an experience of difference runs across, or intersects with the
anticipated line of our becoming’s trajectory, that is, the expectations we have for
ourselves in a given moment. This provokes a transversal engagement within the
individual with that experience of otherness that imparts something unique and prompts
change within and outside her. 747 However, the significance of the specific outcome of
such an encounter – if one could conceive of any finality to such engagements – cannot,
in most instances, be quantitatively or qualitatively measured or evaluated in an objective
sense. Occasionally the result of such an engagement, of what may be envisaged as a
result of it, and what might be achieved or realized out of it will be stupendous – a truly
transformative event with ramifications for the macro-political, or global, level.
An example of identic transformation cultivated by the EU lies in the multiple and
varied sense of identity many Europeans (“good” in the Nietzschean sense or otherwise)
feel vis-à-vis the political project of Europe. They have, in large numbers (larger than
ever before), come to recognize themselves as at once being citizens of a local
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community (say Edinburgh), a region (Scotland), a nation (the United Kingdom), and a
civilizational / supranational polity (Europe) in the broader world (globality). It is the
capacity to cognitively occupy each of the roles these identities confers simultaneously,
without essentializing oneself according to any one among them that distinguishes the
‘good European’ from the average member of the crowd, whose xenophobic chauvinisms
and patriotic affiliations impede the fullest realization of potential becomings these
identic categories enable. The latter are even less able to transcend these identic
categories in their narrower sense, and overcome themselves thereby, which is the
objective of ‘good Europeans’ via the means provided in the abstract potentials of
globality.
Albrow theorizes globality as a new supranational, pluralistic discourse that
incorporates the beneficial results of globalization while dis- and/or re-placing modernity
to segue the world into a new epoch. The advent of the “global age” he discerns is
prompted by rethinking the most significant questions to communal life:
The recurrence of ideas like ‘society’, ‘state’, ‘community’, welfare’, ‘justice’
suggests that they are not merely modern fixes, because they never acquire a final
meaning. It is a mark of epochal change that they are called in for fundamental
reappraisal. 748
He considers the role globality has played in replacing modernity as a break with the past.
In that globalization (as a complex of processes) suggests just another stage of modern
history, globality, as a transformed conceptual framework, takes the globe as its reference
point to engender a corresponding phenomenological understanding that simultaneously
closes the modern epoch and ushers mankind into a ‘global age’. 749
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Albrow also thinks “we are on much safer ground with [the notion of] ‘globality’
since it carries no connotation of necessary outcomes, for by “putting an end to totalizing
discourses,” globality allows for a broader spectrum of difference and affirms alterity
while remaining indeterminate with regard to the direction of mankind’s future
development 750. Through globality the dawning ‘global age’ “involves the supplanting of
modernity with globality,” a state in which ‘world society’ is better understood as a
‘multiplicity without unity.’ This is symptomatized—to paraphrase John Eade (full
citation above at pp 70)—by the ‘deterritorialization of traditional concepts’, which are
rhizomatically disaggregated from their indigenous contexts and ‘resynthesized’ in
unanticipated ways that make them globally efficacious among types of people and
groups with certain shared interests. 751 For Ulrich Beck:
‘Globality’ refers to awareness of the fact that we are increasingly living in a
‘world society’ in the sense that the notion of closed spaces has become illusory
…from now on nothing which happens on our planet is only a limited or local
event. 752
The simultaneous and unlimited extension, revision and combining of disparate modes of
thought (or perspectives) to embrace new affective realities are a manifestly Nietzschean
activity. ‘good Europeans’ of the early twenty-first century, spurred by their goodconscience, recognize the dependence of human communities upon regulative ideals, so
engage in globally transformative creative acts of self-overcoming for the naturalization
of mankind as ethical improvement.
The change they seek to compel is of the sort that fosters productive agonisms.
Through an authentic agon that fortifies challenges, which themselves build on and
evolve the (presently pseudo-) competitive ethos of capital process, they may cultivate an
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acceptance of suffering that strengthens man. As the affective power of local concepts
and forms of life impact global relations and the global is ever more relevant to everyday
life at the (increasingly relevant) ‘local’ level, the conceptual dyad disappears, deepening
knowledge expands human capacities exponentially, and the assimilative dynamic
contributes to new complexes constitutive of the transnational potentials of globality.
From a similar perspective, Roland Robertson has theorized “glocalization” as a
new framework for comprehending how place is reconceived and physically transformed
in globality. Robertson focuses on how globality deepens “the scope and depth of
consciousness of the world as a single place,” which is “objectively demonstrated by
greater physical connectivity and communication that shrinks geographical proximity,
spatial relations and time differences between persons, groups and events.” 753 By
drawing eclectically from each of these related perspectives and synthesizing aspects of
their respective understandings we may arrive at a syncretic and quite Nietzschean notion
of globality. Shaw’s further contention that the relations and forms comprising globality
body forth a unique framework from “the global as a common consciousness of human
society on a world scale: an increasing awareness of the totality of human social relations
as the largest constitutive framework of all relations,” 754 may be expanded upon by
combining his notions of the global (as an ongoing conceptual transformation) and
globality (as a cognitive framework for re-conceiving our integrating world).
An inadvertent product of globalization itself, globality suggests a new practical,
perspectivalist rationality for our caring engagement with the world. As an altered state of
consciousness that may enable a transmutation of the hegemonic reactive values enforced
by Empire, it evinces a new mentality among those whose perceptive and cognitive
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faculties have been similarly altered by their active, critical engagement with the
emerging global reality. It can be more abstractly, although no less usefully, understood
as symptomatic of an interassemblage haecceity (mood or atmosphere of the speeds and
affects generated) of the dawning epoch. 755 The disposition generated by globality
announces the Dasein (as unity in the becoming of their being in the world) of
contemporary Übermensch, and anticipates future forms of man, the becoming-other of
the species, about whose possibilities—and probable appearance—we are increasingly
aware. 756
Globality conditions the possibility for myriad salubrious, authenticating
developments and affirmative acts. These occur, like those who enact them, largely by
chance, as unanticipated affective capacities that propagate active forces and enhance
their flow (expenditure) can only in the most limited sense, and only by extraordinary
individuals, be directed. But the disposition conferred by globality incites those capable
of aggressively exploiting its abstract potential to further pursue higher (nobler) goods
such as the interrogation of all received opinion as well as the basis in reality of those
evaluations that emanate from themselves. This includes revaluing the common
privileging of parochial national identities and territorial borders that naturalize the state
form’s illusory sense of static being in the political realm at both the domestic and
international levels, both within Europe and outside it.
Globality galvanizes stalwart iconoclasts to demonstrate the contingency of all
values and corresponding identities, in order to sensitize others to the anti-natural order
enforced by the prevailing system of ascetic-consumerist values. This decadent order is
predicated on and reinforced internationally by the state form, that “coldest of all cold
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monsters.” 757 Recognition of the contingency of all values via globality orients us to the
ineluctability of the state-form’s demise as the globalization complex is undermined.
With their prodigious energies augmented by realizations of globality’s abstract
potentials, ‘good Europeans’ are transmuting the nihilistic values of our age via
dangerous experiments aimed at making a shibboleth of ultra-liberal-modernity.
Believing “neither in the ‘ideals’ nor in the ‘realities’ of their decaying time,”758
they are especially well suited for this task and the exploitation of globality that enables
it. For they count themselves “[a]mong the Europeans of today… who have the right to
call themselves homeless in a distinctive sense… for their lot is hard, their hope
uncertain.” Nietzsche recognizes the enormous complexity of the challenge facing them,
but also that it is at once generated and met by their unique existence, “we children of the
future, how can we be home in this present?” They find themselves:
…ill at ease in an age which loves to busy itself with honor and consider itself to
be the most humane, mild, and righteous age that the sun has ever seen. It is bad
enough that just these beautiful words inspire us with the ugliest thoughts, that in
them we see only the expression of deep enfeeblement, of fatigue, of age of
decreasing energy. 759
A revivifying effect of their creative (and inherently defiant) acts is a stimulated desire
for the sort of political education advocated by Nietzsche, among weaker individuals,
who may improve themselves thereby. 760 By tuning people in to their traditions and
orienting them to their historicity, globality enables a few, irrespective of culture or
locale, to become other within the expanded (perspectivalist-hermeneutical) horizon of
possibility it provides.
Nietzsche anticipated the potential for transvaluations of secular slave-morality by
the enhanced perspective likely to result from an increasingly broad experience of
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difference and culture (global life) from the beginning of his middle period. He may not
have appreciated that these acts (exemplified in the comparisons he describes in the
passage cited below) would occur within and describe a continued period of steep
“decline” and worsening crisis. Integral to undoing the millennial domination of Europe
by ascetic and materialist priests of ressentiment, the major developments of the
twentieth century761 were essential acts in the long, historical agonistic process of
overcoming the ‘human-all-too-human’. The kind of experiences and values sought by
‘good Europeans’ were facilitated by the proto-globalization occurring in the age of latemodernity; those befitting both their task, the pathos it requires, and their involuntary
pursuit of it, is suggested in a 1878 passage:
Age of Comparison. The less men are bound by tradition, the greater is the
fermentation of motivations within them, and the greater in consequence their
outward restlessness, their mingling together with one another, the polyphony of
their endeavors. Who is there who now still feels a strong compulsion to attach
himself and his posterity to a particular place? Who is there who still feels any
strong attachment at all? Just as in the arts all the genres are imitated side-by-side,
so are all the stages and genres of morality, custom, culture. – Such an age
acquires its significance through the fact that in it the various different
philosophies of life, customs, cultures can be compared and experienced side by
side; which in earlier ages, when, just as all artistic genres were attached to a
particular place and time, so every culture still enjoyed only a localized
domination, was not possible. 762
Although not explicit, Nietzsche here observes in a positive light the enhanced
opportunities many had acquired by the late 19th century for traveling, studying and
experiencing foreign values originating outside the geographical confines of their
birthplace, nation and even continent.
The mingling of peoples and ideas and the tendency of this to foster disattachment to place (their transformed ubiety or sense of “where-ness”) via a compulsion
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to compare all aspects of life with varieties of living and viewing the world outside ones
own native communities is here suggested to be a defining characteristic of the age in
which Nietzsche lived. It was one of proto-globalization, which he took as positively
enhancing the prospect of a revaluation of values signaling the dawn of a new age. The
passage continues:
Now an enhanced aesthetic sensibility will come to a definitive decision between
all these forms offering themselves for comparison: most of them—namely all
those rejected by this sensibility—it will allow them to die out. There is likewise
now taking place a selecting out among the forms and customs of higher morality
whose objective can only be the elimination of lower moralities. This is the age of
comparison! It is the source of its pride—but, as is only reasonable, also of its
suffering. Let us not be afraid of this suffering! Let us rather confront the task
which the age sets us as boldly as we can: and then posterity will bless us for it—
a posterity that will know itself to be as much beyond the self-enclosed original
national cultures as it is beyond the culture of comparison, but will look back
upon both species of culture as upon venerable antiquities. 763
This important passage conveys Nietzsche’s recognition that the task of the age is a
hybridizing and re-synthesis of the best traits and features among disparate cultural forms
and value systems toward unforeseeable ways of valuing and organizing social life. This
Nietzschean variety of hybridization occurs as an outcome of contending forces in which
the healthier one prevails, incorporating the most salubrious aspects of the weaker one
into the stronger, thereby increasing its vitality. In the early 21st century it is the abstract,
positive potentials of globality latent in the reactive institutions, processes and forces of
globalization, which are likely to achieve this noble successor age beyond the one of
comparison that we still inhabit. The only futural certainty ‘good Europeans’ can have is
that steadily transforming the world will involve untold suffering – suffering that must be
joyfully embraced by those capable of bearing it and hastening us toward a transhuman
condition.
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The passage suggests that broad inter-cultural comparison is cognitively
transforming. The act of it inherently compels a personal interrogation of the ways
tradition “grounds” individuals and by extension the societies of which they are a part
through its generation of a putatively autonomous rationality that serves as a basis for
naturalistic action. Such comparison de-naturalizes customary action and leads to the
cognitive dis-attachment from and overcoming of one’s original place (the conceptual
transformation of one’s ubiety); at least among those individuals capable of arriving at
the conclusions it induces. Upon further self-scrutiny, and in light of their expanded sense
of awareness, it compels a questioning unto the abandonment of convictions and values
that their native rationality previously legitimated. Being grounded in tradition is
inherently limiting, hence the positive yet dangerous dimension of value comparison.
Nietzsche, a child of the age of comparison, clearly anticipated the demise of the
prevailing Western tradition, modernity being an incoherent pastiche of disparate
elements drawn from various earlier traditions which Nietzsche – anticipating some of
MacIntyre’s insights – was among the first to scrutinize, and the sort of radical – and, to
many, frightening – possibilities this would present for basing an invigorated future
European culture upon. 764
The passage also proclaims the positive effects such comparison spawns,
intimating the abstract potentials enabled by enlarged perspectives, the beneficial result
of critical reflection on and challenges to ones’ entrenched beliefs (the conventional
Christian-Platonic will-to-truth’s moralizations of reality) that encounters with difference
enables – all of which are amplified in our age of globalization by increased international
contact, communications and awareness. Even if the goal of the intensified level of
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comparison in our age of globalization is the reactive banalization of difference, trite
encounters with difference are still more potentially productive than none at all; hence the
inherent value of trying to educate the progeny of even the coarsest vulgarians – their
individual responses to such opportunities are what may crucially distinguish them from
the herd and single them out as potential or nascent exemplars. Nietzsche hints at the
limitless possibilities such experience would create for further “selecting out,” and acts of
world-transformation they had yet to inflame.

Part Two: US–EU Cooperation: the Western Loci of the Globalization Complex
Predicated on the tenets of multi-party democracy and a competitive free market,
the nations of Western Europe arose phoenix-like from the rubble of war through
multiple frameworks for cooperation. Within Europe itself, multiple elite driven
collaborative initiatives in the realm of economics served the purpose of creating mutual
reliance and an enhanced position vis-à-vis international trade. This included a customs
union and common tariff between the Benelux countries as early as 1947. Further
schemes were implemented via the Brussels Treaty of 1948 (between the Benelux states,
France and the UK), which facilitated cooperation in economic matters and a broad range
of related affairs as well as specifically advancing its members’ common defense.
Sixteen European states agreed shortly thereafter to found the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), an institution that fostered intra-European
trade and assisted in the implementation of the European Recovery Program. This
augmented Washington’s effort to distribute assistance through its Marshall Plan aid
program, which the OEEC facilitated through its efforts to ease distribution of aid to its
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intended beneficiaries, alleviate problems in the exchange of the various currencies in
circulation and work toward an eventual customs union. The American role in the initial
steps toward European integration was significant. The Bretton-Woods accords
established a firm basis for a new global economic system and the Marshall Plan’s
centralized bureaucracy for aid distribution imposed cooperative orientation toward its
end of furthering Europe’s formal integration. Later twelve nations would link
themselves defensively through the NATO treaty in Washington.
The ethos of these moves, if not mainly American in origin (it arguably was) was
largely supplemented through American support—crucial backing that would condition
the possibility for and culminate in the EU. Europe’s economic vitality was important to
the US, which needed stable trading partners. Therefore the elimination of certain trade
barriers and tariffs between European states served its own self-interests. The
establishment of the ECSC and EURATOM (predecessors as noted above) conduced
with this objective. Intra-European trade was liberalized at a fairly steadily pace for the
next few decades, notably with the Treaty of Rome, which set up the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the separate European Free Trade Association (EFTA),
established in 1960. Economic cooperation provided a relatively easy way of agreeing to
integrative policies between sovereign European states by appealing to the self-interests
of each, political cooperation was an immediate and direct consequence.
Although some countries were more reluctant than others (France under de Gaulle
being a familiar example for the impasse he created in mid-1965) to concede features of
their political autonomy to overarching supranational authorities arising through
economic cooperation, the momentum and logic of cooperation veritably compelled it. In
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specific issue areas concessions made according to each nation’s self-interest created
spill-over, which frequently necessitated future concessions in others. Broader political
and social integration was therefore an unavoidable consequence of increasing economic
cooperation. Without denying the considerable difficulty—if not improbability—of the
integration process (it was never certain or by any means ineluctable) it can be fairly
asserted that however taboo a subject it may have been, the integration of the continent
was underway well before many member state government officials or bureaucrats in
Brussels were comfortable admitting it.
The effects of the Luxemburg Compromise notwithstanding, developments
toward ever-closer union continued apace (as evinced by the steady accession of new
members, the expansion and deepening of oversight authorities across broad issue areas
and certain developmental landmarks such as the Paris summit of 1974, the Single
Europe Act of 1986, and the Treaty on European Union—Maastricht—of 1993, to name
a few), even if the rhetoric of national sovereignty is occasionally rehearsed among
domestic constituencies for partisan domestic political consumption. Overcoming this—
occasionally exaggerated—discomfort remains a challenge to the logic of integration
even today. It is symptomatic of the still significant state-centric orientation to political
life that has defined intra-European and international affairs for centuries. It also
indicates the persistence of the mentality that fostered the nationalistic impulses
particular to each nation and contributed to cultural prejudices and historical hostilities
between neighboring countries that constrained their relations and retarded mutual
development.
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Europe’s integration has in no small part been a process of dispensing with
simplistic binaries that previously constructed and limited the identities of its various
peoples. These include notions of the self and other and the inside and outside that
traditionally defined belonging in a community and circumscribed opportunities for
becoming. It is this widespread idiocy, as Nietzsche saw it, that his idea of Europe and
the ‘good Europeanism’ presupposed by it were in large part conceived to overcome.
This twentieth century effort to construct European institutions capable of
managing its trade, fiscal policy and infrastructure so as to regenerate the continent’s
vitality corresponded with the greater project of reordering the international system. This
broader project entailed extending a mixture of European laws and values universally
through the institutional apparati of the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and other
international organizations. Post-war American and Western European collaboration in
the construction of this new international order was and remains so significant to any
comprehension of the macro-level, institution-led processes of globalization and the
paradigm of globality emergent from them that it may accurately and usefully be
described as a complex at the heart of globalizing processes. This is empirically
demonstrated by (among many other things) the very high degree of policy
interdependence between the two powers and the shared ultra-liberal-modern values they
cooperatively seek to universalize as global norms. Thus I refer to it as the US – EU
ideological power aggregate within which a transatlantic ruling class emerged determined
to achieve a unified Europe, and from which it has developed and will continue to define
itself. 765
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The US–EU ideological power aggregate arose through the creation of post-war
international institutions and within a broader trilateral commercial-trading conglomerate
that, by the mid to late 1960s fully included Japan. It presently exists inside an expanded,
multi-lateral set of international institutions comprising a web of states outside the US
and EU, as well as prominent IGOs and, arguably, many NGOs. Numerous corporate
entities act synchronously with it, their success in no small part a result of the globalizing
institutions, processes and forces the post-war international order (dominated—by
design—by the US and major European, now principal EU states) was in part created to
realize.
Another important historical context for comprehending the development of the
EU and its simultaneous role in the creation of the contemporary globalization complex is
the fact that the EU emerged within and was ideologically and existentially contingent
upon the East–West Cold-war and the transatlantic alliance. The security challenge
presented by the confrontation of opposing ideological blocs that divided the continent
defined a critical role for the US in European defense and political cooperation, both in
leading NATO and in support of the development of unifying economic structures.
Victory over a common ideological enemy eliminated a primary impediment to
economic unification, nascent processes of globalization and embryonic globality,
removing a set of possible complications that could have hampered the birth of the new
paradigm gestating in Western institutions and practices. At the end of the Cold war
Western Europe’s shared institutions were consolidating at a rapid pace. Due to its
disproportionate endowment of wealth and military might and its global reach, the U.S.
was better positioned in Europe to exploit the opportunities presented by Communism’s
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collapse, stirring some anxiety and animosity in Western Europe as its corporations had
to compete with each other as well as US firms for investment opportunities and new
contracts. Moreover, European firms had higher operating costs within Europe due to its
complicated tax schemes and the expense of currency conversion.
The commonly shared sentiment between US and European elites vis-à-vis CEE
was an undisguised triumphalism. A spirit of schadenfreude accompanied the vigorous,
competitive efforts to incorporate CEE into the Western fold. Today, the EU’s eastward
expansion represents a logical extension of this process of incorporation. It not only
underscores the momentum of globalization in the region, it physically extends the
jurisdiction of EU institutions and assimilates millions of people as new citizenconstituents.
With the expiration of communism in Europe after a forty-year, largely rhetorical
challenge to the prerogatives and momentum of the Western globalization complex,766
the institutions of neo-liberal capitalism and representative democracy were positioned to
fully absorb the former Soviet-bloc states and newly independent republics of the former
Soviet Union into their increasingly internationalized apparatus. Communism’s collapse
in 1989 and 1991 freed the EEC from certain conceptual constraints to consolidate itself
economically and politically. Having done so throughout the 1990s, it is now proceeding
to expand eastward across the continent in its mission to “unify” Europe, bringing its
disparate parts together as a whole, according to its idea of one Europe.
In a development that good Europeans would—for highly qualified reasons—
endorse, its institutions are creating a federally governed polity, whose supranational
authority is transforming a set of traditional, reactive norms grouped under the general
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heading of national sovereignty. This, according to Nietzsche’s vitalist understanding,
expands possibilities for human flourishing or the spectrum of its capacities within the
institutional order the globalization complex inadvertently enables. Furthermore, it
increases the capacity of exceptional agents within those institutions to direct and exploit
the potentials of globality.
Despite the inauthentic agonistic socio-political milieu through which EU
expansion is occurring, Nietzschean critique makes evident the fact that along with the
preponderant reactive forces (bodied forth as a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic
power) formative of the EU’s becoming, contending active forces (expressed as a
positive will to creative destruction as generative power) however minute, simultaneously
affects its development. Relatively healthier individuals are able to actively hijack and
redirect some of the negative tendencies driving integration and augment others so as to
hasten the EU’s eventual going down and overcoming. The origin of these decisive forces
of our decadent epoch lies in reservoir of depleted volitional resources that might yet
sustain an active dynamic. However infinitesimally small, this power—augmented by
abstract potentials of globality—could serve as a match to set alight a renewed future.
The EU’s internal process of consolidation, and its incorporation of other states has
exacerbated reaction, resentment and bad-consciousness, yet this antagonism generates
unanticipated affects with surprising trajectories; lines of flight that are ascending,
healthy and generative.
For instance, as an ultra-liberal-modern institutional structure, the EU functions
both to stabilize the continent and serve as an influential source and promulgator of
institutional mechanisms upon which the emerging international order is predicated.767
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Though this strives to regulate life and mediate disparate forces of globalization, each
generates gaps between that which is conventionally considered impermissible and the
officially sanctioned, through entrepreneurial, technological and intellectual innovations
that race ahead of any authority’s competence, challenging its jurisdiction and mutating
both practices and culture ahead of law. As such “advances” accelerate change,
opportunity, creation and novelty proliferates in ways difficult to effectively restrain by
even the most flexible governing institutions or legal codes.
Despite its remarkable power of interpolation the globalization complex is
incapable of recognizing every instance of its own regulative impotence and these blind
spots represent opportunities for exceptional individuals (‘outliers’ both for their insight
and dumb luck 768) to exploit. As a burgeoning juridical–political institutional structure it
nevertheless comprises an increasingly ubiquitous and reactive network enacting ever
subtler and comprehensive methods of discipline, surveillance and control over life;
augmenting what international order does exist. But it constantly lags behind the ongoing
innovations emergently challenging it which are posed by the abstract potentials of
globality it unintentionally generates.
To control or delimit such potentially destabilizing developments, elements of the
preexisting order of formal, regulative institutions (national governments, religious
authorities, etc.) attempt to reinforce and bolster their authority by rearticulating their
codified injunctions and reified “essential aspects.” Their masochistic desire to maintain
the forms of life the reigning order supports and which enervate them, expresses itself in
an effort to define evaluative parameters of acceptable change, a threshold level of
tolerance for dissention from and challenges to orthodox beliefs and norms which rapidly
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emerging forms globality present. In so doing they become reactive and inflexible,
perceiving their security as contingent on an already obsolescent international order that
is passing into history.
Hegemonic institutions whose authority is waning are frequently incapable of
recognizing that the form of their existence must change via adaptation or risk extinction.
In our era of globalization, challenges posed to the prevailing international order (which
the globalization complex constitutes) continually provokes disciplinary responses from
constituent elements within it that seek to preserve their efficacy. The interpolating force
of the globalization complex is one of its most distinctive properties. Institutional
responses of this sort can have both invigorating and enfeebling consequences for human
life. In the transitional age of globalization the result of such reaction depends upon how
it ramifies the affective capacity of those few who are capable of realizing opportunities
generated by globality, those strong enough to enact or conduct the forces needed to
condition possibilities for further positive becomings.
Globality therefore suggests the dawn of an ascending epoch in maturation of the
human species as such, for it follows that as its abstract potentials are realized an
exponential increase of such positive forces can be expected and further abstract
potentials generated. This should gradually overcome and thereby transmute many of the
reactive institutions, processes and forces of globalization. The successor era to
modernity, which we are far from achieving—whatever the assertions of certain literary
theorists—will be one that conducts the human species toward its eventual overcoming
and a post- or transhuman condition.
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In response to the many objections raised against their further extension of the
forces of globalization a dual dynamic arises from the hegemonic institutions of
globalization (the circular compounding of reaction). One response to moralizing
protestations against globalizing processes, typified by the social activism of alarm prone
“liberal post-moderns” and other altruists, consists in the deeper sublimation of liberal
discourses into the ideational objectives of globalization. This necessitates the
concealment of the globalization complex’s violences—which bring it into contradiction
with the values legitimating it—to placate the herds at its primary loci. Examples of its
deceptive tactics include, for instance, the advocacy of so-called “fair trade” practices (in
commodities such as coffee), campaigns for higher wages and improved working
conditions in the developing world’s “sweatshops”, and the political rights (conceived in
ultra-liberal-modern terms) of repressed or disenfranchised peoples (e.g.: the Tibetans or
Burmese). 769
The other, co-extending dynamic, consists of the ongoing effort by the reigning
political institutions of our day (states, IGOs, etc.) to continually affirm their legitimacy
and maintain order through ever-more sophisticated simulations of ultra-liberal-modern
values. For skeptical ironists these efforts merely reveal their waning authority. The
pathetic attempts by governments to justify themselves frequently result in the
construction of supposedly threatening “others”. 770 They serve to fortify the subjectivevaluations-cum-ordering-principles of ultra-liberal-modernity via simulacrums of
individual autonomy (free will), as well as legal equality and political enfranchisement –
either as already attained or universally desired – and the duty of “the just” to disseminate
via the exportation of liberal-democracy, at both the micro- and macro-political levels.
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This dual dynamic describes the intensification of a perverse effort to impose a
slave-moral will-to-truth through a particular ethos of promise-making and accountgiving toward the rationalization of imposed responsibility for the purpose of ascribing
blame. The incoherent relativism that results is indicated by the diffuse sense of
entitlement characteristic of citizens in the ultra-liberal-modern societies at the center of
the globalization complex. The mono-culture this produces is typified by easy
consumption, indifference to the environmental human consequences of that consumption
and which promotes a coarse familiarity resulting from the near total absence of any
persuasive rank order of types and corresponding values (Rangordnung). In such a
reactive, difference-annihilating culture, demands and promises are ever more casually
made leading to a condition in which the legitimate assignment of responsibility becomes
impracticable, the legal framework for adjudicating conflict and its imposition of
sanctions becomes increasingly dubious and all authority comes to be viewed with
cynical derision.
In theorizing the Western state’s propagation of globalization, the inadvertent,
generative basis of potentials of globality, Shaw observes that:
The Western state has grown into a genuine power conglomerate precisely
through the development of authoritative structures from their sovereign bases. It
has evolved complex overlapping international institutions, from NATO and other
military organizations through a wide range of political and economic bodies.
Within Europe, it has developed an unprecedentedly deep economic (and
increasingly political) union, with complex institutions, now directly as well as
indirectly legitimated. 771
The EU, as a macro-level conductor of globalizing forces, processes and institutions, is
both a powerful arbiter of change to the norms and framework of international juridical
order attempting to regulate globality and is symptomatic of them as well.
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The US (as arguably the prototypical liberal-modern “European” polity) and
EU—each an extremely large and complicated power constellation in its own right—
share and promote identical values and many of the same interests. In so doing they
comprise a massive power constellation at the heart of the globalization complex. Yet the
different emphasis which the EU places on certain values distinguishes it from the US in
subtle but important ways. Evidence of this lies in European attitudes toward capital
punishment, social welfare, health care and access to affordable education. Through
parallel institutions such as the OSCE 772 and COE773 the EU is increasingly influential in
determining the direction and character of globalization.
These institutions, along with NATO and its Partnership for Peace have been
preparing states on the EU’s periphery for eventual admission to the organization and
otherwise habituating them to the expectations of the US–EU ideological power
aggregate’s framework for international order. Given its advantageous geographical
location and the appeal of its ethos (perceived, however accurately, as an alternative to
the US) the EU is approaching parity with the US in its ability to determine the character
and priorities of globalization. Within the US–EU ideological power aggregate Europe
always shared a significant role in steering the expansion of the globalization complex.
While the US remains the world’s sole remaining superpower 774 and exerts the single
greatest influence on globalization’s unfolding, the EU is projected to become the
world’s largest unified market in the next decade.
Between the US and EU pronounced differences have arisen in the emphases
given the forces of globalization, as well as in the determination of common objectives of
its institutions and processes. This increase of diversity can be expected to augment
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opportunities for the realization of globality’s intangible probabilities. Among the myriad
challenges these differences of emphases pose to the US – EU ideological power
aggregate, none are more glaring than the resurgence of religiosity in American society
and the co-extending conservatism and residually militarist or quasi-imperialist vision of
globalization it exudes through its foreign policy objectives. These three trends are
opposite to the prevailing secular, pacifist ethos of globalization in Europe, the
inclination of whose majority publics’ judging from their prevailing attitudes and views,
seek to realize a much different form of international integration.
However, differences between the Washington and Brussels should not be
exaggerated, for European unification is itself symptomatic of the same globalizing
forces and processes the US (with a few European allies) first exploited – processes that
enabled America’s putative hegemony. No reactive government structure can effectively
constrain or delimit the forces of globalization, and it would be incorrect to assume that
temporary, largely partisan rivalries between administrations in the US and EU member
state governments are profoundly distinguishing in the context of globalization’s broader
paradigm. The self-perpetuating momentum of the phenomenon generates possibilities
for becoming that may or may not be seized upon, but the US – EU ideological power
aggregate’s ongoing collaboration in creating / maintaining the reactive international
order does exist (and which it largely imposed) and its stake in extending and deepening
it, fundamentally links American and European interests. The US – EU ideological power
aggregate has developed into a mutual economic, political and cognitive reliance that
neither can opt out of, and this practical reality will continue to have ramifications for life
on both sides of the Atlantic and throughout the world.
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From a Nietzschean perspective the tendency of its consequences are mainly
positive due to its gradual fulfillment of the abstract potentials of globality. As reactive
forces of globalization sustained by this complex perfect an integrated, transnational
socio-cultural and politico-economic machine made rational, just and normal by the
simulacrum, “a counter-movement is inevitable” which “aims to bring to light a stronger
species”:
Once we possess that common economic management of the earth that will soon
be inevitable, mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a machine in the
service of this economy – as a tremendous clockwork, composed of ever smaller
ever more subtly “adapted” gears; as an ever-growing superfluity of all
dominating and commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous force, whose
individual factors represent minimal forces, minimal values.
In opposition to this dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialized utility, a
reverse movement is needed – the production of a synthetic, summarizing,
justifying man for whose existence this transformation of mankind into a machine
is a precondition, as a base on which he can invent his higher form of being.
Morally speaking, this overall machinery, this solidarity of all gears, represents a
maximum in the exploitation of man; but it presupposes those on whose account
this exploitation has meaning. Otherwise it would really be nothing but an overall
diminution, a value diminution of the type man – a regressive phenomena in the
grand style. 775
As abstract potentials of globality are further realized they will collectively come to
describe “a new aim for humanity,” and—if conducted according to the active force
involuntarily driving the native volition characteristic of healthy individuals—provide
renewed and more authentic meaning to the tremendous process of Europe’s integration,
which the forces of globalization serve.
The EU, as both an instantiation and promulgator of globalization, is a product of
the twentieth century’s “tremendous socialist crises,” 776 and although its conceptualizers,
instigators and present day arbiters (excepting an extraordinary few from among the pack
of mediocrities) may remain unaware of its ultimate consequence for humanity, its
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expansion draws open the curtain on a stage its development has set for the drama of
breeding aristocratic masters capable of elevating humanity by augmenting and
encouraging heroic endeavors. As Nietzsche writes, “This man of the future,” or ‘good
European’:
will redeem us not just from the ideal held up till now, but also from the things
which will have to arise from it, from the great nausea, the will to nothingness,
from nihilism, that stroke of midday and of great decision which makes the will
free again, which gives earth its purpose and man his hope again, this Antichrist
and anti-nihilist, this conqueror of God and nothingness – he must come one day
… 777
Such declarations express Nietzsche’s hope and confident optimism in humankind’s
ability to overcome itself, but are also suggestive of the messianic expectations implicit in
his concept of the Übermensch.
Despite Nietzsche’s angry outbursts against it, morality is an essential tool for
Nietzschean “immoralists” for managing the masses in support of the production of
higher culture. Again, it is upon the examples of classical Greece, the Renaissance and
the Napoleonic wars that Nietzsche (somewhat romantically) suggests that, unless
destroyed by the intense nihilism of our dissipated era uniquely characterized by the
resignation and contentedness of the last-man, a future, revivified epoch will be achieved
via the values nomothetically legislated by European society’s exemplars (e.g.: ‘good
Europeans’). The volitionally propagated ideals enacted through such legislations will
establish an authentically healthy, commanding system of ascetic-discipline for selftraining, cultivation and the instinctual guidance of the herd. They do so by instantiating a
system of morality (value-norms, mores, taboos, etc.) to ramify and/or transform the
affective capacities already operative within their society. If successful, this gradually
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cultivates a new rank order of types (Rangordnung) that arises naturally from the
changed disposition (eros) and cultural practices (askesis and poiesis) of their society’s
members. A relative degree of liberality ensures that the weak and the defective are
allowed to destroy themselves through enfeebling self-indulgence.
Although jarring and counter-intuitive to contemporary liberal sensibilities, such a
form of social organization is most advantageous for the majority of individuals within
society as it maximizes the potential becoming of each—to augment the flourishing of
those who are capable—for the production of ever more energetic and impressive human
specimens. It is not merely libertarian and certainly not utilitarian, ideological stratagems
whose pure forms Nietzsche rejected, but combines insights critical of both, resembling,
in ways that would likely have surprised Nietzsche himself, a radically agonistic
democracy. 778 Therefore, rather than feel “exploited” (particularly in a Marxian sense)
the multitude gradually improves itself by means of such a disciplinary regime. The
inculcation of the masses with such a value-system succeeds in constituting it through an
exploitation of the pre-existing heteronomy of will, or “false consciousness” that
corresponds with their need “to believe in [themselves as] a neutral independent ‘subject’
…that interprets [its own] weakness as freedom and [its] being thus-and-thus a merit”. 779
Nietzsche’s recognition of the ordinary yearning among average human beings for
a placid contentment in conditions of intensifying nihilism prompted his insight into how
“the modern, noisy, time-consuming, self-satisfied, stupidly proud industriousness” of
contemporary Western man could be utilized by future, cultural exemplars toward the
production of higher—stronger, healthier—individuals. 780 The nihilism cultivated by
modernity makes the majority indifferent to everything but quantifiable productivity,
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largely out of the ascetic-consumerist desire to labor in order to conspicuously consume.
This provides those whose naiveté lies in their liberal tolerance and who are convinced of
their superiority over past ages and types (an illusion reinforced by modernity’s discourse
of “progress”), validation of their own self-worth.
In our own hyper-decadent age, the ethos of the prevailing technological
rationality rewards displays of material prosperity by raising the stature of the industrious
within our hedonistic community. “Success” within such an environment becomes a
mask with which the inherently vulgar attempt to conceal their presumption as well as
their rabble natures and origins. A cold cash nexus, as Marx and Engels aptly put it,
functions as the sole determiner of beauty, justice and aptitude. The reinforcement and
naturalization of such crudity through its constant, media-led celebration is orchestrated
by ultra-liberal-modern arbiters of herd-values.
But, as Nietzsche knew and has the extremity of contemporary popular examples
makes apodictically clear, these fêted trendsetters and style gurus are fundamentally
incapable of genuine spiritual development. By this Nietzsche meant the serious and
difficult considerations of higher, subtler matters in which genuine ‘spiritual nomads’
must continually engage and pass through. Moreover, the all-too-many of our age, being
incapable of authentic reverence of anything, are utterly uninterested in the limitations
imposed by their congenital disability, and are incapable of undertaking what
recuperative therapies might be available to them to overcome those limitations anyway.
Nietzsche’s notion of a master morality of breeding was intended, in part, to
prohibit the sort of promiscuous panmixis of types characteristic of liberal-modernity, but
this wanton fraternization is not defined according to conventional reactive criteria (be
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they racist, sexist, classist or other forms of chauvinism, etc.) but rather according to the
differing vitality of individuals. The best, who when allowed to thrive in a reinvigorated
social order, irrepressibly distinguish themselves from among the many, would recognize
one another by virtue of their corresponding desire and develop agonistic friendships to
spur one another to ever-greater heights of creative self-overcoming.
The conditions for such a political architecture at first sounds dangerously abusive
or dubious to ears attuned to the liberal-democratic slave morality of taming, but they do
not aim for a state of affairs too far removed from (or so perverse) the highest condition
such mediocre specimens of the species are likely capable of achieving. The willingness
of the many to toil, their eagerness to work, when harnessed to their plebian greed and/or
a base desire for fame, would allow the best to cleverly deploy the herd’s energies to
achieve the invigorated cultural greatness necessary to provide humanity’s existence with
meaning. 781 This notion would seem to anticipate aspects of Leo Strauss’s mid-20th
century thought, but Nietzsche’s vitalist politics crucially distinguishes his thought—in
both its esoteric and exoteric meanings and intent—from that of Strauss, who was
concerned with the maintenance of power over others, conventionally understood.
Just who again are these great exceptions—good Europeans or protoÜbermenschen—among the throng of humanity? They are real, undoubtedly foibled
persons who happen to enjoy a strong constitution. Not to be confused with the pale race
of liberal-optimists the modern “improvers of mankind”, their healthier condition enables
them to see a farther horizon. The efficacious instinctual ordering of their involuntary
drives and impulses (the anorganic power surging through them as embodied capacitors
of life-force) permits them to characteristically expend themselves toward the realization
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of their distinctive passions (eros) via law generating (nomothetic) acts. These acts result
from self-imposed disciplinary regimes (askesis) of self-creation (auto-poiesis). In our
decadent age their becoming authentic constitutes their going-down, but it incrementally
transitions humankind toward its needed overcoming.
They are difficult to identify, not least because the effects of a single individual’s
accomplishments, the value of their lifetime achievement, can only be gauged
posthumously. Good Europeans, like Nietzsche himself, are posthumous individuals. We
must therefore look back at and survey the affective contributions of a person by
discerning the symptoms of its significance to humankind’s destruction / overcoming.
Conway defines Nietzsche’s notion of the higher man as follows: “the Übermensch is any
human being who actually advances the frontier of human perfectibility.” 782 That
tremendous task—one the vast majority are too enervated to perform—amounts to the
going-down of great creators. However, our age can only afford skeptical ironists who
lampoon, and thereby subvert, the ascetic-consumerist ideals that have destroyed our
capacity for culture and left us too exhausted to recognize the extent of our degeneracy.
These are the good Europeans of our age, individuals enfeebled by decadence whose
defiant expenditure may arouse and so strengthen others to perform similarly inspiring
acts of authentic self-creation, and so on, acts that condition the possibility of future, lawgiving Übermenschen.
The futural architecture of an ascending, life-affirming order may be drafted by
good Europeans. Such proto-Übermenschen are creatively destroying decadent norms
and practices through subversive revaluations of the governing axiomatique of our
volitionally depleted age. By doing so they arouse ingenious alternatives to its nihilistic
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will to nothingness. They may put the spandrels in our dilapidated social structure to
productive use through their critical identification of hitherto unrecognized lacunae in its
institutional design. Not content to passively accept status-quo power relations, they
experiment, utilizing unnoticed spaces in the design of the community they inhabit to
create divergent possibilities from its political motifs. They seek to transform the function
of the existing order and construct new forms from it. In so doing they may create spaces
within which authentic becoming may be nurtured and a revitalized order favorable to the
development of culture established.
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BOOK FOUR
Realizing Nietzsche’s Idea of Europe
Section One
Conditioning the Possibility for Good Europeanism
Part One: Exploiting the abstract potentials of globality: Good Europeans as
instigators of a successor era to modernity.
It is somewhat ironic that contemporary European studies specialists, integration
theorists and political philosophers take little note of Nietzsche, as his concerns for
Europe entailed “many of those attributes that Europeanists are seeking to cultivate for
the institutions of the European Union”. 783 Nevertheless, while the concerns of
contemporary Europeanists may resemble some of Nietzsche’s own, their respective
objectives and his own are quite different. Throughout this work I have employed his
vitalist political and power ontology to examine how the major theories of European
integration, the EU and the globalization complex advance the metadiscourse of ultraliberal-modernity. In book four I examine opportunities for destabilizing its axiomatic
narratives of democracy, political legitimacy and prosperity and suggest a kynical-ironist
method for doing so that, based in ancient skeptical practices, corresponds with the ethos
and should augment the virile drives of good Europeans.
It is important to note that Nietzsche cannot be counted among the conventional
“improvers of mankind”, the liberal-optimists whom he excoriated. While he believed
that a certain degree of material prosperity is necessary for a stable social order and the
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generation of a higher culture through which the best might flourish, he rejected the
acquisitiveness and all-consuming pursuit of lucre and security that occupied “the
newspaper reading demi-monde of the spirit” who unwittingly spread ressentiment
throughout European society, increasing nihilism thereby. 784
Yet (to reiterate), the policies and institutional preferences of the EU (predicated
on a popular, largely un-philosophical emancipatory metaphysical and naïve realism),
have consistently sought to realize overt forms of pity that function to cover-up
sublimated

envy

and

ressentiment.

As

prescriptive

norms

the

worldview

(Weltanschauung) they simultaneously construct and enforce has come to dominate, or
even constitute, the ethos of the emerging European society comprised by all those
member-states of the EU and its penumbra (Norway, Ukraine, Turkey, etc.), who have
formally reformed their political institutions and practices, civil laws and social policies
in order to conform with legislations from Brussels.
The privileging of equality over identity and endeavor to eliminate suffering, as
the primary aims of the political order the EU is creating, underlies this transformation
and the ethos emerging from it. The values coextending with this objective have been
thoroughly instantiated in socio-political structures that always already support neoliberal
capital processes and populist democracy. The contradictions inherent to the former (e.g.:
the generation of extraordinary wealth and grinding poverty rationalized via appeals to
equality of opportunity, etc.) and the radical egalitarianism characteristic of the latter
promote a becoming–ochlocratic, or massification of individuals and majority rule via the
formation of mob factions, at both the level of socio-cultural life the political macro–
sphere and at the individual level, or political micro-sphere, in which coercive
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inducements to becoming-same overwhelm individuals, depriving them of the space and
time for self-creation and the freedom for authenticity.
This enforces the proto-fascist culture of conformity and abjection referenced
throughout this dissertation. It is typified by the homogenizing capitalist democracy
universally compelled by the conventional globalization complex.785 Born of fear and the
weakness of will trepidation produces, these philistinic tendencies are expressed in a set
of social and economic violences that enforce obedience to its ideological prerogatives –
the political status quo. As a decadent development globalization is analogous to a
metastatic cancer within the social organisms it invades. While reproducing excessively,
it frequently induces pluripotent cells capable of becoming anything to augment the
ailment it represents. The latent capacity of those pluripotent cells is thereby wasted,
further undermining the health of the body politic, rather than fortifying its health.
While demanding compliance such decadence punishes authentic difference and
resists genuine creativity (which inherently challenge it), fostering a mentality of
resignation and compliance essential to the maintenance of the ascetic-consumerist
ideals, the absurdissimum of which is its simultaneous simulation of an openness to
innovation that effectively encourages discovery within the parameters of its myopic
standards. This culture of abject conformity is driven by a transnational, self described
“creative class” of philistinic vulgarians whose secularized Christian–Platonic values
continue “the one will alone [that] ruled over Europe for eighteen centuries [and is] set on
making man into a sublime deformity.” 786 Furthermore, this culture, disposition and will
are inextricably intertwined with the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity to which
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the EU appeals in its unremitting efforts to furnish itself with legitimate grounds for its
existence and promote its development.
As I have asserted throughout this work, the doctrines of free market neoliberal
capitalism and populist democracy are mutually reinforcing modes of organization
integral to its liberal–optimism and massifying technological rationality. What is made to
seem morally gratifying through its evaluative lenses (earning ones’ own living,
contributing to ones’ society, participating in the determination of the political course of
ones’ nation, etc.) cannot be made to consist with their own “reasoned” conception of the
self-interests of individuals in society, or with a coherent notion of society in which the
theoretically equal members—irrespective of their diversity—constitute an organic whole
defined by a common set of values.
By providing spectacularized existential meanings and simulated ontological
purposes to a thoroughly dissipated, nihilistic age, the dominant, globalizing ideology
covers-up the contradictions it generates through procedures of consultation and “free”
debate in an ostensibly authentic social commons legitimated by the participation of the
all-too-many. This demonstration seems to validate its commitment to the ideals of
individual enfranchisement and equality as the worst mob factions—ascetic–consumerist
priests of ressentiment—determine the rules of the game. 787
The similitude of the EU’s institutional organization, practices and stated
objectives with ultra-liberal-modern ideals is epitomized by its re-creation at the
supranational level of the originally Western European, liberal nation-state and its
bureaucratic practices and institutional forms. These ideals are further exemplified by the
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EU in its arbiter’s ceaseless endeavors to re-shape the world according to their asceticconsumerist values. 788
In light of this, good Europeans would certainly be indisposed toward the reactive
will-to-truth through which the EU has translated a pastiche ‘idea of Europe’ into the
ideological agent of resignation to a consumerism. That nihilistic philistinism or culture
of conformity banalizes everything refined, distinguished, sublime and magnificent in
favor of mass-produced homogenizing commodities and vulgarizes everyone by
encouraging an ethic of transparency that confuses endearing openness with shameless
self-revelation and mistakes impudicity for sincerity. The consumption of material goods,
necessary at the base level for life, has become the highest purpose and spiritual meaning
of life imposed on “humanity” by the institutions, processes and forces of globalization—
understood as the contemporary ‘Europeanization’ of the world. Implicit in such a
comprehension is the need to view with wry skepticism occasional attempts by the EU’s
more reactionary advocates to define it as an endeavor conceived to protect Europe and
its markets from the very globalization complex with which it largely corresponds.
To summarize a few salient points argued above, the EU has its origins in a
reactive will to truth that seeks the attainment of security in a strategy to secure the
energy and industrial sectors (coal and steel) of post-war Western Europe and ensure
economic development toward material prosperity. Jealous of their own prerogatives,
these objectives were partially sublimated into a broader, arguably nobler effort among
the member states to give a collective account of themselves in the aftermath of World
War Two, a debacle in which many of them tacitly cooperated with the Nazis and were
complicit in their genocide of Jews, Gypsies and Homosexuals. In the wake of this
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complicity with horror, three generations of Europeans have now striven to set the
continent on its liberal, integrating course. Doing so would necessarily entail asserting a
will-to-truth that presupposed a superior knowledge of justice and the authority to pursue
instituting it.
While it would stretch credulity to argue that the ultra-liberal-modern course
Europe has pursued by means of steady economic liberalization and political
democratization and devolution has been worse than the pre-war (dis)order it replaced, its
primary value at this juncture in European history lies in its unintentional conditioning of
the possibility for overcoming its increasingly evident limitations as an ultimately
reactive framework for modes of being and forms of life. This is to acknowledge that in
some quasi-Hegelian sense Europe’s on-going ultra-liberal-modern phase of hyperdecadence has been productive of future, truly salubrious potentials for the overcoming
of humankind.
However, effectively challenging the prevailing order always-already entails
convincing its arbiters (the defenders of any existent socio-economic, political
arrangements) that they do not in fact know best, so as to instigate change. The zealous
ideological convictions of our sickened epoch’s ascetic–consumerist priests of
ressentiment almost ensure the impossibility of this (a fact which serves to underscore
another contradictions such as those referenced above). Due to the support they derive
from the use of reason and the quasi-metaphysical faith in science, which they also
cultivate, the ideals of our putatively secular age are believed in as fervently as the
religious values defining any other.
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The enduring conceit of conventional political authority is that it knows what is
best for all. In our age of populist democracy, or (more precisely) kakistocratic
ochlocracy – rule by the worst mob factions – this can be particularly dangerous. In this
vein Hutter critically observes that:
Politically, programs of action of the envious are often seen to be dictated by the
requirements of security. One of the deepest lies in envious souls is the belief that
they already know what is just; just are called those actions that bring relief, if
only temporary, for feelings of displeasure about themselves. 789
As an outgrowth of the nihilism inherent to the secularized metaphysical realism and
envy propagated by secular ascetic-consumerist priests, the EU contrives to re-create a
new patriotism and corresponding identity as it usurps the function, importance and place
of the nation-state and sublimates its incorporation of the increasing meaninglessness of
the latter entity. In so doing its arbiters assuage their feelings of displeasure and
rationalize their presumption.
Through its treaty agreements, the Acquis Communitaire criteria for accession to
the union, institutional organization and respective bodies’ protocols, and effort to
promulgate a Constitution the EU engages in multi-dimensional acts of “self”-presenting
and “self”-concealing simultaneously. The EU’s discursive concealments generate
rhetorics and shape judgments about the need for and benefits of integration in addition to
the functioning of the EU bureaucratic apparatus itself. Even when its acts of presenting
constitute a Being toward the authentic possibility of realizing the EU’s ownness as it
were, they are always already a product of the homogenization of different types and
interpolation of a conflictual multiplicity of desires. The intrinsically coercive nature of
this, feebly glossed over via democratic processes and corresponding appeals to popular
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legitimacy, makes the EU’s “self”-presenting acts somewhat dubious in that even those
who believe in the authenticity toward which they point have a bad-conscience over the
conditions which gave rise to their possibility. This, by extension, further sublimates the
decadence whose ideational precursor Nietzsche saw as characteristic of and expressed in
the nationalism that threatened in his lifetime. 790 In Nietzsche’s view the EU would
therefore have been likely understood as a crudely expanded form of the slave-moral
construct of the nation-state, some twenty-seven putatively “sovereign” examples of
which now comprise it.
Conceived in response to the horrifying world wars in which the pernicious trend
of nationalism culminated during the twentieth century, the EU has paradoxically
intensified central aspects of the very forms of control it aspired to displace, and achieved
the quintessentially liberal objective of abolishing certain, obvious forms of suffering in
its aim to prevent war. 791 In Nietzsche’s view it would simultaneously be an entity of
diverse potentials: on the one hand it would likely strike him as a set of institutions of
frightening bureaucratic proportions—a all-too-human monstrosity and/or difference
annihilating machine. Yet, despite the culture of conformity he would suspect it of
fostering he would also perceive it to be an apparatus with immense promise for those
with the strength to exploit it.
The space for such widely divergent interpretations, as well as the hope that the
EU might be made into a means of cultivating the authentically human and eventually,
übermenschlich types, arises from the affects which it may have for culture. As an
apparatus conceived according to the imperatives of the technological and actuarial
rationality of positivists, rationalist and economists—“the flies of the marketplace”—its
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unanticipated, emergent traits as an instrument for the invigoration of culture against
those aforementioned reactive prerogatives provides us with a persuasive basis to expect
that it may become something more truly life-affirming than its creators imagined or its
administrators can envisage. This expectation is developed into practicable action
through the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness characteristic of ‘good
Europeanism’. 792
In many obvious ways the EU appears as a psychologically deepened and
geographically expanded bastion for the “tarantulas” and “flies of the marketplace”
Nietzsche described in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Yet although it re-presents monolithic
aspects of the traditional nation-state, that “coldest of cold monsters”, through its
institutional arrangements and relentless efforts to acquire ever greater decision making
powers over its member-states, as such it can also (undeniably) be seen as a driving force
that actively serves the promotion of complexity and progress in the diverse, positive
meanings it indeliberately generates as a hybrid form of governance. For, whatever
degree of negotiated inter-state cooperation precedes its various treaties, legislative
decisions and policy agendas, the EU is a supranational institutional arrangement arrived
at through inter-state bargaining. As such it is correctly understood as a hybridized
political formation of previously unaffiliated peoples whose relatively autonomy is
increased in certain ways through the multiplication of affective capacities, many of
which operate and are interconnected in a multitude of ways that lie outside the EU’s
purview.
This “independence” is not intrinsically threatening to the EU’s institutional
legitimacy, however, as Brussels has codified guarantees of and the means for
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maintaining the appearance of self-determination at a number of socio-cultural and
political levels. 793 This method of accommodation and conservation constitutes an
anticipatory means of accounting for the aforementioned affective capacities before they
develop. Its method of multi-dimensional integration occurs between numerous
institutions at various levels of political community and generates new relations between
long affiliated authorities within European society. The increase in points of connectivity
and greater cooperation and communication between formerly distinct entities via this
hybridic supranational organization has endowed many of them both with greater purpose
and self-sufficiency and reinvigorated their relevance, as devolution in the United
Kingdom or the enhanced national autonomy of Catalonia and Wallonia demonstrates.
Through these points of connection which are proliferating at multiple levels of
institutional authority a dual sense of gratification and displeasure arises. The former
perception develops out of enhanced security and a sense of belonging to a broader
community from which a correspondingly strengthened sense of identity may arise.
Conversely, the latter feeling emerges from a perception of the inauthenticity of this
potential, an element of artificiality perceived in the unreal extension of community that
includes peoples and cultures largely alien to oneself and one’s people. Furthermore,
corporate media and business interests—the juggernaut of spectacularized technological
society that quantifies everything and presumes to administer life via its own economistic
rationality—are observably banalizing and actively homogenizing traditional differences
through consumerist massification, which creates a feedback loop of supply and demand
that provides it with its own rationale.
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If not actually threatening traditional ways of life, some stipulations and mandates
codified in EU law (the Common Agricultural Policy being a notable example) contribute
to a perception that time-honored methods of production and by extension the
authenticity of certain modes-of-being are being diminished through regulations
determined without broad consultation with established producers. Moreover, organized
interest groups are seen to be exerting undo influence over the EU’s priorities
contributing to the perception of a democratic deficit, even as some allege this is
precisely for whose needs the EU seems specifically designed to facilitate. 794
The advocacy and deployment of the noble, inclusive-sounding rhetoric of
“expanded community” with the aim of fostering a deepened sense of Europeanness is
viewed with much distrust, as the underlying will-to-truth of the discourse of unity is
perceived to be—and occasionally exposed as being—at odds with its purported ideals of
enhanced pluralism and self-determination. That inauthenticity produces reaction as
individuals reassert their identic allegiance to a locale, region, nation-state, etc., in what is
often an effort to re-inhabit a nostalgic sense of authenticity that is, in actuality, no longer
vital. In these moments the EU fails to provide its citizen-constituents with the existential
meaning and ontological purpose it must supply if it is to be credible or its stated
objectives supported. Rather, it indeliberately supplies them with further reasons for
skepticism about EU institutions and their purposes, if not rationales for active cynicism
as well as notional resources to determine their own meanings, the emergent affects of
which cannot be anticipated.
Elbe affirms the negative dimension of this, albeit without the caveats Nietzsche
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would likely have included:
Nietzsche’s ‘good European’ would view the growing convergence of state and
business interests with considerable suspicion, because these actors were unlikely,
in his view, to move the debate on the European idea beyond visions grounded on
the will-to-truth, and would thus not be able to increase significantly the welfare
of Europeans in terms of finding a way of rendering European existence
meaningful. 795
In fact, from early on Nietzsche did view this modern convergence, or more accurately
the domination of the state by business interests, with suspicion. 796 Though it is doubtful
that the change is as profound as Nietzsche makes it seem, for when in recorded history
have rulers not united political considerations with, or themselves been dominated by,
“business” interests?
However, contra Elbe, ‘good Europeans’ would not merely be suspicious of such
a convergence (as indeed Nietzsche was in his own lifetime, particularly as it functioned
to usurp the role of culture); rather they would not leave the task of defining a meaningful
existence for Europeans up to reactive state and business interests. Nor would their
primary short term ambition or long term goal be a putative increase in the “welfare” of
the many, so defined. For, as detailed above, in Nietzsche’s view the “welfare” of the
masses only improves with the increased vitality of the best, their positive enhancement
of cruelty and the pathos of distance to invigorate the culture; none of which tasks the
innately vulgar crowd, whose ranks comprise those aforementioned sectors of every
society, can undertake.
Against and simultaneously through the molar forces of globalization, ‘good
Europeans’, as artist-philosopher norm-entrepreneurs, may exploit the nisus of globality
to hasten fortuitous becomings. 797 According to Nietzsche’s vitalist understanding of life,
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they will as an inevitable result of their conation; they are pre-reflectively compelled by
innate volition that is symptomatized by their desires, to enact and maximize their
overflowing forces; enactments of a positive will to creative destruction as generative
power. 798 However, their plight is tenuous, and their acts endangering. Distinguished
from the profanum vulgus 799 by their adaptive capacity (exhibited in youth as an
“inability” to conform) and critical disposition, they are prone to being singled out for the
concentrated attention as customary socialization or moral discipline, of asceticconsumerist priests of ressentiment.
The persecution and revilement they are likely to incur / endure is necessary and
even desirable for them so long as they are not destroyed by it. 800 Those who possess
native resources sufficient to bear the opprobrium their defiant temperaments arouse are
likely to reendow suffering with meaning through their striving to become who they
are. 801 The challenges with which these “untimely others” confront the governing
morality of taming constitute nomothetic acts that inspire emulation. As experimenters
their ingenious subversion of the enforced nihilism of the prevailing ascetic order—
through self-legislating, kynical pranks lampooning the ressentiment and playful mockery
of ascetic/materialist herd values—transmute reactive forces into active ones, provoking
other, similar types by their passion (eros) to undertake disciplinary regimes (askesis) of
self creation (autopoiesis) through the medium of globality.
Among those extraordinary, pluripotent few with requisite strength, enactments of
globality’s abstract potential (affirmations of difference through the cultivation of change
and the aforementioned temporal engagement of oneself as a Dasein in the world via
futural projections of the possibilities to which this engagement gives rise) serve as a
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rehabilitative therapy on the micro-political (individual) level to fortify their regnant
system of instincts. This further invests them with the fortitude needed to resist
resignation to globalization’s life-demeaning values (the temptation to fall back into
inauthenticity) and the resilience to enact transfigurations of governing instincts at the
level of the political macro-sphere through their nomothetic legislations.
In the course of their political education such healthy types recognize that the EU
(as a crucial instantiation and locus of globalization) re-presents an exhausted, reactive
form of socio-economic and political organization. 802 They thereby come to desire and
are empowered to corroborate in its transfiguration. An increased pathos of distance
develops between them and the contented masses. Nietzsche frequently describes the
latter, ‘the herd,’ as placated and comforted (even as it is spiritually diminished) by the
slave morality of taming. The ‘herd’s’ strength is derived from this moral system’s
defense of “Truth,” which serves as a crutch for the weak—those who cannot endure the
suffering caused by their existence.
Life not an argument. – We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we are
able to live – by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest,
form and content; without these articles of faith no one could endure living! But
that does not prove them. Live is not an argument; the conditions of life might
include error. 803
This possibility: that the essential conditions of life might include the very errors that
have unintentionally caused the dissipative hyper-decadence of our ultra-liberal-modern
age, are only comprehensible to the freest spirits.
There are at least three major aspects to the angst generated by the anguish
intrinsic to human life worthy of consideration here: consciousness of one’s mortality; the
“ability to imaginatively extend [oneself] beyond [one’s] own genesis” through
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awareness of one’s place in a chain of being (cognizance of the past) and of the
continuation of existence beyond their own death (looking forward into the future)
wherein their legacy may be preserved through physical reproduction or great works;
and, finally, one’s standing “in opposition to the determinative species of which one is a
part,” which refers to the paradoxes of the principium individuationis, or selfdetermination of man as an animate entity distinct from the whole; that is, the
apprehension arising from ones’ separation from the life ground of Being. 804
The sick are too dissipated and/or cowardly to contend with the apparent
purposelessness of life in a constructive manner. This prompts a dull resignation to an
insurmountable sense of nothingness. Simultaneously the inevitability of their ultimate
negation induces a hopeless impression that all human action is futile. It is this sense of
void whose brink the weak were formerly able to skirt by virtue of the ontological
certainty afforded by transcendental truths now widely recognized to be hollow.
The trust in life is gone: life itself has become a problem. Yet one should not
jump to the conclusion that this necessarily makes one sullen. Even love of life is
still possible – only one loves differently. 805
Presently, this condition of ‘enlightened’, if quite ‘unhappy false consciousness’ is
symptomatized by the prevailing, hyper-decadent cynicism that exacerbates and coversup its nihilism. Distrust in life and individual instincts is in large part due to the
“misleading and parochial character of teleological philosophies of history (whether
Hegelian or positivist),” a mixture of which is exemplified in the West’s ultra-liberalmodern values systematically universalized via globalization. 806
The challenge of affirming the present, of loving the world and humankind
differently, requires the sort of transformed ubiety necessary for attaining the free
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spiritedness (thymos), or sovereign individuality, of ‘good Europeanism’. It also ramifies
the skeptical praxis for overcoming the hyper-decadent values of our ultra-liberal-modern
age, which I explicate below. However, this eroded trust in the discredited illusions that
sustained a groundless confidence in a particular interpretation of life has—as Nietzsche
anticipated—given the hoi polloi new impetus for devaluing life and further empowered
contemporary ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment thereby. In the selfcontradiction of the ascetic life:
[S]atisfaction is looked for and found in failure, decay, pain, misfortune, ugliness,
voluntary deprivation, destruction of selfhood, self-flagellation and self-sacrifice.
This is all paradoxical in the extreme: we are faced with a dissidence which wills
itself to be dissident, which relishes itself in this affliction and becomes more selfassured and triumphant to the same degree as its own condition, the physiological
capacity to live, decreases. 807
The life-denying impulse of this nihilism is discordant with authentic becoming. It seeks
ease, instinctively desiring the abolition of all suffering, but only intensifies suffering
through a sublimation that leads it to wish for suicide.
The suicide by resignation and indifference happens to be the (in)authentic desire
of our hyper-decadent age. That the herd—whose members taken individually are
continuously and systematically deflected from themselves by the prevailing culture of
conformity—does not possess either the insight to recognize this fact (low-level
consciousness) or the resolve to execute the task of overcoming (weakness and mutually
disabling affect of the collectivity) means there will invariably be occasional enactments
of group annihilation. They are occurring all around us, in the form of systematic neglect
of the incapacitated (the mentally ill, homeless and aged in America), school or
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workplace shootings, calculated acts of political terror, low level conflicts, and organized
genocides.
The all-too-many, as Nietzsche observed, prefer fantastic delusions of liberatory
and salvific deliverance from there mis-identified afflictions (hence the philosophical
appeal of liberal-modernity and the power of its discourses), placing unwarranted faith in
spurious ideals and notions of an otherworldly, super-sensible beyond, as well as the coextending secular spectacles

of

democratic

enfranchisement,

ever-“advancing”

technology and consumerism—liberal-modernity’s simulations of fictive equality and
fulfillment. These self-deprecating and injurious figments are preferred to the tragic
beauty that lies in the finitude of this-worldly existence and the life-enhancing challenge
of affirming its affective power. 808
It should be noted that this condition does not, in most cases, even constitute
genuinely inauthentic belief. It amounts to pathetic resignation coupled with a dim hope.
Nagging doubts that the religious beliefs, shopping trips, disapprobation and punishments
of transgressors of social mores and values, etc., actually gratify with answers or imbue
ones’ life with significance, are simply guarded against and, in jejune fashion, denied.
The vast majority do so almost instinctively, lacking the critical thinking skills required
to examine their own convictions. Bereft of the political education necessary to posit
ascending valuations of existence or to judge with any acuity they fail to live preontologically and are therefore incapable of creating works of art that affirm our
transitory condition within the ‘unified ground of being’ 809 The herd’s members, taken
individually, cultivate the very conditions within which they live largely standardized,
unremarkable lives of self-induced intellectual and spiritual anesthetization. The inability
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to recognize a persuasive meaning and believable purpose to existence leads them into an
abyss of passive (suicidal) nihilism. So it is important that in his late period Nietzsche
insists that life has no other “end” than itself, reiterating his recognition of life’s lack of
any objective meaning in his early essay The Greek State. 810
The reduced life of herd members still remains artificially grounded on the fictive
consolations of the “dignity of man” and the “dignity of labor” in our ultra-liberalmodern age. This enables them to remain productive (an instrumentally essential
condition to the eventual overcoming of the hyper-decadence of our present) whilst
avoiding the terror any recognition of their solitary, unbounded existence would be likely
to provoke. 811 Their embrace of a diminished existence (as both symptom and effect of
passive nihilism) inhibits their potential contribution to the advancement of the species
insofar as they may inadvertently supplement the freedom of the rare genius capable of
creating horizons to provide existence with (a sense of) purpose; of legislating values to
create protracted cultural meanings. 812
It is, in a specific sense, the aim of ascetic-consumerist priests of resentment, and
the cultural philistines—or educated mob—they succor, to rationalize and habituate the
herd to placating delusions. 813 According to Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality, the
Judaeo-Christian tradition’s notion of equality of souls in the eyes of God was translated
via Enlightenment ideals into the secular believe in the fundamental equality of men,
which further devolved into the radical egalitarianism and enfranchisement of our
present, hyper-decadent age. 814 In political life this has is expressed through an
ochlocratic demand for equality and a denial of the exception in favor of a leveling
mediocrity. The result is a base culture that celebrates the lowest common denominator of
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the most inferior types. With a discordant instinctual system governing their unhealthy
drives and impulses, herd members, deluded into believing they inhabit the best of all
possible worlds, are eventually prevented from effectively willing at all.
Accustomed to this mis-representation of their weakness by secular slave
morality, their antipathy for life becomes so banal that it eventually fails even to
culminate in an urge to suicidal nihilism: they are too indifferent or sedated to
contemplate self-destruction. 815 Primary among the ambitions of ‘good Europeans’ is to
provide those capable of rescuing themselves from such a numb condition with the tools
to do so, while allowing the incurably sick to pursue their own demise. 816 They would
offer this for the future of the species, by adhering to the master morality of breeding. 817
While Nietzsche’s normative exhortations eschewed reliance on the confusion of cause
and effect (his identification of which was a central feature of his epistemological critique
of the Western philosophical tradition), the resilient ‘good Europeans’ he identified
cultivate within themselves, through ongoing efforts at self-overcoming, an improved
instinctual system for governing their native drives and impulses. 818 This effective selfregulation affects macro-level improvements of the social order within the existing sociopolitical milieu. Their courageous experiments on both themselves and the community
into which they are thrown constitute a deliberate engagement with their fate in a
collaborative creation of possibilities for their own becoming.

Part Two: Good Europeans as instigators of a successor era to modernity
As for achieving their shared ‘idea of Europe’ in the present, Nietzsche’s ‘good
Europeans’ “as heirs of Europe, the rich but also excessively obligated heirs of millennia
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of European spirit” 819 reject any reactive, pseudo-revolutionary programs to replace
globalization’s metanarratives with a salvific alternative—though they might strategically
support aspects of them consistent with their “right” to tell a ‘noble lie.’ Rather, they
recognize the EU’s utility as a mechanism for expanding the range of conventional
political options through increased interconnectivity, multiplicity and institutional
diversity and seek to hijack it, to transform its disposition and divert its course. They aim
to gradually install an alternative, anti-Christian-Platonic (anti-liberal-modernist) ideal
toward their ‘idea of Europe’ to cure the nihilism and treat the injurious effects of the
hyper-decadence of their age. As artists whose medium is the political reorganization of
dissipated life, they strive to give form to machinic instruments capable of assisting the
achievement of their objective.
There is another paradox entailed in this however, as Ansell-Pearson, reflecting
on Nietzsche’s advocacy of such creative acts, of artifice, notes:
Nietzsche’s demand for the philosophical legislation of a new politics of breeding
and cultivation, which owns up to the artificial character of its own artful
techniques of selection, reveals its own revenge against time, against the time of
evolution, exposing a fear and loathing of contingency and the reign of chance
hitherto. 820
The all-too-human fear of our radical temporality and related loathing of contingency and
chance often results in a propensity for other-worldly explanations of reality and salvific
promises of redemption, all of which entail anti-natural acts of self-denial. Historically,
mis-leaders have exploited the fear and insecurity that prompts this tendency and
manipulated communities by means of the superstitious inclinations it generates for profit
and/or political power. Mediocrity tends to predominate when humankind is left to the
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devices of these agents of anti-naturalism, deniers of the body and weaklings, whose
legislations retard the healthy development of the species thereby. 821
By implementing a politics of breeding legislated by the best the realization of an
overhuman condition might be hastened in defiance of the passive nihilists’ resignation
and the deterioration of certain capacities to act. By this I refer to the priorities given to
the affective powers (dynamis) of an entity via enhancements of its functioning and
actualization (energeia) – a relation inextricable from the conative disposition or
anticipatory resoluteness referred to above. It is through the norms conferred by values
particular to a cultural milieu and ones’ emplacement in the world that an individual’s
corresponding stance toward the unfolding of time is conditioned. Values, or changes to
them, therefore determine the interdependent relation of motion and time in the
experience of the world particular to a people – a experience expressed as culture.
As Conway makes clear, in the midst of a thoroughly exhausted age Nietzsche
thought that even the most effective legislators (Gesetzgeber) could only stabilize the
social organism (polity) until it was capable of undertaking a revitalization, i.e.: until
conditions were conducive to its fuller rehabilitation.
The lawgivers who preside over declining peoples and epochs are not the
mythical creators of new values, but crafty bricoleurs of depleted, recycled and
abandoned political resources. If ruled wisely, declining peoples can continue to
thrive, through a strategic inhabitation of the traditions and institutions founded
(and externalized) by their predecessors. But they can neither found new
institutions and traditions of their own nor contribute to the objectified vitality of
those they inherit. 822
The EU, in the context of globalization, is such an innovative response to certain crises
fomented by reactive trends and all-too-human preferences extending back into the late19th century.
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The EU’s policies, enforcement of norms and instrumental role in distilling liberal
values into contemporary human rights discourses (It’s arbiters’ tactical enactments of
the customs established by their forbearers—as Conway describes in the citation above)
have had the effect of insuring greater security and raising so-called “living standards” in
all regions of the continent into which it has expanded, as well, quite discernibly, as the
world beyond its borders. These achievements suggest at least the partial and on balance
positive fulfillment of the EU’s original purpose, at least as defined by those who, as
Nietzsche would likely have put it, suffer indigestion for having eaten badly.
But are the EU’s arbiters merely managing a depleted set of institutions or are
they creating conditions of possibility for a future nomothetic legislator? In the same
passage Conway asserts that:
The resourceful innovations of a plucky bricoleur may not be as impressive as the
founding labors of a legislator of new values, but decadent peoples and ages
simply cannot afford the luxury of a Promethean lawgiver. 823
In our dawning age of globality the most unexpected becomings are ever more likely, not
as more of the becoming-same the contemporary hegemonic technological rationality
propagated through the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity compels to present as
innovation (the contemporary doctrine of “progress”) but in startling challenges to
current convention. These genuinely radical transmutations of familiar forms of life are
ever more unconstrained and ever more dangerous to the ascetic-consumerist priests
whose loathing of the incalculable (of authentic becoming or life itself) serves as the
basis of prevailing values in post-industrial society.
The selective tastes of those courageous experimenters willing to embrace chance
and legislate nomothetically may unintentionally contribute to an enhancement of vitality
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at the macro-level of the political sphere, and possibly found new institutions and
traditions. Whether their pioneering acts or the nomothetic legislations of one promethean
exception will be so profitable cannot be known except retrospectively. They are likely to
occur as lucky accidents. But such fortunate occurrences are being made more probable
through realizations of the abstract potentials of globality. The capacities they create are
just as likely to be exponential as linear in their development.
Anticipating essential elements of the globalization complex (what Hardt and
Negri have dubbed Empire), ‘the common economic management of the earth,’ as an
inevitable consequence of the reactive trends of his own age, as well as the positive
potentials it would inadvertently create for the salubrious development and overcoming
of humankind, Nietzsche wrote:
…as the consumption of man and mankind becomes more and more economical
and the “machinery” of interests and services is integrated ever more intricately, a
counter-movement is inevitable. I designate this as the secretion of a luxury
surplus of mankind: it aims to bring to light a stronger species, a higher type that
arises and preserves itself under different conditions from those of the average
man… Once we possess that common economic management of the earth that
will soon be inevitable, mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a
machine in the service of this economy—as a tremendous clockwork, composed
of ever smaller, ever more subtly “adapted” gears; as an ever-growing superfluity
of all dominating and commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous force,
whose individual factors represent minimal forces, minimal values.
In opposition to this dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialized utility, a
reverse movement is needed—the production of a synthetic, summarizing,
justifying man [the “Übermensch”] for whose existence this transformation of
mankind into a machine is a precondition, as a base on which he can invent his
higher form of being… Otherwise it [the economic mechanization of man] would
really be nothing but an overall diminution, a value diminution of the type man—
a regressive phenomena in the grand style… 824
Aside from demonstrating Nietzsche’s sensitivity to the conditions of life in Europe
during his age and his inimitable foresight, the extent to which the section above
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accurately characterizes contemporary life may be debatable, but it truly foreshadowed
many contemporary critiques of everyday life (e.g.: the Frankfurt School, poststructuralists, deconstructionists, post-modern and post-Marxian or “Marxis” analyses).
The passage conveys his desire to see such potentially harmful trends, which for the
prevailing decadence of the age were inexorably to worsen, used productively, by artist
warriors or thymotic free spirits; that is, he hoped to spur certain of his readers to
transfigure those trends through their machinic becomings and ultimately overcome
them(selves) to realize a transhuman future.
In a passage from the same period (1887—1888) Nietzsche hints at the force of
will required to transfigure the conditions of life he anticipates in his “overall view of the
future European”, by which he refers to the mediocre multitude:
…the most intelligent slave animals, very industrious, fundamentally very
modest, inquisitive to excess, multifarious, pampered, weak of will—a
cosmopolitan chaos of affects and intelligence. How could a stronger species raise
itself out of him? …To fight upward out of that chaos to this form [the
übermenschlich striving for moral and political perfection]—requires a
compulsion: one must be faced with the choice of perishing or prevailing. A
dominating race can grow up only out of terrible and violent beginnings.
…Obviously, they [übermenschlich] will come into view and consolidate
themselves only after tremendous socialist crises—they will be the elements
capable of the greatest severity toward themselves and able to guarantee the most
enduring will. 825
It is upon this foundation – the toil of the many – that the healthiest individuals are
relieved the burden of laboring for their survival, in order to pursue the greater project of
their personal self-overcoming. Their severity toward themselves and the endurance of
their will arouses the passion of others who are provoked to create for themselves and
participate in the founding of culture.

478

Though it strikes us as cruel sounding, on this point Nietzsche, as Conway
observes, is adamant, for suffering in unavoidable and can only be given meaning
through the spiritualization of cruelty – the acceptance of suffering – “lest [by attempting
to abolish suffering and refraining from all cruelty] we disable the engine of moral
progress [and] indulge our pity ‘for “the creature in man,” for what must be formed,
broken, forged, torn, burnt, made incandescent and purified—that which necessarily must
and should suffer’”. 826 Earlier in the same text, Conway reminds us that, with regard to
the quest for perfection, “Nietzsche envision[ed] the completion (rather than the
transcendence) of the all-too-human.” 827 The terms of his perfectionism are not
comprehensible to those incapable of no more than unconsciously reiterating the slavemoral ascetic ideals and the decadence Nietzsche strove to overcome and in which, as a
product of modernity, he himself was implicated.
With regard to the prospects of forging, or inventing, a new, shared European
awareness and sense of identity, Von Ham notes that, “[c]learly Europe can look back on
a checkered past and the only way [to overcome the ressentiment this inflames is] to
develop a ‘European consciousness’ [by] turn[ing] our backs on European history [so as
to] develop as a community that is oriented toward the future.” 828 In the same context he
suggests that a disembedded identity forged out of a reversed identity politics capable of
fostering a shared and intersubjective understanding of culture, and commensurate sense
of solidarity may ultimately serve as a basis for a new form of community. 829
Based upon Nietzsche’s quasi-prescriptive formula of self-overcoming through
the experimental art (Versucherkunst)—regimes of self-discipline (askesis) and agonal
acts of self-creation (auto-poiesis)—I suggest a six-fold strategy, or techne, based on key
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classical, primarily skeptic principles, through which the “best-types” might co-opt the
EU’s institutions from within to become good Europeans. By extension, they thereby
realize ever-higher approximations of the moral and political perfection they seek at the
macro-level as they actualize their idea of Europe. These philosophical principles, drawn
from the ancient skeptical, stoic and cynic traditions, correspond directly with and
presumably influenced many of Nietzsche’s own. They coextend with and support his
appeal for the strongest to engage in regimes of voluntary discipline, including (as
enumerated by Hutter, 2006) periods of recuperative solitude, the cultivation of agonistic
friendships, the often excruciating exercise of writing and reading oneself, continual
attention to and regulation of ones nutritional needs (physical, psychical and intellectual)
and habitation, and the promotion of dance for the physical expression of spirit as well as
laughter (Nietzsche’s “gay science”) whereby one says what is most serious through that
which gives amusement.
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Section Two: Nietzschean praxis
Part One: A Six-Fold Skeptical Strategy to Foster Weltironie or ‘Good
Europeanism’
A skeptical knowledge of reactive power’s deleterious affective capacities may
provide Nietzsche’s thymotic sovereign individuals with the tools, power and capacity
necessary to utilize it advantageously; not a doctrine (which would replicate dogmatisms
or ascetic ideals it seeks to avoid), it comprises a set of yielding strategies for action and
active coping with our hyper-decadent epoch. As Pappas notes, “[a]s a rule skepticism
exacerbates the weakness of the average person. But a strong skepticism in the same
culture… can turn the groundlessness of modern values into an occasion for new
discoveries.” He cites BGE: 209, in which Nietzsche praises the kind of skepticism that
fosters the world-historical irony, or Weltironie, required by would-be comedians of the
ascetic-consumerist ideals that preponderate in our hyper-decadent age:
This skepticism despises and nevertheless appropriates; it undermines and takes
possession; it does not believe but does not die out on this account; it gives the
spirit a dangerous freedom, but is severe on the heart. 830
It is an encouraging product of the same “immense physiological process …the process
of increasing similarity [hybridization] between Europeans”, the leveling effects of which
are more often than not negative, and thus an unanticipated affirmative result of
“Europe’s democratic movement”.
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As stated above, Nietzsche associates the atypical, positive consequences of this
with the ethos of good Europeanism, “the intrepidity of the gaze, the courage and severity
of the dissecting hand, or the tenacious will to dangerous voyages of discovery,” as
against the dissipative, liberal sympathies of “warm-blooded and superficial
humanitarians,” whom he criticizes as “gentle, good-hearted, weak-willed poetic
fools.” 831 Such unexpected outcomes, enactments of “their need to go further, with bold
and painful experiments” through the exploitation of emergent potentials of globality,
evince their conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness. This distinguishing
temperament and worldview co-extends both with their skepticism and the worldhistorical irony that enables good Europeans to take a longer view with regard to the
question of what humankind ought to become. Their Dionysian (tragic) understanding
makes them capable of taking responsibility for themselves through disciplinary regimens
(askesis) of self-creation (auto-poiesis) that become nomothetic legislations. Good
Europeans will arouse the passions of other healthy individuals through the naturalizing
effect of their eros. The future-shaping mimetic performances which are spurred by their
agonal striving for self-perfection (active force or a positive will to creative destruction as
generative power), will incrementally instantiate an alternative, natural, political order. 832
For what should be obvious reasons, classical skeptics were generally wary of
admitting certain guidelines or rules for behavior, though they did seek to advise their
students on the necessity of cultivating a skeptics’ disposition, and these can persuasively
be taken as stratagems for living that, when combined, loosely substantiate a doctrine.
But this can be done so only with difficulty, and cannot be said to strictly consist with the
radical, Pyrrhonic variety of skeptical thought. But it does consist closely enough with
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varying articulations of skeptical thought from the Academic school typified by
Arcesilaus and Carneades to post-Academic skepticism of Anesidemeus and Sextus
Empiricus, and down through the challenges posed by doubters of the Middle Ages and
Renaissance – thinkers such as Michel de Montaigne, Blaise Pascal (through his Jansenist
wager) and his protestant contemporary, Pierre Bayle, to be consistent with the spirit of
that influential philosophical school of thought. Since Descartes’ reinvigoration of
skeptical thought, a skeptical approach has defined Western philosophy, culminating in
Nietzsche’s startling critique of modernity. Today the post-Nietzschean skeptical
tradition manifests itself in deconstructionist, post-modern and post-structuralist thought;
contemporary expressions of a long, qualifiedly anti-rationalist intellectual tradition
consistent with the authentic spirit of Western thought. 833
In the present, the healthiest and most clever individuals, whose joy in and desire
for life best equips them to resist the poison-mixing ascetic-consumerist priests of
ressentiment, may exploit the simulacrum generated by globalizing institutions and
processes to overcome its addling effects. Each of these unique “lucky strikes” are likely
to emerge from the multitude – would-be exemplars of some dimension of humankind’s
potential advantageously gifted by fate with the capacity to implement the skeptical
strategies and discipline for living necessary to co-opt the potentially totalizing control
over reality exerted by the simulacrum. 834 Opposed to nihilism, Nietzsche’s would-be
heroic individuals seek, without nostalgia, to provide the multitude with hope through
meaning, new meaning for life, even if all meaning is mortal. 835 Anticipating certain
insights in the recent works of Foucault and Agemben (including such concepts as
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“technologies of the self” and “bio-power”) that so excite students today, Nietzsche
asserted:
Truth has need of power. – In itself truth is no power at all – whatever its
flatterers of the Enlightenment may be accustomed to say to the contrary! – It has,
rather, to draw power over to its side, or go over to the side of power, or it will
perish again and again! This has been proved sufficiently and more than
sufficiently! 836
And he also maintained that:
Knowledge works as a tool of power. Hence it is plain that it increases with every
increase of power… In order for a particular species to maintain itself and
increase its power, its conception of reality must comprehend enough of the
calculable and constant for it to base a scheme of behavior on it. 837
While based on the skeptical knowledge that its own “truth” corresponds with the power
inherent to a superior spirit of will, it dares, if only as an expression of its own beautiful
folly and willful (self-)delusion, to posit a “truth” for itself at least. This entails a double
awareness that this will is truly reflective of the interests of the best, but not in and of
itself universally true.
To effectuate their objectives they must (as Conway suggests) become master
rhetoricians and deploy related masks that persuasively convey both the esoteric meaning
of their truths, to those capable of comprehending it, and their exoteric message, for those
who cannot be changed but may nevertheless be persuaded to unwittingly further their
political goals and thus be instrumentally useful. Conway observes Nietzsche’s own
failure to attain rhetorical mastery for his inability to “enforce an effective distinction
between [his] esoteric and exoteric teachings.” 838 This is based on Nietzsche’s own
practical recognition that:
The distinguishing mark of rhetorical mastery is the strategic deployment of
rhetorical devices in the service of larger political ends. The rhetorical master
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succeeds not only in assembling an elite cadre of esoteric readers, but also in
persuading his exoteric readers of the wisdom and justice of his political vision;
these latter readers need not be exposed to the master’s esoteric wisdom in order
to serve his covert political ends. 839
As preeminent rhetoricians gradually succeed in indiscernibly usurping power by means
of its discourses and hijacking its exertion and thus its control through bio-power, the
esoterically conveyed values of the strongest will be productively misunderstood by the
mob, populi or political parties, and so must be represented and exoterically enforced as
“true” for a salubrious socio-ethico-political order to nurture the becoming of
übermenschlich. 840
Before the herd, and particularly when challenged, it must be unyielding and
strident – that is cruel, like any value system, through a system of reinforcing traditions,
mores and laws – in order to be either appreciated or believed. For the dawning postmodern epoch’s transhuman future this does not intimate revolutionary social upheavals
in the usual sense of barricades in the streets, but an incremental intensification of the
agon by the herd itself, the sublimation of its increased suffering accomplished through
the simulacrums of neo-liberal capitalism and representative democracy that inure it and
teach it to find satisfaction in its own exploitation. Such intensification will invariably
hasten the overcoming of those social forms by fomenting crises the basis of which are
generated by contradictions internal to their own doctrines, i.e.: capital process’s mantra
of unlimited profit growth and democracy’s sham of political inclusion through
predetermined participation.
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Modernity must run its course and exhaust itself. Conway states an important
correction to common misunderstandings of the role of the lawgiver or the even worse
misreading of the Übermensch.
No mortal can legislate against the economic destiny of his age as a whole. The
emergence of a lawgiver who creates new values does not cause a new epoch to
begin, but instead signals that the career of a new epoch is already underway. 841
Fundamentally transformed notions of ecological responsibility, innovation in bio-genetic
engineering, artificial intelligence and prosthetic augmentations of the human form will
assist a machinic evolution of transhuman freedom in and functioning toward a higher
future. Nietzsche realized early on that a paradoxical feature of life in civil society and
productive freedom was the systematic exclusion entailed in valuing and pitiless utility of
a spectrum of exploitations. These were distinguishing and inextricably characteristic
features of political life, or humankind in community, irrespective of the racial, cultural,
or historical context of the society in question.
Once again, it was in the early, unpublished essay ‘The Greek State,’ where
Nietzsche first (and perhaps most evocatively) articulated his understanding of the role of
the political dimension of human activity, as the formalized enactment of cruelty and
appropriation, for the improvement of humankind:
Accordingly, we must accept this cruel sounding truth, that slavery is of the
essence of culture, a truth of course, which leaves no doubt as to the absolute
value of existence. This truth is the vulture that gnaws at the liver of the
Promethean promoter of Culture. The misery of toiling men must still increase in
order to make the production of the world of art possible to a small number of
Olympian men. …For it is not to be forgotten that the same cruelty, which we
found in the essence of every culture, lies also in the essence of every powerful
religion and in general in the essence of power, which is always evil; …Therefore
we may compare this grand culture with a blood-stained victor, who in his
triumphal procession carries the defeated along as slaves chained to his chariot,
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slaves whom a beneficent power has so blinded that, almost crushed by the
wheels of the chariot, they nevertheless exclaim: “Dignity of labor! Dignity of
man!” 842
If the objective of providing humanity with meanings for life requires the context of
healthy cultures within which great works can fortify and disseminate values as ideals to
be maintained, then some aspect of expropriation of productive activity must occur given
the differences in the fallenness of the ‘They’ – the resignation and acquisitiveness of the
herd – and the conative dispositions or anticipatory resoluteness of genuinely free
individuals. The latter are distinguished from the many by their intuitive recognition of
the logos, or underlying grounds for meaning and political authority provided by their
extraordinary health.
This logos is enacted through their nomothetic legislations: their ongoing striving
for perfection through regimes of self-cultivation and overcoming that comprise a
personal praxis. The affective power of their vitality and effectiveness of their insight for
life influences weaker types, spurring them to mimetically pursue creative disciplinary
techniques of the self that further accentuate difference (thereby productively stimulating
desire as a consequence of generating otherness) and fostering acceptance for the
authentic rank order of types (Rangordnung). Along a spectrum from the strongest or
healthiest to the weakest or sickliest, the authenticity of authorial selfhood becomes
visible, from those ‘spiritual nomads’ and wanderers who, as authentically authentic –
agonists who share the foundational experience (logos) of the No-thing and remain open
to the mysterious source of Being (always understood as the entirety of becoming), to
those who engage in meditative thinking and nobly struggle to resist fallenness, the ease
of herd resignation to which less vital types succumb and who, strive though they may,
487

are only able to become authentically inauthentic. The latter do not strive to perfect
themselves, per se, but may nevertheless unwittingly serve to enhance the species by
performing the inferior, albeit necessary role of calculative thinkers, out of whose striving
the scientific rationality and technological society predicating globality arises.
The basest and most dangerous type for life (the sort dominant in our hyperdecadent epoch) is gradually eliminated. They are lent assistance in pursuing their own
self-destruction and actively bred out of existence via the biopower exerted through rule
by the best. 843 These are the terminally ill, inauthentically inauthentic “individuals”, who
utterly carefree and indifferent about it are content to exist as mere semblances of
beings. 844 Conversely, in a healthy milieu the best are uninhibited, and become masters
both of action (which comes to comprise their exoteric teaching) and style (which comes
to comprise an esoteric teaching) with the strength of will to affect change according to
their social vision and corresponding political design for attaining the future greatness of
European culture.
Unlike Hume’s skepticism, which in an echo of Pyrrho went so far as to doubt
even the basis for skepticism itself and so anticipated the contemporary aporias of
thought and epistemological dilemmas so many liberal post-moderns find themselves in,
Nietzsche’s übermenschlich types risk themselves by recognizing this transhistorical fact
and accept the objective it sets for them to achieve a “truer” or re-naturalized order.
Taken collectively the strategies comprising Nietzsche’s skeptical techne express a wary
disposition toward a decadent society’s standard values – the prerogatives of the herd.
Thus it constitutes an “ironic” scheme for identifying and achieving the good for the
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strongest (and by extension humankind), that consists with a Pyrrhonistic ephectic
drive. 845
Developed in terms of the contingency of all truth claims and the “fundamental”
irrationality of all solutions to humanity’s problem of meaning, it effectively accounts for
the Habermasean objection to genealogical critique as leading to a performative
contradiction. It also accounts for Fraser’s insistence on the need to postulate norms, as
an explicit prescription for greater individual autonomy and type of normative program
for expanding the capacity and capability of individual self-determination. Moreover, it
fulfills certain Foucaultian objectives, for warrior-genealogists implement its critical
ethos to sustain an anti-liberal ethics and practice of dissent. 846
Such a scheme will not appeal to irredeemable decadents, but energetic agents
may enact it as an expression of and effort to realize their native vitality, according to the
volitional resources they possess. 847 Conceived as aesthetic acts in a nomothetic medium,
those spirited enough to adhere to its tenants pursue and fulfill them in an ongoing effort
at self-creation, taking themselves as their masterpiece, they become their own ongoing
works of art. Thus this technique of the self directly corresponds to Nietzsche’s
perfectionism and insistence on the necessity of positing values.
Six interrelated skeptical principles comprise this pragmatic criterion through
which pluripotent individuals may maximize their power, transfigure dissipative asceticconsumerist values and augment a more “natural” organization of macro-political
instincts in the public sphere. They are explicated below (in no particular order of
significance):
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Akatalepsia, entails recognition of the impossibility of certain knowledge, or the
ultimate ungraspability of truth. The doctrine of akatalepsia foreshadowed Nietzsche’s
skeptical, interrogatory disposition toward all truth claims, a disposition that led him to
formulate his notion of will-to-truth and to assume a “perspectivalist” stance toward all
“truth” claims. This is brilliantly explicated in Nietzsche’s unpublished essay On Truth
and Lies in a Non-moral Sense (1873), which anticipates the insights of Derridian
deconstruction and much of twentieth century linguistic philosophy, among other
movements that would become fashionable a century later:
What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and
anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been
poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred and embellished, and which,
after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are
illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have
become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost
their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins. 848
Nietzsche’s critique of values extends from a critique of the criterion of truth and the
function of language in generating and validating it; the legitimacy of dogmatic assertions
of facts and their objectivity in reality and the convictions that arise there from. Nietzsche
rejects the positivist notion that objective truth is attainable but accepts that empirical
observations of the world can provide a perspectivally contingent basis for the assertion
of guiding facts for action in life. In this he possibly resembles a philosophical falliblist
more than a skeptic of the Pyrrhonic variety.
“Truth” as a will to (self-)deception was, Nietzsche asserted, a complex operation
in which an dividual chooses to believe in untruth for the convoluted reason (in a dual
sense) of metaphysical realism and its enforcement via social convention. As settled-upon
error, what gets called truth is really mass assent to matters of belief about putatively
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objective facts resulting from a mischaracterization of the facticity of things. This
produces a tautologous circuitry to reinforce its own delusory portrayal of the world and
engender confidence in a correspondingly grounded reality. The effort to externalize
these mass ascensions to beliefs-cum-convictions and enforce compliance with them is
the starting point of moral systems and arguably the political.
Akatalepsia, in the spirit of open-mindedness and wonder is a crucial component
of a Nietzschean worldview (Weltanschauung) that corresponded with Descartes’ famous
counsel “de omnibus dubitandum [everything is to be doubted]”. Our awareness that
objective or final truths are impossible is based on our recognition of the subjectiveness
of our assessments of what is or is not an ‘evident’ object of inquiry, the establishment of
which is a key precondition for ascertaining (such hypothetical) facts about the world
beyond what is immediately, empirically evident; claims about the objective world. The
evident – non-evident distinction over the nature of claims about legitimate matters of
inquiry raises significant uncertainty about what possibly crucial dimensions of reality we
are unable to access or sufficiently comprehend, thereby warranting akatalepsia. 849
The doctrine of akatalepsia virtually compels another skeptical stance, that of
epoche, the second aspect of the skeptical techne comprising Nietzschean praxis. Epoche
refers to the practice of suspending judgment on the truth or falsity of moral values or the
fixed applicability of particular ethical virtues (disregarding Nietzsche’s persistent, if
romantic, preference for the virtue’s of classical Greece), and one’s belief or disbelief in
certain notion, principles or ideas. It also involves recognition of the condition of
isostheneia (equipollence) characteristic of opinions and the imbrications of all
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perspectives in the health of the individual advancing them as well as the culture in which
an individual/perspective developed. 850 This is necessitated by the realization that:
Human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and only in
these. We cannot look around our own corner: it is hopeless curiosity that wants
to know what other kinds of intellects and perspectives there might be. Rather
has the world become “infinite” for us all over again, inasmuch as we cannot
reject the possibility that it may include infinite interpretations. 851
On the will-to-truth in morality and science, Nietzsche asks:
Just consider thoroughly: ‘why do you not want to deceive?’, especially when it
should appear, – and it does appear! – as though life were aimed at appearance, I
mean at error, deception, dissemblance, delusion, self-delusion, and when on the
other hand, that great manifestation of life has, in fact, always shown itself to be
on the side of the most unscrupulous polytropoi. Such a resolve might, to give it a
mild gloss, perhaps be a piece of quixotism, a small, enthusiastic folly; it could,
however, also be something much worse, namely a destructive principle hostile to
life… ‘Will-to-truth’ – that could be a hidden will to death. – In that way, the
question: why science? leads back to the moral problem: Why morality at all,
when life, nature, history are non-moral? …our faith in science is still based on a
metaphysical faith… that truth is divine …but what if precisely this becomes
more and more unbelievable, when nothing any longer turns out to be divine
except for error, blindness and lies – and what if God himself turned out to be our
oldest lie? 852
Every will-to-truth always already contains a moral dimension, in so far as it seeks to
maintain an imposition of meaning on a world lacking any. Science, as Nietzsche saw it,
rather than pursuing knowledge for its own sake for the sheer wonderment it excites and
the passion it arouses, all too often served as a tool for rationalizing and justifying such –
ultimately moral – impositions of meaning. Though Nietzsche would likely qualify this
assertion today, he would have remained just as critical of the purposes science serves.
Epoche, is the practice of suspending one’s belief in final truths, as absolutely
certain knowledge of reality is ultimately unattainable. It is adopted by ‘good Europeans’,
to maintain a worldview (Weltanschauung) appropriate to their higher, “immoral”
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objectives. The practice of epoche supports their personal cultivation of the
autochthonous habits and practices of “their” hybridized and plastic cultural, regional and
national affiliations and identities so that they may in time transcend them, incorporating
their history, facticity and socially conferred meanings into an encompassing
cosmopolitan disposition (Weltanschauung) augmented by globality.
Their recognition of the relative situatedness of all customs, habits and mores
provides the distance required to both accept their “heritage” and integrate difference into
their perspective on life (including, crucially, themselves). They may thereby
strategically avoid the counter-productive extremes of an unmitigated Pyrrhonic skeptical
stance and its deleterious consequences (popularly understood as a radical form of
doubt—or unreasonable relativism—in which it is asserted that no truth claim can
correspond with reality whatsoever, or that if one could its correspondence could not be
definitively known). In other words the practice of epoche enables them to recognize the
necessity of behaving as if truths were certainly real and as if the essentialisms of the
arbitrary identities and culturally specific values that (at least initially) construct persons
as “individuals” are transcendently true. Such behavior is unnecessary among their peers,
but crucial to the preservation of order among weaker types for whom (universal or
essential) truths are critically important.
Ataraxia is the ancient skeptic and stoic doctrine of disciplined withdrawal;
mastering one’s desires to achieve a state of relative imperturbability. As a part of a
Nietzschean skeptical techne this doctrine must submit to a measure of qualification, for
it is not included here to suggest any reluctance on the part of the practitioner of ‘good
Europeanism’ to take decisive action (as it did in its original Stoical variation) rather,
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here the doctrine of ataraxia is applicable to Nietzschean praxis as the recommendation
of long contemplation in the effort to become what and who one is. It is coterminous with
Nietzsche’s

ascetic

practice

of

solitude,

ramifying

the

cultivated

state

of

contemplativeness and inner rumination necessary for self-knowledge. In addition it
augments the free s
pirit’s quiet rejection of the simulacrum’s simulated values and ersatz existential
fulfillments, as well as the spectacular practices that serve to provide the herd illusory
ontological purpose, through a critical stance toward all such specious truth claims.
Toward this (and against “Socratic, malicious certitude”) Nietzsche asserts that:
He shall be the greatest who can be the most solitary, the most concealed, the
most divergent, the man beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, the
superabundant of will; this shall be called greatness: the ability to be as manifold
as whole, as vast as full. 853
Mastering the ability to direct, via instinct, as much of ones superabundant will as
possible is the challenging task that demands solitude and concealment (a particularly
difficult requirement in an age of the public confessional). This will to power is
expressed in the energy involuntarily surging through one as drives and impulses.
This is a task Nietzsche recognized the importance of and attempted to master
when poor health compelled his early retirement from academia. As Conway states,
Nietzsche shifted his attention to his own becoming, or the political microsphere:
In order to become a philosopher and reclaim the task [Aufgabe] reserved for him,
[Nietzsche] withdrew from the political macrosphere as he understood it,
resigning his professorship at Basel and vanishing into a lonely, nomadic
existence.
And further:
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In order to see himself as a political agent, [Nietzsche] first had to situate himself
within the microsphere of late modernity and discipline himself to acknowledge
the ethical resources arrayed therein. He relocates his perfectionism to the
political microsphere only after personally testing it for himself. 854
Nietzsche, like his Zarathustra, left the society of which he was a part in order to prepare
for an “armed” re-entry to the political macrosphere, which would only occur
posthumously through his works. In his final weeks of cogency this manifested itself in
the form of threatening outbursts directed at prominent figures of his time in letters to
friends, some of whom recognized his developing insanity thereby. However, his
effectual reengagement in the macro-political sphere was also bodied forth in the texts
and publication of those works he conceived and executed in solitude (i.e.: his oeuvre
from the middle period onward).
Echoing his Zarathustra, who returns to society knowing himself but appearing to
those he encounters as a buffoon, Nietzsche’s late writings announce the macro-political
project he settled on, only to be misunderstood, manipulated and much maligned in the
century to come. Given our contemporary inability to read slowly and with due care it his
project would still appear foolish to many. But when his works were beginning to be
taken seriously in the Anglo-American philosophical community, he was “charitably”,
though incorrectly, labeled an “anti-political” thinker (as explicated above). 855 With the
dramatic increase in serious Nietzsche scholarship from the 1970s onward, the ethicopolitical dimensions of his thought have been more thoroughly examined and
appreciated.
Ataraxia is a crucial component of the skeptical techne required to cultivate the
outstanding misfits and invalids who will likely embody the highest development of the
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hyper-decadence afflicting our ‘late-late-modern’ epoch. As Conway observes, it is not
the heroes and beasts of Nietzsche’s fantasies that may redeem us in our dissipative age
of globalization, for the superlative individuals who will realize the abstract potentials of
globality and hasten the transfiguration of values to revivify the health of humankind and
initiate a new epoch, “are not readily apparent to us”, and anyway “will remind no one of
[the] world-historical conquerors” Nietzsche frequently cites as exemplars of his own
decadent vision. 856
The fourth principle is Apangelia, an avowal not involving a commitment to truth
or falsity. Apangelia developed in recognition of the temporal contingency and
epistemological situatedness (e.g.: determined nature) of all consciousness, knowledge
and truth claims. Where Nietzsche remarks that “The charm of knowledge would be
small if so much shame did not have to be overcome on the road to it,” 857 he plays on the
assertion, ‘I know only that I know nothing’ famously attributed to Plato’s Socrates. 858
The point is that even such a paradoxical (or falsely modest?) assertion amounts to a
conceit that reveals tremendous arrogance vis-à-vis the actual condition of knowing in /
having knowledge about the world.
The charm of knowledge, such as it is, lies precisely in the realization that every
assertion of fact is either tautologous (and therefore charmingly naïve) or hubristic (and
charmingly brazen), and that to make any assertions of or appeals to knowledge we must,
in good conscience, overcome the tremendous shame that would otherwise keep us as
silent as Pyrrho of Elis. With such a realization in mind we may profitably reorder the
microsphere (or political life of ourselves) and avow certain truths as always contingent
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and contextually situated and affirm the efficacy of proximate kinds of knowledge
without committing ourselves to them dogmatically.
In the macro-political sphere, however, it is prudent to cautiously adhere to
certain of society’s mores, taboos and proscriptions, however incurably decadent one’s
society has become. One’s self-creation or discovery of one’s übermenschlich potential
requires no more undo interference than the innate eccentricities of such individuals are
certain to incite – the hassles they will inevitably endure both inure them to certain
hardships, including a degree of loneliness and obscurity, but they need not be aggravated
needlessly. Though they are frequently alone and “their pursuits of self-perfection go
largely unnoticed, along with the micropolitical legislations they enact,” this aids them in
their self-creation and discovery as well as empowering them for future macropolitical
labors.
Adoxastos is a critical aspect of a Nietzschean praxis. The Greek word meant
“without belief” and referred to the disciplined effort to resist forming firm convictions
about any issue by its skeptical exponents. In terms of their engagement at the macrolevel of the political, adoxastos is demonstrated by ‘good Europeans’ through feigned
conformity to the prevailing social conventions and value standards of the day. This
corresponds with Nietzsche’s advocacy of the need to experimentally adopt masks, in
part to represent oneself “correctly”. Through the donning of masks one may outwardly
conform to social conventions and mores in order to maximize the quanta of power one
is, in other words, succeed. In our declining epoch the sort of individual capable of selfcultivation would be accustomed to deploying masks and disguises. Among
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contemporary Europeans of all ranks Nietzsche is clear that none would be discredited
for doing so:
The hybrid European – a tolerably ugly plebeian, all in all – definitely requires a
costume: he needs history as his storeroom for costumes. He realizes, to be sure,
that none of them fits him properly – he changes and changes. 859
The actual virtues of superlative exemplars must be disguised from the envious masses, if
only in the interest of their self-preservation. This is not analogous to advocating
cowardice in the face of likely persecution; rather it is the sort of pragmatic stealth
required in order for rare, pluripotent exceptions to remain immune to their society’s
imposed identities and malignant dissipation. Artfulness and mimicry are necessary for
them to stand any chance of success.
Sensitive to the spirit of revenge inherent to the meanings liberal society confers
upon life, the furtive efforts of the strongest must to a certain point be hidden. Their effort
to remain veiled is symptomatic of their intellectual and spiritual strength – the ploy
utilized to achieve a threshold level of conventional success and/or legitimacy, and
possibly never revealed as such. Theirs is a truthful deception fabricated in the face of
existential threats and with the future greatness of the species in mind. 860
If liberal egalitarians would object to such distinctions and rank ordering of types
and subvert, through slave ressentiment, the unpopular virtues of the healthiest, the threat
the former pose to the latter’s becoming must be mitigated through deception. 861 This
thoroughly “Nietzschean” strategy, despite requiring a pragmatic distrust as a part of the
good-conscience of those capable of adopting it, can therefore by understood as quasieudemonic, in so far as it facilitates continued, unobstructed self-overcomings among the
best (the sustained expenditure of excess force through their positive will to creative
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destruction as generative power) and coheres with their objective of realizing affirmative
potentials of globality.
The latter, as a macro-political aim, depends on the flourishing of the strongest,
who seek to overcome, that is, to creatively destroy and thereby transfigure the
globalization complex and the ultra-liberal-modern value matrix that sustains it. As the
strongest have, by necessity, to turn within so as to continually re-discover and invigorate
their “virtues,” this objective consists with the natural route of their becoming.
We Europeans of the day after tomorrow, we first-born of the twentieth century –
with all our dangerous curiosity, our multiplicity and art of disguise, our mellow
and as it were sugared cruelty in spirit and senses – if we are to have virtues we
shall presumably have only such virtues as have learned to get along with our
most secret and heartfelt inclinations, with our most fervent needs: very well, let
us look for them within our labyrinths! 862
‘Good Europeans’ would adopt this strategy of employing a multitude of disguises as a
part of the Nietzschean skeptical techne and ascetic practices of self-cultivation to
become who it is they are. Through the artful deception of masks—the enactment of
certain social roles, such as professor, doctor, or politician—they may remain incognito
long enough to constructively co-opt ultra-liberal-modern (secularized ChristianPlatonic) values and direct the transmuted volition in them to natural ends.
The feigned conformity to social conventions and popular, “common-sense”
convictions, which the doctrine of adoxastos mandates for the strongest, necessitates
mastering the art of employing masks. This does not suggest that they hide from the
scrutiny of others, only that they refrain from revealing themselves in conformity with the
confessional notion of openness that prevails among the herd. 863 Their works reveal what
their outward persona does not, posing challenges to the spirit of revenge. Through
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strategic expenditures of force they squander themselves with purposeful intentionality in
willing their own inevitable downfall. Adoxastos may also be translated “as ‘without false
or ungrounded beliefs’”, 864 and calls for representing oneself “correctly” to succeed in
the conventional terms of ordinary life without being impeded by or unduly suffering
from popular herd chauvinisms and prejudices. This directly corresponds with another of
Nietzsche’s insights, specifically that:
The degree of psychological falsity and opacity needed to sanctify the affects
essential for the preservation and enhancement of power (in order to create a good
conscience for them). 865
It also matches his view, stated in another unpublished note that “Good Europeans”, in
their “preparation for becoming the legislators of the future,” live:
[b]eyond good and evil—but we demand that herd morality should be held sacred
unconditionally. We hold in reserve many types of philosophy which need to be
taught: possibly, the pessimistic type, as a hammer; a European Buddhism might
perhaps be indispensible. We probably support the development and maturing of
democratic institutions: they enhance weakness of the will: in socialism we see a
thorn that protects against comfortableness… We take our accidental positions,
our experiences, as foreground and stress them to deceive about our depths. 866
Active power cannot reveal itself fearlessly in a decadent epoch, and is therefore
compelled to disguise itself: its source, motive and intention: ergo the psychological
falsity required to ensure its preservation. On the contrary, reactive power always already
ramifies the established order, or status quo of such unhealthy periods. Reactive power
does not mask itself, but is intrinsically afflicted with a counter-productive badconscience as it arises out of ressentiment so thoroughly sublimated in its very enactment
that it appears natural.
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In addition to the pragmatic use of masks and strategic (mis)representation,
Nietzsche also asserts that willing against the stridency of all reactive will-to-truth is an
integral characteristic of the übermenschlich:
The great man is necessarily a skeptic (which is not to say that he has to appear to
be one), provided that greatness consists in this: to will something great and the
means to it. Freedom from any kind of conviction is part of the strength of his
will. 867
When considering the meaning of this passage it is useful to recall that Nietzsche loathed
the popular, uncritical skepticism of the masses, which he heard as an echo of the ersatz
skepticism of their (and our present day) ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment: a
base appeal to the egalitarian, laisser aller, ethos of his and our own day. Such a shallow,
equivocal doubt of all values is but one of the poisons the latter mixed with secularized
Christian values and with which it effectively inebriates the herd.
Where this crass relativism, which prevails among educated philistines (the socalled culture class), is not operative, overt and inflexible demagoguery is deployed to
deprecate the value-systems and cultural meanings of others with whom the arbiters of
the globalization complex come into conflict. 868 This is especially clear when one
recognizes that most consumer automatons in the post-industrialized “West” (the centers
of the globalization complex) cannot reflectively assess their society’s values or the
significant features distinguish their culture from others. Falling back upon patriotism and
jingoistic prejudices to justify their received worldview, they are unlikely to find their
inability to cite substantive differences problematic and remain indifferent to the fact, a
reaction that indicates how thoroughly an uncritical relativism has conditioned
contemporary attitudes. The ultimately contented disposition Nietzsche associated with
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the “last man” arises from the annihilation of life-affirming meanings and significations
rather than genuine dialogue about reigning values. Although such indifference does
enable a certain sort of tolerance, this let-it-be attitude is antithetical to the
perspectivalism of good Europeans, who strive to overturn the all-too-human
spectacularized meanings of ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment and re-introduce
natural values according to their good-conscience, rather than merely pander to popular
conviction. 869
The final tenet, Parrhesia, or fearless speech, is a concept and form of praxis
recently examined in some depth by Michel Foucault. It developed as a part of the
doctrine of the ancient school of the Cynics. This corresponds directly with the
untimeliness of truly free or noble spirits, the efficaciousness of whose acts is enabled by
the preceding stances. Parrhesia – if it is to be constructive and not an utterly selfdefeating exercise – must be practiced with irony, great humor and always toward
immediately creative, albeit destructive ends that correspond with the long-term,
constructive ambition of healthy individuals.
As a sophisticated challenge to the reigning ascetic/materialist ideals its utility is
realized by those (such as Nietzsche) capable of harnessing, as Conway observes, “the
erotic power of ascetic practices to tempt some individuals away from the anti-affective
animus of Christian morality.” 870 The immediate objective of such “comedians of the
ascetic ideal” 871 is to spur those with the native vitality into accepting the unique,
constitutional danger that would single them out from the herd and drive them toward
realizing their intrinsic greatness. As Nietzsche observed:
Each of us bears a productive uniqueness within him as the core of his being; and
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when he becomes aware of it, there appears around him a strange penumbra
which is the mark of his singularity. Most find this unendurable, because they
are… lazy, and because a chain of toil and burdens is suspended from this
uniqueness. 872
It is the purpose of ascetic-consumerist ideals to turn the possibility presented by this
essence of life against life itself; to distract persons from this potential within themselves
until they are no longer capable of identifying it – what later existentialists would identify
as self-estrangement. The ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment, who demand “that
we should accompany” them, and who “impose [their] valuation of existence”
universally, punish those who accept that chain of toil whose burden it presents in the
form of a continual desire for self-overcoming as becoming other. 873
Anticipating Freud’s identification of Thanatos, a death instinct or drive,
Nietzsche recognized that the ascetic-consumerist priest succeeds with the vast majority
by exploiting the temptations to succumb to the reactive force or negative will to
nothingness as nihilistic power. 874 This is because, being too weak to enact healthier
instincts, the many finds denying them easier than adhering to an agonal regime of selfdiscipline and creation. Instead they yield to the pressurizing habituation of a culture of
conformity imposed by ascetic-consumerist priests.
…An ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here an unparalleled ressentiment rules,
that of an unfulfilled instinct and power-will which wants to be master, not over
something in life, but over itself and its deepest strongest, most profound
conditions; here, the green eye of spite turns on physiological growth itself, in
particular the manifestation of this in beauty and joy; while satisfaction is looked
for and found in failure, decay, pain, misfortune, ugliness, voluntary deprivation,
destruction of selfhood, self-flagellation and self-sacrifice. 875
Contemporary asceticism in post-industrialized service economies resembles its classic
predecessor only in so far as self-denial remains the definitive practice with the goal lying
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in the attainment of rewards provided by crass materialism and/or an other-worldly
suprasensible beyond. 876 Its strategy for the attainment of self-denial is avoidance, not of
physical exertion or pleasures or even of solitude, rather it is reached via innumerable
acts of consumption intended to divert the attention of the consumer from the
meaninglessness of her own existence. Activities such as shopping, exercise and fitness,
myriad entertainments and petty diversions, career obsession, etc., completely occupy the
consciousness—and encumber the consciences—of contemporary “ascetics”, who come
to feel ashamed of themselves if they are not constantly occupied. By performing in
accordance with their inherently slavish nature they maintain the happiness of the last
man. Blinking idiots, they are bored and anxious when a pensive mood encroaches on
them. Out of a mendacious truthfulness they consider themselves unworthy of authentic
leisure, which they consider time wasted, and indeed, they are undeserving of it.
The new form of ascetic denial consists of consciously resisting any temptation to
engage in critical reflection. An anti-human form of practice co-extending with the anticultural ethos of ultra-liberal-modernity, it consists of deliberate abstention from
contemplative introspection. This exercise in self-denial is support with the medically
prescribed (re: institutionally sanctioned and medically supervised) aid of psychotropic
pharmacological therapies, when necessary. 877
In its highly-secularized new form Christianity now functions to divert its
followers from the most dangerous form of asceticism: self-denial for the sake of oneness
with the eternal. With no time for esoteric truths, neo-liberal capital process cannot afford
to have otherwise productive workers “going off the rails” in pursuit of some mysterious
spiritual enlightenment. Since the death of God Christianity must promote compliance
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with the values of a hyper-decadent consumer society to stay relevant, and this means
shifting the focus away from what does not feel good, namely sin and suffering
(including the suffering of Jesus), and onto self-fulfillment through the happiness that is
achieved via the attainment of one’s materialist goals. Ever-increasing consumption is the
new salvation offered through Christ.
Among the best-types this counter-instinctual aversion to introspective
examination is learned at a tremendous cost. Born into the ascetic/materialist milieu of
our declining, hyper-decadent age, individuals are indoctrinated from birth into “slavish”
forms of conceptual servitude and disciplined to behave as docile and obedient herd
animals, “whose physiological capacity to live decreases,” and who, as an individualthat-might-have-been-but-wasn’t, strenuously resists any effort by individuals-in-themaking, those who seek to become themselves, through their efforts at becoming other,
or in Nietzsche’s qualified sense, following Pindar, who it is they are.
By adhering to these positive skeptical standards that collectively describe a
Nietzschean technique of the self, individuals endowed with the prerequisite strength may
attain enough conventional social rank, authority and power to engage, through a
specifically genealogical approach, in generative acts of parrhesia. By speaking fearlessly
they seek both to preserve the simulacrum and to challenge and re-naturalize society’s
beliefs and habits of action. Thus their fearless speech constitutes a deliberate
intervention in the dominant power-knowledge regime that confronts conventional,
reactive authority. Evolutionary rather than revolutionary, their legislations must appear
to preserve the existing social order precisely to allow them to insinuate themselves into
conventional authority structures to increase their conventional power.
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Skeptical of the veracity of all “truth” claims, warrior-genealogists (along with
those who share their unspoken understanding of the perspectivalist nature of all truth
claims, the significance is comprehensible in direct proportion to the relative strength of
the individual, the practical utility of which is contingent upon their ability to translate it
into power in a hyper-decadent era), still posit values, or “truths” that correspond to the
interests of the best, that may ultimately transform the social order and stimulate other
healthy individuals to do the same. The warrior-genealogist’s approach, “while not being
able to effectively legislate autonomy, may nevertheless seek to demonstrate its
possibility as well as its commitment to it, [wishing] to encourage others to ‘fight’ for the
experience of freedom without recourse to universal norms.” 878 Through parrhesia they
are the only “real enemies and injurers” of the ascetic ideal, making themselves
comedians of it “to deliberately arouse mistrust” of its precepts which they can then
exploit.879 As Elbe further observes in the context of examining genealogical critique,
What the genealogist hopes is that while he refrains from giving his insights
universal attributes, the demonstration of his own critical distancing from traditional
structures of thinking might lead others to recognize their capacity for critique, and might
even motivate them to pursue a similar path. 880
They become, in Nietzsche’s term, artist-philosophers, who strive, through a
stealthy militancy, to co-opt the reactive prerogatives of the simulacrum and gradually
transfigure its simulated values to intensify and “re-naturalize” individuals’ experience of
the agon. In so doing they elevate humanity.
Hitherto these extraordinary promoters of mankind have seldom felt themselves to
be friends of knowledge but, rather, disagreeable fools and dangerous questionmarks (who) have found their task, their hard, unwanted, unavoidable task, but
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finally the greatness of their task, in being the bad conscience of their age. By
laying bare the knife vivisectionally to the bosom of the very virtues of the age
they betrayed what was their own secret: to know a new greatness of man, a new
untrodden path to his enlargement. 881
As Zarathustra propounded, myriad paths to man’s enlargement are most likely to be
created by thoroughly unconventional individuals standing outside society’s mainstream,
whose nomothetic actions are at first contemptuously dismissed by the so-called “higher
men” who enjoy conventional social prestige and authority. But they may also be
revealed by apparently unremarkable persons completely ensconced in conformist social
structures whose enforced orthodoxy diminishes the vitality of healthy individuals.
As long as institutionalized bad-consciousness and ressentiment have not
completely debilitated them (as it does the vast majority) this can occur in whatever
capacity or realm they have succeeded in attaining conventional power: as bureaucrats,
corporate officers, politicians, academics, artists, etc. Thus, as a response to the
simulacrum generated by globalization this skeptical techne provides a means to correct
the millennia’s old inversion of natural relations between the strong and the weak (noble
and base) by actuating the forces needed to maximize each individual’s quanta of liberty
to ramify the positive potential in globality.

Part Two: Increasing the utility of the herd to maximize the power of the strongest
In Nietzsche’s naturalistic view the capable few strive to strengthen the forces
disgregating the instincts in a declining age in order to hasten their transmutation and the
overcoming of its decadence. In our era this would equate with the intensification of the
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and globalization’s corresponding forces,
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processes and institutions to stimulate potentials of globality and augment their
exploitation by the strongest. In so doing the healthy may become who they are, not to
liberate the masses from their condition of mediocre complacency, but to segue
humankind to a post-human future. Extraordinary individuals have a self-interested stake
in the welfare of the herd that co-extends with their broader, noble concern with creating
a higher culture to confer meaning on existence. This lies primarily in preserving the
herd’s practical utility by maintaining the simulacrum that endows its life with a
placating illusion of meaning and purpose.
This concern, which is neither utilitarian nor eudaemonic, corresponds with their
concernful engagement for reaching elevated meanings and truths, which in any case can
never pertain to the herd, as it cannot be emancipated from its baser nature (the liberal
fantasy). Therefore any abrupt end to the simulacrums of ersatz meaning and purpose it is
provided by the contemporary spectacles of our technological society would be disruptive
and damaging. Nietzsche’s tragic artist–philosophers merely hasten the tempo of the
dance, to increase the feverish expression of globalized society’s ingravescent decadence,
which would proceed apace anyway. In so doing they condition the possibility—or
stochastic development—of its overcoming, the materialization of new emergents and the
likelihood of the appearance of Übermenschen thereby.
In an important, if counter-intuitive sense, this fulfills the Rawlsian (autocratically
liberal) demand that inequality between strong and weak function to the advantage of
society’s weakest members, for the hoi polloi lack strength to achieve, let alone tolerate,
more complete liberty. 882 Their “freedom” is realized in living regulated, predictable
lives anchored by stable meanings and essences that fortify their existence with purpose.
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As the majority of people cannot endure too much of the suffering inherent to becoming
(to life itself) they seek the sort of psychological and moral anodynes globalization’s
simulacrum provides. 883
Nietzsche was quite contemptuous of the popular skepticism and resulting
relativism that typified his own era (much like Socrates), which ruined the most
promising young men with the “incurable wretchedness of a heart which is no longer
hard enough for evil or for good, of a broken will which no longer commands, can no
longer command.” 884 He saw it as coextending with the secularization of slave morality
propagated through the liberal precepts of rationalism and individual autonomy.
Nietzsche was adamant that the herd fundamentally needs sustaining beliefs in universal
moral truths and for this reason he determined the creation of values to be among the
highest objectives of the master’s of the future who should naturally rule the earth.
The popular skepticism—or superficial relativism of ‘laissez aller’—that
manifested the decadence of 19th century Europe and Wilhelmine Germany merely
compounded the nihilistic outlook among the throng—the all-too-many who could not,
even marginally, contribute to the development of humankind once infected by the
poison of relativism. 885 Such skepticism threatened the already weakened basis of culture
through anarchy bred by an “anything goes” absence of socially enforced values that
could undermine the collective sense of purpose nurtured by the social bond. 886 Nietzsche
therefore contrasts the “indubious qualities which distinguish the critic from the skeptic: I
mean certainty in standards of value, conscious employment of a unity of method,
instructed courage, independence and ability to justify oneself.” 887
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The term critic is here employed to distinguish the affirmative authentically
skeptical stance adopted by his philosophers of the future, from popular skepticism that
breeds a casual and ruinous relativism the motto of which might be ‘don’t worry; be
happy’. As genuine skeptics Nietzschean critics already know there are no eternal or
universal truths (consistent with the premise of adoxastos), but involuntarily act to create
values they will universal adherence to, as their duty to themselves. This then is at once
their “categorical imperative” and “noble lie”—an outlook corresponding to the truthful
deception mentioned above. Good Europeans overcome the potentially paralyzing
knowledge that ultimately nothing can be known through (critical) acts that correspond
with and realize their native volition.
The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values, he does not
need to be approved of, he judges ‘what harms me is harmful in itself’, he knows
himself to be that which in general first accords honor to things, he creates
values. 888
According to Nietzsche, the burgeoning power of mankind’s representative exemplars is
synonymous with humanity’s development, and crucially depends on providing the herd
with the relatively stable moorings of an ethico-political framework capable of duration.
In the present, which is increasingly characterized by the technological
domination of humankind, the common objective of all artist-warriors is that of
augmenting the institutions of globalization in order to exploit potentials of globality. As
these largely reactive dynamics increase activity, and by extension suffering, the
innovations they give rise to bring to light opportunities for globality’s further realization.
This requires delicately balancing the need to conscript the herd as a resource by
appealing to their self-interest as changes brought about by globalization force them to
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adapt, and increase their suffering. The simulation of agonistic political relations
practiced in contemporary democracies—the interpolating axiomatic narratives
propagated through the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity by the globalization
complex—realizes Nietzsche’s premonition regarding the consequences of decadence,
the high costs of which “the naïve propagators and panegyrists, the apostles of ‘modern
ideas’, would be the least inclined to anticipate.” 889
Modern democracy prepares the ground for the works of thymotic free spirits—
“philosophers of the dangerous ‘perhaps’”—able to call into question the usefulness of all
values, or “truths”, for life. In the same passage where Nietzsche meditated on the likely,
albeit unanticipated consequences of democratization for Western civilization and
realization of the noblest ideal of Europe (the salience of which may be applied to the
prerogatives of European unification and broader political trends of globalization today),
he asserts:
This process of the European in a state of becoming, the tempo of which can be
retarded by great relapses but which will perhaps precisely through them gain in
vehemence and depth… The same novel conditions which will on average create
a leveling and mediocritizing of man – a useful, industrious, highly serviceable
and able herd-animal – are adapted in the highest degree to giving rise to
exceptional men of the most dangerous and enticing quality. While the total
impression produced by such future Europeans will probably be that of
multifarious, garrulous, weak-willed and highly employable workers who need a
master, a commander, as they need their daily bread; while therefore, the
democratization of Europe will lead to the production of a type prepared for
slavery in the subtlest sense: in individual and exceptional cases the strong man
will be found to turn out stronger and richer than has perhaps ever happened
before – thanks to the unprejudiced nature of his schooling, thanks to the
tremendous multiplicity of practice, art and masks. What I mean to say is that the
democratization of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the
breeding of tyrants – in every sense of that word, including the most spiritual. 890
Here the likelihood is suggested that in some rare instances an exceptional individual will
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emerge to become self-legislating – in Call’s sense of the post-modern anarchist. Such
unprejudiced “spiritual tyrants” seek to utilize the masses as a reservoir of power for the
enhancement of their involuntary positive will. In such a capacity the herd might serve as
a resource for the historically contingent means of revaluing advancing a life-affirming
culture they pursue. In an epoch of ascending vitality governed according to the edifying
tradition of cultural practices that facilitate a healthy instinctual organization of the drives
and impulses at both the micro- and macro-levels of the political, the weak would derive
the real meaning and true purpose of their existence through serving as the instruments of
great creators.
Nietzsche asserted that “the philosopher as we understand him, we ‘free Spirits’”,
would be,
…the man with the most comprehensive responsibility, whose conscience bears
the weight of the overall development of humanity, this philosopher will make
use of religion for his breeding and education work, just as he will make use of
the prevailing political and economic situation. 891
Good Europeans, who may become who it is they are through the skeptical praxis
explicated above, make the most of existing conditions, however dissolute and philistinic,
to hasten the appearance of future Übermenschen.
The notion of a nomothetic legislator (Gesetzgeber) creating custom and
determining law by force of will as suggested by each of the passages cited above, is not
at odds with the assertion that the democratization of Europe may breed magnanimous
tyrants. Nietzsche’s use of the term ‘tyrants’ is interesting for many reasons, primary
among which is his recognition of the character such a lawgiver assumes. Nietzsche plays
on the conventional conception of the tyrant to suggest an important double meaning: the
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democratization of Europe is breeding liberal ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment
who are modernity’s vengeful “tyrants” over socio-political life, supervising the
diminution of Western culture.
Additionally, a thoroughly democratized Europe is fostering conditions within
which a few may effectively resist its infinitely regressing simulacrums and thwart their
anti-natural ideals by hijacking them. Through their unique, experimental art
(Versucherkunst) they may subvert and co-opt the interdependent, interconnecting web of
dynamic relationships constitutive of the philistinic culture and its correspondingly ersatz
political order. As every act of valuing expresses a will-to-truth (itself constituting
arrogance toward life, as cited above) it follows that the positing of meanings and
“truths” is always already “tyrannical” and necessitates an embrace of cruelty.
Nietzsche’s use of these terms should properly be understood thus and taken to suggest
his startlingly brave honesty.
The motif of the nomothetic legislator (Gesetzgeber) could be seen as a
romanticization, for in actuality no nomothetic legislator as such ever acted in a wholly
autonomous fashion. The mythologized exploits of heroes such as Gilgamesh and Thales
aside, more familiar, historically verifiable accounts of the acts (and travails) of great
law-givers through recorded history essay the point, irrespective of historical epoch or
cultural context. The exploits of diverse world-historical lawgivers such as Solon,
Lycurgus, Xerxes, Alexander, Caesar Augustus, Charlemagne, Genghis Khan, Suleiman
the Magnificent, Akbar and Dara Shikoh, Jefferson and Madison and Napoleon, all
personify the type. Alternatively, those whom liberal-optimists would identify as great
leaders, men such as Roosevelt and Churchill, Monnet and Schuman, Wałęsa and Havel,
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are in fact “plucky bricoleurs” who stabilize a declining order, mustering the residual
volitional resources of a society to extend its duration. 892 They effectively put off a
civilization’s inevitable expiration by doctoring their diseased age to recuperate its
residual resources. However, they are too sickened by decadence to establish, that is
nomothetically legislate, a vital new order. 893
The experience of each of these “great men” also serves to underscore the point
that the most independent and capable leaders are only able to exercise and maintain
power by satisfying the interests of those social groups upon whom his authority as leader
or tyrant depended, whether it was—in Weberian terms—charismatic, traditional
(monarchical) or bureaucratic in form and structure. Otherwise, any notion of
conventional power conceived in macro-political terms is a false one, as the possibility of
unsanctioned domination—however “spiritual”—lies outside any conceivable notion of
legitimate political community. Although conventional political authority always already
rests on an originary act of usurpation, actual rule by one, as such, is in practice a fiction,
except perhaps in the case of a person living as a hermit.
Nietzsche sought to contend with and reconcile a fundamental dilemma intrinsic
to the political: that of our unavoidable dependency on others and the need for
community it imposes, versus our desire to be autonomous. In his view only an
exceptionally power few can expend the force required to truly approximate authentic
individualism. His recognition of this inescapable human condition, aptly summarized by
John Donne’s famous observation that “No man is an island”, as well as its complication
by differences in the power that individuals are, motivated him to recommend the
experimental art of tyrannizing oneself to cultivate a needed interiority in the public
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process of becoming who one is. He believed that societies had to enact similar violences
of self-creation if they were to prosper and that so too would the human species, if it were
to creatively evolve and not expire from exhaustion. 894
As noted above, every regime arrogates to itself the authority to make (inherently
subjective) determinations of value and define “justice”—determinations that are
invariably coercive and which mystify their own autocratic conceit. These presumptions
inevitably strike some as unjust. However, the Disneyesque, villainous ‘tyrant’ of ultraliberal-modernist ideological representations, the “illegitimate dictator” or “authoritarian
despot” serves to fortify self-justifying liberal myths legitimating democratization itself –
doctrinal axioms upon which our hyper-decadent age’s ascetic-consumerist priests rely
for their legitimacy.
It is precisely through the superficially harmless yet extremely subversive
participation of vivacious anomalists in the very mechanisms and procedures of
tyrannical control over / upon everyday life dominated by liberal autocrats that the best
may concretely initiate the thorough revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe)
they instinctively desire. The involvement of such noble types occurring through their
involvement in repressive (i.e.: anti-natural) political networks of authority and
legitimation, the modes of social conformity and prevailing reason sabotaged through
appropriation, transgression and (sovereign) acts of taking that create new political
antagonisms and means of dealing with their cooptation by conventional authority.
To maximize their will to power, sufficiently strengthen themselves through their
exploitation of abstract potentials of globality, uncanny individuals or “lucky strikes”
may employ the aforementioned skeptical techne to carefully manipulate dominant social
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mores and beliefs into serving their interests (the creative destruction of prevailing
nihilistic values) as need merits. Recognizing even in late-modernity’s secular faith in
reason and fetish for science a kernel of the ascetic ideal, the final phase in its
development, they conceal their doubt, atheism and incredulity toward all beliefs with
masks of “orthodox faith” (be they secular-materialist and / or some form of coexisting
faith in a supernatural divinity) and so outwardly appear to uphold and abide acceptable
social conventions and practices through performative, mimetic enactments of
conformity.
Using the tolerance of (ersatz) difference that the metadiscourse of ultra-liberalmodernity deploys to reproduce itself, they challenge the permitted traditions and identic
sensibilities comprising that difference through mocking parody’s of it. Not to be
mistakenly conflated with the crass relativism perpetuated by the globalization complex
itself, their kynical irony and challenging lampoons of hegemonic values subvert
globalization’s efforts to instantiate universal normative, positive law and neo-liberal
capitalism. They upset received authority to encourage the idea of political authority as
originating within and emanating from forceful individuals (those capable of expending
the greatest quanta of force) rather than as imposed from outside.
This is occurring in myriad ways and mediums, both in globalization’s primary
loci and at its periphery according to a complex, variable calculus arising from the
encounter of ultra-liberal modernity’s ideological prerogative with differing cultural and
identic sensibilities. It happens in innumerable acts of brilliant defiance consisting of
steady, consciousness-raising subversion that may or may not employ humor to make
their point. Some examples from around the world include the anti-consumerism of
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Adbusters, audacious subversions of corporate authority “performed” by The Yes Men,
Zarganar’s seditious lampoons of the Burmese junta, Charbel Khalilor’s brave parodying
of Lebanon’s fractious politics, Hikari Ōta’s comical spoofs of Japan’s parliament, and
Sun Mu’s wry paintings which subtly deride North Korea’s state propaganda. Without
humorous intent, the heroically militancy of environmentalist Paul Watson constitutes
another example. His anti-whaling ‘Sea Shepherd’ missions play a dangerous game in the
gray area of international conservation law to protect endangered marine life.
These defiant acts incrementally hasten the demise of slave-morality by
challenging social norms and exposing the absurdity of regularized practices. In
culturally specific contexts they beg the question: “What does all will-to-truth mean?”
Nietzsche elaborates:
… and here I touch on the problem again, on our problem, my unknown friends:
what meaning does our being have, if it were not that that will-to-truth has
become conscious of itself as a problem in us?… Without a doubt, from now on,
morality will be destroyed by the will-to-truth’s becoming-conscious-of-itself:
that great drama in a hundred acts reserved for Europe in the next two centuries,
the most terrible, most dubious drama but perhaps also the one most rich in
hope… 895
The will-to-truth is a product of the native volition to confer meaning to existence, an
ultimately random and potentially dangerous activity in so far as it may be self-deluding
and damaging to potential becomings. However, necessity compels us, in the Aristotelian
sense of the spirit (nous and energeia as correlative of his concept of dynamis) to create
such meanings. Good Europeans must creatively destroy (transfigure) the residual
vestiges of slave morality so that the megalopsychoi in our midst can make new use,
according to their pathos, of the herd. Putting the all-too-many to work, particularly in
ways that provide them with contentedness and possibilities of self-overcoming (in so far
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as they are capable), will enable would-be Übermenschen to engage in the productive
agonisms by which they perfect themselves. By managing (politically ordering) the
desires and irrational prejudices of common people be it through mass-education, a new
religion, etc., the strongest few might thereby achieve a post-human future; a
consciousness of unanticipated, and presently inexpressible possibilities and more
empowering modes of being. 896
If successful in this risky endeavor, they may empower themselves (and the herd
by extension) enough to engage in the aforementioned generative acts of parrhesia that
incite every noble type to acts of self-overcoming.
Whoever has thought profoundly about where and how the plant man has hitherto
grown most vigorously must conclude that…the opposite of all the herd thinks
desirable are necessary for the elevation of the type man. A morality with such
reverse intentions, which desires to train men for the heights, not for comfort and
mediocrity, a morality with the intention of training a ruling caste – the future
masters of the earth – must, if it is to be taught, appear in association with the
prevailing moral laws, in the guise of their terms and forms. 897
Those who fail to attain a necessary degree of power but engage in acts of parrhesia
anyway risk being dismissed as fools, shunned as social pariahs or even condemned as
criminals and punished for their audacity and transgressions of norms.
Yet in the post-modern era of globality this danger is not as prevalent as in
previous eras because forces of globalization also circulate simulations of defiance of
their “norms” in alternative sub-cultures and organized civil disobedience. Ultimately
they spectacularize the anti-globalization movement’s oppositionality as another
commodified identity. The culture industries and mega-media glamorize the illegal and /
or homicidal activities of governments (regimes both within the globalization complex,
on its periphery and in a state of exception to it), political radicals of various stripes,
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criminal cartels (Hollywood, et al.) and terrorist networks (CNN and Al Jezerra), which
utilize numerous aspects of globalization’s many forces and processes to flourish.
Globalization’s diverse simulacra of autochthonous cultural practices and spectacularized
desire as consumption come thereby to comprise a hyper-reality, the reactive forces of
which aim at totalizing forms of control to manage the chaos they themselves bring
about. 898 Yet as a molar assemblage it is still dynamic enough to modify its objectives
and interpolate (take possession of) alternative discourses that challenge it to banalize
alterity without completely annihilating it. 899
Its internationalizing effects simultaneously accommodate and co-opt difference
in striving to fulfill globality’s potential. However, in this post-modern environment
(which arguably represents an improvement over the limitations imposed in latemodernity) the success of potentially great individuals is still unlikely, and so must be
qualified, for:
In every kind of injury and loss the lower and coarser soul is better off than the
nobler: the dangers facing the latter are bound to be greater, the probability that it
will come to grief and perish is, considering the multiplicity of the conditions of
its life, enormous. – When a lizard loses a finger that finger grows again: not so in
the case of a man. 900
This assertion is, however defensible, quite comic. For it seems obvious that those
accustomed to leisure and a contemplative life are going to find enduring hardship less
bearable than the “lower and coarser soul” inured to it by a lifetime of deprivation.
Nietzsche’s aristocratic elitism is demonstrated in all its outrageous glory here. His
political naivety led to such unqualified pronouncements, which lent his work a
dangerous quality that comprehensively all-too-human political parties such as the
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National Socialists of Germany would make murderous use of in the half-century
following Nietzsche’s death.
Transversally innovating the impetus of ‘good Europeans’ through their
realizations of abstract potentials of globality, the exemplars of humankind, irrespective
of their cultural realm, civilizational milieu or national origin, condition the possibility
for future occurrences of becoming-other through their acts of seditious satire and
comical derision of prevailing ascetic values, which are themselves largely culturally
European in origin. Their kynical mockery also serves to diminish the probability that
they will perish, that is resist succumbing to the reactive requirements of the prevailing
spirit of revenge in our hyper-decadent era. It also enables them to reclaim their place in
the world – to reassert themselves via an invigorated positive will to power to retake their
cultural, social and political space from its appropriation by inauthentic, imposed
European-ness – reclaiming these aspects of themselves through form-giving acts,
evaluations and descriptive engagements that eventuate in new and enhanced hybrid
varieties of life. This necessitates resourcefulness to convert injury and loss into positive
conditions for their flourishing – the incorporation of wounds suffered in the course of
becoming in a dissipative time into the multiplicity of conditions that conduce with the
fullest realization of their emergent potentials.
The ironic, skeptical, critical stance of good Europeans toward themselves and all
truth claims admits a multiplicity of othernesses that enhances this capability just as
effectively as it does among non-European peoples who may be resisting decadent
Western influences or the anti-human effects of their now hybridized form of life.
Against the prerogative of the globalization complex, the transformative potentials of
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globality present opportunities both to individuals in their specific geographical locales
and, when realized, to the becoming of others around the world almost instantaneously.
The paradox is that even a residually Euro-centric concern can, even in the strong wake
generated by centuries of racist (and occasionally genocidal) colonialism, foster such
chances and prompt active transformations of anti-human institutions and practices.

Part Three: The objective of ‘‘good Europeans’’ as nomothetic legislators: realizing
a Nietzschean idea of Europe
Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology may not provide a satisfying, or
some would argue persuasive, program for the sort of fundamental transformation he
advocates. Prankish acts of subversive defiance and experiments in value creation,
however life-affirming, do not in themselves provide the outlines for practicable
alternative institutions for organizing and governing human communities or
administering their increasingly complex needs. Yet it is just such a positivistic
outlook—an idealistic prejudice corresponding with the discourses of scientism—that
Nietzsche identified as inhibiting our futural becoming. Kynicism, as Sloterdijk defines it,
conceptually dovetails with Nietzsche’s effort—an anti-dogmatic praxis—to provoke his
philosophical reader’s to become practitioners of the “‘art of experimentation’
(Versucherkunst)… [that] engender the superlative human beings who alone warrant the
future of the species.” 901 Becoming experimenters and questers and comedians of the
ascetic ideals that would otherwise oppress them, does provide a means of hastening their
own and society’s going-down, however in so doing they may prepare the way for
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Übermenschen endowed with the strength for nomothetic acts of self-creation that
legislate for humankind. 902
Before genuinely radical innovators could come along, our exhaustion in
decadence would have—ineluctably—to occur. According to Nietzsche’s vitalist
determinism, the pre-eminence of decrepit instincts at the macro-political level made
such a collapse both unavoidable and necessary for the species’ revivification.
It is no use: we have to go forwards, and I mean step by step further into
decadence (– this is my definition of modern ‘progress’…). One can inhibit this
development and even dam up the degeneration through inhibition, gather it
together, make it more violent and sudden: but that is all you can do.– 903
The best individuals, or representative exemplars within our comprehensively hyperdecadent culture, reflexively seek to overwhelm the metaphorical dam of which
Nietzsche speaks in the citation above. They aim ultimately to hijack the EU by assisting
in its perfection so as to overcome it. Their championing of the formal, institutionally
driven, ongoing reactive project of unification is a subversive brand of support that seeks
to transmute the EU’s ethos surreptitiously.
Against the ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment of our age who inhibit
authentic, positive change for the sake of preserving a defunct order and naturalizing
decadence, ‘good Europeans’, as ‘unscrupulous polytropoi’, plucky rule dissidents and
criminal betrayers of hegemonic values, customs and laws, act so as to increase the
pressure on the dams that block the flow of change. They hope thereby to intensify
society’s decadence – raising the shaky dam higher – as well as the pressure for release
via their simultaneous discrediting of the all-too-human values that intensify decadence.
This exerts amplified force upon the dam just as it exacerbates stress fractures in its
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foundations. As satirists, ironists, humorists and critics they undermine the dam’s
structure in order to unleash the cleansing flood whose violence and consciously
augmented ferocity will, they know, eventually be forgotten as new, enhanced life forms
thrive in the transformed landscape it leaves behind.
To reiterate, Nietzsche’s vitalist approach to the political and corresponding
power ontology do not provide means by which they can be empirically tested and/or
refuted. But this criticism also applies equally to the more popular and hegemonic
philosophical view of post-Enlightenment liberal-modernity, the tenets of which are
arguably even less demonstrable in the world, as it were. On the basis of this putative
lack of practical veracity, any doubts about Nietzsche’s theoretical program would
provide no objective warrant or more substantive pretext for rejecting it than it would that
of the reigning liberal paradigm. For however seemingly implausible or factually
indemonstrable Nietzsche’s general theory of decadence may be, it is significantly more
modest and more intellectually honest than its liberal–modern antipode. This is
underscored by Nietzsche’s own acknowledgment of the impossibility of proving his
theory’s accurate correspondence with the world – though he hoped it might and even
expected that it would someday be proven true by science. Although this hope may have
been a symptom perhaps of his own decadence – a falling back into inauthenticity via a
wishful longing for the hypothetical reassurance empirical evidence would provide his
theory by scientifically validating it in terms of the prevailing will to truth. 904
Finally he suggests that we ought only to act as if it were a “true” (in the
traditional, transcendent sense) basis for our instinctive “hatred” of the ugly exhausted
and disintegrating in order to supplement the production of edifying culture and
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maximize the thriving of mankind. Yet, with relevance to Nietzsche’s possible
“vindication” by contemporary science, it is extremely interesting to note that recent
developments in both cognitive neuro-science and evolutionary psychology have lent
significant empirical support to some of Nietzsche’s most central (and philosophically
innovative) insights in the form of discoveries pertaining to emotional memory.
Additional support for some of Nietzsche’s key ideas may be found in the burgeoning
fields of epigenetics (i.e.: the physical experiences of previous generations effecting an
individual’s present health) and cosmology (i.e.: the notion of probability that any entity
may physically re-emerge in the cycle of infinitely expanding universes in which
everything that can occur will roughly correlates with his notion of the eternal return of
the same, etc.). There is also a sense in which Nietzsche, in so far as he rejected
Newtonian determinism and the corresponding (and metaphysically / ideologically
sacrosanct) belief in free will, could even be said to have anticipated some of the
philosophical issues raised recently by quantum physics. In summary it is highly probable
that Nietzsche is still significantly underappreciated and if so this would suggest that the
present flurry of activity in Nietzsche studies—of which we are now well into the third
decade—is unlikely to abate anytime soon.
Within his general theory of decadence Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power
ontology provide an analytical framework for assessing the health of a society and the
disposition of individuals within it. Nietzsche’s core propositions essay a genealogically
consistent hypothesis about what sort of shared values best conduce with the power of the
strongest transversally (i.e.: across disparate cultures and traditions within Europe, and
arguably beyond it). His theory of decadence is based upon critical, qualitative
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deductions about the salubriousness of the values particular to a culture at a given time in
its cyclical development. It maintains that the health, or political organization, of the
society from which a system of values arises is symptomatized by its effective facilitation
of durable institutions that maximize the highest potentials of all its members, but
especially the creative powers of its representative exemplars. These individuals are those
healthy enough to be capable of re-invigorating their culture’s signature institutions in
healthy epochs, sustaining some semblance of them in declining eras or of destroying
them to create new ones in decadent ages wherein the former vitality of a culture is
thoroughly exhausted. 905
Via regimes of ascetic self-discipline (askesis) as well as self-creation and
experimentation (auto-poiesis) the healthiest will instinctively strive to resist resignation
to the besetting decadence epitomized by the banal mass culture and vapid consumerist
society of our hyper-decadent era. In so doing they will simultaneously enact the decline
of our age while exploiting liberalism’s simulacrum of equality and simulated
enfranchisement, to perform both the “No” and the “Yes” of their eros. Though they will
inevitably appear ridiculous to the all-too-many as they transform their very lives into
monological works of art, their salutary acts give rise to a new praxis. Their disciplinary
regime of self-creation, the desire to see the world as they would have it, and to will it so,
will provoke emulation by others. As they realize the reality they envisage they become
who it is they are and are simultaneously confirmed as nomothetic legislators
(Gesetzgeber); each mimetic enactment and manifestation of their passion—or will to
power—understood as the actualization their dialogical artwork.
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The authentic nomos of their new praxis inspires mimesis by those who share a
similar conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness, and these performances
generate form a part of the communal ethos of qualified cosmopolitanism in Nietzsche’s
‘good Europeanism’. This encouraging ethos of life-affirmation spurs those sensitive to it
to broaden their striving; it is likely by extension, to proliferate novel modes of being
according to the thymotic pothos (longing for the unattainable) of the strongest
individuals (the most efficient capacitor or dividuum). Their striving creates ascending
values and secures an authentically meritocratic social structure that reflects natural
hierarchy and cultivates an agonistic socio-political realm against the rule of the worst
mob factions (kakistocratic ochlocracy) that the liberal-optimism and technological
rationality of our age has brought into being. 906
Toward the ultimate attainment of an Apollonian organization of humanity,
incrementally instantiated through law, such artist-philosophers must also abet the
perfection of globalization’s myriad spectacles for a long time to come, as they mask
their true, radical objective – to overcome and transmute the metadiscourse of ultraliberal-modernity – before the masses, who, startled by the appearance of free spirits,
would demand that they give an account of themselves according to the parochial slave
morality of taming. These übermenschlich types reveal themselves through irony, selfparody and lampoons of the ignoble lie that all are equally free agents in the global liberal
order. They must, according to the native volitions, become comedians of the asceticconsumerist ideals of our age. 907
It is essential to their success that they preserve the soothing illusions of meaning
and purpose to which the unsophisticated herd has become accustomed. Their reversal of
526

values must be a subterranean occurrence for some time to prevent a catastrophic
paroxysm of violence originating among the most reactionary ascetic–consumerist priest
of resentment, whose suicidal nihilism would prompt them initiate the complete ruination
of the human race. Science will have to be brought back into the service of life and the
responsible management of the earth, which will require radical even subversive means.
The socio-political lines along which science is presently being employed may be
leading directly to the horrors presented in fictional works such as Brave New World or
Gattaca, which our ever-advancing technology and simultaneously deepening
ressentiment have the combined power to realize. Khan suggests a plausible strategy for
mitigating certain of the dangers technology presents through “the Western notion of
freedom as a primitive concept”. He asserts, “We can think of technology as extending
the scope of action over space and time. Such an extension is institutionalized in the
history of development in the West through a coherent set of social, economic and
political institutions and articulation of ideologies of modernity.” 908 By developing this
primitive notion in accordance with the native volitions of the strongest, technology
might provide the best with the range and reach to inaugurate a successor era to
modernity.
Analogous to a healthy immune response to an ubiquitous pathogen, the best
individuals are consistently repudiating, in yes-saying acts that array “tremendous
counter forces” 909 against the existential threat of slave morality’s social leveling that
constantly seeks to infect them, the prerogatives of the sickliest and despisers of the body.
These acts utilize the “fatality that lies concealed in the idiotic guilelessness and blind
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confidence of ‘modern ideas’” 910 against “the corruption, the ruination of higher human
beings, of more strangely constituted souls.” 911
Their heightened “senses” – in the cognitive exercise and increased sensitivity
their engagement with the enhanced consciousness of globality provides – endow them
with the perceptivity needed to detect the disease of hyper-decadence that erodes noble
values. This also enables them to take life-affirming prophylactic measures against the
hegemonic mediocrity of the all-too-many, in acts largely invisible to the dull and so
unperceived by the dissipated crowd. Thus the truly noble exceptions ineluctably edify
one another. Through the productive agonism of contending disciplinary regimes of selfcreation they arouse the exceptions in their midst and breed future generations of their
high-spirited kind to, fittingly, create values for—and so indirectly rule over—a more
natural and healthy social organism in future.
On a higher level their endeavor constitutes the creation of a new ascetic ideal for
the perfection and overcoming of globalization’s ultra-liberal-modern nihilism by its
transmutation into the life affirming abstract potentials of globality. In our “post-modern”
era, the spectacles of neo-liberal capitalism and its corresponding democratic state form
combine in the constructive simulacrum already disciplining advanced industrialized
societies to serve as a basis for this double function. While promulgating profound
changes (perceived as improvements) in the material conditions of the herd, the
simulacrum maintains the appearance of “regularity” in everyday life even while
radically altering it. 912
Globalizing institutions such as the EU, and transformative processes such as its
expansion, mollify the multitude with political empowerment (through representation)
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and the promise of increasing material wealth while conditioning the possibility for the
best individuals, as warrior-genealogists, to continuously overcome themselves. This
improves the latter’s prospects of actualizing and maintaining their innate authority
politically, to elevate humanity by determining mankind’s “where to” and “what for”.
The happiness or fate of such “‘free Spirits’”—their eudemonic aim—is contingent on
their striving to implement the aforementioned Nietzschean technique of the self, rather
than in attaining political power or conventional recognition in fame. Thus they remain
faithful to their duty to enact their authentic nature, behaving in with seeming “liberality”
toward those innately inferior to them as they do so. This gives an especially “ironic”
twist to the Rortian notion of solidarity, which it affirms in a way Rorty might have found
surprising. 913
The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to
replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves – in part through self-parody –
so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had
initially imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function
so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules. 914
By capitalizing on the nisus enabled by the EU within globality to build on its
productive network of forces, the strongest may exploit the simulacrum, generate
untimely becomings and describe a new aim for humanity. As Nietzsche asserts:
… the ‘fundamental will of the spirit’ wants to be master within itself and around
itself and to feel itself master… In this its needs and capacities are the same as
those which physiologists posit for everything that lives, grows and multiplies.
…Finally there also belongs here that not altogether innocent readiness of the
spirit to deceive other spirits and to dissemble before them, that continual pressing
and pushing of a creative, formative, changeable force: in this the spirit enjoys the
multiplicity and cunning of its masks, it enjoys too the sense of being safe that
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this brings – for it is precisely through its protean arts that it is best concealed and
protected! 915
If enough healthy individuals can realize this “imperious and domineering” will of the
spirit to become ‘good Europeans’ the anti-naturalism of our hyper-decadent social order
(predicated on radical equality, the alleviation of suffering and advocacy of pity—all of
which unduly constrain the experience of freedom of the strongest) may be completely
transmuted in the future. In becoming ‘good Europeans’ and unifying the continent they
strive to reinstate a natural order of rank to actualize further potentials of globality and
thereby realize the strongest possible human type, with the aim of ultimately going
beyond humankind via Übermenschen who derive joy from uncertainty, to attain a postor transhuman future. 916
In little more than a century since Nietzsche’s death science has brought
humankind to the threshold of a new epoch, one in which we as a species may be able to
take ever greater control of our future and transform our world. However misleading
modernity’s discourse of progressivism may be, these momentous advancements in
technology, biology and genetics, and cognitive and neuro-psychology are profoundly
changing human life (primarily in the post-industrial societies of the West, at present) and
are likely to change the trajectory of our species’ evolution. The developments to which
these scientific innovations are giving rise will pose opportunities for revaluing the
nihilistic values of our hyper-decadent age, including the liberal optimism and positivistic
scientism which have in part enabled them. The changes they permit will create manifold
ethical challenges concerning the future management of human societies and the earth, as
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our ability to alter the world and enhance (or destroy) life—to overcome and assimilate
ever greater quanta of power—increases exponentially.
Specifically, developments in neuroscience, biotechnology, genetic engineering,
computer science, nanotechnology and robotics may soon enable the convergence of the
machinic and the human in a much-anticipated moment dubbed “the singularity”.
Ongoing efforts to decode the human brain in order to replicate its functioning and
translate our inner experience—or mind—into electronic signals will soon enable the
replication of thought and consciousness as recordable, transmissible, manipulable data.
Via quantum computers, which are in nascent stages of development, multiple minds—
and the very atoms comprising them!—may be utilized in the form of vast neural
networks to simultaneously solve problems of enormous complexity by integrating many
terabytes of information.
This will ineluctably transform what it means to be a human being, and what
constitutes authentic experience as the virtual and the physical worlds merge. Integrating
our biological existence with a virtual one that will—at some time in the next century—
be augmented by and interfaced with other virtual minds, may make corporeality—an
embodied existence—unnecessary. In this dawning future, persons could hypothetically
maintain two existences, one physical and the other virtual. Bodies could be programmed
to work with or without the consent of their “owner”; it is possible that one day people
won’t use their physical brains after some time for development, as the existence of their
mind becomes virtual and integrated into an immensely large neural structure. A brain
might be employed in multiple ways simultaneously, both in its physical form governing
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a body and the performance of physical tasks, and in numerous virtual ones to solve other
problems in a larger, integrated system.
Other imminent developments include that of pharmacology and genetic
engineering enabling enhanced intelligence, the elimination of deleterious deficiencies
and illnesses, and physical strength; robotic and nano-technological enhancements of
health through the treatment of disease and to provide artificial organs and limbs of
possibly greater efficiency; the engineering of primates to attain a level of intelligence
necessary for their use in manual labor. Obviously each of these brief scenarios (and
there are many more) raises multiple and complex ethical, legal and social questions, all
of which bear directly on the political.
How an individual may (be allowed to) exercise control over their destiny
(understood as comprising their mind and their physical body) will become more oblique
as technology transforms the way our brains may function. Determining what rights and
protections individuals should enjoy and what mechanisms will be created to enforce the
free exercise of their prerogatives will inevitably foment conflict. These futural
possibilities also raise terrifying prospects for the conduct of wars, with the possibility
that nations of people could be surreptitiously pacified and manipulated, or physically
zombified and used as instruments, or even genocidally annihilated through genetically
engineered weapons targeting individuals from a specific ethnic or racial group. These
innovations will radically alter conceptions of community and security as well as the
measures employed to achieve and maintain it.
The vast potential for instantaneous enhancement this would create raises the real
possibility of a directed evolution of humankind. The implications of such innovations
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are likely to affect every aspect of life, particularly how people are educated, how they
work, the privacy they may expect and how the individual as such and her rights are
conceived. The redefinition of the individual and personhood which will invariably occur
also portends the reorganization of human societies in fundamental ways. As the
problematic—and largely specious—notion of individuality wanes before the widespread
recognition and appreciation of the dividuum each of us is in a unbroken chain of
existentially crucial relations, challenging ethical questions will arise over how to
accommodate the materialization of super-human specimens as well as manage the
intentions of tremendously intelligent machines. These will be challenges best handled by
good Europeans whose philosophical education, exceptionally broad experience of the
world, ability to recognize and exploit the emergent potentials of globality and radical
affirmation of life and its diversity of types will cultivate within them the needed
disposition to effectively determine how they ought to be managed for maximally
salubrious effect.
Already both theoretical contemplation and practical research is occurring that
attempts to deal with the implications of all of this for the political. The possibilities these
questions, possibilities and scenarios raise are at once frightening and exhilarating,
insofar as they indicate ways in which the human might be overcome and new means by
our species might, as it takes control of and hastens its evolution, better fulfill its
responsibility to the earth. The prospect of generating new socio-political power
constellations in the process of overcoming the ossified nation-state and its negative biopower over life is very exciting.
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That scientific “advances” arising from scientism’s naïve pursuit of truth as
reality may be put to overcoming the ascetic-consumerist slave morality of taming that
subtends it and cultivate authentic becomings (always a becoming-other) against the
privileging of the ‘last man’ and his ideal of molar becoming-same, is a poetic reversal
Nietzsche would have found very pleasing. The dangers will be tremendous as a few
plucky, intrepid souls battle to prevent congenitally botched, world-reprehending asceticconsumerist priests of ressentiment from using technological innovations and the merging
of the human and machinic to “perfect” their anti-human, no-saying socio-political
mnemotechniques of control to further limit alterity and possibilities for authentic
becoming. The human race could easily destroy itself in this process, either directly,
through malice and stupidity or by creating machines over which it loses control. In a
nightmare scenario from the perspective of Nietzschean good Europeans these
burgeoning technologies could be applied in ways that enhance the spirit of revenge and
leave humankind more thoroughly dissipated and enslaved than ever before. This could
permanently inhibit the emergence of the profligate geniuses whose expenditure of force
and going down condition the possibility for the emergence of übermenschlich types.
Perhaps the greatest danger good Europeans face in overcoming themselves lies
in the seduction of liberal optimism, which, naturalized by the meta-discourse of ultraliberal-modernity also drives much of the scientific innovation producing these
transformative potentials. The axiomatic narrative rationalizing the status quo may inhibit
the realization of the most significant possibilities for change. The universal dominance
of the stories naturalizing secularized slave-morality and the corresponding reign of selfidolizing, solipsistic ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment makes it likely that the
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most radical potentials these innovations produce will be suppressed. Rather than
enhancing prospects for the breeding (in both the literal and figurative sense) of a higher
species man, social conditioning may prevail in favor of the further leveling and
dissipation of man, extending our hyper-decadent era of mindless consumption and
nihilistic self-satiation.
In a related consideration of the apocalyptic potentials (in both senses of the word
apocalyptic, i.e.: a revelation and the end of the world) being generated by technology,
De Garis anticipates an “Artilect war” (“artilect” referring to the “artificial intelligence”
of the “massively intelligent machines” it could be harnessed to create) between those
supporting the creation of intelligent machines, whom he dubs “cosmists”, and those who
will inevitably oppose such creations as threats to human life, whom he names “terrans”.
This controversy will, he predicts, be understood in the most significant existential terms,
and come to define the socio-political life of the late 21st century. His admittedly
reductive scenario omits the possibility that critical ironists, such as good Europeans, may
advocate the creation of such machines for specific purposes, as well as the contention
that will arise over ethical considerations over them (i.e.: the uses to which they may
legitimately be put).
In de Garis’ vision, these ‘artificial intelligences’ will appeal to the “cosmists” in
part because creating god-like machines will comport with the creation of a new
scientific religion. Nietzsche anticipated and opposed such a possibility (as examined
above, in part one of book two), fearing that faith in science—as a naïve ‘will to truth’—
might lead to a new form of uncritical, quasi-religious devotion. Insofar as superintelligent machines could be employed to found a gay science (fröhliche Wissenschaft)
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that admits of a plurality of perspectives on life, enhance the discharge of active force in
the positive will to creative destruction as generative power of healthy types, and
augments the making of a higher culture, Nietzsche—and his free spirited descendents—
would support their creation.
However, good Europeans might very well come down on the side of “terrans” in
this battle if the prospect seemed too great that such machines would be used to advance
the world-weary despisers of the body and their life-calumniating ideals. Unfortunately,
the U.S. military is presently among the most enthusiastic researchers and developers of
these new technologies, for the purpose of advancing the governmentality it exists to
defend. By the waging of wars, suppression and comprehensive control over “enemies”
and additional groups of people the conventional authorities with a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force/violence others control over people might be extended in
frightening ways that include neutralizing potential threats and defiance of the law by
altering or even directing the very minds of resisters.
Today the conventional realm of the political is a field of human activity (multiple
forms of life and competing power constellations) dominated by cynicism, inauthenticity
and the coercion of unproductive antagonisms that constrain dissent and inhibit
becoming. But it could, through the despotic negative power of the globalization
complex, enable a means of attainting biopower over life more sinister and invidious than
in any previous epoch of human history. That terrible possibility is one that good
Europeans instinctively oppose through their active realization of adjacent possibilities
provided by technological innovation and the exploitation of cognitive spandrels in the
“architecture” of international society—potentials comprising abstract potentials of
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globality. Aware that a quantum difference in thought can change the world,
humankind’s highest exemplars are resisting the temptation to succumb to nihilism and
exploiting the opportunities provided by our hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern
condition to become who it is they are. However seemingly obscure or insignificant,
these defiant ‘outliers’ and probable buffoons are transforming the future in doing so. 917

Conclusion: Toward a Re-naturalized Future
When a fortuitous individual successfully capitalizes on his innate ability, selfdiscipline (askesis) and chance (in amor-fati) via these four stances, adopting Akatalepsia
as a governing disposition and the remaining three doctrines as a practical strategy for
gaining necessary conventional authority in order to transform it, they may, through
nomothetic, creative acts and fearless—if tactically pragmatic— speech, implement a
revaluation of all values that ultimately redirects and augments the course of human
development.
While becoming who it is they are in innumerable, diverse capacities, they mask
their agenda before the priests of ressentiment in order to ‘go down among them’ and
utilize the existing social milieu and governing institutions to surreptitiously achieve the
improvements they desire. In so doing it is as though they are ‘returning to the cave’ to
cast new shadows on the wall before its mesmerized audience; shadows they have
learned to make as their self-undertaken political education has advanced.
Another effect of their involuntary volition is that their highly visible eros arouses
corresponding passions among those with a similar conative disposition or anticipatory
resoluteness, exciting them to pursue the ‘political education’ necessary for the
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cultivation of a higher, edifying culture. 918 Among these potential exemplars, some may
attain conventional authority and even inhabit some (of the EU’s innumerable) offices to
achieve their political objective. 919 In whatever role they assume, they all strive to engage
in acts of fearless speech to transform their polity’s (re: the EU’s) ethos and objectives.
Exploiting the abstract potentials of globality in this cunning manner such ‘good
Europeans’ will gradually execute a revaluation of all values to revivify an authentically
agonistic, Dionysian politics, instantiate a corresponding rank order of types
(Rangordnung) and reinvigorate European culture for the improvement of mankind.
Nietzsche’s particular idea of Europe is one in which no nation-state borders
constrain the movement (life) of individuals and all are free to develop themselves as far
as they are able. It is anti-liberal precisely for its commitment to truthlikeness, which
necessarily refuses both the transcendental “Truths” of equality and rights presupposed
by our post-Enlightenment liberalism and its consequent if somewhat paradoxical
“relativizing” of all values. The immanent crisis that Western civilization faces is further
suggested by its inability to square the supposed universal applicability of its legally
instantiated notion of equality and rights protections with certain of its own practices
which do not cohere with these ultra-liberal-modern regimes as well as those of the
manifold cultures into which it disseminates its relativity of values via the globalization
complex. 920
“Nietzsche believed the dominant economic, political and cultural forces of the
age were progressively “barbarizing” European society and preparing the way for a series
of calamities.” 921 Rather than conclude the crisis of nihilism, the catastrophic conflicts of
the twentieth century gave rise to the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and a
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reactive globalization complex to universalize its intensified decadence. A significant
assemblage within that larger power constellation, the EU has traded former social
disparities for new forms of existential ennui and malaise codified in legal equality and
human rights. As a consequence, it symptomatizes the century’s hyper-decadence.
Nevertheless, the molar growth of its reactive mode of life is hastening the ultimate
demise of ultra-liberal-modernity and conditioning the possibility for fundamental
regeneration through globality.
Nietzsche thought his idea, and counter-ideal, of Europe would be embodied in
individuals of exceptional integrity, whose will to power would nurture an enlarged
perspective, far-sightedness and corresponding capacity to think freely and to shrewdly
speak the truth. An authentic commitment to truthlikeness necessitates no small quanta of
cunning and subterfuge in a hyper-decadent age; their faithfulness to themselves gives
rise to a wily form of candor. This sophisticated verisimilitude corresponds with a
dedication to fearless speech (parrhesia), such as that practiced by the cynic philosophers
of Classical and Hellenistic age Greece, and the partiality of radical life-affirmation or
yes-saying.
A “change of attitude” (or conative disposition) and determined effort to take hold
of oneself (corresponding with anticipatory resoluteness) among the artist-philosophers
Nietzsche anticipated “will be required to transcend” the spirit of revenge characteristic
of “modernity”. 922 Actualizations of abstract potentials of globality may augment an
authentic being-towards the Dasein of a future mode of ennobled European life that
secondarily spurs existentially significant modifications of the ‘They’ (such as the EU
and the institutions, forces and processes typical of the globalization complex) and its
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Publicness. As with their positive realizations of globality, which these adventurous
Gewaltmenschen conceive from unique, epiphantic experiences and realize via the
pursuit of their passions (eros) which their concernfully absorbed actions arouse in
others, their ecstatic affirmations of life and embrace of chance (amor fati) may uncover
previously buried possibilities for being-towards the Dasein of ‘good Europeanism’ and
its ownmost possibility for Being.
In contemporary Europe (as in America) these tests are likely take the form of
novel challenges to and unanticipated developments of the EU’s authority; the objective
of ‘good Europeans’ being a certain perfection of the EU’s institutional apparatus as
prerequisite to the EU’s eventual overcoming. They are neither sedentary academics nor
are they solitary hermits who withdraw from society by way of rejecting it, rather they
are charismatic individuals proactively engaged in the tasks of everyday life, which they
perform in accordance with their striving to perfect the EU so as to destroy it. In masking
this intention they become authentically inauthentic in order to adapt various social roles
and outwardly conform to the prevailing – reactive – social mores of the day. This could
easily and correctly be understood to include theorists of European integration, whose
works – the envisaging of a reality which they would will into being – as acts of world
creation, occasionally resonate in such a way as to dominate conceptions of the project of
Europe’s formal political integration for sustained periods. Ideas factically create worlds.
With the long vision particular to ‘good Europeans’ these exceptions prepare the
way for future generations of more vigorous men who will be capable of implementing
the fundamental revaluation of all values to which such a growth is indispensable. Theirs
are futural acts undertaken with a good-conscience according to their involuntary
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instincts and drives that incrementally generate a qualified aristocratic ethos shared
among a few and out of which a new master morality may arise “that justifies the strong
and makes possible the solitude and the leisure of the few”. 923
Supplemented by conscious enactments of their volitional urges (e.g.: their
experimental art or Versucherkunst) which excite others, the auto-poiesis of ‘good
Europeans’ further serves the ends of genuine integrity. Underscoring the principle
concern Nietzsche had in cultivating vital political community as a work of art for the
enhancement of power, Elbe summarizes Nietzsche’s vision of Europe as:
…one that (i) avoids nationalist and racist interpretations of existence; (ii) that
refuses to fix the deeper meaning of the European idea and thus also remains open
to those who currently remain outside the borders of the European Union; (iii)
that would not seek to impose its freedom on others, but would equally not shy
away from exemplifying this commitment to a deep experience of freedom; and
(iv) that seeks to address the problem of the increasing globalization of the ‘last
man’ through combating the refusal to cultivate, within existence, an important
reflective depth. 924
While the third point is slightly problematic for its unclear meaning (what, in practical
terms, would it mean to “exemplify this commitment to a deep experience of freedom”?),
Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ would be foremost concerned with the depth of their own
experience of freedom in so far as it augmented their individual regimes of self-discipline
and creation. As opposed to MacIntyre, their “ethics” (Nietzsche occasionally heaps
scorn on the category, as the “science of morals”, and the leveling “morality of
mediocrity” 925), can only be decided personally; its broader social coherence depends on
their masking of the awareness that—at least among healthy individuals—all such
determinations are subjective. 926 From this perspective Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ are
fictionalists, insofar as they act as if, or make-believe that there are moral facts, when
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they “know” there are none. 927 The need for order as a civilizational requirement compels
them to pretend as though transcendently true values corresponding with a knowable and
certain reality, exist. 928 In Nietzsche’s view the question—one of ultimate significance to
the political—is who determines that “reality”, those made healthy by life or those ailing
from it.
‘Good Europeans’ would likely take it as given that peoples outside the AngloEuropean (“Western”) cultural realm—those outside the centers of the globalization
complex—would have a quite different, albeit deep, experience of freedom that, being
largely inaccessible to them as Europeans, would necessitate the suspension of their
judgment of its qualitative merits. Aside from this ambiguity, Elbe’s points are generally
correct. The fourth point in particular corresponds with my own concern, one that I am
confident Nietzsche would have shared: that of devising a practical strategy for
overcoming of the nihilistic prerogatives of the globalization complex through the
revaluing of the decadent values that typify our hyper-decadent age. Toward that end an
experimental art to realize abstract potentials of globality that I have expounded on above
shows the way forward.
The benefit of a Nietzschean analysis of the EU and its expansion may not be
immediately apparent to many Europeanists, because it starts from unfamiliar premises.
Its value lies in the disconcertingly honest way it denudes liberal-modernism’s ideals of
their desirability and provides a strategy for the overcoming of the decadence they
generate. It is also uniquely valuable for the recognition it provides of the ideological
equivalence of the partisan debates in which many European integration and
globalization theorists are engaged. Finally, it points the way toward viable and radically
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different directions Europe (and by extension, the world) could take in its beneficial
development of the species man. Nietzsche’s vitalist politics queer, and thereby make
visible, the reactive and debilitating power arrangements that naturalize the degeneration
of man.
His co-extending critique of liberal-modernity (which I have contemporized and
applied to our hyper-decadent age of globalization) strongly suggests the necessity of
(reactive) EU expansion and globalization for subordinating the Staatinstinkt (state
instinct) and ultimately nation-states themselves to ultimately attain an even higher
purpose. That preparatory process entails an invigoration of the positive will to creative
destruction as generative power (foreshadowed by globality) among those “legislators of
the future,” whose descendents will possess the instincts and strength to act as “masters
of the earth”. 929 As an initial objective in this European and global development, ‘good
Europeans’, as “a new caste dominating all Europe,” nurture the growth of “a protracted
and terrible [European] will “which could set its objectives thousands of years ahead.” 930
According to Nietzsche true philosophers, the ‘laughing lions’ among so-called
“higher men”, avoid directly ruling over their society except on ‘millennial occasions’
when they undertake to reinvigorate it by revaluing their decadent society’s exhausted
values to bring a natural hierarchy into being. The compelling active force of such a
hierarchy, predicated on an affirmative pathos of difference between types to facilitate
the authenticity of each, would ensure its duration, which is the philosopher’s primary
aim. The most important consequence of their imposition of order over society is the
permanence of that order – the creation of an epochal regime lengthy enough to foster the
emergence of civilization and above and out of that, an authentic, lasting culture. 931 The
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crass lust for rule, in the conventional exercise of power over others, is today, as it has
been throughout Europe’s decadent epochs, usually characteristic of the spirit of revenge
and inauthenticity compelled by ascetic priests who tempt the majority to resigned
fallenness and enforce the prerogatives of ressentiment against all that is strong and
healthy. Nietzsche cites a few exceptions to this generalization, including Napoleon, who
arose from the ruins of a decadent era to revitalize Europe with a new hope and
instantiate an enduring order.
Those herd-leaders who are afflicted with a lust to rule over others emerge as
embodied symptoms of their society’s dis-ease. They signal the degeneration of its
culture and reigning forms of life, the corresponding order that extended from these as
well as the evaluative stance, conative disposition and anticipatory resoluteness necessary
among its highest exemplars to sustain them. Ochlocratic leaders undermine the
efficaciousness of formerly noble ways of esteeming, thereby subverting the modes of
being these maintained. In so doing they seek validation and recognition out of their badconscience and through the ressentiment of others. It is the envy of the ‘They’ which they
most value.
The rare artist-philosopher is—even in our hyper-decadent era of abjection under
the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity—at once a subversive and a nomothetic
legislator (Gesetzgeber) whose valuations or acts constitute an on-the-way that transitions
mankind to a future return to his natural surface; although these philosophers have
difficulty occupying the present due to its pervasive spirit of revenge and imposition of a
guilty bad-conscience, they struggle heroically – and in anti-modern fashion – to “give
the realm of appearance an ontological foundation”. 932
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In Heideggerian terms the mood of ‘good Europeans’ (a feature of their
distinctive conative disposition and manifold perspectives) tunes them into certain
realities of life on the continent in such a way that the Dasein of the EU (as a macropolitical entity) is disclosed to them in all its fallenness. In taking hold of themselves in
anticipatory resoluteness they are sensitized to the way in which the averageeverydayness of the EU compels inauthenticity and rewards the das Man state of
becoming-same that Nietzsche associated with the herd mentality and its hegemony.
In addition to more truthfully, and by extension accurately, perceiving the nature
of the EU and its affects throughout the continent and world, ‘good Europeans’
comprehend its Existenz and the Being-towards its ownmost potentiality for Being, or
future potential becoming, thereby. The EU’s fallenness consists in large part of the tasks
and performances it requires in order to sustain and perpetuate itself and the forms /
modes of life it favors, namely an approximation of Schmitt’s “quantitative total state”.
This consists with its privileging of the ‘They’ – the leveling down and obligatory
mediocrity of its Publicness (ways of Being for the “they” 933) – by which ‘good
Europeans’ identify the contemporary mob-hodgepodge which exists according to
dissipative ascetic-consumerist values and uncritically inhabits the simulacra provided it
by the globalization complex of which the EU is a part. This correlates with Nietzsche’s
notion of the comfortable resignation of the herd to the imposed slave morality of taming.
‘Good Europeans’ are, on the contrary, actively engaged in the tasks they
perform, thereby authentically becoming who it is they are and living ontologically – as
concernfully engaged Daseins. This crucially distinguishes them from the masses who are
unreflectively absorbed in the daily inauthenticity – the average everydayness – of
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fulfilling the expectations their communities, nations and the EU itself prescribe for them
as its “citizen constituents”. The ‘They’ disburdens these individuals from the
responsibility of creating themselves and imposing disciplinary regimes for their fullest
flourishing, diminishing their inherently limited eros, which becomes one-dimensional.
Conventional society also naturalizes the partial repression of their native instincts
and drives (while aiming to completely repress them, the instincts and drives are,
however enfeebled, irrepressible), and their condemnation as harmful to the greater good,
so as to impart the bad conscience of self-regulation. It simultaneously makes the herd
into an ahistorically quantifiable and instrumentally useful component of the
technologized life of globalization complex. The tasks with which the EU is primarily
concerned are oriented toward weakening the capacity of individuals to make choices,
meaning that they are always already giving an account of themselves in their
performance of the tasks for which they are held responsible. The herd, as a contented
mass of automatons, surrenders to a regularizing regime of ascetic-consumerist discipline
imposed from without, and which arises from and thoroughly imbricates them in the
spirit of revenge—the ethos of ultra-liberal-modernity. This cynicism turns them,
consciously or not, against their fellow human beings, their environment and life itself, to
ossify in ressentiment of the world into which they have been thrown.
Simultaneously, ‘good Europeans’ would vicariously utilize the international
class of laborers out of whose toil abstract potentials of globality may be realized. 934 The
possibilities in those actualized potentials could enable the eventual modification and renaturalizing of the means by which labor is organized, without gratuitous violences or
undue suffering – not involving any more exploitation than that which mainstream
546

liberals already explicitly accept as reasonable, or any life-affirming Nietzschean would
find necessary. 935 The product of an authentically agonistic drive in an inauthentically
antagonistic socio-political milieu, the utilization of globality would occur with a goodconscience and in accordance with the nature of those who by virtue of their innate
capacities and conative disposition ought to create without the limitations imposed by
anti-natural, life-denying values, as explicated above. As well as symptomatizing suicidal
nihilism, the aforementioned characteristics of our hyper-decadent age indicate
exploitable potentials, which redirected could augment the creation of a vital civilization
of global proportions. Such a quasi-cosmopolitan development would be flexible enough
to include any and all nations and peoples, while resisting the reactive urge to impose a
uniform culture on them.
In the present the inherently deficient existential meanings required by the herd
can continue being provided via simulated identities, ersatz happiness and mass media
spectacles. The marketing, entertainment and culture industries will continue to create
injurious desires and provide the means to fulfill them for the foreseeable future.
Ensuring the ability of the all-too-many to consume will continue satiating their need for
ontological purpose. Rendered docile, the masses remain preoccupied with (enslaved by)
mindless diversions, thereby providing those compelled to exploit globality relatively
greater leeway to do so. 936
The global environmental emergency caused by current levels of consumption in
the industrialized “North”—the primary loci of the globalization complex—also provides
good Europeans with a potential means of transmuting the values of ultra-liberalmodernity. These nihilistic values (indifference and resignation) have directly led to the
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ecological disaster humankind has stupidly created, a disaster that threatens its survival as
well as the survival of many species of flora and fauna. For the sake of the earth
Nietzsche’s thymotic experimenters would—paradoxically, given the momentous role of
science in industrialization and its methodical destruction of the natural world—employ
all scientific means available to reverse the destruction of the planet and conserve
endangered species. If the conditions for life are to be sustained, levels of consumption
will have to radically change for all human beings. This will require a profound
transformation of life as we know it, with wealthy residents of the West consuming far
less and poor residents of the developing “South” receiving assisted in environmentally
responsible developmental strategies. A radical affirmation of life impels good Europeans
to forcefully advocate for the earth as they pursue their distant goal of overcoming
humankind. Such an advocacy amounts to an act of self-conservation in personal
expenditure.
For those capable of conducting them, globality presents opportunities to
transmute the decadent values of our declining age. However, good Europeans, as
immoralists, would not seek to deny, nor imagine themselves capable of depriving the
all-too-many of their nihilistic standards. Aware that the meta-discourse of ultra-liberalmodernity universalized by the globalization complex is driving humankind into a new
and bleak kind of slavery, they can only exploit this tragic state of affairs to develop
conditions conducive to humankind’s future legislators. 937 Their revaluation of values
cannot be executed in a day. These iconoclasts must live philosophically as they struggle
to overcome the decadence in themselves, educating / arousing a few others by their
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example (eros), and preparing the way for Übermenschen who have yet to be born.
Law giving moralities are the principle means of fashioning man according to the
pleasure of a creative and profound will, provided that such an artist’s will of the
first rank has the power in its hands and can make its creative will prevail through
long periods of time, in the form of laws, religions, and customs. 938
Such artist-philosophers furnish life—and the going-down of humankind with tragic
meaning through their striving. Their works joyously affirm the suffering that is
characteristic of existence as it maximizes the power they are. This determination to
prepare the felicitous environment required for preeminent individuals, “future masters of
the earth,” prompts them to spontaneously create out of their tremendous passion and
higher (noble) egoism. 939
The changed mentality engendered by globality and exploited by ‘good
Europeans’ can be expected to transform the norms and practices that typify the
globalization complex by invigorating the instincts of a few and fortifying nascent
übermenschlich types. Ultimately such exceptions aim to reorder Europe and the world,
as well as to provide a mechanism for the rejuvenation of European culture, through a
positive “Europeanization” that both originates from and manifests itself in “‘good
Europeans’, who can actually tolerate free thoughts.” Such individuals stabilize the
herd’s decline through a spectrum of disciplinary techniques comprising the slave
morality of taming sublimated in ever-diversified practices of consumption and the
reification of productivity.

940

This could include subversively theorizing European

integration to unmask the EU’s constitutional conceits and the anti-natural basis of the
values in which it originated and which it continues to embody.

549

Mutatis mutandis, these transformed conditions are likely to secure the necessary
order for the enhancement of higher types, thereby preventing “the physiological
ruination of mankind” Nietzsche so feared. 941 As the healthiest, pluripotent types steadily
transfigure and overcome the forces, processes and institutions of globalization through
their realization of globality they effectively breed an improved, or higher, species man.
Nietzsche’s ideal of ‘good Europeanism’ and his idea of Europe offer practical, antimetaphysical aims by which individuals might edify their own lives by becoming who it
is they are and transform the world via their increased authenticity.
The efforts of exceptions are at once involuntary and consciously pursued, per the
cognitive limits to conscious recognition of the affective power that limit the selfunderstanding. This consists with the spirit intrinsic to Nietzsche’s perspectivalism, in
that it acknowledges the multivariate, dynamic relationship between an individual’s
native volition and the effective nurturing provided by their environment; that is to say,
the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness which permits them to resist
succumbing to the socio-cultural infirmities of their epoch. Realizing abstract potentials
of globality, their striving conditions the possibility of a new type of man, expressed in
re-founded, if not entirely original ascetic practices – kynical techniques for sabotaging
and hijacking the all-too-human ascetic-ideals of globalization to redirect their coercive
power and mock their life denigrating valuations – will facilitate the self-discovery, –
overcoming and –creation required for free spirited ‘good Europeanism’.
Good Europeans strive to bestow an aim upon human life by imbuing it with it
with a salubrious if imperfect meaning. Their transformed consciousness of the individual
as an involuntary agent of will to power in the world generate life-enhancing affective
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capacities (exemplified in their unique practices of discipline and self-creation) to foster
the appearance of genius within disparate cultures and societies in all the regions of the
world. As a revaluation of all values the realization of their potentials, even if halting and
uneven, incrementally reshuffles the social DNA controlling society’s development,
effectively reprogramming its governing norms, mores and rules. The ascendancy of a
healthy instinctual organization of the drives and impulses from these strong individuals
provides the necessary elements for remaking the social organism (at the level of the
political macro-sphere) from within. Over time, the body politic may thereby become
polymorphously proficient at correcting deficiencies and ablating threats to its health.
The expressed passion of good Europeans arouses the eros of others to become who it is
they are in an authentic agonism productive of the sort of individuals necessary for an
authentic community’s maximal flourishing and long-term immunity to the disease of
decadence.
Consistent with his anti-dogmatic perspectivalism, Nietzsche was reluctant to
universalize his values, so refrained (or failed?) to posit a programmatic alternative to the
decadent, liberal-modern values that were coming to prominence in Europe during his
lifetime, and which in an evolved and intensified form naturalize the hyper-decadent
ethos of our ultra-liberal-modern era. Resignation to its life-calumniating asceticconsumerist values sustains contradictory yet wholly interrelated practices of self-denial
in and through self-destructive levels of consumption. This nihilism is maintained by the
cynical, enlightened false consciousness that typifies our culture of abject conformity.
In this work I have striven to disclose how Nietzsche’s critique of the Western
tradition of metaphysical rationality may be seen as providing a coherent and practical
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means of overcoming our disabling decadence and realizing his idea of Europe. Toward
this end I have explicated the under-acknowledged problems inherent to the prevailing,
illusory economic optimism of our globalizing world. In that context I have analyzed the
EU as a primary institutional locus of the forces and processes that are fundamentally
transforming the European continent and, by extension, the world. My analysis has
accorded with a syncretic reading of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics, power ontology and
perspectivalist epistemology.
The unconscious drives and impulses that imperfectly express the anorganic
forces surging through us, as enacted in symptoms of our will to power, within sociopolitical constraints imposed from outside into which we are thrown by fate and which
we mediate via our instincts, largely determines our destinies. Nietzsche’s cheerfulness is
counterintuitive to those convinced of the contemporary liberal-optimistic view, for he
accepts the fact—as a radical affirmer of life—that the vast majority of people are
“bungled and botched”. 942 However, for a lucky few – the anxiety-inducing question that
unsettles ultra-liberal-modern readers of Nietzsche) the very limited control indicated by
the ability to exercise of discipline over our instincts and our ability to affirm our fate
suggests that ultimately it is up to each one of us to become who it is we are by
discovering the capacities through which we might strengthen our will to realize our
noblest potential, be it in a dignified obedience to and instrument of a genius.
Clever individuals, who remain relatively imperviousness to the many “corrupters
of the will, the great slanderers and vindictive enemies of life” by creating personal
regimes of self-discipline (askesis) in accordance with their unique passions (eros),
virtually without regard for social proscriptions, may subvert the ascetic-consumerist
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values of our age. 943 Through witty lampoons that piercingly mock decadent values they
may condition the possibility for future nomothetic legislators to overcome the ascetic–
consumerist ideal that now corrupts human life. Those proto-Übermenschen may then
unreservedly posit values according to the native volition—an overflowing health. Future
generations might benefit by the vivifying “presenc[ing] of life… the process whereby
life strives for immanence, strives for and succeeds in manifesting itself”, thusly. 944
By reinvigorating instincts of strength and joyful power at the macro-level of the
political sphere and instituting a new, authentically agonistic order predicated on lifeaffirming values, future Übermenschen could renew European cultural greatness for the
fullest flourishing of the strongest types. For such free spirited good Europeans, the zest
for life and the suffering it induces are simultaneously increased in the process of
maximizing the positive will to creative destruction as generative power, by which they
give style to their character and create an environment conducive to who it is they are. 945
Toward realizing Nietzsche’s idea of Europe through the overcoming of petty
state politics and the uniting of the continent, the EU is providing for the emergence of a
new European consciousness. Combined with innovations and challenges from social
‘outliers’, self-experimenters and norm-entrepreneurs determined to realize abstract
potentials of globality this, arguably, is occurring in numerous ways. It may very well be
the case—in ways counter-intuitive to most Nietzscheans—that among the more
remarkable examples of this is the creation of “multilateral human rights mechanisms”;
the creation of inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations that “draw their
authority from global and regional international organizations… [and] lawmaking
treaties”. 946 Precisely because these ultra-liberal-modern institutions provide a space for
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the best to develop relatively uninhibited by the preachers of death, the “destruction of
loftier types” might be mitigated. 947
Although it will likely strike many Nietzsche scholars as counter-intuitive, I
contend that the potentials that human rights protections and laws generate for reversing
the anti-natural values out of which they arose make them suitable instruments for the
future masters of the earth. For most Nietzscheans “rights” is an offending term. Yet
although Nietzsche consistently opposed claims to rights, there is no reason to think
Nietzsche would not have supported international efforts to prevent senseless killing and
mass-genocides, however tainted by liberal-optimism; he too would have been horrified
by the Holocaust that motivated adoption by the United Nation in 1948 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Nietzsche recognized both that ‘suffering for what’ is the
ineliminable question preoccupying human existence (a condition which always entails
suffering), and that the answers to that question have traditionally proffered other-worldly
explanations for human suffering that denigrate life, ossify its forms and inhibit their
becoming—leading to decadence.
However, the sort of gratuitously exacerbated suffering resulting from malice
which originates in a nihilistic spirit of revenge—whether Christian or secular in origin—
offended him to action (e.g.: his Genealogy of Morals). His anti-liberal, anti-modern
program is a product of his desire (a will to truth symptomatic of a will to power) to
devise a naturalistic—authentic—means of contending with suffering through the joyous
affirmation of life. There is no reason, by Nietzsche’s own terms, that the healthiest
exemplars wouldn’t put their strength to securing the masses from the egregious cruelty
of a cultural philistine par excellence such as Hitler. In order that great individuals might
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become who they are, by being allowed the freest play to realize their passions, Nietzsche
would very likely have supported human rights as an instrument, if only a temporary one,
for nomothetic legislators to revalue the decadent values—“herd animal ideals”—that
lead to mass psychosis and unwarrantable violence. 948
Human rights need not serve to enforce mediocrity or to eliminate the natural rank
order of types, but may be utilized as a means for elevating culture by dissuading wouldbe persecutors of difference. The will to dominate (will to power) that Nietzsche
celebrates cannot be correctly equated with a will to annihilate human diversity or
eliminate opposition. “Only when a culture has an excess of powers at its disposal can it
also constitute a hothouse for the luxury cultivation of the exception, the experiment, of
danger, or the nuance: —this is the tendency of every aristocratic culture.” 949 An
authentic agon conduces with a form of polity (be it democratic, as Hatab so persuasively
has shown, or otherwise) which fosters an ‘excess of powers’ embodied in differences
between types that cultivate nobility of soul. Such a socio-political milieu also permits
the terminally flawed to pursue their own ruin. Contrarily, the ultra-liberal-modern
polities of our hyper-decadent epoch pursue their downfall—an inevitability which might
also exterminate the human race—by enforcing a spurious equality and prohibiting the
botched from destroying themselves.
Human rights, an anti-natural product of ideals conceived in reaction, have
themselves given rise to unanticipated, abstract potentials of globality by providing
salubrious means by which those capable of becoming strange to themselves might do so.
While consisting in undeniable ways with the ethos and ideological thrust of our epoch’s
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity, the developing body of international human
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rights law is strongly suggestive of just one of the practical (if also counter-intuitive or
even paradoxical) means by which the nihilism of our hyper-decadent era—and the
resignation (re: enlightened false consciousness) to cynicism it compels—may ultimately
be overcome. The instinctive physiological and spiritual weakness of genocidal regimes
and the extreme danger to life and culture posed by their psychotic nihilism provides
apodictical evidence of the necessity for universal human rights against the ascetic–
consumerist priests of ressentiment, however imperfect or occasionally ineffectual. These
regimes are fortifying healthy types who have been—or would be—systematically
weakened by world-weary despisers of the body, incrementally transforming them into
strong-willed personifications of authentic health in the best (Nietzschean) sense. 950
Human rights law, though born of post-Enlightenment, liberal individualist
(quasi-Rousseauian) ideals that Nietzsche opposed and which from the perspective of his
vitalist politics largely ramify slave moral values and the spirit of revenge they
rationalize, comprises a notional apparatus especially suitable to hijacking for the purpose
of combating the very forces of ressentiment and anti-naturalism from which it arose.
Either through the struggle to codify the ultra-liberal-modern ideals in law or once
established as customary norms, human rights law offers a means for subversively
critiquing power, waging a productively agonistic, anti-dogmatic struggle against ossified
traditions and interrogating and combating irrational prejudices as an active revaluation
of all values. Human rights law, conceived positively as means of a recognizing the
existing variation of natural attributes, volitions and differences in the degree of
anorganic power surging through

persons, might facilitate the differing affective

capacities of every individual, enable the ‘outliers’ of society and its stultifying
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conventional values—Nietzsche’s free spirited good Europeans—to discharge themselves
via active forces expressive of a positive will to creative destruction as generative
power. 951
The EU hardly approximates the unification of Europe Nietzsche envisaged
according to his Napoleonic ideal of grand politics (grosse Politik). 952 However, insofar
as the EU constitutes a nascent form of supranational political governance and economic
management, and stands as a primary loci of human rights law throughout the world, it is
a development, which, though imperfect, may be utilized as a preparatory labor toward a
new genuinely aristocratic ideal for humankind. It can be commandeered to establish a
naturalized rank order of types, one prevenient to a future ruling caste comprised of the
continent’s healthiest exemplars.
Europe’s integration is certainly generating a new ethos that may be made to
correspond with the realization of a potentially Nietzschean, quasi-cosmopolitan idea of
Europe based on the alleviation of gratuitous cruelty and violence arising from the urge
for revenge, both of which Nietzsche opposed. Advocating these rights as a mask in
accordance with the skeptical doctrine of adoxastos, they may use the powerful social
narratives of equality before the law and accountability to re-naturalize the inverted rank
order of types of our decadent age. Modifying these principles would also realize their
broader aim of undertaking a revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe). In so
doing they may become who they are while joyously affirming the totality of life in the
process.
In becoming good Europeans—a process the EU, in combination with abstract
potentials of globality, inadvertently facilitates—healthy individuals are revaluing the
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prevailing values of our hyper-decadent age. This includes challenging the axiomatic
narratives propagated by the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and particularly its
representation of democracy as the only legitimate, valid and effective means of affecting
social and political change. 953 The inspiring self-discipline (askesis) and passion (eros) of
their self-creation (auto-poiesis)—the struggle entailed in their experimental art
(Versucherkunst)—is likely to arouse emulation (mimesis). A fundamental transformation
of values may follow, along with the establishment of new political myths to ground
corresponding attitudes and beliefs about human prosperity, the proper role of cruelty and
legitimate authority.
New myths capable of providing the masses with truly life-affirming meanings
that galvanize them to their task of working in the service of greatness, to create a
genuinely vital higher culture, promise to test anew the possibilities and limits of moral
change in the world and initiate the eventual overcoming of liberalism as a living political
tradition. As a quantum difference in thought may transform the world, the concerted
endeavoring and unconscious expenditure of active force in the positive will to creative
destruction as generative power of good Europeans is accelerating salubrious change—
the “evolving self-understanding of the meaning and implications of [liberalism’s] central
theoretical commitments.” 954
The experiments and self-overcomings of the thymotic good Europeans Nietzsche
envisaged may elevate and ennoble humankind by this means, then serve as a basis for its
overcoming. Their attempts to re-naturalize our political order conditions the possibility
for the appearance of future Übermenschen – individuals with the requisite vitality to
transmute the enfeebling values of our nihilistic age. Not imaginary figures in a salvific
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fantasy of redemption, these kynical ironists—the good Europeans and highest exemplars
of humankind Nietzsche hailed—will discredit the poisonous ascetic-consumerist ideals
of our day through comic mockery, to posit viable, life-affirming alternatives that
transfigure the human by facilitating innovative, non-linear becomings.
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Notes
1

Nietzsche’s “good Europeans”, are the audacious, “preparatory human beings” (GS:
283) and “free spirits” (BGE: p) he hailed as the nomothetic legislators whose
involuntary passion would hasten the down-going of a decadent and exhausted European
[Western] civilization. In so doing they lay the groundwork, as it were, for the
appearance of Übermenschen capable of overcoming the human and initiating a
transhuman future.

2

I employ the term ultra-liberal-modern/ity both to convey the intensification of
decadence since the late 19th century, which Nietzsche identified as ‘late-modernity’, and
to acknowledge that the present is not yet ‘post-modern’. The term ‘ultra-liberalmodernity’ conveys the global extension of the Enlightenment project and ubiquity of the
liberal-modern precepts and capital processes typifying the enervated condition it has
conferred on contemporary life. An ideological juggernaut, ultra-liberal-modernity is
thoroughly reactive, but it is not static, rather it is reflexive and dynamic. It reinterpolates challenges to its prerogatives and contains or punishes dissent. It refracts
desire in particular ways, to focusing the attention of consumers whilst distorting
perceptions of need. It affectively directs the priorities of both individuals and
communities. Informing my use of the concept is Khan’s observation that “the ensemble
of attitudes and institutions that are assumed to be coterminous with the idea of
modernity are themselves in flux and need to be described as a system of motion.” Khan,
2003: 329.
3

Nietzsche’s conception of “the morality of decadence”, a central feature of his vitalist
politics and power ontology, is explicated at (among other places in his oeuvre) TI:
skirmishes-35.
4

By “globalization complex” I refer to the inextricably connected and mutually
reinforcing machinations of capital-process and the ideology of ultra-liberal-modernity,
which consist of the interrelated institutions, processes and forces conventionally
associated with globalization. Without reifying the affective capacities engendered by
these reactively dynamic processes, they are understood in summa as a power
constellation. As such it simultaneously exemplifies and coercively disseminates the
nihilistic meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity.
5

Conway, 1997a: 20

6

Ibid, citing A: 4

7

Conway, 1997a: 3

8

Conway, 1997b:14
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9

Ibid

10

There are numerous examples documenting this position throughout Nietzsche’s texts.
See TI: The Four Great Errors, 1 – 8, for a particularly notable example.
11

Peters, 1967: 42

12

See WP: 1067

13

The apodicity and veridicality of Nietzsche’s system (including the will to power
hypothesis, corresponding theory of decadence and eternal return of the same) is no more
vulnerable to positivistic critique than any of the major systems of speculative philosophy
in Western intellectual history.
14

GS: 112

15

Williams, 2001: 55

16

There are a number of variations and types of liberalism, all of which correspond with
a set of shared value presuppositions emphasizing the equality of the individual. Among
these differing expressions of the liberal impulse Donnelly distinguishs neo-classical or
market oriented economic liberalism; rights based political liberalism the origins of
which are found in the works of John Locke, Keynesian neo-liberal economics, and
democratization as liberalization. Donnelly, 1998: 156
17

Donnelly, 1989: 69

18

See for instance, D: 179 and 184, BGE: 203 and 207, GS: 357, and WP: 783, among
others. The modern notion of the individual reduces the multiplicity of a person—more
properly understood as a dividuum comprised of competing affective forces—to a
modern subject. It is this condition which reduces persons to citizen-constituents,
“individuals” vulnerable to the whims of the modern state. This threat necessitates the
construction of protective rights against the organizing structure of the community upon
which the existence of the protected depends. This contradiction is a result of
inconsistencies inbuilt to the nation-state, the preeminent and hegemonic form of political
organization in our era. The contradiction is particularly glaring in the case of democratic
nation-states, whose legitimacy theoretically derives from the consent of the governed,
and which purports to guarantee the security and uphold the innate dignity of a citizenry
it ultimately demeans and who rightly distrust it. This topic is revisited throughout this
work.

19

Nietzsche’s genealogical methodology was utilized to great effect in the penetrating
works of the French social critic Michel Foucault, who applied his own powerful
variation of it to a number of subjects including the development of medical treatment,
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the prison and carceral thought, the social construction of sexuality and the category of
insanity.
20

Nietzsche’s psychological insights would heavily inspire Freud nearly half a century
later.
21

By contrast, Marxian analysis does not provide this; but from a Nietzschean
perspective reiterates and intensifies the prerogatives of ascetic-priests of ressentiment in
the service of a semi-secularized Christian–Platonic notion of justice. Post-Marxian
critical theories do provide it, in proportion to their indebtedness (acknowledged or not)
to post-Nietzschean critique. My work draws upon the latter.
22

KGW, v.4:2, 402 cited in Bergmann, 1987: 109

23

Stefan Elbe’s “Europe: A Nietzschean Perspective,” is an important secondary text on
the crucial link between Nietzsche’s notion of good Europeanism and his idea of Europe
in the broader context of his perspectivist epistemological critique of the Christian–
Platonic will to truth and the death of God.
24

Conway, 1997b: 94.

25

I use the term “Anglo-European” to refer very generally to the entire, extended
European cultural realm, which includes the member-states of the EU and the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA), the United States and Canada, and Australia and New
Zealand. These are typified by the ethos of ultra-liberal-modernity instantiated in the
mutually ramifying and by extension globally hegemonic, if locally varied, institutions of
liberal democracy and neo-liberal capital process. Other loci of Anglo-European value
norms and practices include Chile, Argentina and Brazil. Non-European majority regions
such as the UAE, India, South Africa, Turkey, South Korea, Japan and Hong Kong,
among others, have been profoundly transformed by modified variations of these
nihilistic values, which arguably dominant in their societies, at least insofar as they
prejudice national priorities and drive “development”.
26

On Non-places the erasure of frontiers and the management of transformed social
spaces in ultra-liberal-modernity see Augé, 1995.
27

The “quantitative total state” was the liberal-interventionist form of bureaucratic
administration Carl Schmitt strongly opposed. He considered it the most obtrusive sort of
state, in so far as it attempted to micro-manage the lives of its citizens. Furthermore, he
thought it the least organic form of state and contrasted it with what he took to be the
Hobbesian, qualitative state. See: Scheuerman, 1999: 215.
28

Hardt and Negri’s idea of “Empire” is itself an ideologically loaded explanation of the
imperialistic character of and interpolative capacity of globalization. However, despite its
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Marxian excesses, it does provide some fairly insightful perspectives on and apt
descriptions of the globalization complex.
29

These include discourse analysis, deconstruction and constructivist approaches, though
Nietzsche’s work has also significantly impacted post-Marxian debates in the IP
discipline and the field of European integration theory, respectively.
30

John Richardson’s term for Nietzsche’s complicated notion of being as a process of
becoming via will-to-power – see his excellent and rightly influential study Nietzsche’s
System.
31

WP: 708

32

Among eminent Nietzsche scholars who discount the importance of his thought for the
political, is Walter Kauffman.
33

WP: 12a

34

As Conway states, “Decadence [as Nietzsche understands it] is predicated not of the
visible, corporeal body, but of the “invisible,” instinctual body, the subsystem of drives
and impulses that propagates the native vitality of the animal organism. Whereas the
visible body invariably (if erratically) manifests the prevailing condition of its governing
system of instinctual regulation, only the visible body directly bears the affliction of
decadence (Conway, 1997b: 25).”
35

Conway (1997a: 48) explicates this distinction stating that “The political macrosphere
comprises the network of relations that obtain between a people’s institutions and its
representative exemplars, while the political microsphere comprises those relations
between a people and its representative exemplars that are not mediated by social
institutions.” Throughout this work I utilize this understanding and also use the terms to
distinguish more generally between the community (as the macrosphere) and the
individuals comprising it (microsphere) of the socio-political.
36

Eros is understood hereinafter, following Hutter, as denoting erotic drive, creative
force and an emotional attachment or enthusiasm.
37

Conway, 1997a: 8

38

UM: III–6

39

Conway, 1997a: 8

40

Martin, 1995: 144
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41

Donnelly defines democratization as “the process of establishing electoral democracy.”
He states that “Although it might be seen as a type of liberalization, the qualitative leap
involved justifies a separate category.” Liberalization, by contrast, “involves a decrease
in human rights violations and opening of political space for at least some previously
excluded groups, which roughly means progress in civil and political rights short of
democratization.” Donnelly, 1998: 157
42

It may be surprising to many readers to learn that political scientists are not often
absorbed by axiological concerns.

43

On a Nietzschean notion of post-modern anarchism, see Lewis Call’s “Postmodern
Anarchism”.
44

Kaufmann, 1950: 412, 418; contrary to Nietzsche’s opposition to the idolatry of the
state and political liberalism, it does not follow that he is, as he asserted in the context of
denying any affiliation with political parties of his day (EH: I-3), “antipolitical” in the
broader sense Kaufmann takes from the statement. Rather, he is opposed to partisan
politics as constituted in a liberal-modern and thoroughly decadent epoch.
45

Those who dismiss Nietzsche as a bonafide political philosopher must deliberately
ignore these parts of his work.
46

TI: VIII–4

47

Discourse analysis, textual analysis and historical analysis are the primary
methodological tools applied in this study.

48

“In simplest terms, governmentality refers to the arts and rationalities of governing,
where the conduct of conduct is the key activity. It is an attempt to reformulate the
governor – governed relationship, one that does not make the relation dependent upon
administrative machines, juridical institutions, or other apparatuses that usually get
grouped under the rubric of the State.” Pp 4 of the collaborative introduction from
“Foucault, Culture Studies and Governmentality”, editors: Bratich, Jack Z., Cameron
McCarthy and Jeremy Parker; 2003.
49

See Althusser, 1984; and Gramsci, 1988 and 1991. It should be noted that the strongly
Marxian elements of their respective philosophical analysis are downplayed in this work.
50

Ibid

51

Conway, 1997b: 12

52

On Nietzsche’s views of the law as formative, see BGE: 188; GM: II-2 and III-9; A:
57.
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53

Right should here be understood as suggesting ‘warrant’ or ‘authorization’.

54

See Lewis Call’s Post-modern Anarchism, 2002.

55

GM: I-10 and 13

56

GM: I-7 and 8

57

GM: II-12 thru 14

58

In the present, figures such as the late Princess Diana or the business tycoon Bill Gates
personify this impulse and corresponding system of values. Gates has famously donated
hundreds of millions of dollars to a foundation of his own creation that seeks to find cures
for diseases such as malaria and AIDS, toward the amelioration of suffering and—as he
imagines—poverty in the “developing” world.
59

WP: 963

60

For the concepts of the simulated (the feigned or ersatz) and simulacrums (copies that
lack any original) I here rely on conceptual innovations by Jean Baudrillard, specifically
in “Simulacra and simulation” who drew in part on an earlier notion postulated by Pierre
Kosslowski (author of “Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle”).
61

My use of the notion of ‘spectacle’ and the contemporary ‘spectacular technoculture of
every day life’ derives from Guy Debord’s seminal work “Society of the Spectacle”
among other works including post-Situationist Nietzschean studies, including
“Nietzsche’s Corps/e and the Spectacular Technoculture of Everyday Life”, by Geoff
Waite (see bibliography).
62

My understanding (and this account) of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics is significantly
indebted to both Daniel Conway’s Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the
Twilight of the Idols, and his Nietzsche and the Political. For other excellent extended
examinations of Nietzsche’s politics see Leslie Paul Theile’s Friedrich Nietzsche and the
Politics of the Soul, Bruce Detwiler’s Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic
Radicalism, and Tracy Strong’s Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration.
63

HH: II: 2–292

64

HH: I: 475; note that the first volume of Human, All Too Human, was published 1878,
two sequels (Assorted Opinions and Maxims and The Wanderer and His Shadow, written
in 1879-80 were published latter as the second volume.
65

BGE: 242
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66

BGE: 254

67

BGE: 242

68

BGE: 256

69

GS: 377; Cf. A: 36

70

An example of the former would include the pledge of allegiance; shrill media pundits
exemplify the latter.

71

See Z: I-11(On the New Idol)

72

Lampert, 1986: 55

73

Smith: 154

74

This is a term from the early essay The Greek State, translated by Carol Diethe. Levy
translates the same term “international homeless money hermits” by which Nietzsche
aptly referred to the then emerging class of international business owners and
monopolists who utterly lacked the positive aspects of the “state instinct”.
75

Call, pp. 56.

76

Hutter, pp 60 – 61

77

Conway, 1997a: 64, 90-1 and ‘plucky bricoleurs’. 1997b.

78

Lampert, 1993: 229

79

A deconstruction of the nation-state must include its evolution and its essential
characteristics such as sovereign independence and territorial integrity, in addition to its
absolute power to determine and confer formal communal identity and political
belonging through citizenship.
80

See Z: I-11 (On the New Idol)

81

BGE: 61

82

Appel: 15. I shall henceforth refer to the modernity of our contemporary era –and all
the offshoots of modernity Appel specifies – summarily under the moniker ultra-liberalmodernity.
83

Conway, 1997a: 76
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84

Hutter, 2006: 167

85

WP: 963

86

Conway, 1997a: 7

87

My conception of Empire is only distantly related to Hardt and Negri’s conception of
“Empire”. Hardt and Negri define Empire as a totalizing, yet continually shifting and
decentered phenomenon: “In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial
center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and
deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm
within its open, expanding frontiers.” Hardt and Negri, 2000: xiii
88

Ibid: 9

89

Mandalios, 2008: 1

90

On Nietzsche’s view of ‘the hybrid mixed man of Europe’, see BGE: 223; his
acceptance of difference should not be conflated with the superficial, and difference
annihilating “multi-culturalism” of our ultra-liberal-modern era, the relativistic basis of
which is to be found in the axiomatic narratives comprising its meta-discourse.
91

At GS: 40 Nietzsche distinguishes between the dominant industrial societies that had
arisen in Western Europe and the US in the late-19th century and traditional military
culture that he favored over the former. Obviously he could not anticipate the merger of
industrial society and military culture in the latter half of the 20th century, which would
give-rise to a form of militarism that he would have seen as bereft of the merit-bestowing
qualities and identity forming honor codes characteristic of traditional European military
cultures.
92

This assertion echoes Debord’s over-arching thesis in ‘Society of the Spectacle’.

93

I use the term ‘cover-up’ in the Heideggerian sense, as an indeliberate revelation;
Freud’s notion of Thanatos is clearly related to Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism.
94

Lampert, 1986: 55

95

Danto, 1980: 142

96

See “On the Genealogy of Morality,” and “The Antichrist(ian),” among others of his
works.
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97

See “The Gay Science,” “Beyond Good and Evil” and “Twilight of the Idols,” among
others of his works.
98

See the essay “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-moral sense”, “Beyond Good and Evil”,
and unpublished notes collected as “The Will To Power.”

99

For Nietzsche’s qualified critique of liberal-modernity and the negative side of the
Enlightenment—particularly its Rousseauian strand—see HH: I–26, 150, 463, and II 2–
221; D: 197; BGE: 44 (on “the scribbling slaves of the democratic spirit and its ‘modern
ideas’”), 46; TI: skirmishes 38, 39, 48, 49; and CW: epilogue.

100

Nietzsche doctrine of will-to-power is complicated and incorrectly understood as
being in some way analogous to the metaphysical notion of autonomous agency that
plagued Western philosophy. Nietzsche wrote, “The will-to-power not a being, not a
becoming, but a pathos – the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting
first emerge (WP: 636).”
101

Conway, 1997b: chapters two and three

102

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari thought these important concepts; I draw them from
their respective works and the important application of them by Keith Ansell Pearson
(1997).

103

Ansell-Pearson, 1997: 91

104

This sentence constitutes a partial response to claims by Lampert, 1986: 55, which it
paraphrases.

105

Kynical is the adverbial / adjectival form of Kynicism, a term derived from the Greek
term, kynismos, and has been utilized by Peter Sloterdijk to refer to the playfulness that
transfigures cynicism. He defines kynical acts as the “kind of argumentation [which]
respectable thinking does not know how to deal with”, “a dialectic of disinhibition”
characterized by a “cheekiness” that “gives a new twist to the question of how to say the
truth (Sloterdijk, 1987: 101– 4).” In Book four I link it with the Cynical doctrine of
Parhessia.
106

Notably, Frankfurt School Critical Theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno
did make this discomfiting connection in their ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment’, as refugees
from Hitler’s Germany.
107

Plato’s concept of forms, Augustine’s notion of grace, Spinoza’s idea of substance,
Leibniz’s theory of monads, Kant’s postulations of synthetic a priori reason and
categories, Hegel’s belief in world spirit, Marx’s view of labor, and Rawls’ theory of
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justice, are all just as vulnerable to dismissal as indemonstrable metaphysical
suppositions.
108

For just a few examples of this single aristocratic aspect of Nietzsche’s broad concern
with the subject of beauty see HH: II: 1-118; GS: 85-6, 339; TI: VIII-5, IX-47, A: 57 and
in the Nachlass see: August – September 1885, 41 [1 – 16].
109

This is suggested in a modified form by the Frankfurt School’s mid-twentieth century
critique of Enlightenment liberal modernity, which had produced the opposite of its
original ideals. See Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment.

110

BGE: 208. Hardt and Negri’s notion of Multitude whose act to resist Empire, bears
some, albeit little, relation to Nietzsche’s best or noble types and their enactments of
positive will to creative destruction as generative power through active force. For, in so
far as Multitude is an inclusive category within which exceptional, pluripotent individuals
(irrespective of class, race, gender, etc.) in the nations of Europe (and the world) defy the
reactive suppression of difference, they mimetically replicate (if not personify) primary
tenets of ultra-liberal-modernity and come to re-comprise a mainly reactive herd. After
multiple readings of Empire I am still struck by what seems, in their notion of
“Multitude”, to be a transparently obvious palliative for post-Marxians reluctant to
disavow their populist and revolutionary sentiments. While they admit they are not
speaking of the masses per se, but rather of exceptionally engaged individuals, it is
difficult to distinguish the motives or objective of such individuals from the partisan
liberal ideologues Nietzsche would have disdained for uncritically replicating the asceticmaterialist herd values of ultra-liberal modernity. It is equally difficult to accept the
“revolutionary” potential Hardt and Negri confer upon the Multitude’s insolent and
raucous actions when they seem an obvious effort to expand liberal ideals. Regardless, it
is such conscientious, concerned individuals who Hardt and Negri assert collectively
comprise a large and possibly transformative group, hence “Multitude.” Though I
appreciate the inherent optimism of such wordplay, it seems prima facie obvious that
relative to the hordes of those indifferently consuming in their midst, such individuals
hardly represent a “multitude”. A mob of belligerent 20-somethings “demonstrating” in
Seattle, Genoa or Prague may be disruptive, but however honorable their efforts, it does
not constitute a substantive challenge to the power of the globalization complex, which
was humorously demonstrated when the Ministerial Conference of the WTO was moved
to Doha, Qatar in November, 2001 – a site so isolated and strictly controlled as to be
impossible for protestors to get to. For an examination of the potentials inherent in
popular dissent, which Nietzsche’s good European would seek to exploit as a mechanism
for achieving their (far more radical) ends, see Bleiker, 2000. His analysis is as
simulating and thoughtful as Hardt and Negri’s with the advantage of being significantly
less vaporous.
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111

Over a long period we might expect – as Nietzsche hoped – that these acts (and
becomings) of ‘good Europeans’ will produce a new specimen, one endowed with
exceptional foresight, a few “over” or “super”-men who, out of their own superlative
will-to-power, appear preeminent from the fray. The advent of our ‘global age’ (and its
positive abstract potential of globality) indicates that this is emergently possible.

112

Elbe, 2003: 119

113

For an example of Nietzsche’s disdain of work for its own sake or work undertaken to
fend off boredom (as it anticipates “workaholism”, our pathological work fetish), see GS:
42.
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Del Caro, 2004: 65

115

D: 175

116

Ibid

117

D: 178

118

The creative types Nietzsche envisaged should be understood in such a way as to
exclude nearly all those engaged in producing contemporary popular media and related
pap.
119

BGE: 242. Echoing this (and passages in TI) in more provocative language is an
unpublished note (WP: 960) in which Nietzsche states, “From now on there will be more
favorable preconditions for more comprehensive forms of dominion, whose like has
never yet existed. And even this is not the most important thing; the possibility has been
established for the production of international racial unions whose task will be to rear a
master race, the future "masters of the earth";--a new, tremendous aristocracy, based on
the severest self-legislation, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artisttyrants will be made to endure for millennia--a higher kind of man who, thanks to their
superiority in will, knowledge, riches, and influence, employ democratic Europe as their
most pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth, so as to
work as artists upon "man" himself. Enough: the time is coming when politics will have a
different meaning (WP: 960 1885 – 1886)). This forcefully expresses Nietzsche’s hope
and objective for mankind and reiterates significant elements of themes expressed in
unpublished prefaces in 1872 particularly The Greek State and Homer on Competition.
One must take care to learn the subtle meanings of the seemingly familiar terms here, for
Nietzsche uses many of them, including “tyrants” and “politics” in a very particular and
deliberate sense.
120

See TI: V-6
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121

By Dasein, I take Heidegger’s (Nietzsche-influenced) notion and modify it to suggest
the event of becoming through which the question of being comes into being, thereby
giving rise to the need and ability to discern, elucidate and transform our mode of being –
a need realized through Nietzsche’s vitalist symptomatology of affects, which Heidegger
largely neglected.

122

Although the worth of this oft-ballyhooed feature of neo-liberal globalization is
regularly asserted by its faithful advocate-apologists – it amounts to better technology for
more stupidity, and the “dumbing-down” of the herd (NCW: We Antipodes).
123

The “last man” is the antipode to the Übermensch, a developmental cul-de-sac who
personifies the end of personal growth. The last man as a type represents the terrifying
death of becoming through ultimate resignation to the passive-nihilism of our hyperdecadent age. This should not be conflated with ‘the ugliest man’ who, miserable and
self-despising but without need of pity, contends with the meaninglessness of life after
the ‘death of God,’ prompting Zarathustra’s awareness of the need for the overcoming of
man (Z: IV – 7). By contrast, the ‘last man’ is untroubled about meaning or any crisis
resulting from its absence, so long as suffering is abolished (Z: P-5; BGE: 202, 225).

124

Conation is a Latin term for the innate propensity or striving of an organism or entity.
It is related to eros, and hereafter shall be used in a specifically Nietzschean sense, as the
“conative disposition” indicative of certain types of involuntary, erotic enactments of will
to power. To the very limited extent that it can be consciously grasped, insofar as it is
suggested by an innate proclivity towards life, it is further related to the useful
Heideggerian notion of anticipatory resoluteness.
125

Anankê, refers to the earlier, pertinent Greek idea of necessity understood as an
irrational, undirected element in the universe that conveys a volitional tendency impelling
(or impeding) certain actions through/as physical necessity. Throughout the paper I will
relate it to nisus, the Latin philosophical term conveying the “creative tendency in the
universe toward the production of qualitatively new emergents” (definition from The
Harper Collins Philosophy Dictionary; see bibliography: Angeles, Peter A.). Importantly,
each of these interrelated concepts serves both to substantiate and clarify the historical
precedents, basis for and the precise meaning of Nietzsche’s central notion of will-topower.

126

This should not be taken as a general rejection of development efforts in impoverished
regions of the world, but as a practical critique of and view on both the desirability and
utility of universalizing contemporary consumerist values (and attendant morality of
taming and passive-nihilism) outside the post-industrialized, “developed” economies of
Europe, the Anglo-European nations of North America, Australia and New Zealand. It
also applies to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Asian “tiger” economies, all of which
have already succumbed to the ascetic-consumerist ethos of the West’s secular priests of
ressentiment.
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127

Nietzsche’s concern for human evolution has to do with a transformation of
comprehension and elevation. It entails an unfolding refinement through an everdeepened cognizance of life, and that is the sense – versus a simplified or crude neoDarwinism – in which Nietzsche’s advocated evolution. Without denying his very real
interest in the ultimate objective of breeding a ‘new species man,’ Nietzsche would have
been appalled by early twentieth century Social Darwinism, and rightly seen its advocates
as plebian exponents of a pathetically pseudo-naturalized ressentiment. See Weaver
Santaniello’s Nietzsche, God and the Jews: pp 74, 87.

128

Hyper-decadence is meant to connote the exponential intensification of the decadent
trends Nietzsche identified in the late nineteenth century across the twentieth century and
up to our present. It combines Baudrillard’s apropos critique of the hyper-real condition
of contemporary life which Nietzsche’s nineteenth century critique of late-modernity
anticipated and to which Baudrillard’s notion is indebted. Nietzsche correctly forecast the
inexorable increase of negative forces he identified as characteristic of the decadent, and
their culmination in a contemporary “hyper-decadence” in which they automatically
naturalize and extend themselves aptly conveys the concentration of late ultra-liberalmodernity’s decadent tendencies and their paralyzing effect on contemporary life.
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TI: IX–39

130

WP: 887
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Owen, 1995: 56-7; on the philosophical outlook to which the ascetic ideal gives rise,
see Owen, 2007: 124-25.
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Ibid

133

Ansell-Pearson, The Eternal Return Of The Overhuman, in The Journal of Nietzsche
Studies, Issue 30, Autumn 2005, pp 13.

134

Smith, 1996: 144–6, citing BGE: 45
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BGE: 211
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Smith, 1996: 148
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Ibid, 147
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Ibid

139

Elbe, 2002: 37

572

140

Aspects of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe are, however counter-intuitively, reflected in
certain, however few, protections and guarantees promulgated by EU law.

141

These provisions take a variety of forms, being legally codified or (especially in the
social and cultural realm) adhered to as community wide norms. Nearly all are
articulated in the language of protected human rights guarantees. These are considered
among the most “progressive” on earth.

142

The reaction these liberal policies breed takes numerous forms, finding expression in
political correctness that imposes strictures on language, for instance.

143

HH: 109, cited in Elbe, 2002: 38

144

Smith, 1996: 153

145

Ibid

146

GS: 270 and 335

147

Nietzsche writes of the ‘supra-European’ way of thinking that characterizes good
Europeans at WP 132.

148

Nietzsche first wrote of ‘good Europeans’ in HH: 475, titled “The European human
being and the abolition of nations,” then again in GS: 357 “What is German”, and 377
“We who are homeless”. In BGE he articulates the necessity of the strongest individuals
to become good Europeans (or otherwise refers to them) in the preface, 201, 202, 241,
242, 243 and 256. The theme is reiterated in GM: 3-27 echoing GS377; as well as at EH:
I: 3 and variously in WP: 117, 132, 405, 765, 783, 868, 1051. The term is sometimes used
in quotes to indicate Nietzsche’s self-conscious awareness of its short-hand utility. Good
Europeanism in part references the ephectic drive and cultivated stance of skeptical
ironism informing the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness of such
individuals. It must be understood in the context of his vitalist politics and power
ontology.
149

BGE: 256

150

BGE: 230

151

BGE: 251

152

Nietzsche’s vitalist politics largely consists of his symptomatology of the affects, an
evaluative stance that corresponds with his Genealogy of Morality. It implemented his
belief that “it is insufficient for philosophers simply to observe cultural practices; they
must also interpret these practices as symptomatic of their invisible preconditions,” and
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necessitated a performative reversal of perspectives in practice (Conway, 1997b: 79). The
primary difficulty with it is that it relies on presuppositions which are contestable: those
of his famous assessment of “master” and “slave” moral systems. As Conway notes, “he
offers no empirical means of evaluating the merit of his ensuing diagnosis (Conway,
1997b: 81),” however, this fact can in part be accounted for by his perspectivalist
epistemology and hermeneutics, in the context of which it was developed – and it should
be noted that this problem plagues advocates of any evaluative standard, i.e.: the veracity
of ultra-liberal-modern values cannot be empirically demonstrated, either, yet its
apodicity is widely, if falsely, assumed. Nietzsche’s related power ontology or hypothesis
that everything is will to power provides him with a framework for theorizing the
impelling force that is all that exists, which I also utilize to conduct this thought
experiment and critique.
153

TI: IX–24

154

By ‘transformation’ I refer primarily to re-presentations of the meta-discourse of ultraliberal-modernity by its institutional arbiters/enforcers to interpolate challenges to
it/them, but also to the development of theories explaining integration.
155

Nietzsche is not considered to have done philosophy of science, per se, but to have
critiqued the foundations for an appropriate philosophy of science and problematized
(what were) conventional prejudices then informing—and in modified form still
privileging—scientific practice (e.g.: positivism) as the best means of knowledge
creation/acquisition (see Babich, 1994: 2–3). I must emphasize that it is neither my aim
here, nor within the scope of my abilities, to give a full accounting of Nietzsche’s thought
in the context of 20th century philosophy of science. It can be plausibly argued that
aspects of Nietzsche’s thought can be identified with nearly all the major movements of
20th century philosophy of science, due primarily to his anti-dogmatic perspectivalist
stance and corresponding disposition toward truth claims and knowledge acquisition.
156

Conway, 1997a: 127–8: “Although Nietzsche unequivocally declares bankrupt the
grand, sweeping dream of the Enlightenment, his genealogical method nevertheless
celebrates the subversive, unmasking power of local applications of reason. Drawing on a
familiar image of Enlightenment, he praises the demystifying power of his Genealogy…
If he is to contribute to the self-overcoming of Christian morality, then it must be the case
that he too labors in the service of the will to truth, that he too takes his flame ‘from the
fire ignited by a faith millennia old, the Christian faith, which was also Plato’s, that God
is truth, that truth is divine (GS: 344, cited in GM: III–24)’.”
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Ansell Pearson, 1997: 55

158

Moore, 2002: 8
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159

See, for instance, D: 432–33. In the former, ‘Investigators and experimenters’
Nietzsche anticipates key concerns elaborated a century later by Feyerabend and Hempel;
the latter aphorism ‘Seeing with new eyes’, contemplates “the faithful interpretation of
actuality,” and “knowledge of reality”, in terms of the beautiful, and ponders the role of
the artist in the age of science.
160

His critique anticipates some of the insights developed according to a much different
will to truth by philosophers of science a century later, for instance, in notions as diverse
as Popper skepticism and aversion to dogmatism (set forth in The Open Society and The
Logic of Scientific Discovery), Kuhn (the dependence of truth on a dominant scientific
paradigm or worldview (Weltanschauung), and those of Feyerabend (incommensurability
of theoretical stances). However, Nietzsche rejected the fetishization of rationalism and
progressivism characteristic of much 20th century philosophy of science, seeing in their
scientific ideal of truth a correspondence with metaphysical and moral prejudices.
161

Babich, 1994: 3

162

Babich, 1994: 147; Not so paradoxically however, the contemporary normative social
science practices of which Nietzsche would likely have approved (versus efforts to apply
analytical and/or quantitative methods to the study of social processes) could only have
developed within the context of—and so are themselves a product of—the anti-natural,
ultra-liberal-modern ideals to whose ends they were developed and are employed.
Furthermore, when taken to their logical limits they inevitably lead to the recognition of
the radical contingency of all knowledge claims. However, unlike in Nietzschean
perspectivalism where this can be understood as productive, it results in a paralyzing
relativism in the context of conventional social science practice, which presents a
quixotic aporia for the latter’s most intellectually honest practitioners. (It is not much of a
crisis for the average academic social scientist however, as they generally do not pursue
the logic of their methods so far, selectively employing various methods as they fit their
immediate aims. They are able as a consequence to maintain their comfortable faith in the
univocality of reason and “Truth”.)
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TI: V-4 and VII-5

164

Conway, 1997b: 56

165

Again, see Conway, 1997a: 47-8
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Again, kynicism is a derivation of the Greek term, kynismos, and has been utilized by
Peter Sloterdijk to refer to the playfulness that transfigures cynicism. He defines kynical
acts as the “kind of argumentation [which] respectable thinking does not know how to
deal with”, “a dialectic of disinhibition” characterized by a “cheekiness” that “gives a
new twist to the question of how to say the truth (Sloterdijk, 1987: 101– 4).”
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GM: I-12
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Conway, 1997b: 233

169

GM: III-12
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Conway, 1997a: 131

171

Nietzsche’s concern with evidentiary proofs for his hypotheses is suggested at TI: IX–
20, among other places.

172

See BGE: 34, a passage in which Nietzsche argues that “The faith in “immediate
certainties” is a moral naïveté that reflects honor on us philosopher; but—after all we
should not be “merely moral” men. Apart from morality, this faith is a stupidity…”, and
that “there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective estimates and
appearances…” and BGE: 36, where he suggests, by way of challenging Western “faith
in causality,” that the world might be credibly understood as the sum product of our
drives, the reality of which could plausibly be understood in terms of “one basic form of
the will, namely of the will to power.”

173

Philosophical critics have observed serious problems with the presuppositions of his
critique of values in ‘On the Genealogy of Morality’, observing, for instance, that his
account omits certain inconvenient facts about the very evidence it employs to make his
case, such as his attempt to establish an ultimately arbitrary correspondence between
master morality and health and slave morality and weakness. These are problems of
unwarranted assumptions and argumentative circularity that at some level plague all
philosophical works, a fact that Nietzsche would have seen as underscoring his view that
all truth is perspectivally contingent upon the sort of life that compels us to posit values
and which is symptomatized by those value standards. For the purposes of my application
of his vitalist politics and power ontology to contemporary Europe, I largely set aside
such objections to his arguments and proceed according to the specified strains within the
secondary literature.
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Babich, 1994: 5

175

Feyerabend famously rejected epistemological prescriptions, advocating
methodological anarchism, in which the only guiding principle for scientists pursuing
knowledge should be: anything goes. See his provocative work ‘Against Method’, pp 9 19.
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Babich, 1994: 5
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Conway, 1997b: 7, citing CW: P
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The challenge of overcoming the decadence of our ultra-liberal-modern age does not
reverse the effects of decadence and their consequences; rather it seeks to establish a
radically different order through a creative discipline (poiesis and askesis) of great
suffering.
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CW: E
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Z: I-15
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Ibid
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See Twilight of the Idols: Whether we have become more moral.
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See Conway, 1997b: 14-15, 119, 169
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GM: III-13 thru 15
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GS: 116
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Conway, 1997a: 111
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Conway, 1997a: 102
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Conway, 1997a: 44-5
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Albrow, 1996: 108
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Conway, 1997a: 48
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This is suggested in a modified form by the Frankfurt School’s mid-twentieth century
critique of Enlightenment liberal modernity, which had produced the opposite of its
original ideals. See Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment.
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BGE: 208. A note on Hardt and Negri’s notion of Multitude, which is somewhat
analogous to Marx’s proletariat; the radicalized individuals who concertedly act to resist
‘Empire’, is antithetical to Nietzsche’s aristocratic elitism where the best or noble types
577

rule in a naturally ordered polity. While Hardt and Negri assert that they are not speaking
of the masses per se, but rather of exceptionally engaged individuals, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to distinguish the motives or objective of such individuals as they describe
from the partisan liberal ideologues Nietzsche would have disdained for uncritically
replicating the ascetic-materialist herd values of ultra-liberal modernity. It is equally
difficult to accept the “revolutionary” potential Hardt and Negri confer upon the
Multitude’s insolent and raucous actions when they seem an obvious effort to expand
liberal ideals. Regardless, it is such conscientious, concerned individuals who Hardt and
Negri assert collectively comprise a large and possibly transformative group, hence
“Multitude.” Though I appreciate the inherent optimism of such wordplay, it seems prima
facie obvious that relative to the hordes of those indifferently consuming in their midst,
such individuals hardly represent a “multitude”, so conceived.
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Over a long period we might expect – as Nietzsche hoped – that these acts (and
becomings) of ‘good Europeans’ will produce a new specimen, one endowed with
exceptional foresight, a few “over” or “super”-men who, out of their own superlative will
to power, appear preeminent from the fray. The advent of our ‘global age’ (and its
positive abstract potentials of globality) indicates that this is emergently possible.
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Examples of recently re-emerging ontological essentialisms and conflicts they have
fomented include the former Yugoslavia, conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the Darfur
/ Sudan civil war, inter-ethnic and religious conflicts in Indonesia and Central Africa. In
Western Europe it has taken the form of anti-immigrant movements, the erratic—but
generally growing—support for ultra-nationalist parties and even a resurgence in
Communist party support in Central and Eastern Europe.
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An algodicy is an interpretation and/or explanation of human suffering.
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Specifically the logic of self-determination, which the UN charter instantiates in law,
as well as the developing corpus of human rights law, also set forth in the charter, holds
this exciting and authentically life-affirming potential.
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For an example of Nietzsche’s disdain of work for its own sake, efforts to dignify it or
work undertaken to fend off boredom (as it anticipates “workaholism”, our pathological
work fetish), see GS: 42.
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The creative types Nietzsche envisaged should be understood in such a way as to
exclude nearly all those engaged in producing contemporary popular media and related
anti-cultural pap.
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BGE: 242; Echoing this in more provocative language is an unpublished note (WP:
960) in which Nietzsche states, “From now on there will be more favorable preconditions
for more comprehensive forms of dominion, whose like has never yet existed. And even
this is not the most important thing; the possibility has been established for the
production of international racial unions whose task will be to rear a master race, the
future "masters of the earth";--a new, tremendous aristocracy, based on the severest selflegislation, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will be
made to endure for millennia--a higher kind of man who, thanks to their superiority in
will, knowledge, riches, and influence, employ democratic Europe as their most pliant
and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth, so as to work as artists
upon "man" himself. Enough: the time is coming when politics will have a different
meaning (WP: 960 1885 – 1886)). This forcefully expresses Nietzsche’s hope and
objective for mankind and reiterates significant elements of themes expressed in
unpublished prefaces in 1872 particularly The Greek State and Homer on Competition.
One must take care to learn the subtle meanings of the seemingly familiar terms here, for
Nietzsche uses many of them, including “tyrants” and “politics” in a very particular and
deliberate sense.
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I apply Heidegger’s notion of Dasein (being-there) to suggest the event of becoming
through which the question of our being arises (comes into being), thereby generating the
need to better discern our mode of life (being-in-the-world), an act which invariably
transforms it. I relate this to Nietzsche’s vitalist symptomatology of affects, which
elucidates the way in which the hyper-decadence of our era incapacitates the native
volition of individuals, to impair authentic becoming. I also consider the latter as a
possible means of overcoming that decadence for the healthiest to realize their ownmost
potentiality for Being.
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Although the worth of this oft-ballyhooed feature of neo-liberal globalization is
dogmatically exaggerated by its faithful advocate-apologists – it amount to little more
than “better technology for more stupidity,” as a former professor of mine was fond of
saying.
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The “last man” is the antipode to the Übermensch, a developmental cul-de-sac who
personifies the end of personal growth. The last man as a type represents the terrifying
death of becoming through ultimate resignation to the passive-nihilism of our hyperdecadent age. This should not be conflated with ‘the ugliest man’ who, miserable and
self-despising but without need of pity, contends with the meaninglessness of life after
the ‘death of God,’ prompting Zarathustra’s awareness of the need for the overcoming of
man (Z: IV – 7). By contrast, the ‘last man’ is untroubled about meaning or any resultant
crisis for its absence, so long as suffering is abolished (Z: P-5; BGE: 202, 225). See
further notes for other references.
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Conation is a Latin term for the innate propensity or striving of an organism or entity.
It is related to eros, and here used in a specifically Nietzschean sense, as the “conative
disposition” indicative of certain types of involuntary enactments of will to power. To the
very limited extent that it can be parsimoniously defined, insofar as it is suggested by an
innate proclivity towards life, it is related to the useful Heideggerian notion of
“anticipatory resoluteness”.
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Anankê (or Anangke) refers to the classical Greek idea of necessity understood as “that
inner force which impels certain things to be done or prevents them from being done…
the physical necessity understood as the constantly present, irrational, nonpurposeful,
undirected and uncontrolled element in the universe”. Throughout the paper I will relate
it to nisus, the Latin philosophical term conveying the “creative tendency in the universe
toward the production of qualitatively new emergents” (Angeles, 1992: 11 & 204).
Importantly, each of these interrelated concepts serves as substantiating and clarifying
historical precedents for Nietzsche’s central theory of will to power.
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There are innumerable examples of this in contemporary Western societies. The Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation’s focus on curing Malaria and aiding African nations
exemplifies this trend. Such projects resonate with Western humanitarians while avoiding
the scrutiny and controversy that would arise if they were to tackle difficult socioeconomic disparities in the developed world, particularly the United States, where Gates
earned the larger part of his fortune. Another excellent example is the fashion of microloans to small businesses in the Third-world, which can be done online by credit-card,
thereby assuaging the shame of donors, who may or may not be aware of the fact that just
a few blocks away homeless people go hungry or even freeze to death on America’s city
streets.
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This should not be taken as a general rejection of development efforts in impoverished
regions of the world, but as a practical critique of and view on both the desirability and
utility of universalizing contemporary consumerist values (and attendant morality of
taming and passive-nihilism) outside the post-industrialized, “developed” economies of
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Europe, the Anglo-European nations of North America, Australia and New Zealand. It
also applies to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Asian “tiger” economies, all of which
have already succumbed to the ascetic-consumerist ethos of the West’s secular priests of
ressentiment.
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Nietzsche’s concern for human evolution has to do with a transformation of
comprehension and elevation. It entails an unfolding refinement through an everdeepened cognizance of life, and that is the sense – versus a simplified or crude neoDarwinism – in which Nietzsche’s advocated evolution. Without denying his very real
interest in the ultimate objective of breeding a ‘new species man,’ Nietzsche would have
been appalled by early twentieth century Social Darwinism, and rightly seen its advocates
as plebian exponents of a pathetically pseudo-naturalized ressentiment. See Weaver
Santaniello’s Nietzsche, God and the Jews: pp 74, 87.
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Hyper-decadence is meant to connote the exponential intensification of the decadent
trends Nietzsche identified in the late nineteenth century across the twentieth century and
up to our present. It combines Baudrillard’s apropos critique of the hyper-real condition
of contemporary life which Nietzsche’s nineteenth century critique of late-modernity
anticipated and to which Baudrillard’s notion is indebted. Nietzsche correctly forecast the
inexorable increase of negative forces he identified as characteristic of the decadent, and
their culmination in a contemporary “hyper-decadence” in which they automatically
naturalize and extend themselves aptly conveys the concentration of late ultra-liberalmodernity’s decadent tendencies and their paralyzing effect on contemporary life.
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Through kynical acts, comedians of ascetic ideals expose the absurdity and counterproductive effects of anti-human values. Their playful scorn, or seeming buffoonery, disempowers conventional authorities whose interests the nihilistic status-quo serves, and
who are unable to respond effectively to the undermining of their credibility.
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Aspects of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe are, however counter-intuitively, reflected in
certain, however few, protections and guarantees promulgated by EU law.
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These provisions take a variety of forms, being legally codified or (especially in the
social and cultural realm) adhered to as community wide norms. Nearly all are
articulated in the language of protected human rights guarantees. These are considered
among the most “progressive” on earth.
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The reaction these liberal policies breed takes numerous forms, finding expression in
political correctness that imposes strictures on language and behavior, for instance.

237

HH: 109, cited in Elbe, 2002: 38

238

Sloterdijk, 1987: 5

239

Smith: 153

240

Ibid

241

GS: 270 and 335; Nietzsche’s conception of masterly virtues should not be
misconstrued in terms of an imposition of power-over-others or traditional oppression,
tyrannical authority or coercive power relations, but as an incorporation of weaker
powers into stronger ones in ever-evolving power aggregations.
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Nietzsche first wrote of ‘good Europeans’ in HH: 475, titled “The European human
being and the abolition of nations,” then again in GS: 357 “What is German”, and 377
“We who are homeless”. In BGE he articulates the necessity of the strongest individuals
to become good Europeans (or otherwise refers to them) in the preface, 201, 202, 241,
242, 243 and 256. The theme is reiterated in GM: 3-27 echoing GS377; as well as at EH:
I: 3 and variously in WP: 117, 132, 405, 765, 783, 868, 1051. The term is sometimes used
in quotes but should not be taken as an ironic trope. By placing the term in quotes
Nietzsche meant to acknowledge his self-conscious awareness of its short-hand utility
and convey this to his readers. Good Europeanism references a broad and cultivated
philosophical stance as well as a corresponding conative disposition or anticipatory
resoluteness that must be understood in the context of his vitalist politics and power
ontology.
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For the concepts of simulation I here rely on conceptual innovations by Jean
Baudrillard, specifically in “Simulacra and simulation” which draws in part on an earlier
notion postulated by Pierre Kosslowski (author of “Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle”)
and simulacrums (the replication of essential attributes without reference to an original
copy; a referent’s lack of any original).
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Sartre, 1984: 112 – 113; The ‘Faith’ of Bad Faith: “Bad faith does not hold the norms
and criteria of truth as they are accepted by the critical thought of good faith. …Bad faith
apprehends evidence but it is resigned in advance to not being fulfilled by this evidence,
to not being persuaded and transformed into good faith.”
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My use of the notion of ‘spectacle’ and the contemporary ‘spectacular technoculture
of every day life’ derives from Guy Debord’s seminal work “Society of the Spectacle”
among other works including post-Situationist Nietzschean studies, including
“Nietzsche’s Corps/e and the Spectacular Technoculture of Everyday Life”, by Geoff
Waite (see bibliography). It also draws on Baudrillard’s notion of spectacle, which goes
beyond Debord’s notion of expanded commodity fetishism, conceiving it as processions
of simulacra that transform material reality into pure representation simulating reality
(Morrison, 1998: 203).
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Colm Hogan, 2001: 40, 43; Hogan also usefully examines the operation of ‘interest
differentiation’ and ‘microhierarchization’ in the construction of socio-economic interests
and desire—vis forces of conformity—in advanced capitalist democracies of the West
(47–48). On the ‘New Economy’ consensus, and its myriad simulations of a thoroughly
homogenizing non-conformity and putative celebration of “outside-the-box” thinking by
individuals whose myopic worldview inhibits them from actually perceiving the “box”,
see Frank, 2000: 18–19.
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As stated in Book One, my understanding (and this account) of Nietzsche’s vitalist
politics is significantly indebted to both Daniel Conway’s Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game:
Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols, and his Nietzsche and the Political. For other
excellent extended examinations of Nietzsche’s politics see Leslie Paul Theile’s
Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul, Bruce Detwiler’s Nietzsche and the
Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism, and Tracy Strong’s Friedrich Nietzsche and the
Politics of Transfiguration.
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two sequels (Assorted Opinions and Maxims and The Wanderer and His Shadow, written
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I do not mean to suggest that Europe can be described in terms of a simple dyadic
binary distinguishing those who support Europe and those opposed to it. The vast
majority of Europe’s citizen–constituents are somewhere in the middle, between these
camps. The majority recognize that unification has benefited them, but maintain
somewhat ill-formed notions and incoherent reservations about the Union’s hasty
expansion. There is also widespread reluctance to approve a deeper political merger
occurring prematurely or in a way that erodes democratic accountability. Nonetheless, the
reductive binary of Europhile versus Europhobe does capture some fundamental aspects
of the debate.
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This is a term from the early essay The Greek State, translated by Carol Diethe. Levy
translates the same term “international homeless money hermits” by which Nietzsche
aptly referred to the then emerging class of international business owners and
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“Empire”. Hardt and Negri define Empire as a totalizing, yet continually shifting and
decentered phenomenon: “In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial
center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and
deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm
within its open, expanding frontiers.” Hardt and Negri, 2000: xiii. Despite their assertions
to the contrary, this goes too far in the direction of a metaphysical ontology for me, given
the specificity of the institutions, processes and forces driving globalization and the
apodicity of their effects upon the lives of billions. In fact there are loci of globalization’s
power, which definitely does establish barriers to exclude an outside from its central
power constellations. Furthermore, in performing many of its key functions—all of which
relate to the universal dissemination and enforcement of the meta-discourse of ultraliberal-modernity—it remains quite blatantly imperialistic. It is imperialistic in the
cultural chauvinism of its fundamental tenets and through highly sophisticated and
sublimated means of deployment. It also covers up the imperialistic nature of its action
by deploying spectacles of fulfillment, simulated existential meaning and ontological
purpose; the provision of a ready-made, massifying “reason for being” for the enfeebled
homunculi it has reduced to and manages as “consumers”.
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See BGE: 26 and 27. This should not be taken as implying that Nietzsche was
opposed to science. Rather, he opposed its privileging above all other values, saying “the
objective person…the ideal scholar in whom the scientific instinct, after thousands of
total and semi-failures, for once blossoms and blooms to the end, is certainly one of the
most precious instruments there are; but he belongs in the hand of one more powerful.
[The scientist] is genuine only insofar as he may be objective. [He is] a precious, easily
injured and clouded instrument for measuring… but he is no goal, no conclusion and
sunrise… (BGE: 207).” In radically deconstructing the conventional notion of cause–
effect relations he asserted “one should use ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ only as pure concepts,
that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and
communication—not for explanation. In the ‘in-itself’ there is nothing of ‘causal
connections,’ of ‘necessity,’ or of ‘psychological non-freedom’; there the effect does not
follow the cause, there is no rule of ‘law.’ It is we alone who have devised cause,
sequence, for-each-other, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and
purpose; and when we project and mix this symbol world into things as if it existed ‘in
itself’ we act once more as we have always acted—mythologically (BGE: 21).”
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These include the discourses of rationalism and universalism, for example.
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Sloterdijk, 1987: 5

285

WP: 866

286

The anti-human trends promoted by the ascetic ideologues of unregulated free markets
and populist democracy may be productively subverted by attempters whose individual
regimes of self-creation and discipline inevitably revalue the dissipative values
subtending these institutions.
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Babich: 204 – 5. Also see BT: 15 and 18, for early indications of Nietzsche’s critique
of science.
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To reiterate note two above, the discourses of scientism coextend with and ramify
those of liberal-modernity, i.e.: rationalism, universalism, progressivism, secularism and
humanism.
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See MacIntyre, 1998 (excerpted from ‘Whose Justice?, Which Rationality?’): 183–84;
and Ricci, 1984: 3–4, 90–91
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It is interesting to note that the positivistic orientation that dominates most academic
studies by the discourses of scientism occurred during the late 19th century’s age of
nationalism, when the logic of self-determination and identic particularism (ethnic, racial,
religious, etc.) drove the disparate constituent peoples of various European Empires to
pursue sovereign autonomy via independent statehood. Political Science, as a distinct
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academic discipline, arose in the late 19th century (largely and almost concurrently in the
United States and the United Kingdom), at the same time ideology came to dominate
Anglo-European politics and made a fetish of the state. Both the discourses of scientism
and nationalism are coextending products of the logic (or technological rationality) of
liberal-modernity, which was then reaching its late stages. Shortly after Nietzsche’s death
it would culminate in the violent dissolution of those empires and the Holocaust. The
same nihilistic impulse is still evident today, as the breakup of the former Yugoslavia
demonstrates.
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The central tenet of Nietzsche’s epistemology is that all ‘knowledge’ is perspectivally
contingent; “truth” insofar as it can be said to exist, is always conditioned by the
experiencing “subject” (GS: 354; GM: III-12). It is not correctly understood as a
simplistic “Protagorean” sort of relativism. See Wilcox (1974) chapters 4 and 5; Owen
(1995) pp. 32-39; Conway (1997a) pp. 130-33; Richardson (1996) pp. 36-38, 200, 21819, 226-28, and 263-64.

292

Primarily Ernst B. Haas’s work, specifically, “The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social
and Economic Forces, 1950 – 1957,” SUP; Stanford, 1958; and “The Obsolescence of
Regional Integration Theory,” Berkeley: Institute of International Studies working paper,
1975a.
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Specifically, I refer to the work of Andrew Moravcsik, see “The Choice for Europe:
Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht,” UCL Press; London,
1998.
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Prominent theorists of supranational institutionalism include Wayne Sandholtz and
Alec Stonesweet.
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This is not to deny that these perspectives – as well as their advocates – are mutually
understood as bitterly opposed in their own superficial, partisan political terms.
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See Ricci, 1984: 118-19, on ‘The Scientific Community’ and the problem of the
acceptance of scientific propositions, such as the 19th century belief in the inherently
unequal status of races, as well as Popper’s response to the danger of such undo
endorsement, that being a scientific “spirit of experimentation” in the open society he
envisaged.
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It is Nietzsche’s dilemma as well, exemplified by his postulation of Will to power as
the prime agency in the world, which arguably shifted the “ultimate” cause in the world
onto a different metaphysical grounding, than those of conventional science. Hence a
significant part of Heidegger’s contention that Nietzsche was the last metaphysician.
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Diez and Wiener, pp 18 -19, in Wiener and Diez, eds., 2004
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The terms ‘not showing’ and ‘announcing’ are Heideggerian, and enable us to
comprehend a hidden dynamic of the disclosure that occurs in much science.
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For an example of innovative critical perspectives on theories of European integration,
Peterson (2001) considers whether integration theorists are developing theories that
actually vie with one another, as they generally believe they do. He contends that major
schools explain different outcomes at different levels in a multilevel system of
governance, leading to misleading debates between ultimately compatible theories that
masquerade as rivals. He argues that there is dearth of a credible general theory of EU
governance and this raises particular dilemmas for theorists in choosing which type of
outcome they wish to explain.
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It is known that prominent theorists in the field believe so dogmatically in the “truth”
of their differing perspectives on integration that they nurture stultifying personal
animosities for one another.
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These assumptions legitimate and naturalize the grounds for and development of the
EU as an Urstaat, or totalizing, molar polity in Deleuze’s sense.
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What practical significance it does attain / provide, is not necessarily applicable
outside the unique case of European integration. Philosophically it serves (redundantly)
to reinforce assumptions always-already present in the meta-discourse of ultra-liberalmodernity.
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Chryssochoou, 2001: 15

There is nearly perfect correspondence between the ideological presuppositions of the
major schools of European integration theory and the Copenhagen Criteria, which were
agreed upon in June 1993 and specify the criteria for applicant state accession to the EU.
These include liberal democratic political and legal institutions that comply with human
rights norms and protect ethnic and cultural minorities from discrimination, a free market
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economy and the institutional capacity to adopt and abide by the numerous obligations of
membership et forth in the Acquis Communitaire. As far as I know, the values upon
which the EU is founded are not interrogated anywhere in the literature on European
integration.
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Diez and Wiener, pp 3, in Wiener and Diez, eds., 2004
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The significance of the differences between the approaches is quite exaggerated both
in order to keep the scholarship vital (the academic stake) and for transparently partisan
political reasons. For instance, scholars fiercely dispute whether the EU is integrating
Europe along essentially neo-liberal, state-centric intergovernmental lines or whether the
EU is not actually more characteristic of a set of supranational institutions that are
incrementally supplanting the authority of decreasingly relevant nation states. In my
estimation the answer is clearly both. Europe’s integration is a symbiotic process of
intergovernmental cooperation that is giving rise to a set of supranational institutions
(under the rubric of the EU) that has begun to dictate the terms of its member states’
cooperation and enforce a distinct will that shall eventually supplant its individual nationstate members themselves as the preeminent political authority on thoroughly integrated
continent. Each state’s respective mask may still slightly differ, but the actors wearing
them are all players in the same carnival.
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Schmitter, pp 69; cited in European Integration Theory, Wiener and Diez, eds., 2004.
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However, it must be said that in ideological terms the spectrum of viewpoints
represented in the academic realm is much narrower than in the partisan political arena.
Whereas within the former (academic realm) there is general agreement on certain liberal
premises, in the latter (partisan political arena) extreme nationalist groups, far-left Greens
and reformed communists all compete for public attention, though the necessity of
parliamentary coalition building tends to attenuate the radicalism of these political
factions, once elected.
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The EU’s website, named Europa is accessible (English language) at:
http://europa.eu/index_en.htm.
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An excellent example of the effort to be relevant and justify itself as such is the
Europe Direct service, through which citizens can contact an expert for answers and
practical information about the EU via telephone, email or by going to an information
center in their community. See: http://ec.europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm.
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See the ‘Have your say’ page, at: http://europa.eu/debateeurope/index_en.htm
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The ‘European Cultural Foundation’ website on Advocacy Actions, at:
http://www.eurocult.org/we-advocate/advocacy-actions/, accessed June 2008. Also see
the EU Europa website page on the Commission’s decision to declare 2008 the
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‘European Year of Intercultural Dialogue’, in order that the EU create a single means by
which to raise awareness and promote the cultural sphere with a view to encouraging EU
inhabitants to manage cultural diversity, at:
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l29017.htm.
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This was most evident in the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992,
which failed to pass and so was re-held immediately the following year; likewise the Irish
voted against the Treaty of Nice, a defeat of the EU agenda intolerable to its “elites” and
so-called “leaders” in both Brussels and Dublin; the next year it was repeated so that the
“correct” result could be achieved, after which no referendum was held on the question
again. In both Denmark and Ireland many of these respective treaties’ opponents
protested such cynical and manipulative tactics, but to no avail.
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The “higher men” Nietzsche scorns are vulgarians and buffoons—masters only within
the mob (Z: IV-11 and 13). They are clearly antithetical to the Übermenschlich types such
as described by Zarathustra in ‘On Human Prudence (Z: II-21)’.

323

Thomas Risse: pp 170, in Wiener and Diez, eds, 2004

324

Tsoukalis, 2003: 170

325

Colm Hogan, 2001: 122

326
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transformed conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness among Europeans and
symptomatic of the nisus of globality in its active, healthy expressions, this acts as an
impetus to new forms of economic and political community that are ineluctably changing
the life of the continent in spite of the institutional constraints imposed on it by the EU
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American politician. In the staid milieu of conventional politics they would probably be
doomed to fail. As gadflies outside mainstream political processes they would force the
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organism: the weakening of the traditions that sustained it. Such a decline is typified by
the disgregation and enervation of the instincts among the vast majority of the individuals
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This is to suggest that the ultra-liberal-modern values universalized by the
globalization complex encourage other value-systems/cultures/knowledges to destroy
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induces them to suicide.
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If every human being enjoys a discernable, inalienable degree of dignity it would be
redundant to codify it in rights over-above pre-existing legal proscriptions on violations
of another individuals’ personhood, such as assault, rape, murder, etc.,. As “rights” are
thought necessary to ensure the preservation of that dignity, it is not clear that dignity
really does inhere to every individual, only that we are expected to behave as if it does.
The term dignity itself is never precisely defined by human rights advocates, who seek to
make common a good of the notion, and thereby empty it of any meaning. Human rights’
defenders reference the term to the intrinsic condition of being human, which risks
tautology, and is quite unrelated to the original meaning of the term, which specified
nobility or elevation of character; worthiness to the deference of inferiors that accrues
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behind the human rights notion constitutes a classic slave-moral move: an effort by the
weak to invent pretexts that will secure for them privileges from the strong, whose
dignity is—or would other-wise be—more demonstrable than their own. These mutually
reinforcing notions of dignity and rights epitomize the conceits of liberal-modernism and
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concede that “dignity” is a particular form of the qualia of being human, but that like an
appreciation of beauty, such an experience is never the same between two persons
(justifying equality of rights for all) or that it can in itself legitimately confer any
privileges to the person experiencing it. It would be understood as a perspectivally
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Post-modern ascetic priests of resentment, the arbiters of secular slave morality, are
ideologues who believe in and are satisfied by the “reality” generated by the simulacrum
and its power to “emancipate” humanity. As the authentic representation of legitimate
authority and desire, this consists with the over-arching objective of globalizing
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Rousseau’s notion of the general will and its correspondence with the general welfare
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Nietzschean affirmation of the tragic and corresponding embrace of the Dionysian is all
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Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy’, presented at the 1997
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Genocidal regimes are a consequence of the ultimate nihilistic breakdown of society
through decadence.

710

GS: 377

711

For explications of these themes in Nietzsche’s works see Tracy B. Strong: 1988;
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herd with meaning, purpose and dignity through their example.
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itself, its laudatory monologue. It is the self-portrait of power in the epoch of its
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youth of his day, Nietzsche observed (in “the desire for suffering”), “[t]hey do not know
what to do with themselves—and therefore paint the distress of others on the wall; they
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Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 360; “the State-form, as a form of interiority, has a
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in response to, developments such as the universalization of secular-humanist values,
democratization and rights codified in international law, etc. occurred. These events
would strike Nietzsche as symptomatic of a spreading disgregation of the instincts and
resultant weakness of will (akrasia). Such all-too-human violences, both the gratuitous
seeking of power over others and conventional efforts to prohibit it indicate the perseity
of decadence, the latter a form generated by ultra-liberal-modernity.
762

HH: I–23

763

Ibid; Cf. BGE: 260 and GM: III 25–27

764

Nietzsche’s anti-modernism should not be mistaken as advocating a return to premodern socio-cultural forms. He recognized that in the wake of the death of god, Europe
would be forced to overcome the decadence into which it had descended and/by recreating meanings and traditions for itself. The existential calamity it faced was that of
the irrecuperable nihilism (hyper-decadence) of the ‘last man’, the extreme danger of
which was any future basis upon which persuasive meanings or new truths could be
created might not be attainable.
765

See Kees van der Pijl’s 1984 examination of the trans-Atlantic ruling class.

766

Despite its ideological denunciations and anti-Capitalist vitriol, the Soviet Union’s
reluctant and limited trade with the capitalist “West” and instrumental role in the creation
of the UN and other post-war institutions attenuated any actual ideological or existential
threat it presented. Mainland China had already begun reforms to open its markets and
“join” the world economy by 1991.

767

The International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague provides an example.
Unfortunately, the US has obstreperously refused to participate in that organization.

768

See Malcolm Gladwell’s recent, fairly compelling thesis on the conditions that give
rise to ‘outliers’.

769

The doubt Nietzsche raises about such political rights brings us to a sticky point in his
thought and one of the most difficult aspects of it for we ultra-liberal-moderns.
Nevertheless, he would not have agreed with today’s liberal activists that a person or
622

group is inherently less free for being deprived of what we in the West consider “free”
speech, or full political enfranchisement, etc. However, this is not to suggest that he
would have condoned Beijing or dismissed its repression and systematic subversion of
Tibetan culture, or the unauthentic agon imposed on the beleaguered people of Myanmar
by the ruling military junta. Rather, he would have opposed these regimes for many of
the same reasons he would have opposed the governing regimes in Washington and
Brussels.
770

Existential threats such as the recent menace of terrorism, or arms proliferation, etc.,
suffice to create an outside enemy.

771

Martin Shaw, Theory of the Global State, pp. 228.

772

Again: the OSCE, originally the CSCE, is a trans-Atlantic security organization that
promotes conflict resolution, democracy and human rights.

773

The Council focuses on promulgating and monitoring human rights and
democratization among its members, among other functions.

774

At least in military terms, if no longer in economic and political ones.

775

WP: 866; also see 890 and 898

776

WP: 866 and 868.

777

GM: II–24

778

Lawrence J. Hatab’s work “A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy” (see bibliography)
makes this link extremely clear and thoroughly develops it. In particular see the very
relevant chapters four (“Agonistic Democracy”) and five (“Democracy, excellence and
merit”) of that work.

779

GM: I-13

780

BGE: 58

781

This notion would seem to anticipate aspects of Leo Strauss’s mid-20th century
thought, but Nietzsche’s vitalist politics crucially distinguishes his thought from
Strauss’s.
782

Conway, 1997a: 20

783

Elbe, 2003: 13
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784

BGE: 263; Nietzsche’s aspersion for the conventionally educated—the Democratic
bourgeoisie—who he held primarily responsible for the vulgarization of European culture
in the late 19th century.
785

Its two-fold “moral imperative” is that shopping is in itself a spiritually edifying
activity and that purchases equate with / provide existential fulfillment and satisfy an
important social duty. When the consumer–automatons become reluctant to spend their
money, they are incentivized by the government, as in the $168 billion fiscal stimulus a
two-year program authorized by Congress and President Bush on Feb. 13 2008. Reported
to be the largest legislative initiative to ease an economic downturn in American history
(<http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/4170/1/531>), it provided every American
approximately $600. Six months later (28 November 2008) a man was trampled to death
by a mob of hysterical bargain shoppers at a Wal-Mart in Long Island, New York. See:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/business/29walmart.html?scp=2&sq=wal-mart&st=cse>.
786

BGE: 62

787

Jürgen Habermas is a preeminent contemporary advocate of this ideology and
exponent of practices—he has dubbed “communicative action”—to instantiate it.

788

The EU has become a powerful force for the dissemination of ultra-liberal-modern
values globally, as explicated in Book Three above.

789

Hutter, 2006: 104

790

In Nietzsche’s view the newly established Reich and its personification, Bismarck,
exemplified the decadence of German culture during his lifetime.

791

From a Nietzschean perspective the paradox of this formal abolition of war is that
every institutionally instantiated form of political authority entails a fundamental
arrogation of right – a conceit whose enforcement necessarily requires coercion along a
spectrum of violences. Foucault’s numerous exegeses’ of power / knowledge regimes (in
practices concerning health, carceral techniques and in/sanity brilliantly elaborated the
point.

792

I refer to the potential to transform the EU while using it as an instrument to advance
their aim of conditioning the possibility for genuine culture in Europe through a gradual
instantiation of authentic, agonist relations predicated on a natural rank order of types.
793

Examples include legal provisions for the export of cultural goods and the return of
cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a member state, as well as
codified regional policy, various aspects of which are overseen by the European
Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education, the European Regional Development
624

Fund and the Committee of the Regions. The COE’s European Committee of Social
Rights and Directorate of Culture, Cultural and Natural Heritage, as well as the OSCE’s
High Commissioner on National Minorities augment the EU’s policies.
794

This argument was persuasively made in a recent editorial by Roland Vaubel, a
professor of economics at the University of Mannheim, in The Wall Street Journal. See:
State of the Union: Disproportionately Undemocratic, July 30, 2007 edition.

795

Elbe, 2003: 79

796

See The Greek State, wherein Nietzsche voices concern with the “present day
phenomena in which [he detects] dangerous signs of atrophy in the political sphere…
[attributable to] men [lacking any sense of obligation to the state] placed by birth…
outside the instinct for nation and state, who thus have to recognize the state only to the
extent to which they conceive it to be in their own interest…” Nietzsche refers to them as
truly international homeless, financial recluses as really those whose fear stands behind
[the] movements… [the liberal–optimistic, post-Enlightenment world view and
democratic ethos of universal suffrage].

797

Again, nisus refers to “a striving, the conative state of a thing, also a creative tendency
in the universe to produce qualitatively new emergents” (Harper-Collins dictionary of
Philosophy, 2nd edition). This corresponds nicely with the emergentist strains of
Nietzsche’s vitalism.
798

Conway explicates Nietzsche’s dual conception of the Will to power, “to designate the
boundless, amoral agency that propagates itself through human capacitors [and] the
system of instincts that best provides for the unimpeded propagation of vitality.”
(Conway: 1997b, pp. 49.)

799

“The profane crowd,” an evocative term Nietzsche used at D: IV – 298.

800

This is expounded in the notes. “Types of my disciples.-- To those human beings who
are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities-I wish that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of
self-mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them, because I wish
them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not--that one
endures. [The note continues in Nietzsche's MS: "I have not yet got to know any idealist,
but many liars… (WP: 910 [Spring-Fall 1887])." Later Nietzsche writes, “That one stakes
one's life, one's health, one's honor, is the consequence of high spirits and an overflowing,
prodigal will: not from love of man but because every great danger challenges our
curiosity about the degree of our strength and our courage (WP: 949 [Nov. 1887-March
1888]).”
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801

Nietzsche implored his readers to ‘become who they are,’ a notion adopted from
Pindar (and possibly Stirner), toward arousing recognition of the necessity for selfawareness (a recognition of our existenz) and self-overcoming toward fulfilling ones’
highest potential, or destiny.

802

In our hyper-decadent age the political-education of Übermenschen is a largely selfundertaken endeavor resulting from their erotic concern with mastering themselves and
the world. In Nietzsche’s ideal polity this dimension of breeding the best-types would not
be left to such chance but would be deliberately cultivated (As is the case that Socrates’
expounds in Plato’s Republic).
803

GS: 121

804

Heilke, 1998: 35

805

GS: p3

806

Shapiro, 2006: 478

807

GM: III - 11

808

Baudrillard explicates the simulation that interposes on everyday life, noting
especially the role of the copy and representation’s displacement of the real in our
electronic, digitized and wireless age which has impaired our sense of time and space.
Moreover, the media driven dissociation of values from any referential criteria has the
effect of deterring the real, as all meanings are banalized through the absence of
equivalence toward the annihilation of authentic culture. My notion of ‘hyperdecadence’ is supported by Baudrillard’s observation that, “The universe, and all of us,
have entered live into simulation, into the malefic, not even malefic, indifferent, sphere of
deterrence: in a bizarre fashion, nihilism has been entirely realized no longer through
destruction, but through simulation and deterrence.”
809

810

I refer to the Heidegger’s notion of Dasein’s awareness of its own being-in-the-world.
TI: 6–8

811

See Nietzsche’s unpublished early essay “The Greek State (1872)” on the dignity of
work.
812

See The Greek State (in On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic (1887); translated by
Carol Diethe; Cambridge University Press, 1994) and WP: 866-68

813

One is here reminded of our self-aggrandizing, stultifying “creative class,” which
proudly take themselves for the “higher members” of the mediocre crowd.
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814

For Nietzsche’s critique of the Western moral tradition and the predominance of the
slave morality of taming see all of On the Genealogy of Morality and The Antichrist. See
BGE: 260 for a specific example of how he anticipated the intensification of decadence to
come in the century ahead – the development of which I have labeled the ‘hyperdecadence’ of our age.
815

Many individuals are actually “sedated” through the use of psychotropic
pharmaceuticals.
816

See (the notoriously misused passages from) TI: IX – 36 and A: 2.

817

Far from being a merely rhetorical or metaphorical exhortation, Nietzsche’ advocacy
of this master morality of breeding finds explicit expression in both the late published
works (BGE: 61-2, 213, 262; TI: VII-2 – 5 ; A: 3-4, and as a system of breeding is related
by example via the law of Manu, which Nietzsche cites to illustrate how a well ordered
polity might by ordered and its health preserved, 57) and the Nachlass (see WP: 397-98,
866-68, 898, 957). Also see Strong, “Nietzsche is talking about developing men who are
not subject to the “human-all-too-human.” He repeatedly uses the word zuchten, which
means to breed, raise rear, grow or cultivate, as word normally used in connection with
animals or plants. After leaving Basel, he conspicuously stops using erziehen, which has
connotations of “bring up” and educate (Strong, 2000: 274).” Also see Conway (1997a)
pp. 34-9;
818

See Conway, 1997b, pp 32–35.

819

GS: 377

820

Ansell-Pearson, 1997: 110

821

I refer to the terminal condition of anti-culture, the state of laisser aller which prevails
in decadent epochs.

822

Conway, 1997b: 76

823

Ibid.

824

WP: 866

825

WP: 868

826

BGE: 225; Conway, 1997a: 89

827

Conway, 1997a: 18
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828

Von Ham, 2001: 70

829

Ibid; also see Rorty, 1989: chapter 9 on solidarity, and page 198 of the text. This is not
to endorse Rorty’s position on the previous page that Nietzsche and Heidegger “privatize
their projects, their attempts at sublimity – to view them as irrelevant to politics and
therefore compatible with the sense of human solidarity with the development of
democratic institutions has facilitated. …[T]hat they subordinat[e] sublimity to the desire
to avoid cruelty and pain.” Rorty is anxious that the Nietzschean pursuit of sublimity
deprives us of a shared neutral ground for the creation of alternative institutions to
hegemonic liberal democratic ones, but this assumes the latter are the best (most
efficacious for human flourishing) and that nothing more effective will come along as a
consequence of pursuing Nietzsche’s project of attaining sublimity via experimental art.

830

Pappas: 201; BGE: 209

831

BGE: 209 and 242

832

See Hutter, 2006: 65

833

That being to comprehend life, man’s place in the universe, the nature of “truth” and
the best strategies for living.
834

On “lucky strikes” see A: 4

835

Baudrillard, 1994: 164.

836

D: 535

837

WP: 480

838

Conway, 1997b: 148

839

Ibid

840

See: H: II-71

841

Conway, 1997b: 94

842

TGS

843

See TI: IX-36
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844

This condition is, in Heideggerian terms, a state of irrecuperable fallenness; such
failures comprise the ‘They’: beings from whom Being has withdrawn and whose
presence is only an absence; personifications of Nietzsche’s thoroughly nihilistic ‘last
man’ type.

845

I disregard Nietzsche’s derisive use of the term at GM: III-9; the ephectic drive—
which arguably characterized the native volition impelling Nietzsche in his own life’s
work—need not lead to shallow relativism and nihilism.

846

Elbe, 2003: 105 and 113 on the creative ethos of good Europeanism.

847

Conway, 1997b: 54-5

848

OTL, in Breazeale’s “Philosophy and Truth, Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks
of the early 1870s”, pp 84.

849

Bailey: 123 - 25

850

Hankinson: 314

851

GS: 374, Our new “infinite”

852

GS: 344, How we, too, are still pious

853

BGE: 212

854

Conway, 1997a: 50

855

This can be attributed to Walter Kaufmann, among others. Kaufmann was largely
responsible for re-habilitating Nietzsche’s work in the post-war era among generations of
scholars for whom the prevailing representation of Nietzsche’s ideas and advocacy had
been a malign mis-characterization that dissuaded serious readings of them.

856

Conway 1997a: 51

857

BGE: 65

858

The quote attributed to Socrates takes numerous forms. Among them is: “I know
nothing except the fact of my ignorance.” Socrates, from Diogenes Laertius, Lives of
Eminent Philosophers. Variations on this theme occur in Plato’s dialogue the Apology, at
21d7, for example. However, Priscilla Sakezles, an Associate Professor of Philosophy at
the University of Akron, has published an interesting argument claiming that this is a
popular misinterpretation of Socrates’ (Plato’s) meaning. See her article, ‘Socratic
Skepticism’ in the June 25, 2008 edition of eSkeptic, the newsletter of Skeptic Magazine,
at: <http://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/08-06-25.html>
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859

BGE: 223

860

Although adoxastos might remind some of the Islamic concept of taqyyia, it is not
analogous. The Nietzschean skeptic and good European acts only on the instinctual urge
to become who it is they are, against a decadent society determined to thwart them.
Furthermore, they act out of strength rather than weakness.
861

There is no paradox in the need for the adoption and employment of disguises among
‘good Europeans’ as the strongest individuals. Given that the value of their strengths (i.e.:
their constitution and the nisus of their Being) being discredited and held in contempt by
the hyper-decadent society they find themselves thrown into, they must contend with the
most virulent animosity and constant efforts to weaken them and divert them from their
noble course. The hatred they provoke among the multitude is in fact proof of the
intrinsic weakness of the latter, their (would-be) oppressors; the crucial need to hide
ones’ essential character and values should not be taken as a sign of weakness when
revealing oneself would be self destructive.

862

BGE 214

863

I refer to the undignified openness that admits of no private realm. It is motivated by
the ultra-liberal-modern will to truth and its injunction to reveal oneself in a pathetic
gambit for social acceptance, a premise that presumes toleration of the most venal acts
and types. It also, somewhat hilariously, presumes the supposed merit of humility among
the botched whose lack dignity it exposes. Secularized Christian pity and charity—a
Rawlsian concern with ‘freedom from shame’—operates to cover-up the degrading
nature of the charade. However tawdry, pathetic or humiliating the facts revealed are the
subject is praised—and thanked!—for their “bravery” in revealing them. The audience
experiences a voyeuristic catharsis through the act of witnessing another’s confession,
and the spirit of revenge is briefly satiated. These spectacles are nearly ubiquitous in the
Western world, and exemplified in popular television talk-shows hosted by insipid
celebrities such as Oprah Winfrey, et. al.
864

Bailey: 188.

865

WP: 726. Nietzsche recognizes that the maintenance of power requires manipulating /
managing the herd’s resentment either by the best, in active will to power that creates an
authentically good conscience or by ascetic priests, in negative will to power, which
naturalizes a bad-conscience to make it seem good.

866

WP: 132

867

WP: 963
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868

Take for example the treatment President Mahathir bin Muhammad, the quasiauthoritarian leader of Malaysia, came in for when he took his nation’s currency and
exchange mechanisms out of the international system to protect his domestic economy
from speculative foreign investment during the Asian monetary crisis of 1997 – 1999.
Despite widely acknowledged systemic flaws in the very international financial
institutions (and apart from Mahathir’s shrill pronouncements and irrational blame of
individuals such as George Soros for South-East Asia’s brief financial turmoil) he was
excoriated by Western arbiters of globalization as “protectionist”.

869

Good Europeans are Nietzschean “great men”, or the closest approximation to them
we can expect to encounter in our decadent age.

870

Conway, 1997a: 109

871

Conway, 1997a: chapter six

872

UM: III- 3

873

GM: III-11

874

Much of Freud’s thesis in Civilization and its Discontents constitutes little more than
an unacknowledged extrapolation from the third book of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy
of Morality.

875

GM: III-11

876

Some conservative strains of American Protestantism combine these notions of
reward, linking material wealth with God’s grace, understood to be a consequence /
reward for their divinely conferred grace faith here on earth.

877

See, for instance, the novel “Prozac Nation,” by Elizabeth Wurtzel (1994). With
maniacal, mindless consumption celebrated above all else, contemporary Protestant
Christian religious services are adopting the entertainment ethos, holding Las Vegas style
services at converted sports arenas to accommodate the throng. Celebrity pastors eschew
“negative” messages about guilt, sin, and eternal damnation in favor of a feel good
message that serves to cover-up their faith’s condemnation of life with a mindless happy
face. For an example of this trend see the Lakewood Church of Houston, Texas, led by
celebrity Pastor Joel Osteen.
878

Elbe, Stefan. Millennium, 2001. Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 280.

879

GM: III-27.

880

Elbe, Stefan. Millennium, 2001. Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 280.
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881

BGE: 212

882

This would, from Nietzsche’s viewpoint, have seemed a fact that Rawls, as an ascetic
priest devoted to proselytizing an anti-natural form of idealistic liberalism – a secular
slave-morality of taming par excellence – would be incapable of seeing, or at least
admitting.
883

“All becoming and growing–all that guarantees a future–involves pain.” TI: X – 4

884

BGE: 209

885

The liberal-modern will to nothingness (relativism) that deprives all former meanings
of veracity and all traditions of their authority would provoke an intensely homicidalsuicidal reaction epitomized in the National socialist party a few decades later. That
reaction would destroy Germany and much of the world.
886

BGE: 208. Nietzsche suggests by way of an example, that the growing power of
Russia might produce “a single will by means of a new caste dominating all Europe – so
that the long-drawn out comedy of its petty states and the divided will of its dynasties and
splintered will of its democracies should finally come to an end.”

887

BGE: 210

888

BGE: 260

889

BGE: 242

890

Ibid; cf: WP: 954

891

BGE: 61

892

Conway, 1997b: 76; the designation “liberal-optimist” also applies to such notable
20 century figures as Gandhi, Kemal Atatürk and Ben-Gurion, as they each effectively
established—or laid the groundwork for the establishment of—nation-states which are
ressentiment-driven polities.
th

893

Conway, 1997a: 104

894

Conway, 1997a: 129, on the publicness of healthy self-creation.

895

GM: III – 27
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896

I mean ‘empowering’ in a specifically Nietzschean sense here, as that which increases
the active forces expressed as a positive will to creative destruction as generative power
in healthy individuals.

897

WP: 957

898

Baudrillard, 1994: 121

899

Take the World Social Forum at Porto Alegre, Brazil, for instance: it is the wealth
generated by globalizing institutions and (capital) processes that gave rise to the
infrastructural capacity and motility that enabled so many to travel there from all points
of the earth. The delegates attended the forum, held in a distant locale, to protest
globalization and strategize opposition to its prerogatives. These acts in turn mingle
perspectives (however reactionary) to generate new and/or increased awareness of
globality and realizations of its abstract potentials, irrespective of their ideological
motivations. It is globalization that makes such organizing—alternative ascetic practices
and experimental arts—directed against the inauthenticity and reaction inherent to
“exploitative capital process” possible.
900

BGE: 276

901

Conway, 1997a: 78–9

902

GM: III – 27; Conway, 1997a: 105

903

TI: 9–43

904

See TI: 9-20 for his discussion of the imaginary “dynamometer” with which he
hypothesized the degree to which the ugliness or degeneration in an entity might be
quantifiably measured at some distant time in the future.

905

Conway, 1997b: 14

906

BGE: 211; a condition that, by Heidegger’s understanding, constitutes a deprivation of
Being from beings.
907

GM: III – 27

908

Khan, 2003: 330

909

BGE: 268

910

BGE: 203
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911

BGE: 269

912

See Michel DeCerteau’s The Practice of Everyday Life.

913

See Richard Rorty’s Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, which put a liberal face of
sorts on some influential aspects of Nietzsche’s thought.
914

Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, pp. 151.

915

BGE: 230

916

WP: 1059; also see WP: 999

917

See Gladwell, 2008

918

See OFEI and UM–3

919

It must be noted that in an unpublished note Nietzsche forbade his future heirs,
intellectual successors or ‘good Europeans’ from seeking conventional power or
participating in the “base” activity of ordinary political life. This is somewhat
incongruous however, as every one of the exemplars Nietzsche admires achieved
conventional success, power and authority in their particular historical context within and
through the political life of their respective socio-political milieu. Nietzsche may have
contemplated exhorting ‘good Europeans’ not to feel as though they must immerse
themselves in the repellent setting of conventional political institutions – to the extent
that avoiding them is possible.

920

Nietzsche would understand these rights as a cynical contrivance and ideological tool
for rationalizing further penetrations into other cultures by the globalization complex.

921

Taylor, 1997: 3–4

922

Smith, 1996: 170

923

Ibid: 147

924

Elbe, 2003: 120–21

925

BGE: 186 and 262

926

MacIntyre, 1998: 202 - 220

927

Nietzsche asserts (against Platonic faith in truth and reason and corresponding
arguments against relativity, such as those in the Parmenides) that “there are absolutely
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no moral facts” (TI: VII-1), and “Morality the Circe of humanity, has fundamentally
falsified – moralified – all psychologica – to the point where you get complete nonsense
like the claim that love is something unegoistic …” (EH: Why I write—5).
928

On Nietzsche’s qualified fictionalist stance see Nadeem Hussain’s paper Honest
Illusion: Valuing for Nietzsche’s ‘free Spirits’, in Nietzsche and Morality, ed. Leiter,
Brian and Neil Sinhababu, (2007). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

929

WP: 132

930

BGE: 208

931

Smith, 1996: 166-7

932

Ibid: 169

933

Heidegger, Being and Time: 165

934

As alluded to above; for corroboration of my understanding of Nietzsche’s view on
the utility of the masses / labor of the herd see his essay The Greek State; HH: I – 475, II
– 304; BGE: 242, 258, 259, 262; TI: 7 – 3; A: 57, and WP: 866-68.

935

Fukuyama (1992) was led by certain ambiguities in Nietzsche’s thought to conclude
that ultra-liberal-modernity and capital processes provide the ideal means of fulfilling this
objective. This (neo-Straussian?) imputation mis-reads Nietzsche, whose exoteric
teaching clearly conveys his condemnation of these reactive and decadent ideologies.
Nietzsche resists making specific recommendations as to how the aims of his good
Europeans would be attained. The apparent efficacy of ultra-liberal-modern values to
ensure individual freedom and rights, as well as the strong faith individuals have it them
suggests that overcoming them will be a long process indeed, and speculating about what
it might produce would be futile.
936

Certain “post-modern” critiques of everyday life, such as those posited by Jean
Baudrillard and (the Situationist) Guy Debord, while undeniably valuable and relevant,
are hereby revealed as implicated in the very “decadence” they themselves identify and
condemn as characteristic of their age (an echo of Nietzsche’s own self-implicating
critique of decadence). This is evidenced by the fact that they largely fail to glean the
positive potential in the simulations and spectacularizations of reality they respectively
(reactively) identified as primarily negative for human and civilizational development.
937

Consider HH: 224, BGE: 202 and especially this passage from the late notebooks,
“My philosophy aims at an ordering of rank: not at an individualistic morality. The ideas
of the herd should rule in the herd—but not reach out beyond it: the leaders of the herd
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require a fundamentally different valuation for their own actions, as do the independent,
or the ‘beasts of prey,’ etc.” WP: 287
938

WP: 957

939

GS: 328; TI: 85; WP: 957

940

Elbe, citing Nietzsche, 2003: 121

941

EH: VII-2

942

WP: 116

943

Ibid

944

Del Caro, 2004: 63

945

D: 364

946

Donnelly, 1998: 82

947

BGE: 269

948

WP: 936

949

WP: 933

950

Recent historical examples abound: the Turkish genocide of Armenians, the Nazi
holocaust in Europe, the genocide of ethnic Tutsi’s by racist Hutu extremists in Rwanda,
and the ongoing genocide of Darfuris by Arab Sudanese.

951

See Malcolm Gladwell, 2008.

952

GS: 362

953

A number of economists have recently suggest that in the wake of the global financial
crisis, which has tarnished the Western “Washington consensus” model of capital process
and economic globalization, China’s policies of development resonate among the leading
elites in developing nations.
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Donnelly, 1989: 103–4
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